Prodata Solutions Pty Ltd v South Australian Fire and Emergency Services Commission

Link copied
Case Copied 34 min read

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Prodata Solutions Pty Ltd v South Australian Fire and Emergency Services Commission [2018] FCA 1665

File number: SAD 338 of 2017
Judge: CHARLESWORTH J
Date of judgment: 2 November 2018
Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – security for costs sought by two respondents from corporate applicant – applicant voluntarily providing security in significant amounts by way of irrevocable bank guarantees – whether additional security should be ordered – whether there is reason to believe the applicant will be unable to pay the costs of the respondents if the respondents are successful in their defence – whether security should be ordered in respect of past costs already subject to a costs order – whether respondents’ delay in bringing the application is productive of unfairness – additional security ordered 
Legislation:

Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 1335

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) ss 37M, 56

Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) r 19.01

Cases cited:

Australian Equity Investors, An Arizona Limited Partnership v Colliers International (NSW) Pty Limited (No 5) [2011] FCA 1041

Buckley v Bennell Design & Construction Pty Ltd (1974) 1 ACLR 301

Christou v Stanton Partners Australasia Pty Ltd [2011] WASCA 176

Electrona Carbide Industries Pty Ltd v Tasmanian Government Insurance Board [1985] Tas R 68

Fencott (Bryan E) and Associates Pty Ltd v Eretta Pty Ltd (1987) 16 FCR 497

Fiduciary Ltd v Morningstar Research Pty Ltd [2004] NSWSC 664; (2004) 208 ALR 564

Health Information Pharmacy Franchising Pty Ltd v Khoo [2010] FCA 438

Idoport Pty Ltd v National Australia Bank Ltd [2001] NSWSC 744

Jazabas Pty Ltd & Ors v Haddad & Ors [2007] NSWCA 291

KP Cable Investments Pty Ltd v Meltglow Pty Ltd (1995) 56 FCR 189

Litmus Australia Pty Ltd (in liq) v Paul Brian Canty & Ors [2007] NSWSC 670

Menhaden Pty Ltd v Citibank NA (1984) 1 FCR 542

Mercus Pty Ltd v Industrrial Energy Pty Ltd [2015] FCA 103; (2015) 327 ALR 523

Southern Cross Exploration NL v Fire & All Risks Insurance Co Ltd (1985) 1 NSWLR 114

Trility Pty Ltd v Ancon Drilling Pty Ltd [2013] VSC 577

Warren Mitchell Pty Ltd v Australian Maritime Officers Union (1993) 12 ACSR 1

Date of hearing: 2 October 2018
Registry: South Australia
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Intellectual Property
Sub-area: Copyright and Industrial Designs
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 77
Counsel for the Applicant: Mr P Quinn with Mr A Schatz
Solicitor for the Applicant: Nick Zenophon & Col Lawyers
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr T Golding
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Crown Solicitor’s Office
Counsel for the Second Respondent: Mr T Duggan SC with Ms A Wells
Solicitor for the Second Respondent: Tindall Gask Bentley Lawyers

ORDERS

SAD 338 of 2017
BETWEEN:

PRODATA SOLUTIONS PTY LTD (ACN 058 014 823)

Applicant

AND:

SOUTH AUSTRALIAN FIRE AND EMERGENCY SERVICES COMMISSION

First Respondent

SMS CONSULTING GROUP LTD TRADING AS SMS MANAGEMENT AND TECHNOLOGY (ACN 006 515 028)

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

CHARLESWORTH J

DATE OF…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Prodata Solutions Pty Ltd v South Australian Fire and Emerge... and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2018] FCA 1665
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Prodata Solutions Pty Ltd, the plaintiff, brought proceedings against the South Australian Fire and Emergency Services Commission, SAFECom, and SMS. Prodata sought security for costs from SAFECom and SMS, who are the respondents in this matter. The primary issue before the court was whether the applicants had satisfied the threshold requirement for an order for security under section 1335 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), and whether the court should exercise its discretion to make an order for additional security. The court concluded that the respondents had discharged their burden of establishing the threshold requirement for an order for security. The court found that there was reason to believe that Prodata would be unable to pay the costs of the respondents if the respondents were successful in their defence. The court ordered Prodata to provide additional security for costs in the amount of $200,000.00.

The court considered the evidence of Prodata’s financial position, which showed that the company had lost its largest client, SAFECom, and had not received any payment for its source code in the ESOTAS system. The court found that there was credible evidence to suggest that Prodata may fold if it were unable to pay the costs of the respondents. The court also noted that the irrevocable bank guarantees provided by Prodata were likely to be insufficient to cover the costs of the respondents. The court concluded that there was reason to believe that Prodata would be unable to pay the costs of the respondents if the respondents were successful in their defence. The court found that the respondents had discharged their burden of establishing the threshold requirement for an order for security. The court exercised its discretion to order Prodata to provide additional security for costs in the amount of $200,000.00. The court found that the delay in bringing the application for security was not productive of unfairness. The court noted that the delay was due to the respondents’ need to obtain evidence of Prodata’s financial position, which was not readily available. The court found that the delay did not prejudice Prodata and that an order for security was necessary to protect the respondents’ interests.

Orders

Orders of the court

Full text does not contain this section.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

On 21 August 2018 Prodata filed a notice of change of solicitor. The new solicitors have engaged different counsel for the preparation and conduct of the trial.Evidence of Prodata’s financial position There are no financial statements before the Court detailing Prodata’s current financial position. Each party invites the Court to draw inferences on the limited information that is available. For Prodata it is submitted that the paucity of evidence is fatal to the respondents’ applications for security because they cannot satisfy the Court that the precondition for making the orders is met. A recent extract from the Australian Securities and Investments Commission database shows that Prodata is an Australian proprietary company limited by shares with its principal place of business in Hackney, South Australia. Mr David Mifsud is its sole director and secretary. It has issued share capital of $2.00. Mr Mifsud is the sole legal and beneficial owner of the two issued shares in the company. The assets of the company do not appear to be subject to any unsatisfied charges. Prodata is not the registered proprietor of any real property situated in South Australia. The registered owner of its principal place of business is Mr Mifsud. In support of its urgent interlocutory application, Prodata relied (relevantly) upon two affidavits sworn by Mr Mifsud on 7 December 2017 and 19 December 2017. In the first of those affidavits, Mr Mifsud said (at [132]):SAFECOM is Prodata’s largest client. It accounts for about 60 per cent of Prodata’s business. If Prodata loses SAFECOM as a client without any payment for Prodata’s source code, and without any transitioning-out phase, Prodata may fold. If it does not, I will very likely need to let my employees go. They have been working at Prodata for about 20 years. If Prodata were to get back on its feet later, it would, in my experience, be nearly impossible to find employees of equivalent skill in Adelaide. To the other affidavit, Mr Mifsud annexed (at DM 30) a document titled “Assets & Liability Statement as at today” (19 December 2017)). It contains information, in the form of a simplified table, concerning the financial position of Prodata and of Mr Mifsud personally as at that date. It indicates, and for present purposes I accept, that the net assets of Prodata were, at that time, $155,663.00. As the title to the document suggests, it is concerned with the assets and liabilities of Prodata and Mr Mifsud and so is in the nature of a crude balance sheet. It does not constitute a profit and loss statement in respect of Prodata. Nothing on this application depends upon the net asset position of Mr Mifsud personally. He has not personally given an undertaking to satisfy any costs order that may be made against Prodata and he is not the BankSA customer standing behind the guarantees. He is not otherwise liable to pay any costs order made against Prodata in the proceedings to date and there is nothing to suggest that an order for costs should be made against him personally in the future course of the proceedings.

Decision

Reasons for decision

There is no evidence as to the funding arrangements (if any) that exist between Prodata and the two the customers referred to in the guarantees. Nor is there evidence as to the interests (if any) that the two customers may have in the outcome of the action.Conclusions In light of the provision of the irrevocable bank guarantees, the appropriate question is whether there is reason to believe that Prodata will be unable to pay that part of the respondent’s assessed costs that exceeds (in each case) $100,000.00. That involves a prospective assessment, both of Prodata’s likely financial position at the conclusion of the trial, and of the respondents’ likely recoverable costs should they successfully defend Prodata’s claim. Estimates of the respondents’ costs up to and including the first day of the trial and to the conclusion of the trial are provided elsewhere in these reasons. On those estimates, I conclude that the security, as presently furnished, will likely be insufficient to discharge Prodata’s liability to pay the assessed costs of both SAFECom and SMS. I consider the evidence of Mr Mifsud concerning Prodata’s financial position in December 2017 to be reliable and genuine. Although expressed as a pessimistic prediction, the prediction was premised on certain events occurring which have since in fact occurred. Prodata has lost SAFECom as a client and has not received any payment for its source code in the ESOTAS system. It was these feared events that informed Mr Mifsud’s genuine concern that Prodata “may fold”. The more recent August letter fortifies me in the view that there has been no significant event in Prodata’s trading or other activities so as to put it in a significantly different financial position than that predicted by Mr Mifsud. The letter serves only to confirm Prodata’s dependence on the revenue it received from SAFECom pursuant to the now-expired 2014 Agreement. As I have said, the respondents have the burden of satisfying the Court that the precondition for making the orders is met. I consider they have discharged that burden by the credible testimony to which I have referred, considered in light of the evidence as a whole. The circumstance that Prodata has not in fact “folded” does not discount a reasonable belief that it may yet do so prior to trial or that it may do so by reason of a significant costs order being made in the respondents’ favour. The scenario to be assessed is not the present scenario in which Prodata is obliged to meet only its own legal expenses. The relevant future scenario is one in which Prodata is obliged to compensate two other parties for their own significant cost burdens, after a trial in which it will incur its own considerable costs. The circumstance that Prodata has to date paid its legal expenses from its own resources is, to my mind, a double edged sword. Whilst those payments indicate that Prodata has to date been able to pay its debts as and when they fall due, if Prodata paid those debts by having recourse to the limited assets referred in Mr Mifsud’s affidavit sworn on 19 December 2017, it may be inferred that it is presently in an overall worse financial position than it was in at that earlier time. In the absence of direct evidence as to how Prodata was able to pay such a significant expense from its own resources, the circumstance that Prodata has in fact paid the expenses is of limited forensic assistance.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The Court’s power to make an order for security for costs may be drawn from s 1335 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), s 56 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) (FCA Act) and r 19.01 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth). It is convenient to determine the application by reference to the Corporations Act and FCA Act provisions, on which the parties focused their submissions. They respectively provide:1335 Costs(1)Where a corporation is plaintiff in any action or other legal proceeding, the court having jurisdiction in the matter may, if it appears by credible testimony that there is reason to believe that the corporation will be unable to pay the costs of the defendant if successful in his, her or its defence, require sufficient security to be given for those costs and stay all proceedings until the security is given.56 Security(1)The Court or a Judge may order an applicant in a proceeding in the Court, or an appellant in an appeal under Division 2 of Part III, to give security for the payment of costs that may be awarded against him or her.(2)The security shall be of such amount, and given at such time and in such manner and form, as the Court or Judge directs.(3)The Court or a Judge may reduce or increase the amount of security ordered to be given and may vary the time at which, or manner or form in which, the security is to be given.(4)If security, or further security, is not given in accordance with an order under this section, the Court or a Judge may order that the proceeding or appeal be dismissed.(5)This section does not affect the operation of any provision made by or under any other Act or by the Rules of Court for or in relation to the furnishing of security. If there be differences between these provisions they are not differences upon which the present application turns. Two issues arise. The first is whether the jurisdiction to make the order is enlivened. The second is whether and how the discretion to make the order should be exercised. The power to make the order under s 1335 of the Corporations Act will be enlivened “if it appears by credible testimony that there is reason to believe that the corporation will be unable to pay the costs of the defendant if successful in his, her or its defence”. As Lee J said in Warren Mitchell Pty Ltd v Australian Maritime Officers Union (1993) 12 ACSR 1 at 5, the word “credible” suggests a requirement that the evidence relied upon by the applicant for security have some “characteristic of cogency”. The threshold requirement has otherwise been the subject of varying judicial opinions. They are neatly summarised by Yates J in Health Information Pharmacy Franchising Pty Ltd v Khoo [2010] FCA 438:5Unlike s 1335(1) of the Corporations Act, s 56 of the Federal Court Act does not require ‘credible testimony that there is reason to believe that the corporation will be unable to pay the costs of [the respondents]’. The differences between the two provisions have been considered by decisions of this Court: see, for example, Instyle Contract Textiles Pty Ltd v Good Environmental Choice Services Pty Ltd (2009) 181 FCR 360 at [6]-[8]; MHG Plastic Industries Pty Ltd v Quality Assurance Services Pty Limited [2002] FCA 821 at [8]-[9]. However, given that the applicant’s impecuniosity was the cornerstone of their motion, the respondents submitted that the Court’s jurisdiction under both provisions was, in this case, relevantly identical. They proceeded on the basis that they were required to satisfy the threshold requirement of s 1335(1) in order to succeed on the motion. This approach is understandable. Where the only asserted basis for an order for security relates to the alleged inability of the applicant to meet a future costs order, it is difficult to see in practice a difference between the operation of the two provisions: see the observations of Perram J in Soul Pattinson Telecommunications Pty Ltd v Subex Americas Inc [2009] FCA 651 at [6].6In light of the way in which the respondents have put their motion, it is appropriate to say something further about the threshold requirement of s 1335(1) of the Corporations Act.7The nature of the requirement was described by von Doussa J in Beach Petroleum NL v Johnson (1992) 7 ACSR 203 at 205 as follows:In my opinion the power of the court under s 1335 arises if credible evidence establishes that there is reason to believe there is a real chance that in events which can be fairly described as reasonably possible the plaintiff corporation will be unable to pay the costs of the defendant on service of the allocatur, if judgment goes against it. This will be so even if in other events which can also be fairly described as reasonably possible the plaintiff corporation would be able to pay the costs. The degree of likelihood of the plaintiff corporation being unable to pay the costs along with all the circumstances, actual and possible, about its financial position, would be then taken into account in the exercise of discretion, and in framing the orders of the court if the decision is to order security. 8This approach has been applied many times but has been criticised. In Livingspring Pty Ltd v Kliger Partners (2008) 20 VR 377 at [13]-[14] the Court of Appeal in Victoria said that it was wrong to substitute a judicial exposition for the words of the statute itself: see Central Bayside General Practice Association Ltd v Commissioner of State Revenue (2006) 228 CLR 168 at [84]. The Court of Appeal said that the statutory test was clear: Is there reason to believe that the corporation will be unable to pay the costs of the defendant if successful?9 The Court of Appeal at [15] continued as follows: The phrase ‘reason to believe’ is the touchstone of jurisdiction. It requires a rational basis for the belief – and no more. The wording adopted may be contrasted with other familiar formulations such as ‘if the court is satisfied that’ or ‘if in the view of the court it is likely that’. The section requires the making of a judgment, a risk assessment: is there a risk that the corporation will be unable to pay? (It adds nothing, in our view, to say that it must be a ‘real risk’.) A risk assessment is, of necessity, imprecise. The section calls for a practical, commonsense approach to the examination of the corporation’s financial affairs.10This approach was favoured in Smart Co Pty Ltd v Clipsal Australia Pty Ltd [2009] FCA 1253 at [43].11It may be a matter of debate whether in Beach Petroleum von Doussa J did place an impermissible gloss of the words of s 1335(1): Reinsurance Australia Corporation Limited v HIH Casualty and General Insurance Ltd (in liquidation) [2003] FCA 803 at [12]-[21]. Be that as it may, I propose to follow the approach in Livingspring and Smart, by focussing on the words of the statutory provision itself.