HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Gibbs C.J., Murphy, Wilson, Brennan and Deane JJ.
THE QUEEN v. KEARNEY; Ex parte JAPANANGKA
23 March 1984
Aboriginal Lands
Aboriginal Lands—Traditional land claims—Unalienated Crown land—Application to Aboriginal Land Commissioner—Alienation after application—Jurisdiction of Commissioner—Whether land set apart for a public purpose—Whether power of alienation affected by Land Rights Act—Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976 (Cth), ss. 3(1) "Crown land", 50(1)(a).
Decisions
1984, March 23.
The following written judgments were delivered:-
GIBBS C.J. By amended applications made under s. 50(1)(a) of the Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976 (Cth), as amended, (the "Land Rights Act"), the prosecutors claimed to have a traditional land claim to a number of areas of land near Tennant Creek which had been set apart, formally or informally, for use as reserves of various kinds, particularly as stock routes, stock reserves and water conservation reserves. In some instances the reserve had been declared as such by proclamation in a gazette pursuant to an Ordinance of the Northern Territory or, in one case, an Act of South Australia which had been continued in force in the Territory when the Northern Territory was separated from South Australia and accepted as a Territory of the Commonwealth. In other instances the reserve had not been formally declared, but was shown on public plans. After the Aboriginal Land Commissioner had commenced his inquiry, the Minister for Lands of the Northern Territory, acting under the Crown Lands Act (N.T.), granted to the Northern Territory Development Land Corporation leases in perpetuity of the areas in dispute. The Commissioner held that the effect of this alienation of the lands deprived him of jurisdiction to inquire into and report on the application in so far as it related to the lands so alienated. The prosecutor, Mr. Dick Riley Japanangka, proceeding on his own behalf and on behalf of the claimants, obtained an order nisi for a writ of prohibition prohibiting the Minister from granting any lease or taking any further step pursuant to the grant of the leases of the land the subject of the claim, and for a writ of certiorari quashing the grant of leases of land the subject of the claim. This application was obviously faced with jurisdictional difficulties and the prosecutor does not seek to proceed with it. The prosecutor subsequently obtained an order nisi for a writ of mandamus commanding the Commissioner to exercise according to law the functions conferred and imposed upon him by s. 50 of the Land Rights Act in relation to the whole of the claim made by the claimants. (at p402)
2. Various questions were argued, but in the view that I take only two need be dealt with. For the reasons which I have given in Reg. v. Kearney; Ex parte Northern Land Council (1984) 158 CLR 365,at pp 368-374, which was argued together with the present matters, the grant of the leases to the Northern Territory Development Land Corporation…
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- Case
- [1984] HCA 13
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the Supreme Court of the Northern Territory possessed the constitutional power to entertain a claim that involved the interpretation and application of the *Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976* (Cth). Specifically, the Court had to determine if the Act, by vesting certain powers and responsibilities in the Northern Land Council, had the effect of ousting the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in matters relating to the management of Aboriginal land.
The High Court held that the *Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976* did not confer exclusive jurisdiction on any tribunal to the exclusion of the Supreme Court. The Court reasoned that the Act did not contain any express or implied provision that would prevent the Supreme Court from exercising its traditional supervisory and appellate jurisdiction over the actions of statutory bodies like the Northern Land Council. The principle applied was that legislative intent to exclude the jurisdiction of superior courts must be clear and unambiguous.
The application for prohibition was dismissed.
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