R v Wright; Ex parte Waterside Workers' Federation of Australia

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93 CLR 528

THE QUEEN

HIS HONOUR SYDNEY CHARLES GREVILLE WRIGHT,

A JUDGE OF THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF

CONCILIATION AND ARBITRATION, AND OTHERS: Ex

PARTE WATERSIDE WORKERS' FEDERATION

OF AUSTRALIA. Industrial Arbitration (Cth.)-Court of Conciliation and Arbitration-Power to

regulate industrial matters in connection with stevedoring operations relating to overseas and inter-State trade-Nature of power-Legislative not judicial- SYDNEY,

Prohibition-Constitutional validity of power-Stevedoring Industry Commis Mar. 23, 24;

sion-Variation of order-" Industrial matters "--The Constitution (63 &64 MELBOURNE,

Vict. c. 12), 88. 51 (i.), 75 (v.), 122-Stevedoring Industry Act 1949, 88. 6, 34.

Writs of prohibition lie only in respect of acts to be done judicially. Acts which are ministerial in their nature or administrative only or amount to the exercise of a subordinate legislative power are not subject to the writ, even though what is done involves an excess of authority.

The power conferred by S. 34 of the Stevedoring Industry Act 1949 upon the Court of Conciliation and Arbitration to regulate industrial matters in con- nection with stevedoring operations insofar as those operations relate to trade and commerce with other countries or among the States whether or not *Section 34.-(1) The Court shall

waterside workers. (3) In the exercise have power to regulate industrial

of its powers under this section, the matters in connection with stevedoring

Court shall have power to make orders. operations insofar as those operations

(4) The Court may, either generally or in relation to any port, authorize any countries or among the States or are

person to exercise any of the powers performed in a Territory of the Com-

of the Court under this section. (5) monwealth, whether or not an indus-

Every such authority may be revoked trial dispute extending beyond the

by the Court at any time and no such limits of any one State exists in relation

authority shall prevent the exercise of to those matters. (2) The Court shall

any power by the Court. (6) The have power to determine the terms and

provisions of this Act relating to conditions in accordance with which,

orders made by the Board shall apply including the rates at which, the

to and in relation to orders made Board shall pay attendance money to

93 CLR 529

an industrial dispute extending beyond the limits of any one State exists in relation to those matters is not judicial, but legislative, in character and accordingly prohibition does not lie to restrain an excess of authority.

Section 34 is a valid exercise of the legislative power respecting trade and commerce conferred on Parliament by S. 51 (i.) of the Constitution.

A shipowners' association and a shipping representatives' association sought a variation by the Court of Conciliation and Arbitration of an order made by the Stevedoring Industry Commission to permit of the engagement of the labour of waterside workers for week-end work in the Port of Melbourne by means of press and radio announcements, the existing order requiring such engagement to take place only at a central bureau.

Held,…

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Details
Case
[1955] HCA 35
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The Waterside Workers' Federation of Australia sought a writ of prohibition against Wright J., a judge of the Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration, and against the Commonwealth Steamship Owners' Association and the Overseas Shipping Representatives' Association. The Federation sought to prevent the judge from hearing an application by the associations to vary an order of the Stevedoring Industry Commission. This variation would have permitted the engagement of waterside workers for weekend work in the Port of Melbourne through press and radio announcements, rather than solely through a central bureau as previously mandated.

The legal issues before the High Court were whether the proposed variation constituted an "industrial matter" within the meaning of the Stevedoring Industry Act 1949, whether such an industrial matter was sufficiently connected to stevedoring operations relating to overseas and inter-State trade to fall within the scope of section 34 of the Act, and whether section 34 itself was a valid exercise of the Commonwealth Parliament's legislative power under section 51(i) of the Constitution. The Federation argued that the proposed method of engagement created compulsory employment relationships, which were outside the definition of industrial matters, and that the power conferred by section 34 was legislative, not judicial, and therefore not amenable to prohibition.

The Court held that the power conferred by section 34 of the Stevedoring Industry Act 1949 to regulate industrial matters in connection with stevedoring operations relating to overseas and inter-State trade was legislative in character, not judicial. Consequently, a writ of prohibition would not lie to restrain an alleged excess of authority under that section. The Court reasoned that acts which are ministerial, administrative, or amount to the exercise of a subordinate legislative power are not subject to prohibition, even if they involve an excess of authority. Furthermore, the Court found that section 34 represented a valid exercise of the Parliament's legislative power concerning trade and commerce conferred by section 51(i) of the Constitution.

The application for prohibition was dismissed. The Court concluded that the power granted by section 34 was legislative in nature and thus not subject to prohibition. The Court also affirmed the constitutional validity of section 34 as a proper exercise of the Commonwealth's trade and commerce power.

Background

Background to the litigation

The case revolves around an application made by the Commonwealth Steamship Owners' Association and the Overseas Shipping Representatives' Association to the Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration seeking a variation of an existing order made by the Stevedoring Industry Commission under the Stevedoring Industry Act 1947-1948. This existing order, Order No. 30 of 1948, regulated the engagement and organization of waterside workers in the Port of Melbourne, requiring employers to engage labour only at a central bureau. The respondents sought to modify this order to permit the engagement of waterside workers for weekend work via press and radio announcements, rather than through the central bureau. The Waterside Workers' Federation of Australia opposed this variation and applied for a writ of prohibition to prevent the Court of Conciliation and Arbitration from hearing the respondents' application. The central issue in the case was whether the power conferred by Section 34 of the Stevedoring Industry Act 1949, under which the Court purported to act, was valid and whether it extended to the proposed variation of the order. The respondents argued that the power was legislative, not judicial, and therefore not subject to prohibition. They further contended that the power was a valid exercise of the Commonwealth's legislative power under Section 51(i) of the Constitution, which pertains to trade and commerce with other countries and among the States. The prosecutor federation, on the other hand, argued that the proposed variation did not relate to any industrial matter as defined in the Act and that even if it did, it was not an industrial matter in connection with stevedoring operations relating to trade and commerce. They also contended that Section 34 itself was beyond the legislative power of the Commonwealth and therefore invalid. The court ultimately concluded that the power conferred by Section 34 was legislative in nature and not subject to prohibition. It further found that the section was a valid exercise of the Commonwealth's legislative power under Section 51(i) of the Constitution and that the proposed variation did indeed relate to an industrial matter in connection with stevedoring operations. The order nisi for a writ of prohibition was therefore discharged with costs.

The matter came before the High Court as an application for an order of prohibition to restrain the Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration from hearing and determining an application brought by the respondent associations. The respondents sought a variation of an order made by the Stevedoring Industry Commission under the Stevedoring Industry Act 1947-1948, which was continued in force by the Stevedoring Industry Act 1949. The Waterside Workers' Federation of Australia applied for a writ of prohibition to restrain the hearing of the application by the Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration. The grounds of the order were that the application was not for an order regulating industrial matters in connection with stevedoring operations, that the proposed order was beyond the power and in excess of the jurisdiction of the Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration, and that the section was ultra vires the legislative power of the Commonwealth Parliament. The matter was heard by the Full Court of the High Court, where the prosecutor argued all the grounds except one.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Is the power conferred by Section 34 of the Stevedoring Industry Act 1949 sufficiently judicial in character to make it an appropriate case for prohibition?
2. Does the proposed variation sought by the respondent associations relate to any industrial matter within the meaning of Section 6 of the Act?
3. If the variation sought relates to an industrial matter, is it an industrial matter in connection with stevedoring operations relating to trade and commerce with other countries or among the States within the meaning of Section 34?
4. Is Section 34(1) itself beyond the legislative power conferred by Section 51(i) of the Constitution and therefore ultra vires and void?
5. Is the power conferred by Section 34 legislative in nature, and if so, is prohibition an appropriate remedy?

Held
1. The power conferred by Section 34 of the Stevedoring Industry Act 1949 is not sufficiently judicial in character to make it an appropriate case for prohibition.
2. The proposed variation sought by the respondent associations relates to an industrial matter within the meaning of Section 6 of the Act.
3. The variation sought is an industrial matter in connection with stevedoring operations relating to trade and commerce with other countries or among the States within the meaning of Section 34.
4. Section 34(1) is not beyond the legislative power conferred by Section 51(i) of the Constitution and therefore not ultra vires and void.
5. The power conferred by Section 34 is legislative in nature, but prohibition is not an appropriate remedy.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The Court began by considering whether the power conferred by Section 34 of the Stevedoring Industry Act 1949 was sufficiently judicial in character to make it an appropriate case for prohibition. The Court held that the power vested in the Court of Conciliation and Arbitration was legislative in nature, not judicial, and accordingly prohibition does not lie to restrain an excess of authority. The power to regulate industrial matters in connection with stevedoring operations is an exercise of the legislative power conferred by Section 51(i) of the Constitution.

The Court then examined whether the proposed variation sought by the respondent associations related to any industrial matter within the meaning of Section 6 of the Act. The Court held that the variation sought did relate to an industrial matter, as it involved regulating the terms and conditions of employment of waterside workers.

Next, the Court considered whether the proposed variation was an industrial matter in connection with stevedoring operations relating to trade and commerce with other countries or among the States within the meaning of Section 34. The Court held that it was, as the variation related to the engagement of labour for stevedoring operations.

The Court then addressed whether Section 34(1) itself was beyond the legislative power conferred by Section 51(i) of the Constitution and therefore ultra vires and void. The Court held that Section 34 was a valid exercise of the legislative power respecting trade and commerce conferred on Parliament by Section 51(i) of the Constitution.

Finally, the Court considered whether the power conferred by Section 34 was legislative in nature, and if so, whether prohibition was an appropriate remedy. The Court held that the power was legislative in nature and that prohibition was not an appropriate remedy, as prohibition lies only in respect of acts to be done judicially.

The ratio decidendi of this case is that the power conferred by Section 34 of the Stevedoring Industry Act 1949 is legislative in nature and not judicial, and accordingly prohibition does not lie to restrain an excess of authority. The Court held that Section 34 was a valid exercise of the legislative power respecting trade and commerce conferred on Parliament by Section 51(i) of the Constitution.