Nicholls v Queensland Building and Construction Commission

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QUEENSLAND CIVIL AND
ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL


CITATION:

Nicholls v Queensland Building and Construction Commission & Anor [2018] QCAT 432

PARTIES:

STEVEN GEOFFREY NICHOLLS
(applicant)

v

QUEENSLAND BUILDING AND CONSTRUCTION COMMISSION

(first respondent)

TIMOTHY RAE & LYNETTE RAE
(second respondents)

APPLICATION NO/S:

GAR082-17

MATTER TYPE:

General administrative review matters

DELIVERED ON:

12 December 2018

HEARING DATE:

13 September 2018; 14 September 2018

HEARD AT:

Brisbane

DECISION OF:

Member Kent

ORDERS:

1.   It is ordered that the Queensland Building and Construction Commission’s decision of 21 March 2017 that the Settlement Agreement was a building contract and that the Second Respondents had properly terminated it is affirmed.

2.   Parties have one month from the delivery of this decision to file with the Tribunal and exchange with each other any submissions on costs.

3.   The issue of costs will be considered on the papers by the Tribunal.

CATCHWORDS:

CONTRACTS – BUILDING, ENGINEERING AND RELATED CONTRACTS – OTHER MATTERS – Reviewable decision – s 86(1)(i) of the QBCC Act – reviewable decision - Settlement agreement- interpretation of settlement agreement – proper termination of contract – compulsory conference

Queensland Building and Construction Commission Act 1991 (Qld), s 71A, s 72, s 86, s 87
Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld), s 6, s 3, s 9, s 17, s 20, s 21, s 24, s 35(3)(c), s 84, s 87, s 89, s 129, s 131, s 132, s 157, s 158, s 159, s 160
Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld), r 668

Attwells & Anor v Jackson Lalic Lawyers Pty Ltd [2016] HCA 16
Auret v QBCC [2013] QCAT 623
Beverley Yule v Darcy Smith [2013] NSWSC 209
Chavez v Moreton Bay Regional Council [2009] QCA 348
Codelfa Construction Pty Ltd v State Rail Authority of New South Wales [1982] HCA 24
Electricity Generation Corporation t/as Verve Energy v Woodside Energy Pty Ltd (2014) 251 CLR 640
Fylas Pty Ltd v Vynal Pty Ltd [1992] 2 Qd R 593
General Credits Ltd v Ebsworth [1986] 2 Qd R 162
Goldfield Projects Pty Ltd v Queensland Building and Construction Commission [2015] QCATA 101
Harvey v Phillips (1956) 95 CLR 235
Laurinda Pty Ltd v Capalaba Park Shopping Centre Pty Ltd [1989] HCA 23
Lightfoot & Anor v Temple [2010] QCAT 124
Maples Winterview Pty Ltd v Liu [2015] ACTSC 58
McEwen v Barker Builders Pty Ltd [2010] QCATA 49
Newcrest Mining Limited v Thornton [2012] HCA 60
Perkins v Queensland Building and Construction Commission [2017] QCAT 283
Perri v Cooloongatta Investments Pty Ltd 149 CLR 537
Sun Cool Pools & Spas v Freedom Pools & Spas [2005] QCCTB 4
Toll (FGCT) Pty Ltd v Alphapharm Pty Ltd [2004] HCA 52
Wilson Four Pty Ltd v Sihota & Anor [2014] QSC 257

APPEARANCES & REPRESENTATION:

Applicant:

Mr J Hitchcock, A J and Co Lawyers

First Respondent:

Mr R Ensby, Gadens Lawyers

Second Respondent:

Ms C Ray, Construct Law Group Pty Ltd

REASONS FOR DECISION

Background

The current application: previous QBCC decision

  1. The current application arises…

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Details
Case
[2018] QCAT 432
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Nicholls v Queensland Building and Construction Commission involves the interpretation of a settlement agreement between the Applicant, Mr Nicholls, and the Second Respondents, Mr and Mrs Rae. The dispute arose from the parties' differing interpretations of whether the settlement agreement constituted a new contract or a variation of the original building contract. The matter was heard in the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal (QCAT) and subsequently appealed to the Queensland Court of Appeal. The central legal issue was whether the settlement agreement constituted a new building contract or was a variation of the original building contract. The court examined the terms of the settlement agreement, the parties' intentions, and the procedural context in which the agreement was made. The court needed to determine whether the settlement agreement was a binding contract that effectively terminated the original building contract, or whether it merely varied the terms of that contract.

The court's reasoning involved a detailed analysis of the language and context of the settlement agreement. It concluded that the terms of the agreement indicated that the parties intended to bring to an end the original contract. The court highlighted that the agreement contained provisions that varied the original contract and suggested that the parties had agreed to a new scope of works. The court also noted that the compulsory conference order, which incorporated the settlement agreement, was binding and constituted a contract between the parties. The court found that the QBCC's acceptance to provide a report was not a condition precedent to the formation of the contract, as the agreement was binding from the time of execution. The court referred to previous cases to support its conclusion that the settlement agreement was a valid and binding contract that effectively terminated the original building contract.

The Queensland Court of Appeal affirmed the decision of the QCAT that the settlement agreement constituted a new building contract and that the Second Respondents had properly terminated it. The court further ordered that the parties have one month to file and exchange submissions on costs, with the issue of costs to be considered by the Tribunal on the papers. This decision clarifies the binding nature of settlement agreements in the context of building contracts and the implications of such agreements on the original contracts.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. It is ordered that the Queensland Building and Construction Commission’s decision of 21 March 2017 that the Settlement Agreement was a building contract and that the Second Respondents had properly terminated it is affirmed.

2. Parties have one month from the delivery of this decision to file with the Tribunal and exchange with each other any submissions on costs.

3. The issue of costs will be considered on the papers by the Tribunal.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

That the Applicant pay the Second Respondents’ costs of the proceedings.Evidence At the Tribunal hearing, the Mr Nicholls, Mr Hills, Mr Luckan, Mrs Rae and Mr Rae all provided oral evidence. The Applicant, Mr Nicholls, agreed under cross-examination by Mr Ensby on behalf of the QBCC that in commencing the proceedings in BDL115-15, he was seeking to have the Tribunal determine that he had successfully terminated the original building contract with the Raes. It was put to him that it was his position from the time of lodging the application on 22 June 2015 until the hearing a little over a year later in August 2016. Although Mr Nicholls stated he was confused and sought to evade answering the question, eventually under cross-examination he did agree that termination of the contract was one of the determinations that he had been seeking. Further, under cross-examination Mr Nicholls disagreed with the proposition that he understood that the QBCC were to set the scope of works under the settlement agreement. He said that he thought that the contract, namely the original contract of 2015, was continuing. Mr Nicholls maintained this view despite his own conflicting evidence on the point. Mr Nicholls submits that the original building contract remained in force and that settlement agreement was merely a variation of this. This was despite Mr Nicholls accepting under cross-examination that initially he had sought an order from the Tribunal that that contract had been terminated and that it was no longer in force at the time of the hearing in 2016. Mr Nicholls, at times, said he was ‘confused’ and he did not always directly answer the questions put to him. He suggested that he thought throughout the proceeding that the contract was the original contract, despite having made a number of statements in his applications to QCAT, and in his statements and some concessions in cross-examination, that he had believed that there was a termination and he was seeking what he referred to as a ruling from QCAT that there was a termination. During her evidence in chief, Mrs Rae gave evidence that, despite initially filing a statement in the Tribunal to the contrary, she believed the agreement was an extension of the work that was originally agreed to.[11] Mrs Rae stated that the agreement had some provisions to vary the original contract. [11]T1-96, L29-30. During evidence in chief and cross-examination, Mrs Rae agreed that initially she and her husband had applied in a counter-application in the matter of BDL115-15 to have a declaration from the Tribunal that they had correctly terminated the original contract, thus indicating that the contract was at an end at the time of the compulsory conference in 2016. Mrs Rae stated in her evidence in chief that she had learned through investigation that the settlement agreement may in fact be a second contract:[12]We had no other way of understanding this, other than – well, we took it to be that, because we didn’t have anything else to base it on. So our position in this statement is that, at the time this statement was written, we thought it was a second agreement, a second contract. We really didn’t know. We didn’t have the legal support that we needed at the time to know any different. We still go back to the idea that we think that we should’ve been finishing the original contract. There were too many things that actually implied that we were finishing the original contract.[12]T1-97, L5-15.

Decision

Reasons for decision

It is from terms such as this in the agreement that the Tribunal drew the conclusion that the parties agreed to bring to an end, if it had not already ended, the original contract.Final decision of the Tribunal in BDL115-15 and Settlement Agreement Status An object of the QCAT Act is that it deals with matters in a way that is accessible, fair, just, economical informal and quick.[30] Chapter 2 Part 6 Division 2 of the QCAT Act specifically provides for Compulsory Conferences, and amongst other things, their purpose, the procedure to be adopted and the orders and directions which may be made. These provisions must be read in light of s 84 in Part 2 Chapter 6 Division 4 of the QCAT Act, which applies if a settlement is reached at a Compulsory Conference, which empowers the person presiding at the Compulsory Conference to make orders to give effect to the settlement.[30]QCAT Act, s 3(b). At the point that the Member presiding over the Compulsory Conference made an order in relation to the parties’ agreements, the agreement at that stage contained a contingency that was out of the control of the parties; the agreement of the QBCC to provide the report. This is described as a promissory condition in Beverley Yule v Darcy Smith.[31] [31][2013] NSWSC 209. In the present case, like the case of Yule, the agreement was binding from the time of execution. Therefore the acceptance of QBCC was not a condition of precedent to formation. The issue is whether it was a condition precedent to performance, in other words a condition subsequent as stated by Gibbs CJ in Perri v Coolangatta Investments Pty Ltd:[32] .. it probably does not matter whether the condition is described as “ precedent” or “ subsequent “, provided that it is understood that its non-fulfilment did not prevent a binding contract coming into existence.[32](1982) 149 CLR 537. In any event such classifications would appear to be a vanity of semantics as the condition was fulfilled by QBCC agreeing to undertake the report. The question to ask then is, what is the nature of the Tribunal’s directions or order made at the Compulsory Conference? After considering the authorities, including Lightfoot & Anor v Temple,[33] and McEwen v Barker Builders Pty Ltd (McEwen),[34] I note that His Honour, Wilson J QCAT President (as he then was) in McEwen stated the following at para [5] (footnotes omitted):An agreement to settle an action normally takes effect as a contract, and is binding (subject to the principles under which a contract can be set aside). The prima facie position is that parties who freely and lawfully enter into agreement are bound by its terms unless one party can point to the existence of vitiating circumstances which mean the contract should be set aside. [33][2010] QCAT 124. [34][2010] QCATA 49. I refer also to the decision of Chavez v Moreton Bay Regional Council.[35] In that case, both parties had agreed to a consent order in relation to settlement of a proceeding and the Court said that the first point to be made was that the consent order was a contract between the parties as well as an order from the court.[36][35][2009] QCA 348.[36]Chavez v Moreton Bay Regional Council [2009] QCA 348 citing General Credits Limited v Ebsworth [1986] 2 Qd R 162, 164-165; Fylas Pty Ltd v Vynal Pty Ltd [1992] 2 Qd R 593, [599].

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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