Mead (a pseudonym) v The King; R v Mead (a pseudonym)

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SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Court of Appeal: Criminal)

MEAD (A PSEUDONYM) v THE KING; R v MEAD (A PSEUDONYM)

[2025] SASCA 3

Judgment of the Court of Appeal  

(The Honourable Justice S Doyle, the Honourable Justice Bleby and the Honourable Justice B Doyle)

30 January 2025

CRIMINAL LAW - PARTICULAR OFFENCES - OFFENCES AGAINST THE PERSON - SEXUAL OFFENCES - MAINTAINING SEXUAL RELATIONSHIP WITH CHILD AND PERSISTENT SEXUAL ABUSE OF CHILD

CRIMINAL LAW - APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - PARTICULAR GROUNDS OF APPEAL - IMPROPER ADMISSION OR REJECTION OF EVIDENCE

CRIMINAL LAW - APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - APPEAL AGAINST SENTENCE - GROUNDS FOR INTERFERENCE - SENTENCE MANIFESTLY EXCESSIVE OR INADEQUATE

Application for permission to appeal against conviction and application by Director of Public Prosecution to appeal against sentence.

The applicant was charged with the offence of sexual abuse of a child and two counts of assault occasioning actual bodily harm. He entered a plea of guilty in relation to the sexual abuse charge but disputed several particulars of the charge and the period over which the offending was said to have occurred. He entered a plea of not guilty in respect of the assault charges.  The counts involved the same complainant, who was a young female at the time of the offending. With the exception of one particular which was not proved, the judge found that the disputed particulars of the sexual abuse of a child allegation were made out, and that the applicant was guilty of the two assault charges.

The applicant seeks permission to appeal against his conviction in respect of the assaults (and in respect of the disputed particulars relating to the sexual abuse of a child) on three grounds. He contends that the trial judge erred by bolstering the complainant’s credibility on the basis of consistency of account (Ground 1), improperly relied upon school attendance records to support the complainant’s version of events (Ground 2), and failed to attend to burden and standard of proof by failing to consider whether the applicant’s account was negatived as a reasonable possibility (Ground 3).

Held (the Court) granting permission to appeal but dismissing the appeal against conviction:

1.Properly understood, the trial judge was referring to the internal consistency of the complainant’s evidence in the course of the trial. This did not offend the bolster rule nor assume the truth of the evidence.

2.The trial judge had regard to the complainant’s school attendance for the purpose of assessing the extent to which it tended to support, or not support, her account and the applicant’s account. There was no error in that approach.

3.When considered as a whole, it is sufficiently clear from the trial judge's reasons that he had regard to all the evidence and rejected the reasonable possibility that the accused’s account (in respect of the contested issues) was true.

The trial judge utilised a starting point of seven years imprisonment for the sexual abuse charge. After a reduction for the plea of guilty, making the sentences…

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Details
Case
[2025] SASCA 3
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The applicant, identified by the pseudonym Mead, appealed against his conviction and sentence for maintaining a sexual relationship with a child and persistent sexual abuse of a child. The appeal concerned the admission of evidence and the severity of the sentence imposed. The matter was heard by S Doyle, Bleby, and B Doyle JJ of the Supreme Court of South Australia.

The legal issues before the Court included whether the sentencing judge had erred in applying the principles established in *R v D* to the applicant's case, particularly concerning the relevance of the complainant's age and the nature of the relationship between the applicant and the complainant. The Court also considered the applicant's submission that the sentence was manifestly excessive, taking into account factors such as the delay between the offending and sentencing, and the applicant's rehabilitation and support network.

The Court reasoned that while the prosecutor's submissions on the applicability of *R v D* were somewhat equivocal, the principles of that case, which address the seriousness of sexual offending against children, remained relevant. The Court noted the significant violence and depravity involved in the offending, the complainant's vulnerability, and the applicant's exploitation of her dependence. Despite acknowledging the applicant's progress and support, the Court held that delay and rehabilitation could only mitigate the sentence to a limited extent and should not be given undue weight, as this could deter other victims from reporting abuse. The Court affirmed that the complainant's evidence was credible and reliable, with the exception of one contested act which could not be proven beyond reasonable doubt. The Court ultimately found that the sentence imposed was not manifestly excessive, considering the gravity of the offences and the applicable sentencing principles.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

Before considering that submission and the authorities upon which reliance is placed, it should be noted that immediately following these passages, the judge continued:[16][16] Reasons [155]-[156].The one exception was the contested particular of anal intercourse. The complainant’s evidence was extremely brief and unparticularised as to that event, which she said occurred on an occasion when she was extremely drunk. Whilst the court finds that the complainant believes it occurred, and it may have occurred, the lack of detail and context, and the limitations on the complainant’s evidence as to the topic, together with a lack of consistency in cross examination on the topic mean that the court cannot find the event established beyond reasonable doubt. After careful consideration, the court however does not find this conclusion casts doubt on the remainder of the complainant’s evidence.ConclusionsAt the end of the day, with that single qualification, having given all the evidence the closest consideration, including importantly, the defence case and the accused’s evidence, the court finds that the complainant’s evidence was both credible and reliable, and should be accepted beyond reasonable doubt. The applicant relied upon observations made in Liberato v The Queen (‘Liberato’),[17] Murray v The Queen (‘Murray’),[18] Douglass v The Queen (‘Douglass’)[19] and De Silva v The Queen (‘De Silva’).[20] [17] (1985) 159 CLR 507 at 519 (Brennan J).[18] (2002) 211 CLR 193 at [23] (Gaudron J), [57] (Gummow and Hayne JJ).[19] (2012) 86 ALJR 1086 at [12]-[13] (French CJ, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ).[20] (2019) 268 CLR 57 at [9]-[10] (Kiefel CJ, Bell, Gageler and Gordon JJ). In terms, the observations in Liberato, supplemented by those in Murray and as summarised and affirmed in De Silva, were concerned with the need for a direction to a jury in order to avoid risks associated with the misapplication or non-application of the burden of proof. The risks are that the jury may erroneously consider that it may be enough, in order to conclude the question of guilt, merely to form a preference for the complainant’s evidence over the accused’s evidence and, relatedly, that the jury might wrongly apprehend that they ought only find the accused not guilty if they positively believe the accused’s account. The refinement to the so-called Liberato direction endorsed by the plurality in De Silva, drawing upon observations made by Wheeler JA in Johnson v Western Australia,[21] also reinforces the proposition that even in a case where the jury entirely rejects the accused’s account, it remains necessary to scrutinise the prosecution evidence to determine whether guilt has been proved beyond reasonable doubt.[21] (2008) 186 A Crim R 531 at 535 [14]-[15]. None of these authorities suggests that the evidence of the complainant or the accused should be considered in isolation from one another, or in isolation from the other evidence relevant to the facts in issue to which those witness’ testimony relate. Nor do they suggest that in some way it is wrong ultimately to form a preference for one witness’ testimony over another. The generally-required directions are instead designed to guard against the jury being distracted from the requirement of proof by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt, and to guard against the simplistic and wrong reasoning that merely to reach the point of forming a preference for the complainant’s evidence over that of the accused is sufficient in order to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of the accused’s guilt. The requirement that the accused’s account be negatived as a reasonable possibility (assuming that account would render him or her innocent) is nothing more than the corollary of the proposition that guilt must be proved beyond reasonable doubt. It is not a requirement separately to consider and to reject that evidence beyond reasonable doubt with reference only to the evidence of the accused in chief and under cross-examination, before a verdict of guilt can be reached.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Finally, the applicant pointed to the fact that, before the sentencing judge, the prosecutor had been somewhat equivocal when asked about the relevance of the R v D standard. The prosecutor had said that the standard was most applicable to children under 12 where there was a relationship of trust. The prosecutor then observed that the applicant had by his own admission cared for and been responsible for the complainant and had ‘in a very real sense, [been] her carer and he abused that trust and care’. The prosecutor continued, ‘[s]o perhaps that principles in R v D are not completely applicable to the situation but they are not far off, in my respectful submission’. Later, the prosecutor referred to the decision in Edmonds (a pseudonym) v The Queen[52] concerning the application of R v D. [52] [2022] SASCA 11.Consideration As has been noted, the applicant’s sexual abuse of the complainant commenced when the complainant was 13. The course of offending extended over a little more than two years. The sexual acts found proved included cunnilingus, fellatio, penile-vaginal sex and other violent and depraved acts such as inserting a beer bottle in the complainant’s vagina and urinating on her. Even putting the two assault charges to one side it is plain that the sexual acts that occurred frequently over the relevant period frequently involved violence or the threat of it. The complainant fell pregnant to the applicant, in what was a predictable consequence of his ongoing sexual abuse of her. Not only was the complainant objectively vulnerable to the applicant, but he fostered and exploited her dependence upon him for basic necessities, knowing that she was being neglected by her own father. The applicant supplied the complainant with alcohol to further his purposes. Bearing in mind these considerations which go to the extent and seriousness of the offending, in light of the approach in R v D as repeatedly affirmed in this Court, there was, as the Director submitted, a case for adopting a starting point of more than 10 years imprisonment. The complainant’s victim impact statement makes for difficult reading. It provides a vivid and disturbing illustration of the kinds of harm caused to victims of persistent sexual abuse to which Kourakis CJ referred in R v Lian.[53][53] [2023] SASC 122 at [99]. The applicant is right to identify circumstances that called for consideration in the nuanced application of the R v D guidance; in particular, the circumstance that in the relatively lengthy period of delay between the offending and the time of sentence, the applicant appears to have made some positive progress in his life, and to have earned the trust and respect of a large number of supporters. But in a case like this, delay and rehabilitation can only go so far. They should not be given ‘too much weight’.[54] Whilst these considerations may mitigate the sentence otherwise appropriate, equally, it should not be forgotten, as Bampton J observed in R v C, M, that sexual offending often remains undetected for many years and the prosecution of such offending relies upon the preparedness of victims of abhorrent offending and witnesses to it to report the abuse.[55] Undue lenience in response to the passage of time ought not act as a deterrent to victims who may have taken some time to feel able to pursue a formal complaint from then doing so.[54] R v V, AJ [2012] SASCFC 10 at [3] (Doyle CJ).[55] [2014] SASCFC 62 at [57].