Monster Energy Company v ODD Games Pty Ltd

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TRADE MARKS ACT 1995

DECISION OF A DELEGATE OF THE REGISTRAR OF TRADE MARKS WITH REASONS

Re:Opposition by Monster Energy Company to registration of trade mark application no. 1770632 (16, 25, 28, 41) – Monster Truck Destruction - in the name of ODD Games Pty Ltd

Delegate: Bianca Irgang
Representation: Opponent: Stephen Rebikoff of counsel instructed by Davies Collison Cave
Applicant: Ian Horack of counsel instructed by Collison Co. 
Decision: 2018 ATMO 131
Trade Marks Act 1995 - Section 52 opposition: sections 42(b), 44 and 60 pressed – no ground of opposition established – opposition dismissed.

Background

  1. ODD Games Pty Ltd (‘the applicant’), filed trade mark application number 1770632 on 13 May 2016 in classes 16, 25, 28 and 41 of the International Classification of Goods and Services. Current details of the application are set out below.

    Trade mark:  Monster Truck Destruction

    Trade mark application no: 1770632            

    Filing Date:  13 May 2016

    Specification:  Class 16: Baby Books; Childrens Books; Coloring Books; Activity Books; Comic Books; Magazines; Graphic Novels; Motion picture companion books; Novels; Storybooks; Stickers; Sticker albums; Souvenir program booklets; Books incorporating sound elements; Trading cards; Activity paper craft kits; Pens; Pencils; Pencil cases; Pencil holders; Erasers; Pencil Sharpeners; Ungraduated rulers; Stationery; Diaries; Journals; Binders; Portfolios; Photo albums; Posters; Art prints; Bookmarks; Calendars; Note cards; Notepads; Address books; Sketch pads; Banners; Greeting cards; Party invitations; Gift tags; Party decorations made of paper; Cake decorations made of paper; Wrapping paper; Paper napkins; Facial tissue; Coasters made of paper

    Class 25:Apparel; Footwear; Headwear; Sleepwear; Underwear; Belts; Suspenders; Jackets; Rainwear; Scarves; Socks; Gloves; Shoelaces; Sandals

    Class 28:Action figures and accessories therefor; Board games; Card Games; Construction toys; Dolls and doll accessories; Toys incorporating electronic sound and light elements; Electric action toys; Infant toys; Baby toys; Kites; Inflatable swimming pools; Water Toys; Sand toys; Plush toys; Puzzles; Remote control toys; Ride-on toys; Play houses; Role playing games; Swing sets; Baseballs; Baseball bats; Baseball gloves; Footballs; Trading card games; Toy vehicles; Toy balloons; Darts and dart boards; Pool tables; Paddle ball games; Roller skates; Skateboards; Halloween costumes and masks; Christmas tree ornaments and decorations; Snow globes; Party hats of plastic and paper; Yo-yos; Gaming machines, including, devices which accept a wager

    Class 41:Entertainment services in the nature of production and distribution of motion pictures, television series, and animated cartoons for theatrical release and for distribution via television, cable television, and the Internet; Providing of non-downloadable images, audio, video, text, graphics and related information in the field of motion pictures and animated cartoons via a website; Providing non-downloadable computer games and video games; Musical stage performances and stage shows; Amusement park services; provision of rides, attractions, live shows, exhibitions and other such services in amusement parks

  2. Acceptance of the application for possible registration was published in the Australian Official Journal of Trade Marks on 6 October 2016. Subsequently Monster Energy Company (‘the opponent’) filed its Notice of Intention to Oppose registration followed by its Statement of Grounds and Particulars[1].

    [1]…

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Details
Case
[2018] ATMO 131
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Monster Energy Company (the opponent) opposed the registration of a trade mark by ODD Games Pty Ltd (the applicant). The dispute concerned whether the applicant's proposed trade mark infringed upon the reputation established in Australia by the opponent's "MONSTER ENERGY" trade marks. The decision was made by Bianca Irgang, a Hearing Officer.

The primary legal issue before the Hearing Officer was to determine whether the opponent had established that its "MONSTER ENERGY" trade marks had acquired a reputation in Australia prior to the applicant's priority date of 13 May 2016. Furthermore, the Hearing Officer had to assess whether, due to this reputation, the use of the applicant's trade mark would be likely to deceive or cause confusion among the relevant public. This assessment was to be conducted in accordance with the principles outlined in *Registrar of Trade Marks v Woolworths*, considering all surrounding circumstances and the potential use of the mark by the applicant.

The Hearing Officer found that the opponent had not established any grounds for opposition under section 60 of the relevant Act. The evidence presented by the opponent was insufficient to demonstrate that its "MONSTER ENERGY" trade marks had acquired the necessary reputation in Australia before the applicant's priority date. Consequently, the Hearing Officer determined that the use of the applicant's trade mark would not be likely to deceive or cause confusion. The Hearing Officer ordered that the trade mark application could proceed to registration one month from the date of the decision, unless an appeal was filed. Costs were awarded against the opponent.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

The evidence in these matters consists of the following declarations:Evidence in Support·Declaration of Rodney Cyril Sacks ( ‘Sacks 1’) dated 4 April 2017 ·Declaration of Elizabeth Kate Godfrey (‘Godfrey’) dated 12 April 2017 with the following declarations as exhibits:oDeclaration of Rebecca Lee Dunbar (‘Dunbar’) dated 8 August 2012 oDeclaration of Danielle Jade Roberts (‘Roberts’) dated 9 July 2012 oDeclaration of Adrian Heath Hunter (‘Hunter’) dated 11 October 2012 Evidence in Answer·Declaration of Jasmin Whittaker (‘Whittaker’) dated 13 June 2017Evidence in Reply·Declaration of Rodney Cyril Sacks ( ‘Sacks 2’) dated11 August 2017DiscussionSection 60 - Reputation in Australia Section 60 of the Act provides:60 Trade mark similar to trade mark that has acquired a reputation in AustraliaThe registration of a trade mark in respect of particular goods or services may be opposed on the ground that:(a)another trade mark had, before the priority date for the registration of the first‑mentioned trade mark in respect of those goods or services, acquired a reputation in Australia; and(b)because of the reputation of that other trade mark, the use of the first‑mentioned trade mark would be likely to deceive or cause confusion. To establish the ground of opposition under section 60 the opponent is relying predominantly on its use of and reputation in the trade marks below:MONSTER ENERGY (opponent’s ‘MONSTER trade marks’) The opponent’s MONSTER trade marks (as well as many other ‘MONSTER ENERGY’ trade marks) have obtained registration in a number of different classes[4]. Unlike section 44 of the Act, section 60 does not require that the goods and services upon which the opponent uses its trade mark be of a specified standard of similarity with the goods of interest to the applicant, nor is there a requirement that the opponent’s trade marks be substantially identical or deceptively similar to the Trade Mark. [4] Exhibit RCS-02 accompanying Sacks 1 It is for me to determine whether the opponent has established that before 13 May 2016 any of the opponent’s trade marks were recognized by the relevant market, or at least by a significant number of persons in Australia and whether because of that, the use by the applicant of the Trade Marks would be likely to cause the public confusion. The principles relevant to the assessment of the likelihood of confusion were set out by French J in Registrar of Trade Marks v Woolworths (‘Woolworths’): [5](ii) A trade mark is likely to cause confusion if the result of its use will be that a number of persons are caused to wonder whether it might not be the case that the two products or closely related products and services come from the same source. It is enough if the ordinary person entertains a reasonable doubt. It may be interpolated that this is another way of expressing the proposition that the trade mark is likely to cause confusion if there is a real likelihood that some people will wonder or be left in doubt about whether the two sets of products or the products and services in question come from the same source. (iii) In considering whether there is a likelihood of deception or confusion all surrounding circumstances have to be taken into consideration. These include the circumstances in which the marks will be used, the circumstances in which the goods or services will be bought and sold and the character of the probable acquirers of the goods and services. (iv) The rights of the parties are to be determined as at the date of the application. (v) The question of deceptive similarity must be considered in respect of all goods or services coming within the specification in the application and in respect of which registration is desired, not only in respect of those goods or services on which it is proposed to immediately use the mark. The question is not limited to whether a particular use will give rise to deception or confusion. It must be based upon what the applicant can do if registration is obtained. In respect of the last proposition, Mason J observed in Berlei Hestia Industries Ltd v The Bali Company Inc:[6] “...the question whether there is a likelihood of confusion is to be answered, not by reference to the manner in which the respondent has used its mark in the past, but by reference to the use to which it can properly put the mark. The issue is whether that use would give rise to a real danger of confusion.” [5] [1999] FCA 1020 [50][6] [1973] HCA 43; (1973) 129 CLR 353, 362

Decision

Reasons for decision

Section 55 of the Act provides:55 Decision (1) Unless subsection (3) applies to the proceedings, the Registrar must, at the end, decide: (a) to refuse to register the trade mark; or (b) to register the trade mark (with or without conditions or limitations) in respect of the goods and/or services then specified in the application;having regard to the extent (if any) to which any ground on which the application was opposed has been established.Note: Forlimitationssee section 6. The opponent has not established any grounds of opposition. The trade mark application may accordingly proceed to registration one month from the date of this decision. If the Registrar has been served with notice of appeal before that time, I direct that registration of the trade mark shall not occur until the appeal has been decided or discontinued.Costs It is usual for costs to follow the event, and I see no reason to depart from that principle here. I award costs against the opponent under section 221 of the Act in terms of Schedule 8 of the Regulations.Bianca IrgangHearing OfficerOppositions and Hearings17 August 2018

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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