MELVAINE v Police - [2012] SASC 32

SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
(Magistrates Appeals: Criminal)
MELVAINE v POLICE
[2012] SASC 32
Judgment of The Honourable Justice Kourakis
(The Honourable Justice Kourakis)
9 March 2012
MAGISTRATES - APPEALS AND REVIEW - SOUTH AUSTRALIA - APPEAL TO SUPREME COURT
CRIMINAL LAW - PARTICULAR OFFENCES - OFFENCES AGAINST THE PERSON - SEXUAL OFFENCES - OTHER OFFENCES
The appellant was convicted on three counts of unlawful sexual intercourse in 1992 – on 30 April 2008 the appellant was registered as a “registrable offender” under the Child Sex Offenders Registration Act 2006 (the Act) – as a “registrable offender” the appellant was and remains subject to specific reporting obligations under the Act – the appellant was charged with an offence under s 44(1) of the Act when he departed the State to travel out of Australia and did not report his intended travel to the police within the time requirements stipulated in s 17 – the Magistrate found that the appellant had failed to discharge his reporting obligations under s 17(1) of the Act – consequently the Magistrate found the charged offence proved beyond reasonable and convicted and fined the appellant – whether the Magistrate erred in the construction of s 17 of the Act – whether the lack of any “reasonable excuse” must be proved by the prosecution – whether the appellant had “a reasonable excuse” for his non-compliance with the Act - whether the penalty was manifestly excessive.
Held – appeal dismissed – the reporting obligations in s 17 of the Act are applicable to any person who intends to leave South Australia irrespective of their intended departure date – there is no evidence of a reasonable excuse for the appellant’s non-compliance with his reporting obligations the sentence was not manifestly excessive.
Child Sex Offenders Registration Act 2006 (SA) s17, s18, s22, s44, referred to.
Beckwith v The Queen (1976) 135 CLR 569; Dowling v Bowie (1952) 86 CLR 136, discussed.

MELVAINE v POLICE
[2012] SASC 32
Magistrates Appeal - Criminal:

KOURAKIS J: The appellant appeals against his conviction in the Magistrates Court of an offence against s 44(1) of the Child Sex Offenders Registration Act 2006 (the Act), committed when he failed to notify a police officer of his intention to travel overseas.
On 28 September 1992, in the District Court, the appellant pleaded guilty to three counts of unlawful sexual intercourse committed in July 1992. A suspended sentence of imprisonment was imposed on 16 November 1992. The Act commenced operation on 18 October 2007. Pursuant to s 6 of the Act, the appellant was a “registrable offender” and subject to the reporting obligations contained in Pt 3 of the Act. The appellant was registered under the Act on 30 April 2008 and does not dispute his status as a registrable offender. In broad terms, the Act imposes reporting obligations on registrable offenders, including, pursuant to s 17 of the Act, an obligation to notify authorised officers of the South Australian Police (SAPOL) of their intention to travel overseas seven days before, or where it is impracticable to give that length of notice, 24 hours before, leaving the State. Section 44 of the Act makes it an offence to fail to comply with that reporting obligation without a reasonable excuse.
In the Magistrates Court the appellant defended the complaint that he had beached s 44 of the Act on the following grounds. The appellant testified that on 17 March 2010 at about 2.30 am he was woken by his wife with the announcement that they were “going away”. She had already packed his bag and very shortly thereafter they were both driven to the airport by his daughter. His wife and his daughter handled the check in arrangements and when they returned they excitedly informed him that they had organised a surprise trip to Bali for him and his wife. The appellant caught the 6.00 am flight to Sydney and after a stop over of just a few hours he found himself on a plane to Bali. The appellant testified that in the excitement he forgot about his obligation to report his intention to travel outside the State. The appellant’s testimony was that he simply overlooked his obligation to report to SAPOL – “it didn’t even register.” Only after he arrived in Bali did his obligation come to mind.
The Magistrate seems to have accepted that the Bali holiday was a surprise but was nonetheless satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that “the defendant remembered [his obligation to report] before he left Adelaide, but decided to go anyway.” The Magistrate recorded a conviction and fined the appellant $2,500.
The appellant does not challenge the Magistrate’s factual finding about his state of mind before he left Adelaide airport but appeals against the conviction on the ground that it is attended by errors of law. He contends that because he first formed the intention to leave Australia less than 24 hours before he departed the State, the Act did not impose any obligation on him to report his departure. In the alternative, he contends that any obligation to report his travel was extant only between the time he first formed the intention to leave Australia and his departure from the State, and that in that time, because there was no person in authority in SAPOL available to take his report, he has a reasonable excuse for his failure. Finally, he contends that if the practical effect of the Act was that he should delay his plans until he could give the requisite period of notice, then nonetheless he had a reasonable excuse for not doing so because, on the evidence before the Magistrate, the Commissioner had not approved any police officer to receive his notification and, so the argument continues, it would have been futile to delay his travel plans for the purpose of attempting to notify an approved police officer.
The respondent disputes the appellant’s construction of the Act. It contends that on its terms, s 17 of the Act requires the requisite period of notice to be given irrespective of the intended date of departure and the period of time between the formation of the intention and the intended departure date. The practical effect of s 17 of the Act is that any proposed travel must be delayed for a reasonable time in order to comply with the reporting obligation. The respondent contends that even if, contrary to its submission, the evidence did establish that there was no police officer authorised to receive the report, the appellant does not have a reasonable excuse for his failure to report because he took no steps to do so.
In my view, the appellant’s submissions should be rejected. They would give the Act an absurd operation which would undermine its very purpose. I elaborate on my reasons below.
The appellant also appeals the conviction and fine imposed by the Magistrate. No error in the process of reasoning of the Magistrate is alleged. The appellant simply contends that the resulting penalty is manifestly excessive. I reject the appellant’s contention. Strong penalties are required to ensure the protective purposes of the legislation are achieved. This was not the first occasion that the appellant had travelled overseas without permission. He had been warned for doing so on a previous occasion. The fine imposed was just one quarter of the maximum permissible fine. In order to be an effective deterrent, fines which are commensurate with the expense of travel overseas will generally be required. I elaborate on my reasons further below.
The Act
The object of the Act is to be found in s 3 which provides:
3—Object
The object of this Act is to protect children from sexual predators by—
(a) requiring certain persons who may have a propensity to commit sexual offences against children to keep the Commissioner of Police informed of their whereabouts and other personal details for a period of time—
(i) to reduce the risk of such offences being committed; and
(ii) to facilitate the investigation and prosecution of any offences that are committed; and
(b) preventing such persons from engaging in child-related work.
In the second reading speech the Minister for Police explained:
The purpose of the child offender register, in the Australian context, is to assist police to monitor the whereabouts and activities of registrable offenders who, because of their record of serious offending, are thought to pose a sexual threat to children.
…
At its 44^th meeting in July 2003, the Australasian Police Ministers’ Council (A.P.M.C.) resolved to support the development of a national child sex offender register based on draft legislation modelled on the New South Wales register and associated legislation.
The proposed model was the subject of consultation, at both officer and ministerial level, with the standing committee of Attorneys-General (SCAG). Although supportive in principle, SCAG was concerned to ensure that the proposed model was balanced, and effectively directed resources towards the problem of recidivist and predatory pederasts.[1]
[1] South Australia, Hansard, Legislative Council, 21 June 2006, 574 (Hon. P. Holloway).
Reporting obligations are defined to mean obligations imposed by Pt 3 of the Act.[2]
[2] Child Sex Offenders Registration Act 2006, s 4.
The relevant provisions of Pt 3 are s 17 and s 18 of the Act which provides:
17—Intended absence from South Australia to be reported
(1) This section applies if a registrable offender—
(a) intends to leave South Australia for 14 or more consecutive days to travel elsewhere in Australia; or
(b) intends to leave South Australia to travel out of Australia.
(2) At least 7 days before leaving South Australia, the registrable offender must report the intended travel to the Commissioner and must provide details of—
(a) each State, Territory or country to which he or she intends to go while out of South Australia; and
(b) the approximate dates during which he or she intends to be in each of those States, Territories or countries; and
(c) each address or location within each State, Territory or country at which he or she intends to reside (to the extent that they are known) and the approximate dates during which he or she intends to reside at those addresses or locations; and
(d) if he or she intends to return to South Australia, the approximate date on which he or she intends to return; and
(e) if he or she does not intend to return to South Australia—a statement of that intention.
(3) If circumstances arise making it impracticable for a registrable offender to make the report 7 days before he or she leaves, it is sufficient compliance with subsection (2) if the registrable offender reports the required information to the Commissioner at least 24 hours before leaving South Australia.
18—Change of travel plans while out of South Australia to be given
(1) This section applies if a registrable offender who is out of South Australia decides—
(a) to extend a stay elsewhere in Australia beyond 13 days; or
(b) to change any details given to the Commissioner under section 17.
(2) As soon as practicable after making the decision, the registrable offender must—
(a) if subsection (1)(a) applies, report the details required by section 17(2) to the Commissioner (including those details as they relate to the travel that has already been completed); or
(b) if subsection (1)(b) applies, report the changed details to the Commissioner.
(3) The registrable offender must make the report—
(a) by writing sent by post or transmitted electronically to the Commissioner or to any other address permitted by the regulations; or
(b) in any other manner permitted by the regulations.
Regulations made for the purpose of s 18 of the Act allow a report contemplated by the section to be made by letter sent to a specified post office box, or by electronic means to an email address.[3] The manner of the making of reports whilst the registrable offender is in South Australia is governed by s 22 of the Act. A report pursuant to s 17 of the Act may be made by the registrable offender “attending in person or by making the report in another way permitted by the Commissioner or the regulations, either generally or in a particular case.”[4] Section 22(3) of the Act provides:
3) Only a police officer approved for the purpose by the Commissioner may receive a report made by a registrable offender attending in person and only a police officer or other person approved for the purpose by the Commissioner may receive a report made in another way in accordance with subsection (2).
[3] Child Sex Offender Registration Regulations 2007, r 11.
[4] Section 22(2) of the Act.
No regulations have been made for the purposes of s 22 of the Act.
Construction of the Act
At first sight the difference in the reporting obligations of registrable offenders with respect to interstate and overseas travel appears curious but, in my view, there are several good reasons for it. First, it might have been thought that an obligation to report even short absences interstate might have been too onerous because of the increasing frequency of interstate travel. Even for persons who do not reside in border regions, brief interstate trips for work related purposes are now very common. Quite apart from the burden on registrable offenders, taking reports on all interstate travel may have placed a heavy administrative workload on SAPOL, which would have detracted from the effectiveness of the scheme. The greater freedom allowed for interstate travel might also reflect a concern to ensure that the provisions of the Act were reasonably appropriate and adapted to the constitutional freedom of interstate movement. On the other hand, travel out of Australia will not be as frequent and will generally be for extended periods. The stricter regime for overseas travel might also have been thought necessary to monitor the practice often referred to as “sex tourism”.
Section 32 of the Act provides that the obligations to report imposed under Pt 3 are suspended for any period during which the registrable offender is outside South Australia unless, relevantly to this appeal, the obligation is an obligation to report a change in travel plans pursuant to s 18 of the Act.
Section 44 of the Act constitutes the offence of failing to comply with reporting obligations in the following terms:
44—Offence of failing to comply with reporting obligations
(1) A registrable offender must not fail to comply with any of his or her reporting obligations without a reasonable excuse.
Maximum penalty: $10 000 or imprisonment for 2 years.
(2) In determining whether a person had a reasonable excuse for failing to comply with his or her reporting obligations, the court before which the proceedings are being heard is to have regard to the following matters:
(a) the person's age;
(b) whether the person has a disability that affects the person's ability to understand, or to comply with, those obligations;
(c) whether the form of notification given to the registrable offender as to his or her obligations was adequate to inform him or her of those obligations, having regard to the offender's circumstances;
(d) any other matter the court considers appropriate.
(3) It is a defence to proceedings for an offence of failing to comply with a reporting obligation if it is established by or on behalf of the person charged with the offence that, at the time the offence is alleged to have occurred, the person had not received notice, and was otherwise unaware, of the obligation.
The appeal raises a question of construction of s 17 of the Act and its application to registrable offenders who form the intention to leave South Australia before the expiration of the required reporting periods. It also raises the question of the onus of proof of the element of a reasonable excuse for the purposes of s 44 of the Act.
The Scope of the Reporting Obligation
Section 17(1) of the Act imposes the reporting obligation, particularised in s 17(2) of the Act, on a registrable offender who, relevantly, “intends to leave South Australia to travel out of Australia.” Section 17(1) of the Act, does not qualify or limit the reporting obligation to those registrable offenders who intend to leave South Australia after the expiration of the periods of time prescribed by s 17(2) and s 17(3) of the Act. It would be very surprising if Parliament had intended the reporting obligation to apply only to those registrable offenders who had made longer term travel arrangements in advance of the time periods specified.
Section 17(1) and s 17(2) of the Act, but for the different positions taken for interstate and overseas travel, might have been conveniently expressed in one section which provided as follows:
If a registrable offender intends to leave South Australia to travel out of Australia he or she must, at least seven days before leaving South Australia, report the intended travel to the Commissioner.
In effect the appellant contends that the scope of the reporting obligation should be curtailed by reading the words in s 17(1) and (2) of the Act as if those subsections provided:
If a registrable offender intends to leave South Australia to travel out of Australia [at some time after the expiration of seven days from forming that intention] he or she must, at least seven days before leaving South Australia report the intended travel to the Commissioner.
There is in my view no reason to so substantially curtail the reporting obligations by effectively reading the words in parenthesis into the Act.
In any event, s 17(3) of the Act presents an insuperable obstacle to the implied qualification for which the appellant contends. Section 17(3) of the Act expressly contemplates that a registrable offender might form an intention to leave South Australia in less than seven days from reaching that decision and provides that, if giving seven days notice is impracticable, there is sufficient compliance with s 17(2) of the Act, if a report is made at least 24 hours before departure. Plainly, s 17(3) of the Act proceeds on the premise that s 17 applies to registrable offenders even if they decide to leave the State less than seven days before the intended date of departure. The impracticability referred to in s 17(3) of the Act includes, most obviously, impracticability in delaying the travel for at least seven days in order to make a report of the intended travel. The impracticability referred to may well also include cases in which a registrable offender intends to leave more than seven days after making the decision to travel overseas, but encounters difficulties in making the report before the commencement of the seven day period.
The ultimate result of the appellant’s construction of s 17(1) of the Act is that notwithstanding s 17(3), the Act has no application at all and does not require even 24 hours notice in a case where a registrable offender decides to leave the State in less than seven days from forming that intention.
In my view, the construction suggested by the appellant is strained and leads to a manifest absurdity. It subverts the objects of the Act and gives s 17(3) of the Act very little work to do. It could not have been intended to exempt spontaneous and sudden decisions to leave the State or Australia from the monitoring regime established by the Act. The words of s 17 of the Act should be given their ordinary meaning. The reporting obligation applies to any person who “intends to leave South Australia” irrespective of their intended departure date. The practical effect of the legislation is to limit, by delaying, the freedom of movement of registrable offenders who form that intention only within seven days of their intended departure date.

The strict approach to the construction of penal statutes does not require the emaciation of clearly expressed provisions and a subversion of the manifest purpose of the legislation.
In Beckwith v The Queen[5], Gibbs J said:
“The rule formerly accepted, that statutes creating offences are to be strictly construed, has lost much of its importance in modern times. In determining the meaning of penal statute the ordinary rules of construction must be applied, but if the language of the statute remains ambiguous or doubtful the ambiguity or doubt may be resolved in favour of the subject by refusing to extend the category of criminal offences…The rule is perhaps on of last resort.”[6]
[5] (1976) 135 CLR 569.
[6] Beckwith v The Queen (1976) 135 CLR 569 at 576.
The plain words of s 17, and the manifest purpose, of the Act do not leave any room for doubt or ambiguity.
Having held that the reporting obligation imposed by s 17 of the Act applies to the appellant, it remains to consider further his claim to have had a reasonable excuse for his failure to give notice of his intended departure.
No Reasonable Excuse
I turn first to the question of the onus of proof.
Dixon CJ explained the principle of construction by which this question must be resolved in Dowling v Bowie[7]:
The argument treats the case as governed by the common law doctrine that where a statute having defined the grounds of some liability it imposes proceeds to introduce by some distinct provision a matter of exception or excuse, it lies upon the party seeking to avail himself of the exception or excuse to prove the facts which bring his case within it. The common law rule distinguishes between such a statutory provision and one where the definition of the grounds of liability contains within itself the statement of the exception or qualification, and in the latter case the law places upon the party asserting that the liability has been incurred the burden of negativing the existence of facts bringing the case within the exception or qualification. See Barritt v Baker. The distinction has been criticized as unreal and illusory and as, at best, depending on nothing but the form in which legislation may be cast and not upon its substantial meaning or effect. The question, however, where in such cases the burden of proof lies may be determined in accordance with common law principle upon considerations of substance and not of form. A qualification or exception to a general principle of liability may express an exculpation excuse or justification or ground of defeasance which assumes the existence of the facts upon which the general rule of liability is based and depends on additional facts of a special kind. If that is the effect of the statutory provisions, considerations of substance may warrant the conclusion that the party relying on the qualification or exception must show that he comes within it. Cf. Pye v Metropolitan Coal Co. Ltd.; Darling Island Stevedoring & Lighterage Co. Ltd .v Jacobson.
[7] Dowling v Bowie (1952) 86 CLR 136.
Dealing with the mere form of s 44 of the Act, the element of reasonable excuse is incorporated in the very provision which creates the offence, thus giving the appearance that proof of its absence is a necessary element of guilt. However, in my view, the substance of the offence created by s 44 of the Act is the failure to comply with reporting obligations. A registrable offender will escape liability for that failure only if he or she has a reasonable excuse for it. The obligation to report is not merely a desired practice, departure from which is only an offence if accompanied by unacceptable circumstances. The scheme of the Act demands, and its success depends on, a very high degree of compliance. The onus of proof therefore rests on the registrable offender.
The first reasonable excuse proffered by the appellant is that in the time between the formation of his intention and the departure of his flight for Sydney there was no police officer authorised to receive a report of his notification, pursuant to s 22 of the Act, available to take that report.
The evidence of approval of police officers by the Commissioner, for receiving reports in person, was far from clear. The police witnesses appeared to conflate the approval of police officers pursuant to s 22(2) of the Act with authorisations to access the register of child sex offenders pursuant to Pt 4 of the Act. Ultimately, the evidence did not show that any person other than Senior Sergeant McLean (Sergeant McLean) was approved to take reports in person. Indeed, Sergeant McLean’s evidence that he was approved was not convincing. Sergeant McLean testified that the Commissioner had delegated the responsibilities under the Act to him. A document said to evidence the delegation was received as exhibit P2. Exhibit P2 contained no such general delegation. Exhibit P2 merely nominated the police officer in the position held by Sergeant McLean, “Officer-in-Charge of the ANCOR Unit”, as a police officer who could provide an evidentiary certificate as to the contents of the register pursuant to s 72 of the Act.
Sergeant McLean also expressed his “view as Registrar” that travel plans could be reported to a police officer by phone, letter or email. There is no statutory position of “Registrar”[8], but Sergeant McLean may have been referring to his authorisation pursuant to s 72 of the Act. Be that as it may, that delegation, exhibit P2, gave him no authority to exercise the Commissioner’s power, under s 22 of the Act, to permit alternative means of reporting travel. When Sergeant McLean was asked expressly whether he was approved by the Commissioner for the purpose of receiving a report in person pursuant to s 22(3) he again asserted that as the “ANCOR Registrar” he was responsible for the administration of the “Registry.” There is no “Registry” established by the Act. Attempts by counsel to draw Sergeant McLean’s attention to the distinction between the operation of ss 22 and 72 of the Act were met with the response “I must admit I am a bit confused…”.
[8] The Act uses the term “corresponding registrar” to mean the person in interstate and foreign jurisdictions who discharges functions similar to those exercised by the Commissioner under the Act.
Eventually, Sergeant McLean testified that he did have a direction from the Commissioner giving him responsibility for the management of registrable offenders which included an approval to take reports from offenders pursuant to s 22(3) of the Act, but that he would have to return to his office to find it. Sergeant McLean also testified that approximately 80 to 100 other police officers were similarly authorised. I find it difficult to have sufficient confidence in his evidence to find that those officers were in fact approved by the Commissioner. I suspect they were merely police officers who had been allocated those responsibilities by other officers in the SAPOL hierarchy:[9]
[9] The appellant was interviewed after his return to Australia by Detective Brevet Sergeant Crowhurst. Detective Crowhurst testified that even though he had been stationed at the Sexual Crime Investigation Branch since January 2005 he did not believe he was authorised to take reports of intended overseas travel from registered offenders. Another witness, Detective Simpson, who was attached to the ANCOR unit, testified that he “believed” he was approved by the Commissioner to receive a report but that he had no written approval to that effect.
There was no evidence that Sergeant McLean was available to take a report from the appellant in the time between the formation of the intention by the appellant and his departure. On the other hand, the evidence did not show that he was not available. The evidence certainly does not show that he was not available to take a report from the appellant had the appellant delayed his departure to allow a reasonable time in which to make a report seven days before his departure.
In my view, the appellant failed to discharge his burden to show that there were no approved police officers available to take his report. Even though the evidence that the Commissioner had approved police officers was unsatisfactory, the evidence did not establish that he had not done so. Having failed to prove that the Commissioner had not approved any police officers to take a report of his intended travel plans the appellant’s reliance on the limited amount of time between discovering he was booked on a flight to Bali and his departure was misplaced for two reasons.
First, it is a necessary implication of s 17(3) of the Act that there can be no reasonable excuse, within the meaning of that term in s 33 of the Act, for not giving at least 24 hours notice.
Secondly, the reasonableness of the excuse is not to be adjudged within the constraint created by the registrable offender’s own decision to depart quickly. The question which must be asked is whether or not there was a reasonable excuse for leaving at all, or at least for not delaying the departure. It will rarely be the case that the personal enjoyment of a holiday will amount to a reasonable excuse for non-compliance with the Act. It is equally difficult to see how the financial loss which might be occasioned by cancelling travel bookings, which had been made without regard to the notice requirements of the Act, could amount to reasonable excuse. In this case there was no evidence of the financial loss which would have been suffered if the appellant’s travel had been re-arranged.
Finally, even if it were proven that no approved police officer was available to take the appellant’s report, even if he had delayed his departure, that circumstance alone would not have given the appellant a reasonable excuse. I accept that if a registrable offender plans his travel in a way which allows a reasonable time to make an appointment with an approved police officer to report his intended travel, and takes reasonable steps to do so, but, nonetheless, is unable to report, because of the unavailability of an approved police officer, he will have a reasonable excuse for non-compliance. However, in this case, even if the Commissioner had failed to approve any person to take the report, that failure was not relevantly causative of, and was therefore not the excuse for, the appellant’s failure to discharge his reporting obligations. The fact remains that the appellant made no attempt at all to report his intended travel. The Magistrate expressly found that the appellant was aware of his obligation before he left Adelaide but decided not to discharge it. The appellant may have had a reasonable excuse if he had made reasonable efforts to notify the Commissioner of his intended travel but those efforts had been frustrated by the failure of the Commissioner to approve a police officer to take the report. However, the cause of the appellant’s non-compliance was his deliberate choice to prefer his personal holiday over his statutory reporting obligations.
Penalty
The appellant was well aware of his obligation to report his travel. In mid 2008, he travelled to Vanuatu and after his return, was spoken to by a police officer. Detective Simpson testified that he telephoned the appellant in June 2009 to discuss his unreported overseas travel. According to Detective Simpson the appellant complained that he did not “agree wholly with the Act…” Detective Simpson reminded him of his obligation to give seven days notice of overseas travel. Detective Simpson informed the appellant that the report could be made by email, telephone or personal communication with the ANCOR unit. In July 2009, Detective Simpson met the appellant and his wife at a North Adelaide Café. The appellant was again reminded of his obligation to report his intended travel. The appellant was also given a written document which asserted that he must report all travel outside of South Australia for a period of 14 consecutive days at least seven days prior to departing by attending in person. In that respect the document is misleading because all overseas travel, irrespective of the intended length of absences is reportable. [10]
[10] Even though the appellant’s Bali holiday was planned to be for less than 14 days he did not rely on the misinformation as a reasonable excuse for his failure or in mitigation for sentencing purposes.
It was open to the Magistrate to take the view that the real reason for the appellant’s non-compliance was his resentment of the restrictions on his freedom of travel imposed by the Act when he had been convicted so long ago.
The appellant’s case for an exercise of the discretion not to record a conviction was not a strong one. His record is already significantly tainted by his convictions for sexual offences in the District Court in 1992.
The Act establishes a scheme for the protection of children. The protection of children, in Australia and overseas, from sexual assault is of paramount importance. I acknowledge that the scheme is so wide that the restrictions will be applied to some persons who do not present any, or any substantial, risk of further offending. However, it is impracticable to establish a scheme which would differentiate between offenders according to their risk profile. The success of the regime established by the Act requires penalties for breach of the notification and reporting obligations which act as a strong general deterrent.
The imposition of convictions and of fines which are sufficient to influence registrable offenders to delay their travel plans in order to meet the reporting timetable will, generally, be necessary in order to achieve the Act’s purposes. Indeed, it must not be overlooked that the penalties provided by the Act for breach of the reporting obligations include imprisonment.
It has not been shown that the sentence imposed was manifestly excessive.
Conclusion
I dismiss the appeal against conviction and sentence