Jack v Chief Executive Officer (Housing) (No 2)

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CITATION: Jack v Chief Executive Officer (Housing) (No 2) [2021] NTSC 81

PARTIES:  JACK, Johnny

v

CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER (HOUSING)

TITLE OF COURT:  SUPREME COURT OF THE NORTHERN TERRITORY

JURISDICTION:  SUPREME COURT exercising Territory jurisdiction

FILE NOS:2020 – 03879 – SC

DELIVERED:  29 October 2021

HEARING DATE:  22 April 2021

JUDGMENT OF:  Grant CJ

CATCHWORDS:

CIVIL PROCEDURE – Parties – Joinder – Of defendant – Necessary and proper

Provision for joinder remedial and designed to enable parties to litigate the real issues in expeditious, effective and cost efficient way – Necessary for applicant for joinder to establish good arguable case for relief against party sought to be joined – Applicant failed to identify arguable case that Territory acting as ‘agent’ of landlord of premises – Application for joinder dismissed.

Housing Act 1982 (NT) s 7, s 15, s 16, s 17, s 21
Northern Territory Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2014 (NT) s 28, s 64, s 67, s 99A
Northern Territory National Emergency Response Act 2007 (Cth) s 31
Northern Territory (Self-Government) Act 1978 (Cth) s 5

Supreme Court Rules 1987 (NT) r 9.06

A-G (NSW) v Brewery Employés Union of New South Wales (1908) 6 CLR 469, Bathurst City Council v PWC Properties Pty Ltd (1998) 195 CLR 566, Bolwell v Australian Telecommunications Commission (1982) 61 FLR 154, Bradken Consolidated Ltd v Broken Hill Pty Co Ltd (1979) 145 CLR 107, Cavanagh v Chief Executive Officer (Housing) (2018) 345 FLR 55, Colonial Mutual Life Assurance Society Limited v The Producers and Citizens Co-operative Assurance Company of Australia Limited (1931) 46 CLR 41, Inglis v Commonwealth Trading Bank of Australia (1969) 119 CLR 334, International Harvester Company of Australia Proprietary Limited v Carrigan’s Hazeldene Pastoral Company (1958) 100 CLR 644, Mandahan v Toyota Finance Australia Ltd (No 2) [2020] FCA 3, Metropolitan Water, Sewerage and Drainage Board (NSW) v Fisher (1980) 33 ALR 173, Palgo Holdings Pty Ltd v Gowans (2005) 221 CLR 249, R v Kearney; Ex parte Japanangka (1984) 158 CLR 395, Ventana Pty Ltd v Federal Airports Corporation (1997) 95 LGERA 58, referred to.

GE Dal Pont, Law of Agency, 2nd Ed (2008) LexisNexis Butterworths Australia
Hogg PW, Liability of the Crown (2nd ed, Sydney: LBC, 1989)

CIVIL PROCEDURE – Jurisdiction – Stay of proceedings – Inherent jurisdiction – Abuse of process

Power to stay for abuse of process should only be used sparingly – Categories of abuse of process not closed – Oppressive for a defendant to be faced with proceedings in different jurisdictions seeking the same relief – Impairs administration of justice to commence parallel proceedings in original jurisdiction of Supreme Court in relation to a matter initiated and pendent in a different forum – Contrary to statutory scheme governing residential tenancies for proceedings to be commenced in original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court – Proceedings permanently stayed. 

Residential Tenancies Act 1999 (NT) s 48, s 122

Administration of Territory of Papua…

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Details
Case
[2021] NTSC 81
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Jack v Chief Executive Officer (Housing) (No 2) involves Jack, a tenant, and the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of Housing, with the dispute being heard in a relevant Australian court. Jack seeks to challenge a decision made by the CEO regarding his tenancy, specifically related to the CEO's alleged breach of a term implied by s 48(1) of the Residential Tenancies Act. The court was tasked with deciding whether Jack's application for summary judgment or a permanent stay of proceedings could be granted based on the CEO's previous determination in the Tribunal.

The legal issues that the court needed to address included whether Jack's claim was barred by res judicata, cause of action estoppel, or issue estoppel, and if initiating the proceedings amounted to an abuse of process. The court considered the implications of the Tribunal's decision, which was not final as it was subject to internal review, and evaluated whether the principles of estoppel and abuse of process could still apply. The court examined whether the CEO's determination could be considered a final judgment for the purposes of these doctrines and if the initiation of internal review by Jack affected their applicability.

The court concluded that Jack's application for summary judgment or a permanent stay of the proceedings must fail. It held that the CEO's determination in the Tribunal was not final and thus did not bar Jack's claim through res judicata or estoppel. Furthermore, the court found that while Jack's claim could be considered an abuse of process, it was not so in the circumstances of this case. The court acknowledged the importance of finality in litigation but determined that the initiation of internal review did not amount to an abuse of the court's process.

The final orders of the court were to deny the CEO's application for summary judgment or a permanent stay, allowing Jack's proceedings to continue. This decision underscores the nuanced application of legal doctrines in the context of internal review processes and the importance of considering all relevant factors when assessing claims of abuse of process.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

For these reasons, the application for the joinder of the Territory must fail.The application for summary judgment or a permanent stay I turn then to consider the CEO’s application for summary judgment or a permanent stay of the proceedings. In essence, the application is brought on the basis that by reason of the Tribunal’s determination that the CEO was not in breach of the term implied by s 48(1) of the Residential Tenancies Act, the cause of action sought to be prosecuted by Jack in this Court is res judicata; and/or is precluded by cause of action or issue estoppel; and/or constitutes an abuse of process. It may be accepted that the decision of the Tribunal on the preliminary issue did not equate to res judicata in the strict sense. The fact that the decision was subject to internal review, and that Jack has initiated a review, precludes its characterisation as a final decision which attracts the operation of the doctrine of res judicata. Turning then to the question of estoppel, even if one were to accept for the sake of argument that the Tribunal is not exercising Territory judicial power in the determination of applications under the Residential Tenancies Act, the High Court has recognised that cause of action estoppel and issue estoppel are not confined to the exercise of judicial power, and that they may also operate in the context of judgments rendered in other adversarial proceedings.[29] However, estoppel in those forms can also only result from the rendering of a final judgment. The availability and initiation of the internal review procedure again precludes that characterisation.[30] The application before the Tribunal, including the preliminary issue determined adversely to Jack’s interests, remains pending because the preliminary determination may be varied or set aside on internal review. However, even where the principles of res judicata or estoppel do not preclude a party from re-litigating issues which have been decided against it in other proceedings, a superior court has inherent jurisdiction to prevent that re-litigation as an abuse of process.[31] Although the exercise of that jurisdiction is not attracted merely because a party seeks to re-litigate an issue already decided against it, it is prima facie an abuse of process to bring a proceeding which is in essence a collateral attack upon a decision which has not been subject to appeal, or is subject to an appeal which is yet to be determined.[32] There is no relevant point of distinction for this purpose between an appeal and the internal review which Jack is presently prosecuting in the Tribunal. In AON Risk Services Australia Ltd v Australian National University, French CJ described the breadth of the doctrine in the following terms:Abuse of process principles may be invoked to prevent attempts to litigate that which should have been litigated in earlier proceedings as well as attempts to re-litigate that which has already been determined. [Reichel v Magrath (1889) 14 App Cas 665] is a long standing example of a re-litigation case decided on abuse of process grounds, rather than on the basis of res judicata or issue estoppel. It was relied upon in [Walton v Gardiner (1993) 177 CLR 378] and [Rogers v The Queen(1994) 181 CLR 251]. In the former case, Mason CJ, Deane and Dawson JJ said that:[P]roceedings before a court should be stayed as an abuse of process if, notwithstanding that the circumstances do not give rise to an estoppel, their continuance would be unjustifiably vexatious and oppressive for the reason that it is sought to litigate anew a case which has already been disposed of by earlier proceedings.The majority also endorsed the observation in [Hunter v Chief Constable of West Midlands Police [1982] AC 529] that courts have an inherent power to prevent misuse of their procedures in a way which, although not inconsistent with the literal application of the Rules, would nevertheless be unfair to a party to the litigation “or would otherwise bring the administration of justice into disrepute among right-thinking people”.The House of Lords in [Johnson v Gore Wood & Co [2002] 2 AC 1] acknowledged the distinction between “[Henderson v Henderson] abuse of process” on the one hand, and cause of action estoppel and issue estoppel on the other. Referring to public interest considerations of the kind discussed earlier in these reasons, Lord Bingham of Cornhill said:The underlying public interest is the same: that there should be finality in litigation and that a party should not be twice vexed in the same matter. This public interest is reinforced by the current emphasis on efficiency and economy in the conduct of litigation, in the interests of the parties and the public as a whole. The bringing of a claim or the raising of a defence in later proceedings may, without more, amount to abuse if the court is satisfied (the onus being on the party alleging abuse) that the claim or defence should have been raised in the earlier proceedings if it was to be raised at all.A broad merits-based judgment was required, taking account of public and private interests affected and focussing attention on the crucial question whether, in all the circumstances, a party is misusing or abusing the process of the court by seeking to raise before it an issue which could and should have been raised earlier. As Lord Bingham said: “As one cannot comprehensively list all possible forms of abuse, so one cannot formulate any hard and fast rule to determine whether, on given facts, abuse is to be found or not.” [33]

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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