MONDAL v Minister for Immigration

[2015] FCCA 571

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA

MONDAL v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR [2015] FCCA 571

Catchwords:
MIGRATION – Migration Review Tribunal – Skilled (Residence) (class VB) visa – meaning of ‘competent English’ within the Migration Act 1958 – whether the Tribunal applied the correct definition – whether Legislative Instrument F2012L01287 was a valid exercise of power.

Legislation:  
Acts Interpretation Act 1901, s.15AA
Legislative Instruments Act 2003, s.13
Migration Act 1958, ss.55, 476

Migration Regulations 1994, Schedule 2

Bali v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [ 2014] FCA 986
Berenguel v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2010) 264 ALR 417; [2010] HCA 8
Judiciary and Navigation Acts, Re(Advisory Opinions case) (1921) 29 CLR 257; (1921) 27 ALR 193
Zhang Fu Qiu & Zhen Hui Liu v Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs (1994) 55 FCR 439; (1994) 37 ALD 443

Applicant: GOUTAM MONDAL

First Respondent: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION

Second Respondent: MIGRATION REVIEW TRIBUNAL

File Number: SYG 1438 of 2014

Judgment of: Judge Street

Hearing date: 13 March 2015

Date of Last Submission: 13 March 2015

Delivered at: Sydney

Delivered on: 13 March 2015

REPRESENTATION

Solicitors for the Applicant: Mr M. Jones
Parish Patience Immigration Lawyers

Solicitors for the Respondent: Ms S. Zarucki
Clayton Utz

ORDERS

1. The amended application be dismissed.

2. The Applicant to pay First Respondent’s costs fixed in the sum of $6646.

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT
OF AUSTRALIA

AT SYDNEY

SYG 1438 of 2014

GOUTAM MONDAL

Applicant

And

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

MIGRATION REVIEW TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

1. This is an application within the Court’s jurisdiction under s.476 of the Migration Act 1958 in respect of a decision of the Tribunal on 30 April 2014 affirming a decision not to grant the applicant a Skilled (Residence) (class VB) visa.  The application filed raised three grounds and today, on the day of hearing, there was an endeavour to amend the grounds to delete ground 3 of the originating application’s grounds and to insert two further grounds.  At the time of hearing the application to amend, the Court sought to clarify the scope of operation in relation to the third ground, which was identified as an argument directed towards invalidity of provisions concerning whether someone has a valid passport.

2. It was pointed out that there was no question of the type of passport identified being held by the applicant in the present case and that the issue sought to be raised in relation to ground 3 was hypothetical and as such was not within the Court’s jurisdiction under the principles identified in Judiciary and Navigation Acts, Re(Advisory Opinions case) (1921) 29 CLR 257; (1921) 27 ALR 193 [265]-[267]. It is clear from what was said from the bar table that the new proposed ground was entirely academic in that the applicant held no passport of a kind that could give rise to any consequence for the applicant in respect of the alleged invalidity.

3. I am not for a moment suggesting that there was any substance in the proposed third ground, but it is not appropriate to permit an amendment that is clearly outside the Court’s jurisdiction and it was for that reason that the new proposed ground 3 amendment was not allowed. 

4. The new fourth ground in the proposed amendment lacked specificity as to what it was that was said to be invalid.  The argument identified from the bar table indicated that again it was endeavoured to attack two parts, first a provision concerning the IELTS test and secondly a provision concerning a valid passport.

5. The first part of challenge under the new proposed ground 4 relating to the IELTS test has a nexus to the applicant and is not entirely academic. The desired second part of the new proposed ground 4 was a challenge to para.2C of the legislative instrument F2O12 LO1287 and was clearly hypothetical and had no consequence for the applicant.  It was in these circumstances that the Court required the proposed amendment to be confined to para.2A of the said instrument, being the first part of the new proposed ground 4.  Accordingly the amended application filed with leave, now before the Court raises the following grounds:

   1. The Tribunal misapplied the law.

   Particulars

   The Tribunal found that Regulation 1.15C requires the applicant to have a prescribed IELTS score at the time of application for the visa rather than at the time of decision on the visa application.

   2. The Tribunal misinterpreted reg 1.15C.

   Particulars

   The Tribunal interpreted reg 1.15C as if it were an exhaustive definition of the term “competent English”, which it is not.

   3. (deleted)

   4. Legislative Instrument F2012Lo1287 (IMMI 12/018) is an invalid exercise of the power to make such an instrument in respect of paragraph 2A.

6. Before dealing with the substance of the grounds it is appropriate to identify the history of the determination made by the Tribunal because it independently has a material impact on any discretionary consideration even if the grounds advanced were able to be made out. 

7. The applicant applied for a Skilled (Residence) (class VB) visa on 14 May 2012.  In that application the applicant was asked a series of questions set out as follows:

   Have you undertaken an English test within the last 24 months? 

   Yes. 

   If yes, provide details of the most recent English test. 

   Name of test? 

   IELTS 

   Date of test? 

   26 April 2012. 

   Test reference number? 

   Please see the enclosed receipt.

   What is your language ability? 

   Competent. 

8. It is by no means apparent that any test was ever sat by the applicant on 26 April 2012 at the time the application was lodged.  At the commencement of this hearing in this matter the Court raised concern as to the truth of that answer by the applicant in respect of the discretionary considerations informing whether leave should be granted to amend the application.

9. The Court raised the concern that in light of the communication sent to the applicant on 23 November 2013, drawing attention to the need for the provision of further material as a request for information and in particular the request:

   English requirements

   Evidence of English language ability

   Please provide evidence of your English language ability.  This may include a certified copy of your International English Language Testing System (IELTS) certificate or Occupational English Test Certificate (OETC).

10. This request for that information strongly supports the inference that no test of 26 April 2012 was provided with the application and I requested the solicitor for the applicant to provide, if possible, a copy of the alleged IELTS test conducted on 26 April 2012. I indicated that otherwise the Court may infer that the answer given was not true, which might inform the exercise of discretion on the amendment and, during the hearing, raised its impact on the discretion as to final relief.

11. After approximately a 15 minute adjournment the Court was informed it would take two hours to obtain the test and the Court was informed that it would be provided to the Court.  It was in those circumstances that the hearing continued and in circumstances where there was no opposition to the amended application as refined that leave was granted to amend the application.

12. In response to the letter dated 23 November 2013 requesting evidence of English language ability, there was a letter sent on 18 December 2013 from solicitors on behalf of the applicant indicating that the visa applicant’s IELTS results:

    We will forward to your office the visa applicant’s IELTS test results as soon as we receive it. We therefore ask the Department to grant us a further 21 days to do so. Please advise should you disagree with the request. As soon as they are received will be forwarded to the Department.

13. After a further 21 days the applicant was requested to provide the IELTS test results.  On 7 January 2014, the solicitors for the applicant wrote to the Department providing copies of two receipts for English tests to be sat on 11 January 2014 and also on 18 January 2014. The solicitors letter requested an extension of time to await the IELTS tests for 18 January 2014 to confirm he has Competent English.

14. On 17 January 2014 the delegate determined that the applicant did not meet the criteria for the grant of a Skilled (Residence) (class VB) (subclass skilled-independent 885) visa.  The delegate identified the requirements for the visa and that he had considered the application against the criteria for all subclasses in the VB visa class.  The delegate concluded (CB48):

    As you do not meet the legal requirements for the grant of any subclasses within the Skilled (Residence) (class VB), I therefore refuse to grant you a Skilled (Residence) (class VB) subclass 885 (Skilled – Independent) visa.

15. The delegate identified that the prescribed criteria was set out in Schedule 2 of the Migration Regulations 1994 and that clause 885.213 was a criterion to be satisfied at the time of the application. Effectively clause 885.213 required the applicant to have Competent English. Regulation 1.15C, as they existed at the date of application, provides that a person has Competent English if the person:

    1.15C Competent English

    If a person applies for a General Skilled Migration visa, the person has competent English if the person:

    (a) satisfies the Minister that:

    (i) the person undertook a language test, specified by the Minister in an instrument in writing for this subparagraph; and

    (ii) the test was conducted in the 2 years immediately before the day on which the application was made; and

    (iii) the person achieved a score specified in the instrument; or

    (b) satisfies the Minister that the person holds a passport of a type specified by the Minister in an instrument in writing for this paragraph.

16. The delegate identified:

    In order to satisfy Migration regulation 1.15C, applicants are required to provide evidence of obtaining a specified score in either an International English Language Testing System (IELTS) or Occupational English Test (OET) language test, or alternatively a citizen of and hold a passport from one the United Kingdom, the United States of America, Canada, New Zealand or Republic of Ireland.  

17. The delegate said (CB48):

    You did not prove satisfactory evidence of Competent English with your visa application. In a request dated 23 November 2013 you were asked to provide evidence of Competent English. The time period afforded to provide evidence of Competent English has now passed.

    To date I have not received evidence, and am not satisfied that the are a citizen, and hold a passport from, the United Kingdom, the United States of America, Canada, New Zealand or Republic of Ireland.

    As you do not meet Regulation 1.15C for the reasons outlined above, you constantly do not satisfy the requirements of clause 885.213.

18. The delegate considered whether the applicant met an alternative visa subclass and held that that he was not satisfied that this application is a valid application for 886 or 887 visa within class BD and concluded that the applicant did not meet the legal requirements for the grant of any subclass within the Skilled (Residence) (class VB) visa and for that reason the visa was refused. 

19. The applicant lodged an application for review to the Tribunal on 5 February 2014, which was accompanied by a letter from the solicitors for the applicant as follows:

    The applicant instructs us that he is confident he will submit to the MRT during the period of processing evidence of competent English such as to meet the provisions of Regulation 885.213. We will also make a submission that this is a time of decision and not time of application requirement.

20. The applicant was sent an invitation to appear before the Tribunal on 13 March 2014 and relevantly it identified (CB67):

    The Tribunal notes to date you have not presented evidence that you meet the English language proficiency requirement (‘competent English’) for the visa.

21. The letter then identified how the applicant could show Competent English, which relevantly referred to having (CB67-68):

    …achieved a specified score in a language test that was conducted in the two years immediately before the day on which the visa application was made.

22. In response to the letter from the Tribunal the solicitors for the applicant sent a letter dated 4 April 2014 in which they sought to agitate an argument about the construction of clause 885.213 based on an earlier decision of the High Court in Berenguel v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2010) 264 ALR 417; [2010] HCA 8, which had clearly been the subject of a consequential amendment to clear the requirement in respect of Competent English prior to the application. Nonetheless, the letter sought to develop an argument as to why the regulation should not be construed as exhaustive and why up to date material might be provided by reference to s.55. Section 55 of the Migration Act provides as follows:

    Section 55 – Further information may be given

    (1)  Until the Minister has made a decision whether to grant or refuse to grant a visa, the applicant may give the Minister any additional relevant information and the Minister must have regard to that information in making the decision.

    (2)  Subsection (1) does not mean that the Minister is required to delay making a decision because the applicant might give, or has told the Minister that the applicant intends to give, further information.

23. At the end of the letter the solicitors said:

    We request the Tribunal to process this application in the same manner as all pre 1 July 2011 lodged cases and offer our client a chance to sit for a further IELTS test to achieve a competent IELTS test result.

24. It is clear that s.55 does not provide an ongoing continuing entitlement to provide further information to the Minister so as to prevent a decision making process. Attached to the letter was also sent a response to the hearing invitation, which suggested that the applicant would take part in the hearing and would be attended by a representative, which was signed and dated on 2 April by the applicant.

25. On 11 April the solicitors for the applicant sent a letter to the Tribunal “eloquently”:

    We would like to advise that our client has now instructed us that he consents to the Tribunal making a decision on the papers having regard to our submission sent to the Tribunal on 4 April 2014.

26. It is clear from the decision of the Tribunal, delivered on 30 April 2014 that it was as a result of that letter that the Tribunal cancelled the hearing scheduled on 14 April 2014 and proceeded to make a decision on the review. In the context of this case I express concern as to the absence of provision to the Tribunal by the applicant of any evidence of having completed a Competent English test in seeking to advance arguments about the significance of such a test and the application of s.55 of the Migration Act 1958.

27. It seems to me to be wholly lacking in merit for the applicant to be advancing hypothetical arguments about an ability to pass and provide a Competent English test when no step has been taken by the applicant to provide the same.  This is not a case where it is apparent that there has been provided to the Tribunal earlier IELTS tests, nor is there any evidence of the IELTS test of 26 April 2012 that was identified in the application at the time of applying for the visa.  These are matters of considerable concern in the context of the nature of the arguments that the applicant seeks to develop in attacking the decision of the Tribunal.  The Tribunal in its reasons identified the issue in this case:

    7. The issue in the present case is whether the applicant has competent English as required by cl.885.213.

28. The Tribunal carefully and correctly identified the amendments and correctly identified the significance of the change that was made in para.16 as follows:

    16. This definition, unlike the definition considered in Berenguel’s case, requires that the test be conducted before the visa application is lodged. This can be constructed from the ordinary meaning of the words used in r.1.15C(a)(ii) and also from the use of the word “undertook” in r.1.15C(a)(i) referring to the past tense. This construction is also supported by the Explanatory Statement in the Migration Amendment Regulations 2011 (No.3) SLR 2011 No. 74 which states as follows:

    In particular, the Regulations amend the Principal Regulations to:

    • amend several definitions relating to English language qualifications to clarify the time frame within which an English language test must have been conducted. (emphasis added)

    17. The Explanatory Statement further states:

    New regulations 1.15C, 1.15D and 1.15E also clarify that the person will only have competent English, proficient English or concessional English, if the Minister is satisfied that the language test undertaken by the person was conducted no more than two years immediately before the day on which the application for a GSM visa was made.

    These amendments ensure that the applicant for a GSM visa is assessed as holding the relevant English language test score before the application for a GSM visa is made. This supports the policy intention that only applicants who are assessed as having the specified English language test score prior to making application for the GSM visa may satisfy the relevant Schedule 2 criterion. (emphasis added)

    18. It is therefore clearly the intention of the Parliament that the English test be undertaken prior to lodging the visa application. The purpose of cl.885.2013 in schedule 2, as applicable in this case, is therefore not to ensure that the “standard of English language competency is recently ascertained” (Berenguel’s case at 26) but that an applicant is assessed as having the specified English language competency prior to filing the visa application. This requirement is imposed by the direct operation of the definition of competent English in r.1.15C (Berenguel’s case at 25)

    19. In written submissions to the Tribunal, the applicant’s migration agent referred to s.55 of the Act and paragraph 26 of the High Court’s decision in Berenguel. Section 55 of the Act states as follows:

    (1) Until the Minister has made a decision whether to grant or refuse to grant a visa, the applicant may give the Minister any additional relevant information and the Minister must have regard to that information in making the decision.

    (2) Subsection (1) does not mean that the Minister is required to delay making a decision because the applicant might give, or has told the Minister that the applicant intends to give, further information.

    20. Section 55(1) of the Act provides that the applicant may given the Minister, or in this case the Tribunal, additional relevant information up until the decision is made and the Minister, or in this case the Tribunal, must have regard to that information in making the decision. The Tribunal wrote to the applicant on 13 March 2014 requesting that he provide evidence of competent English within 7 days and inviting him to appear before the Tribunal on 14 April 2014 to give evidence and present arguments relating to the issues in his case.  The applicant has not provide the Tribunal with any evidence of competent English that it can have regard to and has declined the hearing invitation.

    21. In his written submission date 4 April 2014, the applicant’s migration agent requested that the applicant be given further time to sit an IELTS test undertaken after the visa application was filed on 14 May 2012 will not satisfy the requirements for competent English and will not assist the applicant in meeting the criterion in cl.885.213. It would also not be ‘relevant information’ for the purposes of s.55 of the Act.

    22. For the reasons givens above, the Tribunal does not accept the submissions made by the applicant’s migration agent.

    23. There is no evidence before the Tribunal the applicant has competent English as defined in r.1.15C. Accordingly, the Tribunal finds that the applicant does not have competent English as defined in r.1.15C(a).

1. The Tribunal was correct in its decision to affirm the delegate’s decision and that the argument advanced lacked legal substance. Additionally, the argument advanced by the applicant in circumstances where the applicant has not provided prior to the Tribunal decision any further material of a kind under s.55 meant that the arguments being developed by the applicant were substantially a hypothetical attack.

2. The short answer in relation to ground 1 is that the Tribunal was correct in its construction. Further, there is a decision of Collier J in Bali v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [ 2014] FCA 986 that at [19] provides as follows:

   19. The primary judge observed that Berenguel pre-dated amendments to the Regulations which now require satisfaction of a test conducted “in the two years immediately before the day on which the application was made.” Her Honour referred to the decision of Riley J in Palanisamy v Minister for Immigration [2013] FCCA 1779 in support of the conclusion that those amendments made it a requirement for the test to be taken prior to lodgement of a visa application. (emphasis added)

3. That decision is binding on this Court and there is no substance in ground one. I would however go further to identify that it is not appropriate to have hypothetical grounds advanced based on arguments relating to s.55 where there is no evidence to support the foundation of the argument I may have struck out all the grounds on that basis if it had been earlier before me. However, it is important to add that because of the hypothetical nature of the applicant’s case this is not a case where it would have been appropriate in any event, even if there had been some substance in arguments about the construction of reg.1.15C where as a matter of discretion the Court should have entertained the hypothetical attack in the application.

4. Accordingly, it would not be appropriate to grant relief in circumstances of the kind in the present case given the unsatisfactory conduct of the applicant to which I have referred, even if ground 1 were made out. For the reasons I have given ground 1 is not made out. 

5. In relation to ground 2, the short answer again is that this Court is bound by the decision of Perram J in Parmar v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2011] FCA 760 at [18]:

   18. I cannot accept this argument. It is tolerably clear that the meaning of ‘competent English’ in reg 1.15C is the same as it is in the criteria set out for the visa in cll 485.215 and 485.222. As a matter of ordinary construction one would approach the interpretation of the Regulations on the basis that the expression ‘competent English’ has a uniform meaning throughout the Regulations unless the context otherwise demanded: Queensland v Forest [2008] FCAFC 96; (2008) 168 FCR 532 at 540-541 per Black CJ applying the well-known statement of Hodges J in Craig, Williamson Pty Ltd v Barrowcliff [1915] VicLawRp 66; [1915] VLR 450 at 452. In this case, the context does not demand that it be given different meanings in those different places. To the contrary, it is clear that cll 485.215 and 485.222 and reg 1.15C travel together as a package of provisions dealing with the position of skilled occupation visas. As such, I do not accept that it is open to read ‘competent English’ in the criteria as meaning ‘competent English or competent English as defined’. Nor is it possible to approach the matter so as to say that the definition in reg 1.15C is not exhaustive. The opening words of the definition – ‘If a person applies for a General Skilled Migration visa, the person has competent English if the person satisfies the Minister that the person [achieves certain results]’ – does not textually lend itself to a non-exhaustive interpretation. The provision is in a familiar form in which a state of affairs is made conditional on the state of mind of a Minister. If it is read non-exhaustively then its legal operation becomes radically different. No longer is the question whether the Minister is satisfied the criteria have been met. Instead, ‘competent English’ becomes a legal standard to be determined by a Court. I do not think that such a profoundly different operation of the regulation is a plausible interpretation of it.

6. That decision is binding of this Court, but it is also clearly the position that the construction applied by the Tribunal was correct.  Again the Court raised that in respect of the second ground, it also is one in which, independently as a matter of discretion even if there was any substance in the argument, it would not warrant any grant of relief because of the conduct of the applicant to which I have referred. 

7. In relation to ground 4 there is again a short answer to the effect that the decision of Perram J in Parmar in [29]-[28] has in substance dealt with the essence of the argument of invalidity being raised in this Court.  That reasoning of Perram J is clearly applicable to the argument here advanced in seeking to attack the instrument, is binding upon the Court and is also clearly correct.

8. I will however identify that Mr Jones sought to develop the argument by reference to the definition in the regulations.  In reg.103 an IELTS test:

   Regulation 1.03

   …

   means the International English Language Testing System test.

   And the definition of Occupational English Test:

   Regulation 1.03

   …

   means an Occupational English Test conducted by the National Language and Literacy Institute of Australia

9. In relation to the provisions attacked in the instrument to which I have referred, para.2 provides as follows:

   2. SPECIFY for applications lodged before 1 July 2012 tests, test scores and passports, as follows:

   A. For the purposes of subparagraph 1.15C(a)(i) the following language tests:

   • an  International English Language Test System (IELTS test); and

   • an Occupational English Test (OET).

   B. For the purposes of subparagraph 1.15C(a)(iii) the following scores:

   • an IELTS test score of at least 6 for each of the 4 test components of speaking, reading, writing and listening; or

   • a score of at least „B‟ in each of the four components of an OET.

   C. For the purposes of paragraph 1.15C(b) a valid passport issued by the United Kingdom, the United States of America, Canada, New Zealand or Republic of Ireland, to a citizen of that country.

10. The thrust of Mr Jones’ argument was that there was no identification of the entity by whom the test might be conducted and that the test might be conducted by anyone or that the test could be created by anyone with no certainty as to what that test might be.  Mr Jones sought to say that that problem was not one which applied to the Occupation English Test because it identified by whom the test might be conducted.  Mr Jones sought to advance an argument of invalidity by an affidavit that identified that the National Language and Literature Institute of Australia had been deregistered on 11 March 2005.

11. The deregistration of the National Language and Literature Institute of Australia is of no significance and does not give rise to any invalidity of 2A of the legislative instrument.  It is clear that the legislative instrument falls within the Legislative Instruments Act 2003 and s.13 requires the same provisions in the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 to be applied as if the legislative instrument was a section of an Act. This gives rise to the application of s.15AA in adopting an interpretation that best achieves the purpose of the object of a provision.

12. I note that s.15AA of the Acts Interpretation Act that requires a construction as being the subject of the construction so as not to exceed the legislative power of the Commonwealth. I also note there is a provision in s.13(2) of the Legislative Instruments Act that says:

    13(2). If any legislative instrument would, but for this subsection, be construed as being in excess of the rule-maker's power, it is to be taken to be a valid instrument to the extent to which it is not in excess of that power.

13. The principles to be applied in determining whether the delegated instrument exceeds the law making power were not in dispute.  This was identified by the eminent Lockhart J in Zhang Fu Qiu & Zhen Hui Liu v Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs (1994) 55 FCR 439; (1994) 37 ALD 443, [446] as follows in the first respondent’s submissions:

    30. In Qui v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affair (1994) 55 FCR 439, Lockhart J, in dismissing a claim where the validity of an English language criterion in the Regulations was challenged, stated at 94460 that “[w]hen the validity of a regulation is challenged on the basis that it is “unreasonable” such that it goes beyond the regulation-making power, the word “unreasonable” in this context means that the regulation is so oppressive and capricious that no reasonable mind can justify it”. See also Yu v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2004) 140 FCR 126 and Minister for Primary Industries and Energy v Austral Fisheries Pty Ltd (1993) 40 FCR 381.

14. It cannot possibly be the case that the reference to International English Language Test Systems in paragraph 2A can be said to be unreasonable, nor is it oppressive or capricious and the absence of identification of the bodies by whom it may be conducted does not give rise to a position that any person could create such a test or conduct a test.  It is clear that the test identified as a matter of construction is intended to be a genuine test and the hypothetical proposition that a fake test might be created by anyone does not give rise to the provision being unreasonable or invalid.

15. In these circumstances it is clear that ground 4 has no substance.  Again, however, I raise the fact that as a matter of discretion the applicant’s conduct in the present case also gives rise to circumstances where, even if there had been some substance in the alleged invalidity, this is not a case where it would have been appropriate for the Court in its discretion to grant the applicant any relief.

16. Since the commencement of these proceedings two hours have passed in respect of the opportunity for the applicant to produce the document identified in the application and the alleged test dated 26 April 2012.  I am informed from the bar table that the applicant cannot locate any such document.  The inference I draw is that the applicant did not have any such document and that is a matter of concern in the context of the applicant’s conduct in this case. This is an independent discretionary factor that would in my opinion warrant declining any relief to this applicant even if there was any substance in the grounds of the amended application. There is no substance in any of the grounds raised.  For the reasons I have given the amended application should be dismissed.

I certify that the preceding forty-four (44) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Judge Street

Associate: 

Date:  16 March 2015