R v CAB

Case [2020] SASCFC 33


SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Court of Criminal Appeal)

R v CAB

[2020] SASCFC 33

Judgment of The Court of Criminal Appeal

(The Honourable Chief Justice Kourakis, The Honourable Justice Doyle and The Honourable Justice Livesey)

5 May 2020

CRIMINAL LAW - APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - APPEAL AGAINST SENTENCE - GROUNDS FOR INTERFERENCE  - SENTENCE MANIFESTLY EXCESSIVE OR INADEQUATE

CRIMINAL LAW - SENTENCE - INTERPRETATION OF SENTENCING PROVISIONS

Application by the Director of Public Prosecutions for permission to appeal against a sentence imposed in the District Court.

The respondent is a serious registrable offender under the Child Sex Offenders Registration Act 2006 (SA) (CSORA). On 4 December 2019 he was convicted and fined $900 for committing the following three offences against the CSORA:

• failing to comply with reporting obligations contrary to s 44(1);

• failing to comply with reporting obligations relating to reportable contact with a child contrary to s 44(1a); and

• being a serious registrable who had reportable contact with a child and did not inform an available responsible of his status as a serious registrable offender or the offences that resulted in him receiving that status contrary to s 66L(2).

Each of the three offences was committed whilst the respondent was subject to a term of imprisonment, ordered to be served on home detention, that was imposed for three counts of child sexual offending that occurred between 1975 and 1989.

In the District Court, the Director made an application for the revocation of the respondent’s home detention order consequent upon the respondent committing the three offences. The sentencing Judge excused the breach of the order and dismissed the Director’s application for revocation. The respondent served the remainder of his home detention order without further incident and was released on parole on 16 May 2019.

In this Court the Director sought permission to appeal on two grounds; first, on the ground that the sentence imposed for the three offences was manifestly inadequate, and secondly, on the ground that the sentencing Judge erred in refraining to revoke the respondent’s home detention order.

Held, per Livesey J (Kourakis CJ and Doyle J agreeing) refusing permission to appeal:

1. Given the approach taken to the facts by the parties before the sentencing Judge, and bearing in mind the respondent’s personal circumstances, the fine of $900 was not a manifestly inadequate sentence.

2. It was open to the sentencing Judge to find that there were proper grounds to excuse the respondent’s breach of his home detention order and refrain from revoking the order.

3. In any event, the purposes that Crown appeals against sentence are intended to serve would not be met by a grant of permission to appeal.

Child Sex Offenders Registration (Miscellaneous) Amendment Act 2013 (SA); Child Sex Offenders Registration Act 2006 (SA) s 3, s 4, s 11, s 13, s 16, s 17, s 18, s 20A, s 44, s 66L; Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1988 (SA) s 58; Offenders Probation Act 1913 (SA) s 9;

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R v CAB [2020] SASCFC 33
Case
[2020] SASCFC 33
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of R v CAB concerned an appeal against a sentence imposed on the respondent. The dispute centred on the interpretation and application of sentencing provisions within the Child Sex Offenders Registration Act 2006 (SA) (CSORA). The appeal was heard by the Full Court of the Supreme Court of South Australia, comprising Kourakis CJ, Doyle and Livesey JJ.

The legal issues before the court included the proper construction of sections 44(1) and 44(1a) of the CSORA, which prescribe penalties for failing to comply with reporting obligations. Specifically, the court had to consider the distinction between general reporting obligations and those relating to "reportable contact" with a child, and the differing maximum penalties associated with each. The court was also required to determine whether the facts of the case presented an exceptional circumstance warranting the laying down of new sentencing principles.

The court considered the objects of the CSORA, which are to protect children from sexual predators by requiring certain individuals to inform the police of their whereabouts and to prevent them from engaging in child-related work. In relation to the respondent's appeal, the court noted the significant delay between his interview and arrest, and the fact that he had served his home detention order and was on parole without further incident. However, the court ultimately found that the facts did not present a rare or exceptional case that would justify the court establishing new sentencing principles.

The application for leave to appeal was dismissed.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

In my view, the facts of this case do not present an example of the rare and exceptional case which would afford this Court an opportunity to lay down principles for the governance and guidance of sentencing courts.[50][50] Griffiths v The Queen (1977) 137 CLR 293, 310 (Barwick CJ).Conclusion I dismiss the application.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In relation to ground 2, counsel for the respondent emphasised that there had been a significant delay between the time the respondent was interviewed (2 November 2018) and the time he was arrested (4 April 2019), thus allowing the respondent to serve a significant portion of his sentence on home detention. Counsel also reminded the Court that the respondent had now served the entirety of his home detention order without further incident, and had been on parole since 16 May 2019, again without further incident. Thus, allowing the appeal would result in the respondent being twice vexed by the State repeating its exercise of coercive power.Consideration In dealing with ground 1, it is instructive to first set out the objects of the CSORA which are found in s 3:3—ObjectThe object of this Act is to protect children from sexual predators by—(a)requiring certain persons who may have a propensity to commit sexual offences against children to keep the Commissioner of Police informed of their whereabouts and other personal details for a period of time—(i)to reduce the risk of such offences being committed; and(ii)to facilitate the investigation and prosecution of any offences that are committed; and(b)preventing such persons from engaging in child-related work. In relation to counts 1 and 2, the legislative instruction is found in ss 44(1) and (1a). They provide:44—Offences of failing to comply with reporting obligations(1)A registrable offender must not fail to comply with any of his or her reporting obligations without a reasonable excuse.Maximum penalty: $10 000 or imprisonment for 2 years.(1a) A registrable offender must not fail to comply with a reporting obligation relating to reportable contact with a child without a reasonable excuse.Maximum penalty: $25 000 or imprisonment for 5 years. Reportable contact is defined in s 13(4) of the CSORA:[23][23] Section 4 of the Child Sex Offenders Registration Act 2006 (SA) provides that “reportable contact” has the meaning set out in s 13(4) of the Act. (4) For the purposes of this section, a person has reportable contact with a child—(a) if—(i) the person has contact with the child consisting of—(A)any form of physical contact or close physical proximity with the child; or(B)any form of communication with the child (whether in person, in writing, by telephone or other electronic device); and(ii)the contact with the child—(A)occurs in the course of—• the person or the child visiting or residing at a dwelling (whether the person and the child are alone or with others); or• the person (whether alone or with others) supervising or caring for the child; or(B)involves the person providing contact details to the child or obtaining contact details from the child or otherwise inviting (in any manner) further contact or communication between him or her and the child; or(b)if the person has contact of a kind, or occurring in circumstances, prescribed by the regulations. Section 13(6) makes clear that reportable contact includes contact that is supervised.