Christou v Stanton Partners Australasia Pty Ltd

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JURISDICTION     :   SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

TITLE OF COURT  :   THE COURT OF APPEAL (WA)

CITATION:   CHRISTOU -v- STANTON PARTNERS AUSTRALASIA PTY LTD [2011] WASCA 176

CORAM:   NEWNES JA

MURPHY JA

HEARD:   4 JULY 2011

DELIVERED          :   10 AUGUST 2011

FILE NO/S:   CACV 144 of 2010

BETWEEN:   NICK CHRISTOU

First Appellant

CORPORATE SYSTEMS PUBLISHING PTY LTD
Second Appellant

AND

STANTON PARTNERS AUSTRALASIA PTY LTD
First Respondent

STANTON ACCOUNTANTS & ADVISORS PTY LTD

Second Respondent

ON APPEAL FROM:

Jurisdiction              :  SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

Coram  :MASTER SANDERSON

Citation  :STANTON PARTNERS AUSTRALASIA PTY LTD -v- CHRISTOU [2010] WASC 370

File No  :CIV 2252 of 2009

Catchwords:

Practice and procedure - Appeal against dismissal of application for security for costs - Delay in making application - Relevant principles - Whether failure by defendant to comply with case management directions a relevant factor in exercise of discretion to order security - Whether security should be ordered for costs incurred before application made

Legislation:

Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), s 1335
Rules of the Supreme Court 1971 (WA), O 25

Result:

Appeal upheld in part

Category:    B

Representation:

Counsel:

First Appellant              :     Mr A P Rumsley

Second Appellant          :     Mr A P Rumsley

First Respondent           :     Mr M P Bruce

Second Respondent       :     Mr M P Bruce

Solicitors:

First Appellant              :     Alan Rumsley

Second Appellant          :     Alan Rumsley

First Respondent           :     Bennett & Co

Second Respondent       :     Bennett & Co

Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):

Bryan E Fencott & Associates Pty Ltd v Eretta Pty Ltd (1987) 16 FCR 497

Buckley v Bennell Design & Constructions Pty Ltd (1974) 1 ACLR 301

Corporate Systems Publishing Pty Ltd v Lingard [No 4] [2008] WASC 21

Darelvale Holdings Australia Pty Ltd v Waterjet Designs Pty Ltd [2003] FCA 863

Felsink Pty Ltd v City of Maribyrnong [2007] VSC 49

Gentry Bros Pty Ltd v Wilson Brown & Associates Pty Ltd (1992) 8 ACSR 405

Green v CGU Insurance Ltd [2008] NSWCA 148; (2008) 67 ACSR 105

Hismelt Corporation Pty Ltd v Pratt [2007] WASCA 192

Idoport Pty Ltd v National Australia Bank Ltd [2001] NSWSC 744

Livingspring Pty Ltd v Kliger Partners [2008] VSCA 93; (2008) 20 VR 377

Remm Construction (SA) Pty Ltd v Allco Newsteel Pty Ltd (1992) 57 SASR 180

Southern Cross Exploration NL v Fire & All Risks Insurance Co Ltd (1985) 1 NSWLR 114

Stanton Partners Australasia Pty Ltd v Christou [2010] WASC 370

The State of Western Australia v Bond Corporation Holdings Ltd (1991) 5 WAR 40

Town & Country Sport Resorts (Holdings) Pty Ltd v Partnership Pacific Ltd [1991] FCA 459

Warren Mitchell Pty Ltd v Australian Maritime Officers' Union (1993) 12 ACSR 1

Wilson v Metaxas [1989] WAR 285

  1. NEWNES JA:  This is an appeal against a decision of Master Sanderson dismissing an application by the appellants (the defendants in the action) for security for costs.  The master refused the application on two grounds:  the appellants' delay in seeking security and their…

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Details
Case
[2011] WASCA 176
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of Christou v Stanton Partners Australasia Pty Ltd, the dispute involved an appeal against the dismissal of an application for security for costs. The case was heard in the Federal Court of Australia. The primary issue was whether a party which unreasonably delays in making an application for security for costs can expect to obtain security for costs incurred during the period of the delay and for interlocutory steps which were ordered to be completed before the application was made but not completed due to the applicant's default. The court also considered whether the failure of the defendant to comply with case management directions was a relevant factor in exercising the discretion to order security.

The court held that unreasonable delay in making an application for security for costs ordinarily precludes the applicant from obtaining security for costs incurred during the period of the delay and for interlocutory steps which were to be completed before the application but were not due to the applicant's default. It found that it would be unjust to require a plaintiff to provide security for costs incurred by the defendant before the defendant took steps to seek security. The court considered that security was appropriate for future costs but not for costs incurred prior to the application. The court also found that there was no substance in the proposed amendment to the grounds of appeal regarding the financial position of the second respondent. The court held that no reasonable inference could be drawn about the financial position of the second respondent from the fact that it had not paid the amounts ordered by Beech J, as there was no evidence of any demand for payment or attempt to enforce the judgment.

The court concluded that the appeal should be dismissed and ordered that the appellants pay the costs of the respondents.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

However, a party which unreasonably delays in making an application for security for costs cannot ordinarily expect to obtain security for costs which it has incurred during the period of the delay. Nor can it ordinarily expect to obtain security for costs in relation to interlocutory steps which it was ordered to complete before the application was made but which, by reason of the applicant's default, have not been completed. In such circumstances, it would be unjust to require a plaintiff to provide security for costs which the defendant had incurred before it finally bestirred itself to take steps to seek security for costs: see Southern Cross Exploration NL v Fire & All Risks Insurance Co Ltd (1985) 1 NSWLR 114, 125; Darelvale Holdings Australia Pty Ltd v Waterjet Designs Pty Ltd [2003] FCA 863 [15]; Felsink Pty Ltd v City of Maribyrnong [2007] VSC 49 [25]. In the present case, I consider that security is appropriate for future costs, but not for costs incurred prior to the application. In relation to future costs, I would exclude the appellants' costs of providing discovery, as their discovery was not provided before the application was made only because they continually failed to comply with the orders of the case management registrar. In relation to the second respondent, it was submitted in support of the application to amend the grounds of appeal that the master erred in concluding there was no evidence as to the financial position of the second respondent; in particular, that there was no credible evidence that there was reason to believe that the second respondent would be unable to meet an order for costs if it were unsuccessful in the action: see s 1335(1) of the Corporations Act. The appellants submitted, in effect, that in so finding the master overlooked two matters: the failure of the second respondent to pay the amounts for which it was liable pursuant to the orders of Beech J of 28 March 2008, and evidence that the first respondent controlled the second respondent. It was submitted that the evidence established that the second respondent provided services for a fee to the first respondent's accounting practice. It was also apparent that the first respondent had ceased to trade after 2008 and was impecunious. It was submitted that the second respondent could not therefore have derived income from providing services to the first respondent. It was also argued that a party resisting an application for security for costs should provide the court with full and frank disclosure of its financial position and the second respondent had failed to do so. The appellants contended that having regard to those matters and the failure of the second respondent to pay the amounts for which it was liable pursuant to the orders of Beech J, the clear inference was that the second respondent was impecunious. In my view, there is no substance in the proposed amendment. It is notable that the appellants did not seek to adduce any evidence of the financial position of the second respondent in support of the application. No searches were done of publicly available registers, such as land titles, and no enquiry was made of the second respondent as to its financial position. On the hearing before the master, little attention was paid to the position of the second respondent. At least in the context of the complex web of litigation in which these parties are involved, I do not consider that any inference can reasonably be drawn as to the second respondent's financial position simply from the fact that it has not paid the amounts ordered by Beech J. That could have come about for a number of reasons. In that regard, I note there is no evidence that any demand for payment has been made by the appellants or any attempt made to enforce the judgment. And the fact that since 2008 the second respondent has apparently derived no income from providing the first respondent with services says nothing about the asset position of the second respondent.