WILLIAMS JA: On 6 August 2001 the applicant filed a notice of appeal in which he sought leave to appeal against sentence and also an associated application for an extension of time within which to lodge such an appeal.

It appears from material before the Court that the applicant was originally sentenced for drug offences, including trafficking in methylamphetamine and producing methylamphetamine in excess of the quantity prescribed in the third schedule of the Drugs Misuse Regulation 1987.

The original head sentence was eight years' imprisonment with a recommendation for parole after three years. That sentence was made cumulative on an earlier sentence in relation to which the applicant was on parole when he committed those drug offences.

He originally sought leave to appeal within time against the sentence imposed and that matter was heard by this Court on 6 June 2001. The Court was then comprised of Justices Thomas, Muir and Atkinson. The applicant was then represented by counsel experienced in the criminal law. The Court reserved its decision and on 29 June 2001 delivered its reasons for granting leave to appeal and varying the sentence by substituting for the sentence originally imposed, a sentence of seven years' imprisonment with a parole recommendation after three years. Of course that sentence was cumulative as indicated above.

Subsequent to that the present applications were filed. The applicant, who appears in person today, contends that his counsel on the hearing of the appeal in June failed to follow instructions and put contentions to the Court which were the opposite of instructions given.

It appears from the reasons of the Court delivered by Justice Thomas that a substantial body of material had been filed in support of the application. That is material in addition to what was in the bound appeal book. That appears to have included some affidavit material and transcripts of the applicant's conversations with police and investigators.

The judgment refers to some of the matters which were made relevant by the receipt of that additional material. It seems that the applicant's present complaint is that the judgment did not analyse in greater detail that additional material. However, it appears that the Court considered that the material generally did not have a significant impact on the question then before the Court.

Of more importance for present purposes is the fact that the applicant has already lodged an appeal under section 668 of the Criminal Code which has been adjudicated upon and the order perfected. The Crown submits that an accused person has one right of appeal under that section of the Code and once that is exhausted then there is no further right of appeal whether by leave or otherwise.

In support of that the Crown relies on the earlier decisions in this State of the Court of Criminal Appeal in The Queen v. Smith (1968) Queensland Weekly Notes 50, and The Queen v. Smith (No 2) (1969) Queensland Weekly Notes 10, and the decision of the High Court in Grierson v. The King (1938) 60 Commonwealth Law Reports 431.

The applicant has sought to meet that line of authority by relying on section 8 of the Supreme Court of Queensland Act 1991. That section provides that this Court has all the jurisdiction that is necessary for the administration of Justice in Queensland. The applicant, in support of his submission that that section grants this Court power to entertain his application, refers to the decision of this Court in The Queen v. Pettigrew (1997) 1 Queensland Reports 601.

In that case the Court was concerned with a situation where the Court had initially refused an application for leave to appeal by acting on an erroneous factual basis. The Court considered that in those circumstances it had power either under section 8 or its inherent jurisdiction to deal with the matter on the merits. That case, in my view, is clearly distinguishable from the present.

It is clear from the judgments of Justices Pincus and Davies in The Queen v. Lowrie (1998) 2 Queensland Reports 579 that section 8 should be construed so as not to confer any additional criminal appellate jurisdiction on this Court; that is jurisdiction in addition to that derived from Chapter 67 of The Criminal Code. In my view, given the history of this matter, the applicant's right to appeal to this Court is exhausted and it follows that each of the applications filed on 6 August 2001 should be dismissed.

JONES J: For the reasons given by the learned presiding Judge I too agree that the application should be dismissed.

DOUGLAS J: I agree.

WILLIAMS JA: The orders will be as I have indicated.

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Details

AGLC: R v Corrigan [2001] QCA 401
Case: [2001] QCA 401
Decision Date: 24/09/2001

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of The Queen v Anthony William Corrigan, the applicant, represented by experienced criminal law counsel, sought leave to appeal against his sentence and an extension of time to lodge the appeal. The applicant was originally sentenced for drug offences, including trafficking and producing methylamphetamine, and was given a cumulative sentence of eight years' imprisonment with a recommendation for parole after three years. The Court of Appeal, consisting of Justices Thomas, Muir, and Atkinson, had previously granted the applicant leave to appeal and varied the sentence to seven years' imprisonment with a parole recommendation after three years. The applicant's current application for leave to appeal and an extension of time was heard by Justices Williams, Jones, and Douglas. The applicant's primary contention was that his counsel failed to follow instructions during the initial appeal, leading to the opposite of the instructed contentions being put to the Court.

The legal issues before the Court of Appeal were whether the applicant had exhausted his right to appeal against his sentence under section 668 of the Criminal Code and whether the Court had the jurisdiction to entertain the application under section 8 of the Supreme Court of Queensland Act 1991. The Crown argued that the applicant had only one right of appeal under section 668, and once it was exhausted, there was no further right of appeal. The Crown relied on previous decisions from the Court of Criminal Appeal and the High Court to support this argument. The applicant, on the other hand, relied on section 8 of the Supreme Court of Queensland Act 1991, which states that the Court has all the jurisdiction necessary for the administration of justice in Queensland, and cited a decision from this Court in The Queen v Pettigrew as support for his submission. However, the Court of Appeal found that the case was distinguishable from the present case and that section 8 should not be construed as conferring additional criminal appellate jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeal held that the applicant's right to appeal against his sentence was exhausted, and therefore, the applications for leave to appeal and an extension of time should be dismissed. The Court found that the applicant's complaint about the judgment not analysing additional material in greater detail was not relevant, as the Court considered that the material did not have a significant impact on the matter before them. The Court of Appeal also noted that the applicant's reliance on section 8 of the Supreme Court of Queensland Act 1991 was misplaced, as it did not confer any additional criminal appellate jurisdiction. Justices Jones and Douglas agreed with the presiding Judge, and the orders were made accordingly.

Orders