R v GH

Case [2000] FCA 1618

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY 

DISTRICT REGISTRY

 A1 OF 1999

BETWEEN:

THE QUEEN
Appellant

AND:

GH
Respondent

JUDGES:

SPENDER, MILES and MADGWICK JJ

DATE:

14 NOVEMBER 2000

WHERE MADE:

CANBERRA

CORRIGENDA

Amendments to Reasons for Judgment dated 13 November 2000.

1.In [71] delete “in paras 15, 16 and 17” and insert “in [42], [43] and [44]”.

2.In [73], first line, delete “see para [11]” and insert “see para [38]”.

3.In [82], line 8, delete “at para [13]” and insert “at para [43]”.

Imme Hambly

Associate to the Chief Justice


FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

The Queen v GH [2000] FCA  1618

EVIDENCE – admissibility – where accused charged with conspiring to pervert the course of justice and evidence of statements attributed to him sought to be admitted as part of commission of the offence – whether statements admissible pursuant to s 84 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) - whether statements are admissions within the meaning of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) - whether statements are representations “adverse to the person’s interest in the outcome of the proceeding.”

Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s 84
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 30A

R v Duff (unreported, NSWCA, 17 September 1998) – discussed
R v Horton (1998) 45 NSWLR 426 – discussed
R v Esposito (1998) 45 NSWLR 442 – discussed
Ajit Singh Sat-Bhambra (1989) 88 Cr App R 55 – cited
R v Clarke; ex parte AG [1999] QCA 428 – cited
The Queen v Veneman and Leigh [1970] SASR 506 – cited
Edwards v The Queen (1993) 178 CLR 208 – cited
R v Fernando (1999) NSWCCA 66 – referred to

Edmunds v Edmunds and Ayscough [1935] VLR 177 - cited
Papaskomas v The Queen (1999) 196 CLR 297 - cited

THE QUEEN v GH
A1 OF 1999

SPENDER, MILES and MADGWICK JJ
CANBERRA
13 NOVEMBER 2000


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY

DISTRICT REGISTRY

 A1 OF 1999

BETWEEN:

THE QUEEN
Appellant

AND:

GH
Respondent

JUDGES:

SPENDER, MILES and MADGWICK JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

13 NOVEMBER 2000

WHERE MADE:

CANBERRA

THE COURT DETERMINES THAT:

The questions submitted to the Court for its determination under s 30A of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) should be answered as follows:

Question 1:Were the statements attributed to the accused in the recorded conversations “admissions” within the meaning of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth)?

Answer:No.

Question 2:If so, are the statements attributed to the accused in the recorded conversations inadmissible by virtue of s 84 of the Evidence Act in the circumstances of the trial of the accused?

Answer:Question does not arise.

Note:Settlement and entry of orders id dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY DISTRICT REGISTRY

A1 OF 1999

BETWEEN:

THE QUEEN
Appellant

AND:

GH
Respondent

JUDGE:

SPENDER, MILES and MADGWICK JJ

DATE:

13 NOVEMBER 2000

PLACE:

CANBERRA

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

SPENDER J:

  1. In this appeal I have had the…

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Details
AGLC
R v GH [2000] FCA 1618
Case
[2000] FCA 1618
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appellant, GH, was before the court in the case of R v GH, which was heard in the Supreme Court of Queensland. The central issue in this case was whether a particular statement made by the appellant could be considered a confession under section 10 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 1894, and thus be excluded from evidence if it had been obtained under undue influence. The appellant argued that the statement, which exculpated him, should be protected under the statute, but the prosecution maintained that it was not a confession and therefore not subject to the protection afforded by the statute.

The court examined the definition and scope of a 'confession' as interpreted in previous case law, notably in R v Lindsay and R v Doyle ex parte Attorney-General. The court held that a confession for the purposes of section 10 must either be a direct admission of guilt or a statement of facts that tend to prove guilt. Exculpatory statements, even if false, do not meet this definition and are therefore not protected by the statute. The court further explained that while false exculpatory statements could indirectly incriminate a defendant, they do not constitute a confession because they do not directly link the defendant to the crime.

In applying these principles to the current case, de Jersey CJ determined that the appellant's statement was exculpatory rather than confessional, and thus not protected by section 10. The court concluded that the statement was not a confession as it did not directly admit guilt or provide facts that tend to prove the appellant's guilt. Instead, the statement was a denial of guilt, which, when shown to be false, could only indirectly contribute to the appellant's conviction.

The court's decision upheld the prosecution's right to use the exculpatory statement as evidence, provided it was obtained lawfully. The court's interpretation of section 10 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 1894 reinforces the distinction between confessional and exculpatory statements in the context of criminal proceedings.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

de Jersey CJ said:“What is a ‘confession’ for the purpose of [s 10 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 1894]? The issue has twice been addressed at appellate level in Queensland. In R v Lindsay [1963] QdR 386, 393, Mack J, as he then was, in the Court of Criminal Appeal, with the agreement of Philp ACJ and Hart J, held that a ‘confession’ (for purposes of the Aboriginals Preservation and Protection Acts) included ‘any statement obtained from the prisoner which could lead to the inference of guilt or which would tend to prove it’. He adopted the view of O’Connor J expressed in Attorney-General for New South Wales v Martin (1910) 9 CLR 713, 732 that for there to be a confession, there ‘must be either a direct admission of guilt, or of some fact or facts which may tend to prove the prisoner’s guilt at the trial’.The issue was again discussed in R v Doyle ex parte Attorney-General [1987] 2 QdR 732, where Shepherdson J, with the agreement on this point of Kelly SPJ and Matthews J, followed Lindsay, and added, relevantly for the present, that ‘an exculpatory statement which is not a confession …is not protected by s.10’ (p 746). There is substantial additional authority supporting that view.Isaacs J dealt with the point in Attorney-General for New South Wales v Martin, supra, pp 734-5, as follows:‘Looking at the statement in the present case, I find there is nothing incriminating in that document. Everything in it from beginning to end is the denial of guilt. … although it is a denial or exculpation, and therefore it is outside the principle of protection which the common law has thrown around a prisoner to guard him against a confession gained under the influence of a threat or promise, and consequently I am of the opinion that it is not within the Act. I have said that the statement was not incriminatory. I should like to add this: that in one sense a false statement by a prisoner, though a denial or exculpation, might indirectly be the means of convicting him, not by reason of that statement proving his guilt, but by reason of other evidence which shows the statement is untrue, or that the prisoner is unworthy of belief. If he says that he at the time was elsewhere, but it is proved that he was not; or if he says some other person was there and it is proved the other person was not there, that might destroy his defence. It does not, however, prove he actually committed the crime. The prosecution still has to depend on its own affirmative evidence for that, and therefore I do not think a denial or exculpation is, even when contradicted by subsequent evidence, to be regarded as an incriminatory document, in the same sense as a confession or admission of guilt or a statement which is an affirmative link in the chain of evidence, because it admits some fact which tends to prove the guilt of the prisoner.’ See also p 732 per O’Connor J; R v McKay [1965] QdR 240, 242 per Mack J as he then was; R v Coats (1932) 51 NZLR 401, 405, 407; and Maddaford v Brown [1953] SASR 169, 172.In my opinion s 10 did not apply to this material because it was not confessional. As I have said, it was exculpatory material, which, even when shown to be false and thereby providing the foundation for an argument that the appellant had told lies on material points because of a consciousness of guilt, did not take on a relevantly confessional character.”[The emphasis in the passages from the judgment of Isaacs J are mine].

Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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