SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
(Court of Appeal: Criminal)
POLICE AND DEPARTMENT FOR CORRECTIONAL SERVICES v MAHON
[2022] SASCA 76
Judgment of the Court of Appeal
(The Honourable President Livesey, the Honourable Justice Lovell and the Honourable Justice Doyle)
4 August 2022
APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - APPEAL - GENERAL PRINCIPLES - POINTS AND OBJECTIONS NOT TAKEN BELOW - WHEN NOT ALLOWED TO BE RAISED ON APPEAL - COURSE OF CONDUCT AT TRIAL - PARTICULAR CASES - FAILURE TO OBJECT TO JUDICIAL BIAS
CRIMINAL LAW - APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - APPEAL AGAINST SENTENCE - GROUNDS FOR INTERFERENCE - SENTENCE MANIFESTLY EXCESSIVE OR INADEQUATE
APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - PROCEDURE - SOUTH AUSTRALIA - WHEN APPEAL LIES - FROM SUPREME COURT - BY LEAVE OF COURT
MAGISTRATES - APPEAL AND REVIEW - SOUTH AUSTRALIA - APPEAL TO SUPREME COURT
The respondent was sentenced in the Magistrates Court of South Australia for 26 dishonesty, property and drug offences. During sentencing the sentencing magistrate disclosed to the parties that a victim was “a person known” to her. Counsel for the respondent did not object to the magistrate proceeding to sentence nor take instructions from the respondent. The magistrate sentenced the respondent to 28 months and 32 days’ imprisonment. A non-parole period of 18 months was fixed.
The respondent successfully appealed his sentence to a single judge of this Court, contending that the sentence was manifestly excessive and that the magistrate was disqualified from sentencing on account of apprehended bias. The single judge found that the sentencing process miscarried by reason of “the magistrate raising the issue so late in proceedings and the appellant’s solicitor not obtaining instructions as to whether to raise an objection or make an application for recusal”.
The appellants now seek leave to appeal and appeal against the orders made. The appellants contend that the judge erred in concluding that waiver depended on whether the client had given specific instructions and in determining the appeal by reference to a ground not advanced by either party.
Held (the Court) granting permission to appeal and allowing the appeal:
1.The respondent by his counsel waived any objection to the magistrate proceeding to sentence. Counsel acted within his ostensible authority. There was no miscarriage in the sentencing process.
2.It cannot be said that the sentence imposed by the magistrate was manifestly excessive.
3.The orders made by the judge are set aside and, in their place, there will be an order dismissing the respondent’s appeal from the sentencing magistrate.
Australian Solicitors Conduct Rules 2015 r 8.1; Bail Act 1985 (SA) s 17; Controlled Substances Act 1984 (SA) ss 18, 33L; Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) ss 85, 134, 139, 144; Criminal Procedure Act 1921 (SA) s 158; Firearms Act 2015 (SA) s 31; Magistrates Court Act 1991 (SA) s 42; South Australian Legal Practitioners Conduct Rules r 8.1; Summary Offences Act 1953 (SA) s 41; Supreme Court Criminal Rules 2014 (SA) r 104V(2); Uniform Civil Rules 2020 (SA) rr 217.10, 218.17, referred to.
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read Police and Department for Correctional Services v Mahon and more:
- Read every judgment in full
- Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
- See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
- Download judgments as PDF or Word
One click creates your free account or signs you in.
By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.
- Case
- [2022] SASCA 76
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue before the Full Court was whether the sentences imposed by the magistrate were manifestly excessive, and consequently, whether David J erred in his decision to allow Mr. Mahon's appeal from the magistrate's sentencing. The Court also had to consider whether any points not taken before the sentencing magistrate or on the initial appeal to David J could be raised on this further appeal.
The Full Court reasoned that the sentences, when considered individually and as a whole, were not manifestly excessive. They found that David J had erred in setting aside the magistrate's sentencing orders. The Court applied the principle that an appellate court should only interfere with a sentence if it is demonstrably wrong or unjustifiably severe. The Court also noted that points not taken at trial or on the first appeal were generally not permitted to be raised on a subsequent appeal, particularly where there was no compelling reason to depart from that rule.
The Full Court granted the appellants permission to appeal, allowed the appeal, and set aside the orders of David J. In their place, the Court ordered that Mr. Mahon's appeal from the sentencing magistrate be dismissed.
Orders
Orders of the court
Full text does not contain this section.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Full text does not contain this section.