FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Parmar v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2011] FCA 760
Citation: Parmar v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2011] FCA 760 Appeal from: Parmar v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2010] FMCA 818 Parties: DUSHYANT MANILAL PARMAR v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP and MIGRATION REVIEW TRIBUNAL File number: NSD 1535 of 2010 Judge: PERRAM J Date of judgment: 7 July 2011 Erratum: 7 July 2011 Catchwords: IMMIGRATION – Visas – skilled graduate visa – English language test requirements – appeal from Federal Magistrates Court upholding decision to refuse visa – whether regulation defining ‘competent English’ states a sufficient or necessary standard – whether valid – Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) reg 1.15C Legislation: Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) ss 136, 144
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 27
Immigration Restriction Act 1901 (Cth) ss 3(a), 5
Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 504Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) reg 1.15C, Schedule 2 cll 485.215, 485.222
Federal Court Rules Order 80Cases cited: Berenguel v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2010) 264 ALR 417 cited
Craig, Williamson Pty Ltd v Barrowcliff [1915] VLR 450 cited
Ghori v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2011] FCA 759
Kelly v The Queen (2004) 218 CLR 216 cited
Minister for Primary Industry and Energy v Austral Fisheries Pty Ltd (1993) 40 FCR 381 cited
Mohamad v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2010) 191 FCR 31 cited
Queensland v Forest (2008) 168 FCR 532 cited
Qiu v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1994) 55 FCR 439 cited
R v Carter; Ex parte Kisch (1934) 52 CLR 221 cited
R v Wilson; Ex parte Kisch (1934) 52 CLR 234 cited
Rahman v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 1236 cited
Sportsbet Pty Ltd v New South Wales (2010) 186 FCR 226 cited
The King v Davey; Ex parte Freer (1936) 56 CLR 381 cited
VUAX v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2004] FCAFC 158 cited
Yu v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2004) 140 FCR 126 citedDate of hearing: 11 February 2011, 11 May 2011 Date of last submissions: 11 May 2011 Place: Sydney Division: GENERAL DIVISION Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 36 Counsel for the Appellant: Ms K Edwards Counsel for the Respondents: Ms A Mitchelmore Solicitor for the Respondents: Australian Government Solicitor FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Parmar v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2011] FCA 760
ERRATUM
1.The eighth sentence of the first paragraph should read:
The well-known case of Egon Kisch, suspected by Attorney-General Menzies in the Lyons government of being a communist sympathiser but fluent in many European languages, provides an example of the law in action albeit one where its limits were ultimately reached.
I certify that the preceding one (1) numbered paragraph is a true copy of the Erratum to the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Perram. Associate:
Dated: 7 July 2011
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
NSD 1535…
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- Case
- [2011] FCA 760
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court found that the regulation did not state a sufficient standard and that the requirements of reg 1.15C were rational and proportionate. The court held that the regulation did not merely require an overall score of 6 across the four components of the IELTS test, but rather, required a score of 6 in each of the components. This was consistent with the definition of a 'competent user' provided by the IELTS test itself, which indicated that an overall band score of 6 signified the level of a competent user. The court distinguished the case from Berenguel, as the regulation did not promote the vice of absurdity. The court held that the requirements of reg 1.15C were rational and proportionate, as they were not disproportionate to the attainment of the objects of the Migration Act.
The appeal was dismissed with costs. The court noted the assistance received from Ms Mitchelmore and Ms Edwards, who appeared on a pro bono basis as a result of an Order 80 referral. The court expressed gratitude for their useful and effective performance. The final orders were that the appeal be dismissed and that the appellant pay the first respondent’s costs.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be dismissed.
2. The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs.
Note:
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
There is, therefore, lacking the grammatical foothold which permitted the High Court in Berenguel to approach the construction issue in the manner that it did. When dealing with the second issue below I conclude that the requirements of reg 1.15C are rational and proportionate. That conclusion provides an additional reason for distinguishing Berenguel in the construction of reg 1.15C which I favour does not promote, as the proposed construction in Berenguel did, the vice of absurdity. In those circumstances, I do not accept that reg 1.15C could be satisfied merely because this Court thought that Mr Parmar could speak competent English or through some other means outside those exhaustively stated in that regulation.Second issue: whether regulation 1.15C is invalid as irrational or disproportionate I turn then to the first of Mr Parmar’s attacks on the validity of reg 1.15C. Mr Parmar says reg 1.15C rests for its lawfulness upon the regulation making power which authorises it and that that power may be used only to make regulations which are not disproportionate to the attainment of the objects of the Migration Act. Regulation 1.15C implements the IELTS test but, so Mr Parmar submitted, the requirements of IELTS for competent English are only that an applicant achieve an overall score of 6 across the four components and not that he or she achieve a score of 6 in each of them. Since the regulation was expressly utilising the IELTS, the absence of some explanation as to why a different approach to the test had been embraced in reg 1.15C meant that it was not possible to discern a rational basis for the regulation. Put another way, the IELTS required only an overall score of 6 for competent English and it was irrational for reg 1.15C to implement the IELTS test whilst using a standard – 6 in each component – which was materially different to the IELTS standard itself. Without some understanding for this disparity in approach, reg 1.15C was to be seen as illogical or at least irrational. To understand this submission it is necessary to say something of the IELTS tests. From the tests which Mr Parmar sat the following facts about IELTS may be gleaned:(a)IELTS is an acronym for International English Language Testing System;(b)the testing system is operated by the British Council, an entity known as IDP IELTS Australia and the University of Cambridge;(c)the tests administered to examinees under the IELTS are performed by a variety of centres and institutions;(d)the IELTS system provides for two kinds of tests: the general training test and the academic test;(e)the general training system test (with which this appeal is concerned) assesses an examinee across four bands: listening, reading, writing and speaking;(f)that the general training test awards a score for each component and also an overall score. I am unable to determine what the maximum score in each band, or the overall band score, are. It is not disclosed in the test result forms themselves. It is true that the print-out from the IELTS website suggests the existence of a 9-band scale ranging from Band O (test not attempted) through to Band 9 (expert user). The result of the Minister’s hearsay objection and my earlier s 136 direction is, however, that this material is not to be used for a hearsay purpose. I cannot find, therefore, what the bands are but I can find that IELTS has said that Band 6 is that of ‘a competent user’ who has ‘generally effective command of the language despite some occasional inaccuracies, inappropriateness, and misunderstandings. Can use and understand fairly complex language, particularly in familiar situations’. IELTS has also said on the same webpage that these band scores correspond not only to each of the four components of listening, reading, writing and speaking but also to the overall band score. Thus the IELTS site does say that an overall band score of 6 signifies the level of a competent user. This evidence has a non-hearsay relevance: the rationality, proportionality or logicality of the regulation in question may be susceptible to a comparison between what reg 1.15C says about competent English and the IELTS test, on the one hand, and what IELTS itself says about it, on the other. On this view, reg 1.15C fixes as the threshold for competent English an achievement of a score of 6 in each section whereas what IELTS itself appears to advocate is an overall score of 6.