RW & ME Smith Pty Ltd v Boral Resources (Vic) Pty Ltd

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SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA

COURT OF APPEAL

S EAPCI 2022 0055
RW & ME SMITH PTY LTD (ACN 105 445 645) Applicant
v
BORAL RESOURCES (VIC) PTY LTD (ACN 004 620 731) Respondent

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JUDGES: McLEISH, NIALL and MACAULAY JJA
WHERE HELD: Melbourne
DATE OF HEARING: 27 March 2023
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 11 August 2023
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION: [2023] VSCA 182
JUDGMENT APPEALED FROM: RW & ME Smith Pty Ltd v Boral Resources (Vic) Pty Ltd [2022] VCC 729 (Judge A Ryan)

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CONTRACT – Construction – Summary termination – Meaning of ‘Cartage Works’ in cartage contract – Whether applicant’s repair of equipment at respondent’s plant fell within meaning of ‘Cartage Works’ – Whether trial judge erred finding respondent entitled to summarily determine cartage contract due to applicant’s alleged default in performing ‘Cartage Works’ – Error established – Appeal allowed.

CONTRACT – Construction – Scope of release clauses – Whether wide general words of release confined to apply only to specific subject matter – Properly construed relevant clauses only released and indemnified respondent from claims arising from short-term contract made after termination of principal contract – Respondent unable to rely on release in claim against it for breach of principal contract.

Grant v John Grant & Sons Pty Ltd (1954) 91 CLR 112 applied; Wardman v Macquarie Bank Ltd [2023] FCAFC 13 considered.

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Counsel

Applicant: Mr LEP Magowan
Respondent: Ms MJ O’Sullivan KC with Mr O Fagir

Solicitors

Applicant: Aitken Partners
Respondent: Australian Business Lawyers & Advisors

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction

Grounds of appeal and issues

Factual background

The Agreement

Incident on 9 July 2015

Boral’s investigation and response

The Second Deed

Judge’s reasons

Breach of Agreement

Unconscionability and estoppel

Termination of Agreement

Second Deed

Goodwill

Loss and damage

Were the repair works ‘Cartage Works’?

Whether a truck was being loaded at the time of the incident

The construction of ‘Cartage Works’

Did the applicant breach the Agreement and enliven Boral’s right of summary termination?

Was Boral precluded from terminating the Agreement for some other reason?

Did the applicant release Boral from the claim for wrongful termination?

Submissions

Analysis and conclusion

Was it unconscionable for Boral to rely upon the release in the Second Deed?

Would Boral have terminated the Agreement on three months’ notice?

Conclusion and orders

MCLEISH JA
NIALL JA
MACAULAY JA:

Introduction

  1. RW & ME Smith Pty Ltd (the applicant), is a company owned by Robert Smith, a truck driver, and his wife. The applicant delivered concrete for the respondent, Boral Resources (Vic) Pty Ltd (‘Boral’), under a cartage agreement (‘the Agreement’). On 9 July 2015, Mr Smith and another employee of the applicant helped employees of Boral replace a broken drive chain on an elevator at Boral’s concrete plant. The broken chain was preventing Boral from loading concrete onto trucks. After the successful repair, and the plant resuming operations, Boral summarily terminated the Agreement because of what it alleged was the applicant’s serious misconduct when assisting with the repair. Despite the summary termination, and with…

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Details
Case
[2023] VSCA 182
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

RW & ME Smith Pty Ltd (the applicant) sought to appeal a decision of the Supreme Court of Victoria, which found that Boral Resources (Vic) Pty Ltd (the respondent) was entitled to summarily terminate a cartage contract and to recover damages. The applicant argued that the trial judge erred in concluding that the respondent was entitled to terminate the contract due to the applicant’s alleged default in performing ‘Cartage Works’ and that the release clause in the termination deed did not apply to the respondent’s liability for breach of the principal contract.

The primary legal issues for the court to determine were whether the applicant’s repair of equipment at the respondent’s plant fell within the meaning of ‘Cartage Works’ in the cartage contract, and whether the release clause in the termination deed was broad enough to release the respondent from the applicant’s claims for breach of the principal contract. The court also had to consider whether the trial judge erred in finding that the respondent was entitled to terminate the contract and to recover damages.

The court found that the trial judge erred in concluding that the applicant’s repair of equipment at the respondent’s plant fell within the meaning of ‘Cartage Works’. The court held that the applicant’s actions did not constitute ‘Cartage Works’ and that the respondent was not entitled to summarily terminate the contract on this basis. The court also found that the release clause in the termination deed only applied to the short-term contract made after the termination of the principal contract, and did not release the respondent from the applicant’s claims for breach of the principal contract. The court held that the trial judge erred in finding that the respondent was entitled to recover damages for the applicant’s alleged breach of the principal contract.

The court allowed the applicant’s appeal and set aside the decision of the Supreme Court of Victoria. The court found that the respondent was not entitled to summarily terminate the cartage contract or to recover damages for the applicant’s alleged breach of the principal contract. The court ordered that the respondent pay the applicant’s costs of the appeal.

Background

Background to the litigation

The Second Deed, titled ‘Deed of Termination’, was executed as a deed by Mr Smith on behalf of the applicant and Paul Hillyer as authorised officer for and on behalf of Boral. The Second Deed contains the following relevant terms:BackgroundThe Contractor has, as a [sic] independent contractor, provided various transport services to Boral upon certain terms and conditions accepted and performed by the parties over a period of time (Contract).The parties gave [sic, ‘have’] mutually agreed to terminate the contract upon the terms and conditions set out in this deed.Terms and Conditions1. Contract Termination1.1 To enable the Contractor to sell the vehicle within the Boral fleet.2. Final Payment2.1 Boral will pay the Contractor the amount due to the Contractor for services provided by the Contractor to Boral for the period from the last payment date to the Termination Date (Final Payment Amount).2.2 The parties agree that payment by Boral to the Contractor of the Final Payment Amount is in full and final settlement of all payment obligations of Boral to the Contractor under the Contract to the intent and with the effect that no further claim for any payment may be made by the Contractor against Boral.2.3 The parties agree that the Final Payment Amount includes but is not limited to any and all claims, costs, fees, fines, third party claims, claims for property and personal damage and expenses howsoever arising and in any way related to the transport services provided by the Contractor to Boral and the vehicles, equipment and drivers used or engaged by the Contractor when providing those transport services.3. Indemnity and Release3.1 By its execution of this Deed, the Contractor agrees that, subject to payment by Boral to the contractor of the Final Payment Amount due for the period to the Termination Date, the Contractor will indemnify and release Boral from any and all liabilities, losses, claims, damages and expenses howsoever arising which may, directly or indirectly, arise from the Contract and the vehicles, equipment and drivers used and engaged in the provision by the Contractor of the transport services.3.2 The Contractor acknowledges and agrees that effective on the termination date the Contract between Boral and the Contractor is at an end and the Contractor has no further claims or entitlements against Boral either now or in the future and hereby releases and indemnifies Boral against any and all such claims.4. General Conditions…0.0 [sic] Entire Agreement This deed embodies the entire agreement and understanding between the parties concerning its subject matter and succeeds and cancels all another [sic] agreements and understandings concerning the subject matter of this deed and any warranty, representation, guarantee or other term and condition of any nature not contained in this deed is of no force or effect.5. Legal adviceThe Contractor confirms that it has been advised by Boral to obtain independent legal advice concerning the terms of this deed and has been provided with an opportunity to obtain that advice.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Whether the applicant’s repair of equipment at the respondent’s plant fell within the meaning of ‘Cartage Works’ in the cartage contract?
2. Whether the trial judge erred in finding the respondent entitled to summarily determine the cartage contract due to the applicant’s alleged default in performing ‘Cartage Works’?
3. Whether the wide general words of the release clauses in the Deed of Termination are confined to apply only to the specific subject matter of the release or if they extend to other claims?
4. Whether the respondent can rely on the release clauses in the Deed of Termination in a claim against it for breach of the principal contract?

Held
1. The court concluded that the applicant’s repair of equipment at the respondent’s plant did not fall within the meaning of ‘Cartage Works’ in the cartage contract.
2. The trial judge erred in finding the respondent entitled to summarily determine the cartage contract due to the applicant’s alleged default in performing ‘Cartage Works’. The error established led to the appeal being allowed.
3. The court held that the wide general words of the release clauses in the Deed of Termination are confined to apply only to the specific subject matter of the release.
4. The respondent cannot rely on the release clauses in the Deed of Termination in a claim against it for breach of the principal contract.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The court approached the first issue by examining the meaning of 'Cartage Works' in the context of the cartage contract. It determined that the applicant’s repair of equipment at the respondent’s plant did not constitute ‘Cartage Works’ as defined in the contract. This conclusion was based on a detailed interpretation of the contract terms, where 'Cartage Works' specifically referred to the provision of transport services and not the repair of equipment. Consequently, the court found the trial judge’s determination that the respondent was entitled to summarily terminate the contract due to the applicant’s default in performing 'Cartage Works' to be erroneous. This misapplication of the contract terms was deemed sufficient to warrant allowing the appeal.

In addressing the second issue, the court scrutinised the general release clauses within the Deed of Termination. The court found that these clauses were specifically tailored to release and indemnify the respondent from claims arising from the short-term contract that followed the termination of the principal contract. This interpretation was supported by the principle that release clauses are to be narrowly construed to avoid broad and unintended releases. Therefore, the clauses did not extend to other claims, particularly those related to the principal contract. This conclusion was in line with established legal principles such as those found in Grant v John Grant & Sons Pty Ltd (1954) 91 CLR 112, which underscore the importance of interpreting release clauses in their specific contractual context.

The court further examined the applicability of the release clauses to the respondent's claim for breach of the principal contract. It held that since the release clauses were intended to cover claims arising from the short-term contract, they did not extend to claims concerning the principal contract. This reasoning was consistent with the decision in Wardman v Macquarie Bank Ltd [2023] FCAFC 13, which emphasised the necessity of construing release clauses narrowly. The court’s decision underscored the principle that parties cannot be deemed to have released claims not explicitly mentioned in the release clauses. Consequently, the respondent was unable to rely on the release clauses in the Deed of Termination in the current claim for breach of the principal contract.