FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Prodata Solutions Pty Ltd v South Australian Fire and Emergency Services Commission [2018] FCA 1665
File number: SAD 338 of 2017 Judge: CHARLESWORTH J Date of judgment: 2 November 2018 Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – security for costs sought by two respondents from corporate applicant – applicant voluntarily providing security in significant amounts by way of irrevocable bank guarantees – whether additional security should be ordered – whether there is reason to believe the applicant will be unable to pay the costs of the respondents if the respondents are successful in their defence – whether security should be ordered in respect of past costs already subject to a costs order – whether respondents’ delay in bringing the application is productive of unfairness – additional security ordered Legislation: Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 1335
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) ss 37M, 56
Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) r 19.01
Cases cited: Buckley v Bennell Design & Construction Pty Ltd (1974) 1 ACLR 301
Christou v Stanton Partners Australasia Pty Ltd [2011] WASCA 176
Electrona Carbide Industries Pty Ltd v Tasmanian Government Insurance Board [1985] Tas R 68
Fencott (Bryan E) and Associates Pty Ltd v Eretta Pty Ltd (1987) 16 FCR 497
Fiduciary Ltd v Morningstar Research Pty Ltd [2004] NSWSC 664; (2004) 208 ALR 564
Health Information Pharmacy Franchising Pty Ltd v Khoo [2010] FCA 438
Idoport Pty Ltd v National Australia Bank Ltd [2001] NSWSC 744
Jazabas Pty Ltd & Ors v Haddad & Ors [2007] NSWCA 291
KP Cable Investments Pty Ltd v Meltglow Pty Ltd (1995) 56 FCR 189
Litmus Australia Pty Ltd (in liq) v Paul Brian Canty & Ors [2007] NSWSC 670
Menhaden Pty Ltd v Citibank NA (1984) 1 FCR 542
Mercus Pty Ltd v Industrrial Energy Pty Ltd [2015] FCA 103; (2015) 327 ALR 523
Southern Cross Exploration NL v Fire & All Risks Insurance Co Ltd (1985) 1 NSWLR 114
Trility Pty Ltd v Ancon Drilling Pty Ltd [2013] VSC 577
Warren Mitchell Pty Ltd v Australian Maritime Officers Union (1993) 12 ACSR 1
Date of hearing: 2 October 2018 Registry: South Australia Division: General Division National Practice Area: Intellectual Property Sub-area: Copyright and Industrial Designs Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 77 Counsel for the Applicant: Mr P Quinn with Mr A Schatz Solicitor for the Applicant: Nick Zenophon & Col Lawyers Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr T Golding Solicitor for the First Respondent: Crown Solicitor’s Office Counsel for the Second Respondent: Mr T Duggan SC with Ms A Wells Solicitor for the Second Respondent: Tindall Gask Bentley Lawyers ORDERS
SAD 338 of 2017 BETWEEN: PRODATA SOLUTIONS PTY LTD (ACN 058 014 823)
Applicant
AND: SOUTH AUSTRALIAN FIRE AND EMERGENCY SERVICES COMMISSION
First Respondent
SMS CONSULTING GROUP LTD TRADING AS SMS MANAGEMENT AND TECHNOLOGY (ACN 006 515 028)
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
CHARLESWORTH J
DATE OF…
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- Case
- [2018] FCA 1665
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court considered the evidence of Prodata’s financial position, which showed that the company had lost its largest client, SAFECom, and had not received any payment for its source code in the ESOTAS system. The court found that there was credible evidence to suggest that Prodata may fold if it were unable to pay the costs of the respondents. The court also noted that the irrevocable bank guarantees provided by Prodata were likely to be insufficient to cover the costs of the respondents. The court concluded that there was reason to believe that Prodata would be unable to pay the costs of the respondents if the respondents were successful in their defence. The court found that the respondents had discharged their burden of establishing the threshold requirement for an order for security. The court exercised its discretion to order Prodata to provide additional security for costs in the amount of $200,000.00. The court found that the delay in bringing the application for security was not productive of unfairness. The court noted that the delay was due to the respondents’ need to obtain evidence of Prodata’s financial position, which was not readily available. The court found that the delay did not prejudice Prodata and that an order for security was necessary to protect the respondents’ interests.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The Court’s power to make an order for security for costs may be drawn from s 1335 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), s 56 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) (FCA Act) and r 19.01 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth). It is convenient to determine the application by reference to the Corporations Act and FCA Act provisions, on which the parties focused their submissions. They respectively provide:1335 Costs(1)Where a corporation is plaintiff in any action or other legal proceeding, the court having jurisdiction in the matter may, if it appears by credible testimony that there is reason to believe that the corporation will be unable to pay the costs of the defendant if successful in his, her or its defence, require sufficient security to be given for those costs and stay all proceedings until the security is given.56 Security(1)The Court or a Judge may order an applicant in a proceeding in the Court, or an appellant in an appeal under Division 2 of Part III, to give security for the payment of costs that may be awarded against him or her.(2)The security shall be of such amount, and given at such time and in such manner and form, as the Court or Judge directs.(3)The Court or a Judge may reduce or increase the amount of security ordered to be given and may vary the time at which, or manner or form in which, the security is to be given.(4)If security, or further security, is not given in accordance with an order under this section, the Court or a Judge may order that the proceeding or appeal be dismissed.(5)This section does not affect the operation of any provision made by or under any other Act or by the Rules of Court for or in relation to the furnishing of security. If there be differences between these provisions they are not differences upon which the present application turns. Two issues arise. The first is whether the jurisdiction to make the order is enlivened. The second is whether and how the discretion to make the order should be exercised. The power to make the order under s 1335 of the Corporations Act will be enlivened “if it appears by credible testimony that there is reason to believe that the corporation will be unable to pay the costs of the defendant if successful in his, her or its defence”. As Lee J said in Warren Mitchell Pty Ltd v Australian Maritime Officers Union (1993) 12 ACSR 1 at 5, the word “credible” suggests a requirement that the evidence relied upon by the applicant for security have some “characteristic of cogency”. The threshold requirement has otherwise been the subject of varying judicial opinions. They are neatly summarised by Yates J in Health Information Pharmacy Franchising Pty Ltd v Khoo [2010] FCA 438:5Unlike s 1335(1) of the Corporations Act, s 56 of the Federal Court Act does not require ‘credible testimony that there is reason to believe that the corporation will be unable to pay the costs of [the respondents]’. The differences between the two provisions have been considered by decisions of this Court: see, for example, Instyle Contract Textiles Pty Ltd v Good Environmental Choice Services Pty Ltd (2009) 181 FCR 360 at [6]-[8]; MHG Plastic Industries Pty Ltd v Quality Assurance Services Pty Limited [2002] FCA 821 at [8]-[9]. However, given that the applicant’s impecuniosity was the cornerstone of their motion, the respondents submitted that the Court’s jurisdiction under both provisions was, in this case, relevantly identical. They proceeded on the basis that they were required to satisfy the threshold requirement of s 1335(1) in order to succeed on the motion. This approach is understandable. Where the only asserted basis for an order for security relates to the alleged inability of the applicant to meet a future costs order, it is difficult to see in practice a difference between the operation of the two provisions: see the observations of Perram J in Soul Pattinson Telecommunications Pty Ltd v Subex Americas Inc [2009] FCA 651 at [6].6In light of the way in which the respondents have put their motion, it is appropriate to say something further about the threshold requirement of s 1335(1) of the Corporations Act.7The nature of the requirement was described by von Doussa J in Beach Petroleum NL v Johnson (1992) 7 ACSR 203 at 205 as follows:In my opinion the power of the court under s 1335 arises if credible evidence establishes that there is reason to believe there is a real chance that in events which can be fairly described as reasonably possible the plaintiff corporation will be unable to pay the costs of the defendant on service of the allocatur, if judgment goes against it. This will be so even if in other events which can also be fairly described as reasonably possible the plaintiff corporation would be able to pay the costs. The degree of likelihood of the plaintiff corporation being unable to pay the costs along with all the circumstances, actual and possible, about its financial position, would be then taken into account in the exercise of discretion, and in framing the orders of the court if the decision is to order security. 8This approach has been applied many times but has been criticised. In Livingspring Pty Ltd v Kliger Partners (2008) 20 VR 377 at [13]-[14] the Court of Appeal in Victoria said that it was wrong to substitute a judicial exposition for the words of the statute itself: see Central Bayside General Practice Association Ltd v Commissioner of State Revenue (2006) 228 CLR 168 at [84]. The Court of Appeal said that the statutory test was clear: Is there reason to believe that the corporation will be unable to pay the costs of the defendant if successful?9 The Court of Appeal at [15] continued as follows: The phrase ‘reason to believe’ is the touchstone of jurisdiction. It requires a rational basis for the belief – and no more. The wording adopted may be contrasted with other familiar formulations such as ‘if the court is satisfied that’ or ‘if in the view of the court it is likely that’. The section requires the making of a judgment, a risk assessment: is there a risk that the corporation will be unable to pay? (It adds nothing, in our view, to say that it must be a ‘real risk’.) A risk assessment is, of necessity, imprecise. The section calls for a practical, commonsense approach to the examination of the corporation’s financial affairs.10This approach was favoured in Smart Co Pty Ltd v Clipsal Australia Pty Ltd [2009] FCA 1253 at [43].11It may be a matter of debate whether in Beach Petroleum von Doussa J did place an impermissible gloss of the words of s 1335(1): Reinsurance Australia Corporation Limited v HIH Casualty and General Insurance Ltd (in liquidation) [2003] FCA 803 at [12]-[21]. Be that as it may, I propose to follow the approach in Livingspring and Smart, by focussing on the words of the statutory provision itself.