Nelson v Commissioner of Highways (No 3)

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Supreme Court of South Australia

(Land and Valuation Division)

NELSON v COMMISSIONER OF HIGHWAYS (No 3)

[2023] SASC 22

Judgment of the Honourable Justice Blue  

17 February 2023

REAL PROPERTY - COMPULSORY ACQUISITION OF LAND

REAL PROPERTY - COMPULSORY ACQUISITION OF LAND - COMPENSATION - ASSESSMENT - MARKET VALUE

It was determined that the second applicant is entitled to compensation totalling $269,972.73 and the first applicant is entitled to compensation totalling $13,455.97 pursuant to the Land Acquisition Act 1969: Nelson v Commissioner of Highways (No 2) [2023] SASC 7.

The applicants seek an order that the respondent pay their costs of the proceeding (or alternatively a proportion of their costs). The respondent seeks an order that the applicants pay 50 per cent of the respondent's costs of the proceeding (or alternatively that each party bear their own costs).

Held:

1 Subject to the Court’s overriding discretion, the starting point in exercising the discretion under section 36 of the Land Acquisition Act 1969 is that the claimant should recover their costs of a proceeding seeking determination of the amount of compensation payable (at [32]).

2    It was not unreasonable for the applicants not to accept what the respondent contends were informal offers contained in the letters sent on behalf of the respondent in April 2014, August 2014 and October 2021 (at [57], [69], [72]).

3    The conduct of the applicants in not negotiating in response to the offers was not in the circumstances unreasonable such that they should be deprived of recovering costs on that account (at [59], [70], [77]).

4    The fact that the applicants recovered much less than the amounts contained in the formulations of claim does not entail that they should be deprived of recovering costs on that account (at [88]).

5    The applicants should be deprived of recovering costs insofar as they unsuccessfully pursued novel claims by way of a claim for loss of future profits of the business and for future loss of wages of Nelson family members (at [99]).

6    On a broad axe assessment, 25 per cent of the applicants' costs should be attributed to future profits and future wages claims (at [105]).

7    Order that the respondent pay 75 per cent of applicants’ costs of the proceeding (at [107]).

Land Acquisition Act 1969 (SA) s 23A, s 23C(1), s 23C(2)(b), S 23C(3)(b), s 36, s 36(b)(i); Supreme Court Act 1935 (SA) s 40, s 40(2); Evidence Act 1929 (SA) s 67C, referred to.
Anderson v Commissioner of Highways (No 3) [2018] SASC 166; Brewarrana v Commissioner of Highways (1973) 6 SASR 541; Chadrysiak v Commissioner of Highways (No 2) [2018] SASC 191; Dillon v Gosford City Council [2011] NSWCA 328, (2011) 184 LGERA 179; Love v Roads Corporation [2011] VSCA 434; Minister for the Environment v Florence (1979) 21 SASR 108; Morris v McEwen [2005] SASC 284, considered.

NELSON v COMMISSIONER OF HIGHWAYS (No 3)
[2023] SASC 22

Civil

  1. BLUE J: On 19 January…

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Details
Case
[2023] SASC 22
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Nelson v Commissioner of Highways (No 3) involves Mr Nelson and a company (the Nelson Parties) who seek costs from the Commissioner of Highways. The primary dispute revolves around the compulsory acquisition of land, specifically concerning the assessment and compensation for the land and business conducted on it. The case was heard in the Supreme Court of South Australia.

The key legal issues before the court involved determining the appropriate costs order between the Nelson Parties and the Commissioner. The court needed to consider the comparative provision under the Land Acquisition and Compensation Act, particularly section 36, which outlines the factors that the court should consider when determining costs. The central consideration was whether the court should deviate from the general principle that the claimant should recover their costs, and if so, under what circumstances and to what extent.

The court's reasoning involved examining the nature of the claim, the Commissioner's offer, and the conduct of both parties during the proceedings and negotiations. The court referenced the decision in Love v Roads Corporation, which established that the starting point in compensation proceedings is that the dispossessed owner should recover their costs. However, the court also considered the factors outlined in section 36, such as the quantum of the claim, the Commissioner's offer, and any failure to negotiate in good faith. Ultimately, the court determined that the Commissioner should pay 75 per cent of the Nelson Parties' costs, reflecting a balanced approach that acknowledged the complexity of the case and the respective positions of the parties.

The final order of the court was that the Commissioner pay 75 per cent of the Nelson Parties' costs of the proceeding, reflecting the court's consideration of the relevant statutory provisions and the conduct of the parties involved.

Orders

Orders of the court

Full text does not contain this section.

Background

Background to the litigation

Mr Nelson and the Company (collectively the Nelson Parties) seek an order that the Commissioner pay their costs of the proceeding (or alternatively a proportion of their costs). The Commissioner seeks an order that the Nelson Parties pay 50 per cent of the Commissioner’s costs of the proceeding (or alternatively that each party bear their own costs).Background I set out here matters of background relevant to costs. More detailed background facts are set out in my previous judgments.[2][2] Nelson v Commissioner of Highways [2020] SASC 109; Nelson v Commissioner of Highways (No 2) [2023] SASC 7. Mr Nelson was the owner of the freehold interest in the Land. The Company was the owner of a leasehold interest in the Land and conducted a barbecue and wood heater business on the Land. On 25 October 2013 the Commissioner served on Mr Nelson notice of intention to acquire the Land pursuant to section 10 of the Act. On 13 March 2014 the Commissioner compulsorily acquired the Land. The Commissioner made an offer to pay $2,120,000 to Mr Nelson in respect of his freehold interest and paid that amount into Court. The Commissioner did not make an offer at that stage to pay the Company in respect of its leasehold interest in the Land or pay any amount into Court on account of the acquisition of its leasehold interest. The Company continued to conduct the Business on the Land (rent free) after that date. On 19 March 2014 there was a meeting between Mr Nelson (and possibly Mr Humphries) and Department representatives at which Mr Nelson said that he would seek $3.7 million compensation for the Land and $4.9 million compensation for the Business. On 25 March 2014 Mr Humphries sent a letter to the Department providing a narrative description of those figures in response to a request by the Department. On 27 March 2014, in response to a further request by the Department, he provided a detailed breakdown. The breakdown in respect of the Land comprised $2.75 million based on Mr Fudali’s valuation, $800,000 for “developer’s profit estimate” and $150,000 for disturbance. The breakdown in respect of the Business comprised $1.31 million market value (based on adjusted profit of $149,562 per annum); $1.65 million for “developer’s profit estimate”; $500,000 for intangible assets; $180,000 for loss of profits in the 2014 year; and various other compensation heads. On 16 April 2014 Brian Sander provided to the Department a valuation of the Business at $600,000. On 23 April 2014 Mr Berry, Manager Real Estate Services at the Department, sent a letter to Mr Allen. It said that the Department had received a formal valuation valuing the Business at $600,000 inclusive of plant, goodwill and stock. It noted that the average stock figure over the last four years was $140,000 and said that the Department therefore offered $460,000 for the Business exclusive of stock. It said that, if not all of the stock was sold during the proposed closedown sale, a valuation of any remaining stock could be undertaken and an adjustment made to the figure of $460,000 to include the remnant. It said that, in light of these matters, the Department was unable to accept the Nelson Parties’ claim of $8.6 million (referred to in Mr Humphries’ letter).

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Accordingly, the appropriate costs order is that the Commissioner pay 75 per cent of the Nelson Parties’ costs of the proceeding.Conclusion I order that the respondent pay 75 per cent of the applicants’ costs of the proceeding on the standard costs basis.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In Love v Roads Corporation[16] Warren CJ, Tate JA and Emerton AJA said in respect of the comparative provision[17] of the Land Acquisition and Compensation Act 1986 (Vic):We accept that the position of a claimant in proceedings under the Act is not that of an ordinary litigant and that the starting point for the exercise of the Court’s discretion as to costs is that the dispossessed owner should recover the costs of making the claim. The discretion as to costs in compensation proceedings is tilted in favour of the claimant.[18] [16][2011] VSCA 434. [17]Section 91 of the Victorian Act is largely the same as section 36 of the South Australian Act, albeit that it contains some additional factors to be taken into account under subsection 2(b) and is subject under subsection 2(c) to other provisions of the Act. [18]At [173]. (Footnote omitted)Matters to be taken into consideration The subsequent words of section 36 provide that the Court “shall, where it is, in the opinion of the Court, appropriate to do so, take into consideration” the matters listed in paragraphs (a) and (b). On the one hand, it is mandatory for the Court to take the specified matters into account. On the other hand, this is mandatory only where the Court is of opinion that it is appropriate to do so. This entails that the Court must take into account these matters when it considers that they warrant a departure from the starting point that the claimant should recover their costs. In Minister for the Environment v Florence[19] Wells J explained the position in these terms:It is to be observed that the direction is not unconditional; the Court is only to give effect to the direction where it considers it appropriate to do so. The implication, in my opinion, is that before applying the substance of pars (a) and (b) there must be some identifiable facts or circumstances signifying the appropriateness of considering, in particular, the relationship between the Authority’s best offer and the amount awarded, unreasonable conduct on the part of either party, or an excessive claim or unduly depressed offer. Put another way, what the section means is … , when the facts and circumstances seem to call for it, the Court is to consider the implications, for the case then before it, of those paragraphs.[20][19](1979) 21 SASR 108. [20] At 135.Quantum of claim, Authority’s offer and negotiations The provisions relating to the Court taking into consideration the claim by the claimant, offers by the Authority and any failure on the part of the Authority or the claimant to negotiate in good faith raise for consideration the positions taken by the parties in and before the proceeding as to the amount of compensation and in negotiations. Section 36(a) refers to the amount of compensation (if any) offered by the Authority. This is a reference to the amount of compensation offered by the Authority pursuant to section 23A. If the Authority makes no offer of compensation pursuant to section 23A (for example if it takes the view that the claimant has no interest in land or that the claimant’s interest is valueless), paragraph (a) will have no application. However, where the Authority makes an offer of compensation under section 23A (the usual case), paragraph (a), when considered relevant by the Court, requires a comparison between the amount of compensation determined by the Court to be payable on a reference under section 23C with the amount of the Authority’s section 23A offer.