Prodata Solutions Pty Ltd v South Australian Fire and Emergency Services Commission (No 3)

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Prodata Solutions Pty Ltd v South Australian Fire and Emergency Services Commission (No 3) [2020] FCA 1210

File number: SAD 338 of 2017
Judge: CHARLESWORTH J
Date of judgment: 21 August 2020
Catchwords:

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application by respondents for dismissal of proceedings pursuant to r 5.23(b)(i) the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) or s 37P(5) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) – where the applicant is in default within the meaning of r 5.22 of the Rules – where applicant failed to file lay affidavits within ordered timeframe – where applicant failed to prosecute the proceeding with due diligence – where applicant failed to make a timely application to vary orders progressing the matter to trial – where applicant failed to apply for variation of the trial dates –where applicant’s default caused the trial dates to be vacated – where applicant has provided no satisfactory explanation for its default – applicant’s conduct having the effect of delaying the progress of the matter to trial in circumstances where orders for delay could not have been secured on the merits –whether the overarching purpose in s 37M of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) would be “best promoted” by the dismissal of the originating application – originating application dismissed

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application by corporate applicant for dispensation with the requirement in r 4.01(2) of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) – corporate applicant seeking to be represented in the proceedings by its managing director – where applicant previously terminated the retainer of four successive lawyers in the proceedings – consideration of factors relevant to the exercise of the discretion to dispense with the usual rule – whether respondents’ applications for dismissal should be assessed on the assumption that the corporate applicant would be represented by a lawyer in the event that the proceedings were to remain on foot

Legislation:

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) ss 37M, 37N, 37P

Copyright Act 1968 (Cth)

Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) rr 1.34, 4.01, 4.04, 5.22, 5.23, 11.02, 30.01

Civil Procedure Act 2010 (Vic) ss 7, 9

Supreme Court (General Civil Procedure) Rules 2015 (Vic) r 63.03

Cases cited:

AON Risk Services Australia Limited v Australian National University (2019) 239 CLR 175

Coal and Allied Operations Pty Ltd v Australian Industrial Relations Commission (2000) 203 CLR 194

Cox v Journeaux (No 2) (1935) 52 CLR 713

Flightdeck Geelong Pty Ltd v All Options Pty Ltd [2020] FCAFC 138

Pharm-a-Care Laboratories Pty Ltd v Commonwealth of Australia (No 12) [2012] FCA 289

Prodata Solutions Pty Ltd v South Australian Fire and Emergency Services Commission [2018] FCA 1665

Prodata Solutions Pty Ltd v South Australian Fire and Emergency Services Commission (No 2) [2019] FCA 2051

Queensland v JL Holdings Pty Ltd (1997) 189 CLR 146

Rozenblit v Vainer (2018) 262 CLR 478

Sali v SPC Ltd [1993] HCA 47; 116 ALR 625

Southcorp Brands Pty Ltd v Australia Rush Rich Winery Pty…

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Details
Case
[2020] FCA 1210
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Prodata Solutions Pty Ltd initiated proceedings against the South Australian Fire and Emergency Services Commission and SMS Consulting Pty Ltd in the Federal Court of Australia, claiming infringement of copyright and passing off. The respondents applied for the dismissal of Prodata's claim on the basis of its default under r 5.22 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth), as well as for the enforcement of the requirement in r 4.01(2) of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) that Prodata be represented by a legal practitioner in the proceedings. The primary legal issues before the court were whether Prodata's default warranted the dismissal of its originating application and whether Prodata was entitled to be dispensed with the requirement to be represented by a legal practitioner.

The court held that Prodata's default warranted the dismissal of its originating application. Prodata had failed to file its lay affidavits within the ordered timeframe, had not made a timely application to vary orders progressing the matter to trial, and had not applied for variation of the trial dates. These defaults caused the trial dates to be vacated, and Prodata provided no satisfactory explanation for its default. The court concluded that Prodata's conduct had delayed the progress of the matter to trial, and that the dismissal of the originating application would best promote the overarching purpose in s 37M of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth).

The court also held that Prodata was not entitled to be dispensed with the requirement to be represented by a legal practitioner. Prodata had terminated the retainer of four successive lawyers in the proceedings, and the court found that the factors relevant to the exercise of the discretion to dispense with the usual rule did not favour the granting of such relief. The court held that the respondents' applications for dismissal should be assessed on the assumption that Prodata would be represented by a lawyer if the proceedings were to remain on foot.

The court dismissed Prodata's interlocutory application and the originating application, and ordered that Prodata pay the costs of the interlocutory applications and suppression applications. The court also dispensed with the requirement for Prodata to be represented by a legal practitioner for the purposes of the suppression applications. The date of dismissal of the originating application was to be the date upon which judgment was given on the suppression applications.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The applicant’s interlocutory application dated 1 July 2020 is dismissed.

2. Pursuant to r 5.23(1)(b) of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) and s 37P(5) and (6)(a) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), the applicant's originating application is dismissed from the date specified in order 6.

3. The applicant is to pay the costs of:

(a) the applicant’s interlocutory application dated 1 July 2020;

(b) the first respondent’s interlocutory application dated 16 July 2020;

(c) the second respondent’s interlocutory application dated 10 July 2020.

4. The applicant's interlocutory application filed on 14 July 2020 and its interlocutory application emailed to the Court on 31 July 2020 (the suppression applications) and the respondents’ applications for costs of the originating application are set down for hearing at 10.30am on 1 September 2020.

5. Pursuant to r 1.34 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth), r 4.01(2) is dispensed with for the purposes of the applications referred to in order 4.

6. The date of dismissal of the originating application is the date upon which judgment is given on the suppression applications.

7. Until 4.00pm on 1 September 2020, no non-party is to be granted inspection of any affidavit or evidentiary material filed by the applicant in the proceedings except with the leave of the Court.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Prodata did not make any application before the expiry of the ordered deadline to have the deadline or the trial dates revoked or varied. To date, it has not suggested a date by which its lay affidavits can or should be filed, whether or not it is permitted to be represented by a non-lawyer in the proceedings. Prior to the vacation of the trial dates, it did not propose any alternate schedule of orders so as to ensure that the trial dates could be maintained or to otherwise minimise any delay in the commencement of the trial.AFFIDAVIT EVIDENCE Prodata relies on two affidavits sworn by Mr Mifsud. The first affidavit is to the following effect:(1)Mr Mifsud has a background in mechanical engineering and computer science.(2)He terminated the services of the third lawyers “due to significant differences I held in relation to the conduct of the matter”.(3)Mr Mifsud “formed the considered view that it would not be in the best interests” of Prodata for the third lawyers to continue to represent it, and that it would be in the company’s best interests for him to represent the company “personally” in light of his “own close personal knowledge” of its case.(4)Mr Mifsud engaged the fourth lawyers on 17 June 2020 having become aware of the requirement in r 4.01(2) of the Rules.(5)It was necessary to terminate the fourth lawyers’ retainer on 30 June 2020 because “there was insufficient time for [the fourth lawyers] to both obtain a sufficient understanding of the matter and review the significant discovery that had been made, allow me to meet the Court timetable, and progress the applications I believed necessary for the proper prosecution of the Applicant’s case” and because the fourth lawyers were “unable to secure the services of suitable Counsel” to represent Prodata at the trial. Mr Mifsud’s second affidavit is to the effect that:(1)On 24 January 2020 Mr Mifsud travelled to meet with the third lawyers about the conduct of Prodata’s case. The preparation of Prodata’s lay evidence was included (as item 8) on an agenda for the meeting.(2)Prodata’s delay in filing its lay evidence should not delay the trial “given the expert witness submissions and replies have been lodged with the court”.(3)Prodata’s past delays in the conduct of the proceedings had been modest, the respondents had been granted extensions and the parties had been courteous in their correspondence about Court deadlines.(4)Prodata was unable to file its lay evidence on time because of:(a)SAFECOM’s resistance to produce material requested by Prodata’s expert;(b)SAFECOM’s resistance to the proposal Prodata had advanced for displaying ESOTAS in the courtroom during the trial;(c)the termination of the third lawyers’ retainer, “due to significant differences I held in relation to the conduct of the matter” and because of matters contained in a letter Mr Mifsud had emailed both respondents on 10 June 2020 at a time when Prodata was not represented by a lawyer (explained below).(5)SAFECOM’s interlocutory application was “conduct unbecoming of a model litigant”.(6)Prodata did not change legal representation to gain a strategic benefit, its change in legal representation had not delayed the trial or provided any benefit to Prodata, and it was not Prodata’s intention to delay the trial.(7)Prodata has proposed a reasonable solution for displaying ESOTAS in the courtroom that should not cause an unreasonable burden on SAFECOM.(8)He had “dedicated my time entirely to this case” and Prodata’s staff had also invested very considerable time to extract and prepare material for the trial, including the development of a document handling system, and he could not have done any more “to prepare or present material including reviewing thousands of emails and documents to meet deadlines and respond to the respondents’ requests over the past two and a half years”.(9)SAFECOM had “withheld evidence” requested by Prodata’s expert.(10)He believed Prodata had a strong case and had asserted that case in correspondence to the respondents.(11)He believed that SMS Consulting had breached the terms of an undertaking given to the Court in December 2017 in the context of Prodata’s application for urgent interlocutory relief.(12)He referred to communications between Prodata and the Crown Solicitor’s Office apparently in the course of negotiating the terms of the software agreement in 2014 which Prodata says is sufficient proof that it is the owner of copyright in the relevant software components of ESOTAS.(13)The respondents had refused to communicate with him directly until Prodata was granted leave to be represented by a non-lawyer in the substantive action.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Mr Mifsud submitted that even if he were required to engage a lawyer, there would remain a “whole number of other matters that we would deal with first” including “the adjournment” and foreshadowed proceedings for contempt arising from the respondents’ alleged breach of the 2017 interim injunction.CONCLUSIONS OF FACT There is no evidence concerning Prodata’s financial position. The company has not asserted financial impecuniosity as a basis for seeking to be represented by a non-lawyer in the proceedings, nor is impecuniosity advanced as an explanation for the failure to file the lay evidence on time. Mr Mifsud’s intimation that dismissal of Prodata’s claim would affect third parties has no support in the evidence before me and I reject it. There is no evidence to support Prodata’s assertion that its delay in filing its lay affidavits is explained by any insufficiency in either respondents’ discovery. Having previously asserted that each respondents’ discovery was “woefully inadequate”, Prodata filed an application for further discovery which it did not ultimately press. Moreover, it expressly acknowledged that it did not allege that either respondent was in breach of the orders for discovery made in December 2019. The discovery application was dismissed against SAFECOM and withdrawn against SMS Consulting, in each case with costs. SAFECOM has since consented to give discovery of the Emerald files. Whilst Prodata has made an application for the Emerald files to be produced in a different way, the Court has previously made it plain that the parties’ lay affidavits should be prepared and filed irrespective of whether there are outstanding disputes on matters such as discovery. Correspondence and argument concerning discovery in these proceedings has been extensive and costly. Throughout 2019, the parties exchanged and proposed categories of documents, many of which were disputed. Those categories that were unable to be agreed formed the subject matter of detailed argument in December 2019. Nothing in the email correspondence of 2 June 2020 provides a satisfactory explanation for Prodata’s failure to complete and file its lay affidavits within the ordered timeframe. Had the course to trial not been disrupted by the termination of the third and fourth lawyers’ retainers and the failure to file lay affidavits, the application for orders sought by the email of 2 June 2020 would have been set down and determined on its merits whilst other steps preparatory to trial were undertaken. If the latest discovery application succeeded and additional documents obtained, that might have formed the basis for an application to file supplementary affidavit material. It has not otherwise been shown that Prodata has a legal entitlement to the production of the Emerald files in the manner it presses for. The associated assertion that the respondents have “withheld evidence” is rejected. Nor am I able to accept the assertion that the respondents’ “resistance” to Prodata’s proposal for displaying or demonstrating the ESOTAS system at trial is in any way causally connected with Prodata’s decision to terminate the retainers of the third and fourth lawyers or with its failure to file its lay evidence on time. The parties may reasonably differ in their views as to the best way to demonstrate the software components in the course of the trial, however Prodata has not explained how those differences bear on the content of its lay affidavits or the timing of their completion. To the extent that the parties were at an impasse about the best procedure for demonstrating ESOTAS at trial, Prodata has made no application for orders to resolve it.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established