Russell and Australian Postal Corporation (Compensation)

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Russell and Australian Postal Corporation (Compensation) [2022] AATA 3227 (6 October 2022)

Division:GENERAL DIVISION

File Number:          2021/8517

Re:Keith Russell

APPLICANT

AndAustralian Postal Corporation

RESPONDENT

Decision

Tribunal:Senior Member Dr M Evans-Bonner

Date:6 October 2022

Place:Perth

Application 2021/8517 is dismissed pursuant to s 42B(1)(c) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth).

............[Sgd]............................................................

Senior Member Dr M Evans-Bonner

CATCHWORDS

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Workers’ Compensation – dismissal application brought by the Respondent – whether Applicant attempting to re-litigate issues from earlier proceedings resolved by consent decisions in 1997 and 2007 – re-litigation – res judicata – issue estoppel – policy considerations – Tribunal satisfied that application is an abuse of process of the Tribunal – objective of the Tribunal in s 2A of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) applied – application for review dismissed pursuant to s 42B(1)(c) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth)

LEGISLATION

Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth), s 2A, 34A(5), 34D(2), 42B, 42B(1), 42B(1)(c

Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth), s 16, 19, 21, 57

Seafarers Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1992 (Cth)

CASES

Australian Postal Corporation v Oudyn (2003) 73 ALD 659
Casarotto v Australian Postal Commission (1989) 10 AAR 191
Commonwealth v Snell [2019] FCAFC 57
Duncan v Fayle [2004] FCA 723
General Steel Industries Inc v Commissioner for Railways NSW [1964] HCA 69
Hennessey-Milne and Comcare [2018] AATA 4453
Kuligowski v Metrobus [2004] HCA 34
Novosel v Comcare [2017] FCA 722
Plumb v Comcare (1992) 39 FCR 236
Re Grimsley v Telstra Corporation Ltd [2010] AATA 106; (2010) 51 AAR 401
Re NXPQ and Comcare [2021] AATA 4094
Re Onassys and Comcare [2021] AATA 829
Re Quinn v Australian Postal Corporation (1992) 15 AAR 519
Re Williams v Australian Electoral Commission [1995] AATA 160

Re ZDHG and Comcare [2019] AATA 5028

REASONS FOR DECISION

Senior Member Dr M Evans-Bonner

6 October 2022

Overview

  1. On 11 November 2021, Mr Russell’s legal representatives lodged an application in the Tribunal on his behalf (T1) (Application 2021/8517).

  2. In his application Mr Russell sought review of a redetermination decision of the Respondent dated 3 November 2021 (T148) (3 November 2021 Reviewable Decision).

  3. The 3 November 2021 Reviewable Decision was that the Respondent was not liable to pay compensation to Mr Russell in respect of incapacity for work in the period 16 December 2005 to 27 April 2016 pursuant to s 19 of the Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (Cth) (SRC Act).

  4. On 15 December 2021, the Respondent made an application to the Tribunal seeking that Application 2021/8517 be dismissed pursuant to s 42B(1) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) (AAT Act). The Respondent submitted that Mr Russell’s application was an abuse of process because the issues in Application 2021/8517 had been resolved in one or more previous applications by consent in 1997 and 2007. Specifically, the Respondent submitted in their dismissal application “that the applicant is impermissibly…

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Details
Case
[2022] AATA 3227
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This matter concerned an application by Mr Russell for review of a decision made by the Australian Postal Corporation. Mr Russell had previously made a workers' compensation claim in 1995 for "depression and anguish" arising from his employment. Following a consent decision in 1997, which affirmed a determination that he was entitled to medical expenses only, and a further consent decision in 2007, Mr Russell sought to re-litigate issues related to his condition and its impact on his employment and financial stability. The Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) was required to determine whether the current application constituted an abuse of process by attempting to re-litigate issues already resolved in earlier proceedings.

The Tribunal was asked to consider the principles of *res judicata* and issue estoppel, as well as the broader concept of abuse of process in the context of the AAT's powers under section 42B(1)(c) of the *Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975* (Cth). Specifically, the Tribunal had to assess whether the current application, by seeking to revisit matters previously resolved by consent decisions in 1997 and 2007, was an inappropriate or unreasonable re-agitation of concluded issues, thereby constituting an abuse of the Tribunal's process. The objective of the Tribunal under section 2A of the AAT Act, which promotes the fair and just resolution of matters, was also a relevant consideration.

The Tribunal applied the principles articulated in *Novosel v Comcare* and other relevant authorities, which confirm that even where *res judicata* or issue estoppel may not strictly apply, proceedings can still be dismissed as an abuse of process if they amount to re-litigation. The Tribunal found that the issues raised by Mr Russell in the current application were substantially the same as those that had been resolved by the earlier consent decisions. It was held that allowing such re-litigation would be unfair to the respondent and contrary to the efficient and just operation of the Tribunal. The Tribunal noted that consent decisions, like those in this case, are intended to provide finality to disputes.

Consequently, the Tribunal found that Mr Russell's application was an attempt to re-litigate issues already resolved by consent decisions in 1997 and 2007. The Tribunal concluded that it was appropriate to dismiss the application under section 42B(1)(c) of the *Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975* (Cth) on the basis that it constituted an abuse of the Tribunal's process.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

For the reasons set out below, I have found that Application 2021/8517 is indeed an attempt by Mr Russell to re-litigate issues that were resolved in the previous consent decisions. I have found that it is appropriate for Application 2021/8517 to be dismissed under s 42B(1)(c) of the AAT Act on the basis that it is an abuse of process of the Tribunal. Background facts Mr Russell worked for the Respondent as a delivery manager/supervisor (T5/19). After working in that role for approximately three years and six months, he made a workers compensation claim in mid to late November 1995 for “depression and anguish”. Mr Russell stated in his claim form that he first noticed the injury on 8 November 1995 (T5/19). In his first medical certificate, Mr Russell’s general practitioner recorded a diagnosis of “depression” which was “precipitated by recent events at work” (T4/18). On 20 December 1995, the Respondent accepted liability for “depression” with a date of injury of 8 November 1995 (T13/33). On 27 July 1996, Mr Russell ceased working for the Respondent when he accepted a voluntary early retirement package (T22/61; T24/63). First consent decision On 3 October 1996, the Respondent determined that it was not liable to pay further incapacity compensation payments to Mr Russell for “depression” and that he was entitled to medical expenses only (T22/61). A reconsideration request was made on behalf of Mr Russell on 14 October 1996 by his then legal representatives (T23/62). However, on 4 November 1996, the Respondent affirmed the determination of 3 October 1996 (4 November 1996 Reviewable Decision). This was because the decision-maker was satisfied that Mr Russell did not have any entitlement to incapacity payments pursuant to s 21 of the SRC Act (T24/63). Mr Russell, through his then legal representatives, lodged an application seeking review of the 4 November 1996 Reviewable Decision in the Tribunal on 14 November 1996 (T25/65-67). The statement of facts, issues and contentions (SFIC) filed by Mr Russell’s legal representatives provides an indication of the issues that were the subject of the 4 November 1996 Reviewable Decision. I note here that the contents of a SFIC should be viewed with some caution because the Tribunal is not limited in its consideration to the issues raised by the parties and can consider all the matters that were put before the original decision-maker (Novosel v Comcare [2017] FCA 722 (Novosel), [92]). With that caveat in mind, the SFIC gives some indication of the issues, submissions, and contentions that were before the Tribunal for consideration. The SFIC referred to Mr Russell wanting to remain in his employment with the Respondent, but due to a lack of certainty about his employment, deciding to take a voluntary redundancy (E2, pages 7 and 8, paras [24] and [30]). The SFIC also states the contentions that (E2/9-10): (a)on and from 27 July 1996 the applicant continues to suffer from the effects of an injury sustained arising out of or in the course of employment by the respondent;(b)by reason of the injury the applicant has been incapacitated for work since 27 July 1996 and continues to remain so incapacitated; ……(f)that he sustained injury arising out of or in the course of his employment by the respondent:(i)for which liability has been accepted;(ii)which injury has resulted in a permanent impairment;(iii)in respect of which the applicant is entitled to compensation for permanent impairment pursuant to s 24 of the Act.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

After a mediation, Mr Russell and the Respondent reached a consent agreement resulting in the Tribunal affirming the 4 November 1996 Reviewable Decision on 27 August 1997 (T41). The consent agreement was made in accordance with s 34A(5) of a now superseded version of the AAT Act. Second consent decision In June 1998, Mr Russell purchased a bobcat to run his own business. On 24 February 2004, Mr Russell had an accident where the bobcat was hit by a train (T147/478). In a subsequent letter to the Respondent, received on 16 December 2004 (T60/136), Mr Russell requested that, “I am formally applying for re assessment of compensation from Australia Post”. He stated that his claim was based on loss of earnings, loss of employment prospects, the negative effect his condition had on his wife and family including strain and loss of financial stability, and that his medical situation had caused insurers to reject his application for work cover, income protection, sickness, and accident benefits. Mr Russell further summarised that:… I still suffer from and I am under medical treatment for damage to my health caused by my employment by Australia post. Do [sic] to the injuries that I sustained during my employment with Australia post I am not able to find employment, I am not able to gain Insurance, I have been financially disadvantaged, this in turn has affected both my marriage and the living standards of my family. On 21 October 2005, the Respondent determined that it was not liable to compensate Mr Russell for “depression” from 24 February 2004 when he ceased working in the bobcat business (T75/164-165). Mr Russell requested reconsideration of the 21 October 2005 determination in a letter to the Respondent dated 26 October 2005 (T76). In this reconsideration request:(a)Mr Russell confirmed that he was claiming “compensation for the loss of ability to gain employment commensurate to the level and income I had gained while employed by Australia Post prior to the forced, manipulated, and Not Voluntary Early Retirement Caused by my ill-health” and the associated impact on his family that his condition caused to his health and finances (first point).(b)With respect to the 24 February 2004 bobcat accident, Mr Russell stated that the accident “effectively, put me out of business” because “I did not have the financials to continue”. He stated that if he had not had the accident, he would have continued working in the bobcat business. Mr Russell explained that he was working in the bobcat business out of necessity, rather than choice. This was because he was unable to gain other employment with many businesses and employers due to his medical condition, which he directly attributed to his employment with the Respondent (T75/164; T76/166) (second point). (c)Mr Russell clarified some medical points that arose out of a report by Consultant Psychiatrist Dr Ng dated 14 February 2004. The Respondent had arranged for Dr Ng to examine the Applicant on 14 February 2005 and in his report of the same date, Dr Ng had referred to Mr Russell having bursitis in his left and right hips, pain in his left knee and lower left leg (T63/142). Mr Russell clarified in his letter of 26 October 2005 that he thought the problems with his lower back, left and right knees, ongoing depression and lack of confidence were directly caused by his employment with the Respondent and were affecting his “life and work prospects” (T76/166) (third point).

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In relation to the issue of re-litigation and the Tribunal’s powers to dismiss an application for abuse of process under s 42B(1)(c) of the AAT Act, the following principles stated by Perry J in Novosel are relevant:(a)“even in cases where re-litigation of an issue may not be barred by res judicata or an issue estoppel, nonetheless the institution or continued pursuit of proceedings may constitute an abuse of process” (at para [106]). Perry J (at paras [107]-[108]) cited illustrative passages from the Federal Court decision of Re Quinn v Australian Postal Corporation (1992) 15 AAR 519 and the Tribunal decision of Re Grimsley v Telstra Corporation Ltd [2010] AATA 106; (2010) 51 AAR 401:In expressly empowering the Tribunal summarily to dismiss proceedings under s 42B(1)(c) of the AAT Act on the ground that they constitute an abuse of process, it is apparent that the Parliament intended to empower the Tribunal to protect its own processes against analogous forms of abuse. Thus, the AAT found in Re Quinn v Australian Postal Corporation (1992) 15 AAR 519 at 526 (upon which the Tribunal here relied) that:Section 33 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act provides for the Tribunal the flexibility needed to control its process. It is with regard to the dictates of fairness and expedition, after proper consideration of all the facts, that the Tribunal conducts itself.It would seem inappropriate and unreasonable to us for there to be relitigation without reason of the same issues before the Tribunal. It would be unjust to applicants to have to face a situation where a decision may be made today and relitigated tomorrow on the very same facts. The Tribunal should not generally allow relitigation of issues already decided and previous Tribunal decisions should be regarded as establishing the matters actually decided and of the grounds for the determination.The same approach was adopted by Hack DP in Re Grimsley v Telstra Corporation Ltd [2010] AATA 106; (2010) 51 AAR 401 at [11] in finding that it would be unfair to Telstra to permit the applicant in that case to re-litigate issues already determined in earlier proceedings by a consent decision. As the Deputy President held at [13]:Prima facie, the consent decision in the matter ought to be regarded as having determined the matters in controversy. Here the issue of causation was one of the matters in controversy. Ms Grimsley contended that the effects of the accepted injury continued. Telstra contended that they no longer did so. I do not regarded as unfair to Ms Grimsley to not permit her to agitate the very issue determined by consent on the earlier proceedings. Indeed it would be unfair to Telstra to permit that to happen. In reality, what Ms Grimsley seeks to do is to go back on the resolution of the matter that she consented to in July 2009.(b)In summary, “the fact that an applicant may be able to bring a further claim does not mean that if a further claim is made, it cannot constitute an abuse of process in the circumstances of the particular case” (para [110]).Policy considerations: s 2A of the AAT Act