R v I, A - [2005] SADC 62

DISTRICT COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
(Criminal)
R v I, A
Criminal Trial by Judge Alone
Reasons for the Verdicts of His Honour Acting Judge Wilson
10 May 2005
CRIMINAL LAW - PARTICULAR OFFENCES - OFFENCES AGAINST THE PERSON - OTHER OFFENCES AGAINST THE PERSON - SEXUAL OFFENCES
Three counts of rape, with alternative counts of unlawful sexual intercourse, and two counts of indecent assault - trial by Judge alone.

CRIMINAL LAW - EVIDENCE - EVIDENTIARY MATTERS RELATING TO WITNESSES AND ACCUSED PERSONS - CORROBORATION
Evidence - no corroborative evidence - notional warning called for in the circumstances of the case re need for special care before convicting on evidence of complainant aged 15 or 16 at the time - held to be unsafe to rely on evidence of complainant standing alone and unsupported and unconfirmed - factors warranting warning considered - to ask: "why would the complainant tell a series of lies?" held to be inappropriate form of reasoning - failure to complain held to affect complainant's credibility - notional warning called for on account of complainant's failure to complain.
Evidence Act 1929, referred to.
R v Corrigan (1998) 74 SASR 454; Palmer v R (1998) 151 ALR 16; R v Zorad (1979) 2 NSWLR 764; R v E (1996) 39 NSWLR 450; R v Uhrig CCA (NSW), 24 October 1996, unreported; R v Rodriguez CA (Vic), 13 June 1997, unreported; Robinson v R (1991) 180 CLR 531; R v Pahuja (1987) 49 SASR 191; Question of Law No. 1 (1993) 59 SASR 214, applied.

R v I, A
[2005] SADC 62

The accused has been charged, in this trial by judge alone, with eight sexual offences; namely, two counts of indecent assault and three counts of rape, in relation to each of which rape count there is an alternative count of unlawful sexual intercourse.
The alleged victim of the alleged offences which, in their totality, may be characterised as child sexual abuse, was born on 29 May 1986 and was therefore, at the time of the respective events particularised in the counts in the information, aged 15 (for count 1) and 15 or 16 years (for the remaining counts).
The accused is a 59-year-old businessman. He was, during the relevant period, the complainant’s employer conducting, with his wife, a (suppressed) business.
The exhibits tendered during the trial comprised a time book (Exhibit P1); a bundle of photographs (Exhibit P2); an audio tape (Exhibit P3); a transcript of the audio tape (Exhibit P3A); two bundles of portions of transcript of the proceedings at an earlier trial (Exhibits P4 and P5); an extract from a street directory (Exhibit D1); a plan of an area in the Hotel Adelaide (Exhibit D2); and a photograph of the display room at the Hotel Adelaide (Exhibit D3).
Some facts were agreed and noted in the transcript. A view was conducted.
The principal witnesses were the alleged victim (the complainant) and the accused.
The complainant testified as to the allegations and the accused gave sworn evidence in denial of all the alleged misconduct.
Apart from the principal witnesses there were no eye-witnesses.
The facts of this case were well summarised by Mr Pearce, counsel for the prosecution, in his brief Opening Address. I refer to pp.43-46 of the transcript.
The complainant’s allegations made in evidence coincided, generally speaking, with the allegations upon which Mr Pearce opened. The accused’s sworn evidence, though not limited to dealing with those allegations, comprised a series of denials, that is to say, denials that the alleged indecent assaults and other sexual interference occurred.
The events leading up to the alleged sexual abuse were summarised by Mr Pearce in this way (at p.43 of the transcript):
The evidence is that shortly before her 16th birthday she (suppressed) was being encouraged by her family to look for work and her father took her one day to (suppressed) and, whilst in (suppressed), was encouraged by her father to effectively knock on the doors of the businesses in (suppressed), to see if they had any work. That took her to a business known as (suppressed), a business run by the accused and his wife. She went into the shop in May 2002 and spoke to the accused about employment. He indicated, on the Crown’s case, that he may have work for her. He ran a business with his wife that (suppressed). There was discussion about whether he may have some work for her helping to (suppressed). (suppressed) gave her details, left them with the accused, and, a short time later, a matter of some days, she received contact from the accused that he did, in fact, have part-time work for her. She commenced and on her first day of work the incident giving rise to count 1 took place, the allegation of indecent assault.
Count 1 relates to an alleged incident on the way back from a job at Payneham on or about 10 May 2002, said to have occurred in a car parked on the side of the road, when the accused is alleged to have indecently assaulted the complainant by touching her on the thigh in the area around her vagina.
Counts 2 and 3 relate to an alleged incident between 9 May 2002 and 20 August 2002 in a car in a car park near a railway line at Albert Park, previously said to have occurred at or near Croydon, when the accused is alleged to have sexually interfered with the complainant, then under the age of 17 years, that is to say, he is alleged to have had sexual intercourse with her without her consent, or had unlawful sexual intercourse with her, as the case may be, by inserting his finger into her vagina.
Counts 4 and 5 relate to an alleged incident between 9 May 2002 and 20 August 2002 in the work room at the accused’s place of business, (suppressed), when the accused is alleged to have sexually interfered with the complainant, then under the age of 17, that is to say, he is alleged to have had sexual intercourse with her without her consent, or had unlawful sexual intercourse with her, as the case may be, by inserting his finger in her vagina.
Counts 6 and 7 relate to an alleged incident in or about August 2002 in an area adjacent to the display room at the Hotel Adelaide in North Adelaide, when the accused is alleged to have sexually interfered with the complainant then under the age of 17 years, that is to say, he is alleged to have had sexual intercourse with her without her consent, or had unlawful sexual intercourse with her, as the case may be, by inserting his finger into her vagina.
The last count relates to an incident on or about 17 August 2002, said to have occurred in a stationary car near St Ann’s College at North Adelaide, when the accused is alleged to have indecently assaulted the complainant by touching her on the leg in the vicinity of her vagina.
I reminded myself that, in a case of this kind, I am the judge not only of the law, but also of the facts. I reminded myself of the presumption of innocence, of the onus of proof being on the Crown, and of the standard of proof being beyond reasonable doubt. I did not overlook the principle that if, upon a consideration of all the evidence in this trial in relation to any charge under consideration (each is to be considered separately), the evidence is open to any reasonable conclusion other than that the accused is guilty, then he is entitled to the benefit of my reasonable doubt and he should be acquitted.
I remembered that the accused gave evidence on oath. He need not have done so. His sworn evidence is evidence that was entitled to careful consideration.
As part of my responsibility as judge of the law and in accordance with my view of the law, I permitted and directed that the evidence of (suppressed), the complainant, be given outside the courtroom and transmitted to the courtroom by means of closed-circuit television. I ordered that other special arrangements be made pursuant to the Evidence Act. I make it clear that I have not drawn any inference adverse to the accused from the fact that such arrangements were made. I have not allowed the fact that such arrangements were made to influence me to treat the evidence of (suppressed) in some special or different way. I have not given her evidence any greater weight, on account of those special arrangements, than it would otherwise have been entitled to receive. I assessed her evidence and weighed it in the same way as I assessed and weighed the evidence of any other witness.
In R v Corrigan (1998) 74 SASR 454, Doyle CJ, with whose conclusions Millhouse and Nyland JJ agreed, said (at p.465):
There is no longer a rule of law or practice that requires a judge to give a warning in the traditional form … in relation to the evidence of the victim of a sexual offence or in relation to the evidence of a child who gives evidence on oath. That is the result of s.12A and s.34I(5) of the Evidence Act 1929 (SA). … The abolition of the general rule requiring a warning in relation to the evidence of a victim of a sexual offence or of a child leaves untouched the requirement that the judge give a warning whenever a warning is necessary to avoid a perceptible risk of miscarriage of justice arising from the particular circumstances of the case: Longman v R (1989) 168 CLR 79 at p.86 per Brennan, Dawson and Toohey JJ. … The effect of the decision of the High Court in Longman is that the nature and strength of the warning that is required, assuming that one is required in the particular circumstances of the case, will itself depend upon the circumstances of the case. … (P)articular circumstances, or the combined effect of a number of matters may call for a stronger warning (than a comment), and, in particular, for a warning in the traditional terms…
In my assessment of the circumstances of this case, a warning was called for, albeit a notional one, on account of the fact this is a trial by judge alone, in terms nearly as strong as that given in the traditional terms. I have exercised special care and I have been cautious. I have borne in mind the risks that would be associated with convicting this accused on the evidence of this complainant standing, as it does, alone and unsupported and unconfirmed by other evidence from an independent source, unless, having scrutinised that evidence with special care and paying heed to the caution, I were to be satisfied of its truth and accuracy.
The several factors special to this case which, in conjunction with other circumstances more commonly encountered in cases of this kind, exist so as to warrant, in my opinion, such a warning are:
1.The evidence of Mrs Bartemucci, whom I find to be an independent and credible witness of what actually occurred at the San Giorgio’s Community Centre, which effectively operated as a complete answer to the allegations persisted with and made in the two counts of which the accused was acquitted at the first trial; Mrs Bartemucci’s evidence, which I accept, coupled with the objective evidence constituted by Exhibit P1 (the timebook) and Exhibit D4 (the appointments book) served to undermine the credibility of the complainant, whose evidence regarding that incident is to be seen as false.
2.The change by the complainant in her evidence, in particular, as to the location of where the alleged offence (either count 2 or count 3) was committed, a change from a location near the railway line at Croydon to a location near the railway line at Albert Park; this change in her testimony served to undermine to a significant extent the complainant’s credibility.
3.The relatively close timing between (and, therefore, the significance of) the allegations coming to the attention of the police on 29 August 2002 and the complainant’s decision to stop going to work any more for the accused on or after 17 August 2002, when the complainant must have been aware of the need very soon to repay loan and other moneys as well as the fact that full-time work was soon to start.
Those other circumstances which, in combination with the factors previously mentioned, warrant, in my opinion, the need for a warning in almost traditional terms are as follows:
A.The fact that the complainant continued, on her evidence, to return to work for the accused after each of the alleged acts of non-consensual sexual interference which spanned a period of about three months. The plausibility of such a story is diminished when it is noted that the alleged acts included, according to the complainant, acts of sexual penetration constituting more than indecent touching; in fact, rapes and non-consensual sexual assaults.
B.The fact that the complainant’s description of what occurred in relation to the charges particularised in alternative counts 2 and 3 would necessarily require a degree of manual dexterity and bodily manipulation that is hard to contemplate as a realistic possibility. The factor calling for the warning is not the exposed nature of the location (changed from that indicated previously), because that is not something that would necessarily or even probably deter an intended sex offender from doing things to his intended victim inside a motor vehicle; the described manoeuvre, which is bordering on the impossible, is such a factor.
C.The fact that the complainant’s description of where the accused’s conduct appertaining to counts 4 and 5 allegedly took place in unlikely localities in circumstances in which other workers could have suddenly appeared in or near the work-room.
Ms David’s rhetorical questions posed during her final Address “What if she screamed? What if someone walked in through the delivery door?” served to illustrate the improbability of events having occurred in the manner as testified to by the complainant.
D.The improbability (I do not say “impossibility”) of the events having occurred in the way described, somewhat inconsistently, by the complainant appertaining to counts 6 and 7 at the places allegedly chosen by the accused to act inappropriately and described by the complainant. These were very risky spots for him to have chosen, having regard to the relatively open, accessible and exposed nature of the display room at the Hotel Adelaide and the adjacent rooms and passages and having regard to the commercial relationship between the accused and the staff of the Hotel Adelaide. Ms David pointedly asked the rhetorical question: “Is he really supposed to have taken such risks with a girl (an employee) at the premises of a location with (the licensees of which) he is in a commercial relationship?”
There was little in the demeanour of the complainant to assist in the task of assessing her overall credibility. As an attractive and self-assured 18-year-old at the time of giving her evidence at this trial, she did not manifest the outward signs of the untrustworthy witness, although she did, on more than a few occasions, take a long time to answer some questions, and she was obviously being very reflective in answering questions asked of her in examination-in-chief and cross-examination.
As will appear, this is a case in which I have concluded that it would be unsafe to rely upon the evidence of the complainant appertaining to each and every one of the allegations of sexual interference.
In assessing the complainant as a witness, I found myself unable to read very much into her testimony regarding her reluctance to complain for fear of being seen to ruin her father’s “pride in (her)”. Although the complainant was not broken down under searching and thorough cross-examination, she had to admit (and did admit) changes in her testimony and inconsistencies which, in their total effect, tarnished her credibility.
The accused, who gave sworn evidence, presented as basically an honest witness who saw himself as having been falsely accused. His background, his limited education and the understandable defects in his command of the English language served to explain his shortcomings as a witness. Only in the context of answering questions regarding some notations in the complainant’s timebook and related matters did he fail to impress as a witness. In most respects his apparent credibility remained intact. I do not, in the end, assess him to be discredited.
There was something superficially persuasive in Mr Pearce’s arguments to the effect that the complainant’s evidence had “the ring of truth” about it and did not have the hallmarks of the fabricated story. That argument is akin to the submission sometimes arising from the posing of the question ‘Why would the complainant tell a lie’. There are, as I will be holding, risks with reasoning along those lines and I consider it inappropriate to do so here.
Apart from what the authorities say about such reasoning - see Palmer v R post, Ms David put it well in her Address:
The suggestion was also made, and this is my final general observation in respect of (suppressed) evidence, that there were certain comments of hers that would be, as I understand the submission, difficult to make up. Suggested comments such as ‘on a scale of 1 to 10 what are my chances’ or ‘one breast will get jealous if I don’t touch the other breast’, that type of comment, the use of the word ‘bella’. We don’t know and we are not allowed to know what (suppressed) experiences are or are not. We don’t know where or what she could have transposed those comments from. We don’t know how she has come up with those comments. We don’t know who she has spoken to, who she has talked to, what her friends’ experiences are, what she has read in the papers, what she has seen on TV, what she has drawn her allegations from. We can’t address your Honour on that, but the point is that it is for the Crown to prove each and every one of these charges beyond a reasonable doubt, and the suggestion that there is some ring of truth to these comments does not take your Honour very far. It does not take your Honour very far in the context of the actual allegations, the fact that they are completely unsupported by any independent evidence whatsoever, and the fact that we know very little about (suppressed) and her background.
That states the position well.
Bearing in mind the onus and standard of proof and the need for caution in the circumstances of this case, I find myself giving the accused the benefit of the doubt.
I have given myself a notional Zorad direction; see R v Zorad (1979) 2 NSWLR 764 at 777, in which a direction in the following terms was approved:
The law has determined over many years of experience that, in cases of alleged sexual offences, jurors should have in mind the matter of complaint by the (complainant) when a jury (or a judge sitting as both judge and jury) is called upon to consider the evidence of the complaint … (The) Crown is entitled to adduce evidence of a complaint which comes from a complainant or prosecutrix as evidence to assist (the jury) to determine (his or) her credibility. … If a (complainant) has not made a complaint of a sexual offence, (the jury) would consider that circumstance and consider whether the absence of complaint affects her credibility. … All the circumstances (need to be) considered … The absence of any evidence of complaint … only entitles (the jury) to consider that as going to his credibility. The mere fact that there is no evidence of complaint does not mean (that the jury) would reject her evidence completely; (the jury has) to weigh it all up and see how it affects her overall testimony. It may be of importance, it may not be. It may be of slight importance. It is a matter for (the jury) as to the weight (to be given to it), and it can only be used to test her credibility…
I add the following as required by s 34I(6a) of the Evidence Act. The suggestion having been made during this trial before me, as a judge sitting alone and therefore as one carrying the responsibility of judge and jury, to the effect that, according to the evidence, the complainant failed to make a complaint about the alleged sexual abuse to which she allegedly had been subjected, I gave myself a notional warning to the effect that the complainant’s failure to make a complaint or series of complaints did not necessarily mean that any or all of the allegations is (or are) false, and I reminded myself, as trier of the facts, that the complainant could have had valid reasons for failing to make any complaint. I do not regard the complainant’s stated reason, namely not wishing to destroy her father’s “pride in (her)”, as valid. I might have concluded otherwise if the complainant’s father had been called as a witness and had given evidence.

I must (and did) put out of my mind any question or speculation arising from the absence of evidence of a motive for the complainant to have told a series of lies. The law is that absence of proof of motive is neutral and it certainly does not buttress the complainant’s credibility; see Palmer v R (1998) 151 ALR 16. It is an impermissible line of reasoning to elevate a complainant’s credibility because no motive on the complainant’s part to lie, or to make a series of false accusations, was proven or suggested by the accused, or suggested on his behalf.
In Palmer’s case, Brennan CJ and Gaudron and Gummow JJ said (at p.20):
It is one thing to permit cross-examination of a complainant in order to elicit, if possible, a motive to lie. It is another thing to permit cross-examination of an accused to show that an accused cannot prove any ground for imputing a motive to lie to the complainant. A complainant knows whether he or she has a motive to lie, as a motive to lie is a fact that must be proved to impeach the complainant’s credit, the complainant may be asked about it. And evidence may be given by other witnesses of events from which such a motive may be inferred. But the fact that an accused has no knowledge of any fact from which a motive of the kind imputed to a complainant in cross-examination might be inferred is generally irrelevant. In general, an accused’s lack of knowledge simply means that his evidence cannot assist in determining whether the complainant has a motive to lie, but if the facts from which an inference of motive might be drawn are facts that the accused would know if they existed, his lack of knowledge could be elicited to disprove those facts.
If it were permissible generally to cross-examine an accused to show that he has no knowledge of any fact from which to infer that the complainant has a motive to lie, the cross-examination would focus the jury’s attention on irrelevancies, especially when the case is “oath against oath”. In such a case, to ask an accused the question, “Why would the complainant lie” is to invite the jury to accept the complainant’s evidence unless some positive answer to that question is given by the accused. As Gleeson CJ, speaking for the Court of Criminal Appeal of New South Wales, said in F (1995) 83 A Crim R 502 at 511-512:
the ‘central theme’ of the case, according to the trial judge, could be found in the question, ‘Why would the complainant lie?’. That is a question, often left unspoken, which usually hovers over cases of this nature … While that question, sometimes spoken, sometimes unspoken, is often of great practical importance, it is never the ‘central theme’ of a criminal trial. At a criminal trial the critical question is whether the Crown has proved the guilt of the accused person beyond reasonable doubt. Just as the law does not require the Crown to prove a motive for the criminal conduct of the accused, the law does not require the accused to prove a motive for the making of false accusations by a complainant.
A similar view underlies what Pincus JA said in the Court of Appeal of Queensland in R v G (1994) 1 Qd R 540 at 545-6:
for a judge to give a direction implying that, ordinarily, a young complainant in a sexual abuse case is unlikely to invent and adhere to the allegations is difficult to reconcile with the direction which the learned trial judge gave that it is dangerous to act on such a complainant’s uncorroborated evidence.…
The propriety of questioning the accused about his lack of knowledge of any reason why a complainant should lie was considered by Sperling J in the Court of Criminal Appeal of New South Wales in R v E (1996) 39 NSWLR 450 at 464:
We are dealing here with a case where there is no direct evidence of an actual motive to lie, nor evidence from which a specific motive to lie could reasonably be inferred. To ask, ‘Why would he or she lie?’ in such a case is to invite the jury to speculate as to what might be possible motives for lying and to assess their likelihood. That is not to try the case on the evidence, but to speculate concerning unproven facts. The absence of evidence of a motive for lying and of a plausible explanation for lying is not proof that there was no motive for lying. Yet to pose the question at all is to give legitimacy to that method of reasoning and to that conclusion … Secondly, the question is unfair to the accused. How can the accused or his counsel be expected to see into the mind of the complainant, and be held accountable for failing to discern whatever motive there may be for a false story? … Thirdly, the effect of the question is to reverse the onus of proof. The question implies that, unless the jury is satisfied that the complainant is a liar, they should accept the complainant’s evidence and convict.
The third observation may overstate the effect of the question in a particular case, especially if the trial judge gives the jury a direction to the contrary. A firm and clear direction from the trial judge may prevent the impropriety of asking the question from causing justice to miscarry. Nevertheless, as the question is irrelevant to any issue in the case, it ought not be asked.
As Hunt CJ at CL put in R v Uhrig, CCA (NSW) 24 October 1996, unreported at 15-16, said, to ask the question ‘Why would the witness lie?’
invites the jury to speculate … to the conclusion that, unless they are satisfied by the accused that the witness has a motive to lie, they should accept the evidence of that witness and convict. In my view, that danger of such illegitimate speculation is a sufficient reason for saying that the rhetorical question should not be raised in such a case.
A contrary view has been expressed by Callaway JA in the Court of Appeal of Victoria in R v Rodriguez, CA (Vic), 13 June 1997, unreported at p.2:
It is true that there is no onus upon the accused to prove a motive for the complainant’s allegations. It is also true that absence of motive cannot, in cases like these, be inferred from absence of evidence of motive. But neither of those heresies is necessarily embraced when a jury is invited to ask themselves the question ‘Why would the complainant lie?’ in the course of assessing her or his credibility. Other things being equal, and that is an important qualification, the complainant’s account is more likely to be true of a motive or possible motive for lying cannot be discerned and less likely to be true if it can be.
With respect, a complainant’s account gains no legitimate credibility from the absence of evidence of motive. If credibility which the jury would otherwise attribute to the complainant’s account is strengthened by an accused’s inability to furnish a motive for a complainant to lie, the standard of proof is to that extent diminished. That is the converse of the proposition stated by a Cresswell J in the case cited by Wills (on Evidence) where his Lordship acknowledged that ‘Proof of motive to lie weakened the complainant’s credibility. The correct view is that absence of proof of motive is entirely neutral.
Kirby J in Palmer’s case said at p.48:
… although no authority of this court binds us to a particular outcome, I have concluded that it would not be harmonious with the principle adopted in Robinson v R (1991) 180 CLR 531, to permit questions to be asked or suggestions to be made that the accused’s evidence is weakened, or the complainant’s strengthened by, the inability of the accused to explain why the complainant would lie. In Robinson this court adopted a rule forbidding questions or comment which would suggest that the accused’s evidence denying the offences charged is to be the subject of close scrutiny because of the interest which the accused necessarily has in the outcome of the trial. This court held that to permit, in that case, judicial directions (but by inference also questions making the same suggestions) would undermine the presumption of innocence which the law accords to an accused person. This ruling has attracted some criticism. It has been said that it has given rise to different interpretations as to the strictness of the principle established. But as I read the ruling in Robinson it is a simple one easy to apply. Neither by questions nor by submissions, nor by judicial directions (The emphasis is mine) may it be suggested that an accused’s denial is undermined and an accuser’s accusations strengthened, by the obvious fact that the accused has an interest in acquittal. The forbidden imputation about the accused’s motive to lie to secure acquittal has as its counterpart, a prohibition on the investigation of the motivation, if known, of the accuser to lie, realising, as the accuser must, that this could result in the accused’s conviction and punishment. If the one is forbidden by the authority of this court, it is impossible, as a matter of principle, to permit the other. Each has a tendency to undermine the protection afforded by the burden and onus which rests upon the prosecution throughout the trial.
The principle in Robinson has since been re-affirmed by this court in Stafford v R (1993) 67 ALJR 510. In this appeal, it was not suggested that the principle was wrong. While it does not, as a matter of legal authority, determine the present case, any rule which permitted questions of the accused about the accuser’s motivations, or which encouraged elaboration of that issue by a prosecutor or judge where it had not been initiated by the accused, would be difficult to reconcile with it. In circumstances where the arguments of principle and policy are so finely balanced, the adoption of a rule which is harmonious with an analogous principle earlier accepted by the court is, for me, decisive.
I have reminded myself and acknowledge that there are cases where the alleged victim’s allegations may be so convincing and the accused’s denials so incredible that the trier of fact may be convinced of the truth and accuracy of the alleged victim’s allegations, notwithstanding the need for (and the adoption of) a cautious approach. But this, in my judgment, is not such a case.
I have reminded myself further and also acknowledge that there are other cases, and this is, I think, one, in which the prosecution encounters difficulties in persuading the trier of facts to arrive at conclusions of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
This is a case in which, the actual evidence to one side, there is the real possibility of the complainant having hidden motives for giving false evidence and for making false allegations - see the observations of King CJ in the R v Pahuja (1987) 49 SASR 191 at 199 and in Question of Law No.1 (1993), 59 SASR 214 at 218.
The prosecution’s task in a case of this kind is not made any easier by the developments in the Law of Evidence which occurred in the 1990s, that is to say, at about the time when Robinson v R and Palmer v R were decided in the High Court of Australia – see, in this context, the dissenting judgment of McHugh J in Palmer v R at pp.26 to 39,especially at para.69.
It is not only that the evidence of the complainant was unsupported and unconfirmed by other evidence from an independent source that has led me to the verdicts I will announce shortly, but there were several other factors present here. When regard is had to the inconsistent statements and, in some respects, the proven errors made by the complainant, to the absence of anything to buttress her credibility either in the form of evidence of prompt and fresh complaint at the earliest reasonable opportunity or in the form of evidence of distress, to the fact that the complainant continued to work and returned to work and re-returned to work throughout a period of three months, working for an employer whom she claims not only was sexually interfering with her but also was raping her, and to the other factors I have set out in these Reasons for Verdicts, it would be extremely hazardous to convict on any of the counts charged.
My scrutiny of the complainant’s evidence with special care has led me to the conclusion in relation to each count considered separately (and, in the case of counts 3, 5 and 7, only after reaching verdicts of acquittal on counts 2, 4 and 6) that I am not satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of the truth and accuracy of any of the complainant’s allegations to the effect that she was the victim of multiple sexual offences. I have concluded that it is reasonably possible that the accused’s denials represent the truth.
For all these reasons there will be verdicts of not guilty on each and every count. The accused will be discharged. The accused is discharged.