Prescott v Legal Practitioners Disciplinary Tribunal

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SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Civil: Application)

PRESCOTT v LEGAL PRACTITIONERS DISCIPLINARY TRIBUNAL & ORS

[2009] SASC 309

Judgment of The Honourable Justice Layton

30 September 2009

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW - PREROGATIVE WRITS AND ORDERS - PROHIBITION - DISCRETION OF COURT AND MATTERS PRECLUDING RELIEF - EXISTENCE OF OTHER REMEDY

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW - PREROGATIVE WRITS AND ORDERS - MANDAMUS - ON WHAT GROUNDS AND FOR WHAT PURPOSES - TO COURTS AND TRIBUNALS

EQUITY - EQUITABLE REMEDIES - INJUNCTIONS - CONSIDERATIONS UPON WHICH COURT EXERCISES DISCRETION - OTHER SUFFICIENT REMEDY AT LAW

PROCEDURE - MISCELLANEOUS PROCEDURAL MATTERS - DECLARATIONS - APPROPRIATE FORM OF RELIEF - DISCRETION OF COURT - EXISTENCE OF ALTERNATIVE REMEDY

Application for judicial review of proceedings before the Legal Practitioners Disciplinary Tribunal – charges of unprofessional conduct against the plaintiff – plaintiff claimed continuation of Tribunal proceedings would constitute an abuse of process and a denial of natural justice – orders in the nature of prohibition and mandamus, as well as an injunction and declaratory order sought – plaintiff did not challenge any decision on the part of defendant Legal Practitioners Board or Tribunal – plaintiff had not made application to Tribunal for a stay of its own proceedings for abuse of process – threshold legal and jurisdictional issues to be determined – whether Tribunal has power to stay proceedings before it – whether appropriate exercise of discretion to make  orders where alternative remedy not pursued.

Held: Orders refused – Tribunal has power to stay proceedings – the plaintiff had not pursued an alternative and more appropriate remedy before the Tribunal.

PROCEDURE - SUPREME COURT PROCEDURE - SOUTH AUSTRALIA - PROCEDURE UNDER RULES OF COURT

Plaintiff sought to invoke Court’s inherent jurisdiction in applying for prerogative relief – Supreme Court Rules 199 and 200 of 2006 set out requirements for judicial review applications – whether Rules replace or modify Court’s inherent jurisdiction for prerogative relief – whether plaintiff required to comply with the Rules in invoking Court’s inherent jurisdiction.

Held: The plaintiff was required to comply with Rules 199 and 200 of the Supreme Court Rules – the procedure in Rules 199 and 200 are precise and cannot be ignored for convenience.

Legal Practitioners Act 1981 (SA) s 80(4), s 82(2a), s 82(4), s 82(5); Supreme Court Act 1935 (SA) s 17, s 29, s 31; Supreme Court Civil Rules 2006 (SA) r 192, r 199, r 200, r 264; Supreme Court Rules 1987 (SA) r 98; Supreme Court Act 1981 (UK) s 21(1), referred to.
Newcombe v Medical Board (SA) (2007) 96 SASR 564; Walton v Gardiner (1993) 177 CLR 378; Herron v McGregor (1986) 6 NSWLR 246; Re a Medical Practitioner (1993) 2 Tas R 90; James v Medical Board of South Australia (2006) 95 SASR 445; Re Ross [1995] 1 QR 319; Jago v The District Court of New South Wales (1989) 168 CLR 23; Medical Board of South Australia v N, JRP (2006) 93 SASR 546; Hinton Demolitions…

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Details
Case
[2009] SASC 309
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Prescott v Legal Practitioners Disciplinary Tribunal, the plaintiff, Mr Prescott, sought a stay of proceedings before the Legal Practitioners Disciplinary Tribunal, arguing that the continuation of those proceedings would constitute an abuse of process and a denial of natural justice. The tribunal had been hearing charges of unprofessional conduct against Mr Prescott and another practitioner, Mr Reynolds, arising from their conduct in relation to a series of legal matters. The plaintiff contended that the tribunal lacked the authority to proceed with the hearing due to the unavailability of two of the three original panel members. The plaintiff sought orders in the nature of prohibition, mandamus, an injunction, and a declaration from the court.

The primary legal issues before the court were whether the tribunal had the power to stay the proceedings and whether it was appropriate for the court to exercise its discretion to make such orders when an alternative remedy was available within the tribunal process. The court also needed to determine whether the plaintiff was required to comply with specific procedural rules when invoking the court's inherent jurisdiction for prerogative relief.

The court held that the tribunal did have the power to stay the proceedings, and it was within the tribunal's discretion to decide whether to exercise this power. However, the court exercised its discretion to refuse the relief sought by the plaintiff because he had not pursued the more appropriate remedy of applying to the tribunal to stay the proceedings itself. The court further determined that the plaintiff was required to comply with the procedural rules, specifically Supreme Court Rules 199 and 200, when invoking the court’s inherent jurisdiction for prerogative relief. These rules were precise and could not be ignored for convenience.

Ultimately, the court dismissed the plaintiff's application and refused all the orders sought, concluding that the tribunal was the proper body to hear an application for a stay of proceedings on the grounds advanced by the plaintiff. The court's decision underscored the importance of pursuing available internal remedies before seeking external judicial intervention.

Orders

Orders of the court

Full text does not contain this section.

Background

Background to the litigation

These allegations are contested by counsel for the second defendant, the Legal Practitioners Conduct Board (“the Board”), in a number of respects. These need not be addressed here as they concern the merits which await my conclusion on the preliminary issues between the parties. I also note at this point that the Board, and not the Legal Practitioners Tribunal, was represented at the hearing, however counsel for the Board indicated that he was instructed to inform me that the Legal Practitioners Tribunal would abide the decision of the Court. Brief background facts The plaintiff, Mr Prescott, and the third defendant, Mr Reynolds, are both legal practitioners. In September 1998, the plaintiff and the third defendant went into partnership together and between 1998 and 2000 they conducted business as a law firm, trading as Reynolds Prescott. Prior to going into business together they had both been practising at the law firm of Townsends, Barristers and Solicitors. During the period from about 1997 to 2000, the two practitioners carried out legal work and provided advice to a number of clients in relation to an investment scheme which the parties refer to as the “Lateral Trading Matter”. The Board first received a complaint about the practitioners from one of the clients of the Lateral Trading Matter on 24 June 1999. Thereafter, there was correspondence and communications between the Board and the practitioners. On 19 May 2005, the Board resolved that charges of unprofessional conduct be laid against the practitioners in relation to their conduct in respect of clients of the Lateral Trading Matter between 1998 and 2000. Because the impugned conduct occurred more than five years prior to the laying of the charges, s 82(2a) of the Legal Practitioners Act 1981 (“the Act”) required the consent of the Attorney-General to lay the charges. The Attorney-General, the Honourable Michael Atkinson, sent a letter to the Board indicating his consent and on 14 July 2006 the Board laid four charges against the practitioners for unprofessional conduct. Those charges were contested by the practitioners. The matter went to a hearing before the Legal Practitioners Tribunal composed of three members and proceeded at various intervals over a period from May to September 2007. On 24 September 2007 the plaintiff’s counsel made an application to have the matter adjourned so that medical evidence could be obtained to consider the effect of the plaintiff’s mental state on the giving of his evidence. The Legal Practitioners Tribunal granted the adjournment. Subsequently, there were difficulties about continuing the matter before the same members of the Legal Practitioners Tribunal, as one had been appointed as a magistrate and a second had unfortunately passed away, leaving only one member who was able to continue to hear the matter. Whilst the Act specifically provides for a hearing to continue with only two members of a panel, it does not contain any provision for proceeding with only one member. Section 80(4) of the Act states:80—Constitution and proceedings of Tribunal(4)If, before proceedings are finalised, a member of a panel chosen under subsection (1) dies or is otherwise unable to continue acting, the two remaining members of the panel may continue to hear and determine the proceedings.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

It was at this point that the plaintiff brought these proceedings in the Supreme Court.Evidence admitted in these proceedings By agreement between the parties, certain evidence came before me for the purposes of deciding the threshold issues. This evidence is drawn from paragraphs 38.1 to 38.6,[1] 38.9 to 38.11 and 38.20 to 38.24 of the affidavit of the plaintiff filed on 16 December 2008 and their exhibits (“the affidavit”), together with further matters agreed between the parties as indicated in the transcript of these proceedings. This evidence can be summarised as follows. [1] The last sentence of paragraph 38.6 was not included as part of the evidence. The plaintiff carried out legal work on the Lateral Trading Matter in 1997 and 1998. He first received a request from the Board on 7 July 1999 to explain his conduct in relation to this work. Pursuant to the Act, the Board was compelled to seek the consent of the South Australian Attorney-General to lay the charges out of time.[2] [2] MTP 5. The relevant section of the Act states:82—Inquiries…(2a) A charge relating to conduct by a legal practitioner must be laid before the Tribunal within five years of the conduct unless the charge is laid by, or with the written consent of, the Attorney-General. On 8 June 2008, the Attorney-General sent a letter to the Board consenting to the laying of charges. The text of the letter was:[3] I refer to your letter dated 11 May, 2006, about the conduct of legal practitioners, Mr Leo Reynolds and Mr Michael Prescott.Pursuant to section 82 (2a) of the Legal Practitioners Act 1981, I consent to the laying of a charge of unprofessional conduct against Mr Leo Reynolds and Mr Michael Prescott, the particulars of which appear in the draft charge attached to your letter of 11 May, 2006.[3] MTP 31. On 14 July 2006 charges alleging unprofessional conduct were laid by the Board, in the Legal Practitioners Tribunal proceeding Action No.2 of 2006, as summarised below:[4]1That between about 9 March and 19 October 1998, the practitioners, contrary to s 41(1) of the Act, failed to deliver to their clients, either personally or by post, a bill specifying the total amount of the costs before appropriating money in satisfaction of a claim for legal costs;2That between February 1998 and October 1998, the practitioners failed to comply with the requirements of the Legal Practitioners Regulations 1994 in relation to their trust account.3That between about 13 January 1998 and 10 August 1998, the practitioners made inappropriate and improper charges to the clients in so far as they made separate charges for a number of letters without categorising the letters as circular, resulting in gross overcharging.4That between about March 1998 and September 2000, the practitioners failed to maintain communication as agreed with clients who had accepted the practitioners’ Terms of Engagement, or any adequate communication with all clients.[4] MTP 7. A Legal Practitioners Tribunal panel consisting of Ms Maureen Pyke QC, Mr Paul Anderson and Ms Joanne Tracey began a hearing of the charges on 15 May 2007.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Even if a proper foundation had been made out and there was arguably a prima facie case on the merits, I would have exercised my discretion to refuse to grant the relief sought. The proper body to hear an application for a stay of proceedings on the grounds sought by the plaintiff is the Legal Practitioners Tribunal itself.Conclusion For the above reasons I dismiss the application and each of the orders sought by the plaintiff.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

I therefore adjourned the matter to the following day to allow the parties to prepare for these arguments and to permit the plaintiff finally to refine the relief sought and to provide the Court with an outline of the relevant questions for me to consider in relation to jurisdiction. On resumption, counsel for the plaintiff provided the Court with a list of issues and indicated that the relief sought remained the same. Issues for consideration This proceeding, in my view, raises the following issues:·Does the Court have inherent jurisdiction to stay the Legal Practitioners Tribunal proceedings for abuse of process?·Does the Legal Practitioners Tribunal have power to stay proceedings itself pursuant to the Act?·Does 6R 199 modify or replace the historical supervisory jurisdiction of the Court to grant prerogative writs?·Should the Court issue a writ of either prohibition or mandamus or make orders in the nature of prohibition or mandamus in the circumstances?·Should the Court make the declaration sought in the circumstances?·Should the Court grant an injunction in the circumstances?Supreme Court’s inherent jurisdiction to stay Legal Practitioners Tribunal proceedings for abuse of process Whilst a survey of the case law has not provided any case where the Supreme Court has entertained an application for a stay of proceedings which are before the Legal Practitioners Tribunal, there is no doubt that this Court has inherent jurisdiction to stay proceedings of the Medical Professional Conduct Tribunal (“Medical Tribunal”) on the ground that they amount to an abuse of process. Such an application was brought before this Court in Newcombe v Medical Board (SA) (2007) 96 SASR 564. In that case Duggan J refused to grant a stay in the circumstances, but his Honour made it clear that the Court had jurisdiction to order a stay if the circumstances so warranted. His Honour said:[10]The power of superior courts to stay proceedings before disciplinary tribunals on the ground that those proceedings are oppressive or an abuse of process is well established.[10] Newcombe v Medical Board (SA) (2007) 96 SASR 564, 566[9]. For this proposition his Honour relied substantially upon Walton v Gardiner (1993) 177 CLR 378. In the course of their Honours’ reasons in Walton v Gardiner, the High Court (Mason CJ, Dean and Dawson JJ) considered an argument that the Supreme Court of New South Wales did not have inherent jurisdiction to stay proceedings of the equivalent of the Medical Tribunal of that State. Their Honours found there to be no reason to depart from previous New South Wales authority[11] to the effect that the Supreme Court had such power.[12] In particular, the High Court said:[13]the appeal must be disposed of on the basis that it is now settled that the Court of Appeal's supervisory jurisdiction with respect to "the administration of justice in New South Wales" [Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW), s 23] extends, in the absence of legislative intervention, to the making of an order staying proceedings in the Tribunal on the ground that they constitute an abuse of the Tribunal's process.[11] In particular, Herron v McGregor (1986) 6 NSWLR 246.[12] Walton v Gardiner (1993) 177 CLR 378, 389-91.[13] Walton v Gardiner (1993) 177 CLR 378, 391-92.