Monster Energy Company v Lo Chun-Hua
[2017] ATMO 33
•21 April 2017
TRADE MARKS ACT 1995
DECISION OF A DELEGATE OF THE REGISTRAR OF TRADE MARKS WITH REASONS
Re:Opposition by Monster Energy Company to registration of trade mark application 1520185(43) – ICE MONSTER logo - in the name of Lo Chun-Hua.
| Delegate: | Debrett Lyons |
| Representation: | Opponent: Steven Rebikoff of counsel, instructed by Davies Collison Cave Pty Ltd. Applicant: Ian Horak of counsel, instructed by Madderns, Solicitors. |
| Decision: | 2017 ATMO 33 Trade Marks Act 1995 - opposition to registration under section 52 – grounds under sections 42(b), 44 and 60 pressed – section 60 established – Trade Mark refused registration. |
Background
This matter involves an opposition to the registration of a trade mark application under section 52 of the Trade Marks Act 1995 (‘the Act’). The current details of the opposed trade mark application are:
Trade Mark No.: 1520185
Trade Mark :
(‘the Trade Mark’)
Applicant: Lo Chun-Hua (‘the Applicant’)
Priority Date: 26 July 2012[1]
Specification of Services: Class 43: “Bar services, cafes, cafeterias, restaurants, self-service restaurants, snack- bars.” (‘the Services’)
[1] The application was filed on 16 October 2012 but claims Convention priority from two Taiwanese trade mark applications, one in class 30 and one in class 43. The application was amended during examination to delete the class 30 goods originally claimed and along with it the corresponding Convention claim for that class.
The Trade Mark was examined as required under section 31 of the Act and advertised as accepted for possible registration in the Australian Official Journal of Trade Marks on 27 March 2014.
On 27 May 2014, Monster Energy Company (‘the Opponent’) filed a Notice of Intention to Oppose registration of the Trade Mark.
On 30 July 2014, after seeking and obtaining extensions of time in which to do so, the Opponent filed its Statement of Grounds and Particulars (‘SGP’).
On 1 September 2014, the Applicant a filed its Notice of Intention to Defend.
A “Cooling-Off Period” was requested by the parties but the dispute was not resolved and the opposition proceeded.
The parties have filed evidence in accordance with the Trade Mark Regulations 1995 (‘the Regulations’) discussed as required below.
Both parties requested to be heard. The hearing was held in Canberra on 5 December 2016 before a delegate of the Registrar of Trade Marks. The Opponent was represented by Mr Steven Rebikoff of counsel, instructed by Davies Collison Cave Pty Ltd and the Applicant was represented by Mr Ian Horak of counsel, instructed by Madderns, Solicitors.
The delegate who conducted the hearing, however, is now not in a position to render a decision in this matter and so it has been allocated to me, a delegate of the Registrar, for my decision.
The parties have been given notice of this change in procedure and have not responded adversely.
In reaching my decision I have paid regard to the whole record of the hearing, which was recorded with the parties’ consent, and to the written submissions of counsel and to the evidence filed by the parties.
Grounds of opposition and Onus of proof
The SGP lists the grounds under sections 42(b), 44 and 60 of the Act which were pressed by the Opponent in its written and oral submissions.
The Opponent bears the onus of establishing at least one of those grounds of opposition on the civil standard of the balance of probabilities.
For the reasons which now follow, I have found that the Opponent has met that onus in relation to the section 60 ground of opposition. It was therefore unnecessary for me to go on to consider the other grounds of opposition pressed.
I note here that for the purposes of section 60 the rights of the parties are to be determined as at the priority date of the application which, as stated, is 26 July 2012.
Section 60
Section 60 of the Act is reproduced below:
Section 60 - Trade mark similar to trade mark that has acquired a reputation in Australia
The registration of a trade mark in respect of particular goods or services may be opposed on the ground that:
(a)another trade mark had, before the priority date for the registration of the first‑mentioned trade mark in respect of those goods or services, acquired a reputation in Australia; and
(b)because of the reputation of that other trade mark, the use of the first‑mentioned trade mark would be likely to deceive or cause confusion.
The Opponent claims a reputation in the trade mark MONSTER (‘the Opponent’s Mark’) which it has used in relation to non-alcoholic beverages, principally so-called “energy drinks”.
The Opponent’s Mark is registered.[2] Had this opposition turned on section 44 of the Act, which would have involved inquiry into the deceptive similarity of the compared trade marks, then I might have had more to say about their objective resemblances. However, I am mindful of what was observed in the case of Rogers Seller & Myhill Pty Ltd v. Reece Pty Ltd [2010] ATMO 5 (‘the Roger Seller case’), where the Hearing Officer wrote that:
28. … Prior to amendment by the Trade Marks Amendment Act 2006, section 60 required an opponent to additionally show that the trade mark with the reputation in Australia and the opposed trade mark were at least deceptively similar to one another. That is no longer so, but why the section was amended and how it operates post-amendment are crucial matters.
…
38. The Explanatory Memorandum goes on to offer an operative rationale for the amendment to section 60, specifically that:
The provisions have not been written so as to establish a new class of trade marks ("well-known" marks) or to prescribe a particular threshold of how well-known a mark must be. Rather, the test has been written so that it can be applied to all marks.
The test depends on the extent of the reputation in Australia that has been acquired by a sign. In light of that reputation, the question to be asked is whether the use of a subsequent trade mark would be likely to result in deception or confusion. ... The tests for deception and confusion are all well established in judicial authority, and hinge on the question of whether or not a reasonable number of people may be caused to wonder if a trade connection exists between the marks. By removing the requirement for substantial identity or deceptive similarity from section 60, the ground for opposition under section 60 can be used to oppose the registration of a trade mark because of the possible deception or confusion arising solely from the reputation of a trade mark.[12]
39. Confusion cannot arise solely from the reputation of one trade mark. There must always remain a level of similarity between the marks, whether we call it deceptive similarity or something less, and no matter how small it might be. The likelihood of confusion must depend on the reputation of the opponent’s trade mark, but have regard (amongst other factors) to the level of similarity of the goods/services and the degree of similarity of the trade marks, greater or smaller.
40. What can be said then of section 60 as we now find it is that it comprehends that the trade marks under comparison might be quite dissimilar, and yet, taken in combination with the repute of the opponent’s trade mark (and possibly other factors), deception or confusion is still more likely than not. Put another way, section 60 now contemplates that an opponent may prevail because of the reputation in the mark on which it relies notwithstanding that the trade marks under comparison may even be quite dissimilar.
[2] See Trade Mark Registration 1073748, registered from 5 September 2005.
I will return to the question of the similarity of the Trade Mark and the Opponent’s Mark but wish to make it plain from the outset that the success of the Opponent’s section 60 case hinged most fundamentally on its proof of reputation.
In McCormick & Co Inc v McCormick, Kenny J considered what is intended by the word ‘reputation’. Her Honour had consulted the Macquarie Dictionary and on the basis of the definition provided decided that, in section 60, reputation is “the recognition of the [trade mark] by the public generally”.[3] Her Honour quoted with approval the following words of Lockhart J in Re ConAgra Inc v McCain Foods (Aust) Pty Ltd:
[R]eputation within the jurisdiction may be proved by a variety of means including advertisements on television or radio, or in magazines and newspapers within the forum. It may be established by showing constant travel of people between other countries and the forum and that people within the forum, (whether residents there or persons simply visiting there from other countries) are exposed to the goods of the overseas owner …[4]
[3] [2000] FCA 1335, [81].
[4] (1992) 33 FCR 302, 343.
Kenny J referred to the case of Hugo BossAG v Jackson International Trading Co Kurt D Bruhl GmbH & Co KG (1999) 47 IPR 423, where Hearing Officer Thompson observed:
… reputation derives both from the quantum of sales under that mark and also the esteem, or image, projected by that trade mark. The quantum of sales, advertising and promotion contributes to the ‘recognition’ component of the trade mark’s reputation. The credit, image and values projected by a trade mark attaches to the ‘esteem’ component of the reputation as do the public events and other trader’s marks with which [the] owner of the trade marks in question chooses to associate the trade marks via sponsorships, cross-promotions, ‘contra deals’ and so forth. It follows that a trade mark used in relation to goods with comparatively low sales may have a high and strong reputation by virtue of the high credit or esteem in which it is held or, conversely, that a trade mark which has very high sales may have a strong reputation notwithstanding the lack of esteem that attaches to it.[5]
[5] at 436.
Kenny J concluded in this respect that:
[I]n practice, it is commonplace to infer reputation from a high volume of sales, together with substantial advertising expenditures and other promotions, without any direct evidence of consumer appreciation of the mark, as opposed to the product: see, e.g., Isuzu-General Motors Australia Ltd v Jackeroo World Pty Ltd (1999) 47 IPR 198; Marks & Spencer plc v Effem Foods Pty Ltd (2000) AIPC ¶91-560; Photo Disc Inc v Gibson (1998) 42 IPR 473; and RS Components Ltd v Holophane Corp (1999) 46 IPR 451. This Court has followed this approach as well, acknowledging that public awareness of and regard for a mark tends to correlate with appreciation of the products with which that mark is associated, as evidenced by sales volume, amongst other things. Thus, in Toddler Kindy Gymbaroo Pty Ltd v Gymboree Pty Ltd [2000] FCA 618 (“Gymboree”), Moore J accepted at [94] that the applicant had established a reputation for the purposes of s 60 solely on the basis of use and promotion of the relevant mark. Another example of this approach is Nettlefold Advertising Pty Ltd v Nettlefold Signs Pty Ltd (1997) 38 IPR 495 (“Nettlefold”), in which Heerey J relied upon the public visibility of the applicant’s marks over approximately two decades as well as a $100,000 promotional campaign in finding that a reputation for the purposes of s 28 of the 1955 Act existed.
I note here, too, the case of Le Cordon Bleu BV v Cordon Bleu International Ltee[6] decided under section 28(a) of the Trade Marks Act 1955, an ancestor of section 60. Whilst section 28(a) of that Act did not use the word “reputation”, Heerey J put the question to be answered in that case as:
“Having regard to the reputation acquired by the French companies in the name Cordon Bleu, is the Court satisfied that the Canadian mark used in a normal and fair manner in connection with pâté and meat spreads will be reasonably likely to cause deception or confusion amongst a substantial numbers of persons?”[7]
[6] (2000) 50 IPR 1.
[7] at [84].
His Honour went on to state that:
What is ‘significant’ or ‘substantial’ will depend on the nature of the goods or services in question. For some highly specialised products, awareness among a few thousand persons, or even less, might be sufficient … We are here concerned with foodstuffs sold in supermarkets, delicatessens, milk bars and other retail outlets. The relevant market is virtually the entire Australian population from early teenage years onwards.[8]
[8] Ibid 20. It is to be noted that Heerey J’s decision was overturned on appeal to the Full Federal Court, although not on the point quoted, indeed the court specifically noted that Heerey J’s approach contained no error, see Renaud Cointreau v Cordon Bleu International Ltee [2001] FCA 1170, [75].
The Opponent must therefore demonstrate that by 26 July 2012 the Opponent’s Mark had acquired the sort of reputation in Australia such that use of the Trade Mark would be likely to deceive or cause confusion amongst a substantial number of persons.
As the Roger Seller case indicates, whether deception or confusion is likely will also turn in part on the relationship between the applied-for Services and the goods or services in respect of which the reputation in the Opponent’s Mark is shown. Put another way, as it was in the case of Pottle Productions Inc v Rute Ithalat Ve Ihracat Anonim Sirketi[9], the Registrar’s delegate observed that:
The assessment of the likelihood of deception or confusion under section 60 is informed by the strength of the reputation of the Opponent’s trade mark(s), the inherent distinctiveness thereof, the degree of similarity between the trade marks under consideration and the nexus or connection between the goods and/or services of the parties. Each of these is a variable and it is possible that a trade mark’s reputation might be sufficiently strong and the degree of similarity to an opposed trade mark be so great (particularly where the trade marks are inherently distinctive) that confusion or deception will be a likelihood where very little, if any, nexus or connection exists between the goods and/or services under consideration.
[9] [2012] ATMO 124.
Rodney Cyril Sacks is the Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the Opponent. His 4 September 2015 statutory declaration forms part of the Evidence in Support of the opposition. He declares that energy drinks bearing the Opponent’s Mark have been sold in Australia since 2006.
On the evidence it was perhaps 2009 before the Opponent had its own settled chain of distribution in Australia. The evidence of use of the Opponent’s Mark between 2006 and 2009 is less than perfect but it matters none since confidential sales figures show that up to the priority date sales of the Opponent’s energy drinks have been simply colossal in terms of volume sold and revenue generated therefrom.[10]
[10] Sacks [29].
Although not of direct evidence to the Opponent’s Australian reputation, these sales are matched abroad and Sacks declares that energy drinks bearing the Opponent’s Mark, measured by unit volume, are the best-selling energy drink in the United States and the second best-selling energy drink worldwide.[11]
[11] Sacks [10].
Putting to one side for the present all other evidence, there is no doubt that by the priority date the Opponent’s Mark had an immense reputation in Australia in respect of energy drinks.
A statutory declaration made by Elizabeth Kate Godfrey, solicitor, on 10 September 2015 on behalf of the Opponent annexes evidence made in unrelated proceedings but having a bearing on the present case. That evidence includes a statutory declaration made by Adrian Heath Hunter, Manager of the Opponent’s Australian distributor, on 11 October, 2012 (“Hunter”).
Together, Sacks and Hunter go on to show that the Opponent’s Mark has been used in conjunction with added matter, forming trade marks such as MONSTER RIPPER (for a combined fruit juice and energy drink), MONSTER ENERGY SHOTS (for a small volume energy supplement drink), X-PRESSO MONSTER (for an expresso coffee and energy drink blend), MONSTER REHAB (for a tea flavoured energy drink), and UBERMONSTER (for a brewed malt energy supplement), amongst others.[12] These usages preceded the priority date and many of these trade marks are also registered.
[12] Sacks [21]-[23]; Hunter [13]-[14].
Goods bearing the Opponent’s Mark have been retailed in literally thousands of outlets across the country from supermarkets to take-away stores, pubs and clubs to petrol stations. The presence of the Opponent’s Mark is ubiquitous.[13]
[13] Sacks [24].
Millions of dollars have been spent on the marketing and promotion of the Opponent’s Mark in Australia before the priority date. The sponsorship of sportspersons and sporting events has been a point of focus in that marketing drive and the ways in which the Opponent’s Mark has been promoted to the Australian public is so manifest that it could not have gone unnoticed by a significant portion of that audience.
The Applicant openly states that it does not challenge the contention that the Opponent has a reputation, but it is critical of the Opponent’s section 60 case for two primary reasons.
Firstly, the Applicant submits that the preponderance of the evidence in support of the claim to reputation shows use of a composite trade mark, seen below, and that this is the trade mark in which a reputation exists (and, so it follows, in the Applicant’s argument, a trade mark with very marked differences to the Trade Mark).
Second, the Applicant submits, the reputation is limited to energy drinks of one kind or another and, aside from some peripheral merchandising items in which the Opponent could not claim a reputation, energy drinks are the only goods which the Opponent has promoted (and, so it follows, a chasm divides those goods and that reputation from the applied-for Services).
In terms of the likelihood of confusion or deception the parties are separated, in essence, by the arguments which follow.
The Opponent’s position was put most simply at the hearing by Mr Rebikoff’s submission that “there is clearly a real risk that consumers that come across the ICE MONSTER trade mark will have cause to wonder whether it is in some way associated with [the Opponent] or forms part of the MONSTER family of trade marks.”
The Opponent’s written submissions are slightly different, arguing that confusion would result because the public would believe:
The Applicant’s position is that that there is no “MONSTER family of trade marks” in the sense described by the evidence in the case of McDonald’s Corporation v Mark Vincent Glaser [2016] ATMO 22 where the opponent successfully claimed a monopoly in “McXXX” formative trade marks.
Further, that:
…
In the case of Millennium & Copthorne International Limited v Kingsgate Hotel Group Pty Ltd Jacobson J summarised the principles of deceptive similarity with reference to the authorities as follows:
Without seeking to reformulate the various statements of principle stated in the Full Court authorities, it is sufficient for present purposes to identify the critical elements which seem to me to inform the issue of deceptive similarity in the present case. There are nine elements.
First, the judgment of likelihood of deception is a practical one. It requires an assessment of the effect of the challenged mark on the minds of potential customers: Woolworths[14] at [49]; Australian Woollen Mills[15] at 658.
Second, the question of deceptive similarity is not to be decided by a side-by-side comparison. It is to be determined by a comparison of the impression based on recollection of the opponent’s mark that persons of ordinary intelligence and memory would have, and the impression that those persons would get from the opposed trade mark: Crazy Ron’s[16] at [73]; Shell Company of Australia Ltd v Esso Standard Oil (Australia) Ltd [1963] HCA 66; (1963) 109 CLR 407 at 415 per Windeyer J.
Third, allowance must be made for imperfect recollection: Crazy Ron’s at [74].
Fourth, the effect of the spoken description must be considered: Woolworths at [49]; Crazy Ron’s at [75]; Australian Woollen Mills at 658.
Fifth, it is necessary to show a real tangible danger of deception or confusion: Woolworths at [43] and [50]; Crazy Ron’s at [76]; Southern Cross Refrigerating[17] at 594 – 595.
Sixth, a trade mark is likely to ‘cause confusion’ if the result of its use will be that a number of persons are ‘caused to wonder’ whether the two products come from the same source: Woolworths at [50]; Southern Cross Refrigerating Co at 595. This test sets a lower threshold than that which is required to establish that conduct is likely to mislead or deceive under s 18 of Schedule 2 of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth): see McWilliam's Wines Pty Ltd v McDonald's System of Australia Pty Ltd [1980] FCA 159; (1980) 33 ALR 394 at 398 per Smithers J.
Seventh, all surrounding circumstances must be taken into consideration. The circumstances include those in which the marks will be used, and in which the goods or services will be bought and sold, as well as the character of the probable acquirers of the goods and services: Woolworths at [50]; Crazy Ron’s at [86] – [89]; Southern Cross Refrigerating at 595.
Eighth, the question of whether there is a likelihood of confusion is not to be answered by reference to the manner in which a party has used the mark, but by reference to what an applicant can do. That is to say, the use to which it can properly put the mark if registration is obtained: Woolworths at [50]; Berlei Hestia Industries Ltd v The Bali Company Inc [1973] HCA 43; (1973) 129 CLR 353 at 362 per Mason J.
Ninth, if a registered trade mark includes words which can be regarded as an ‘essential feature’ of the mark, another mark that incorporates those words may cause a tangible danger of deception or confusion by reason of consumers retaining an imperfect recollection of those words: Crazy Ron’s at [79]. However, care must be taken to not too readily characterise words in a composite trade mark as an ‘essential feature’ because to do so may effectively convert a composite mark into something different: Crazy Ron’s at [100].[18]
[14] Registrar of Trade Marks v Woolworths Ltd [1999] FCAFC 1020.
[15] Australian Woollen Mills Ltd v FS Walton & Co Ltd [1937] HCA 51; (1937) 58 CLR 641.
[16] Crazy Ron’s Communications Pty Ltd v Mobileworld Pty Ltd [2004] FCAFC 196; (2004) 209 ALR 1
[17] Southern Cross Refrigerating Co v Toowoomba Foundry Pty Ltd (1954) 91 CLR 592.
[18] [2012] FCA 1022, [38]-[46].
As previously stated, I am not required to decide whether the compared marks are deceptively similar. However, in my assessment the word “monster” is the essential feature of the Trade Mark. The device element might be a monster or an “ice monster” and adds nothing extra conceptually to the word “monster”. Visually it does not form an important part of the Trade Mark. The word “ice” is separated from the word “monster” by a graphical embellishment. To the extent that the words “ice” and “monster” are in fact read together, the word “ice” describes a type of monster.
I have formed my decision based on an established reputation in the Opponent’s Mark in respect of energy drinks. Notwithstanding the common use by the Opponent of a composite trade mark in the nature of that shown above at paragraph 36, I find that there is a separate and well-established reputation in the Opponent’s Mark.
Moreover, it is enough that this reputation is in respect of energy drinks of various kinds without the need for further examination of whether the use might have been characterised more broadly to embrace other types of drinks or liquid nutrition supplements.
The Applicant asks that I take into account the actual nature of its business and the way in which the Trade Mark has in fact been used.
Ms Betty Hung is the director of a company which owns and controls the Applicant and her statutory declaration (“Hung”) made on 6 January 2016 comprises the evidence in answer to the opposition. She declares that the Applicant has stores operating under the Trade Mark in China, Japan and Taiwan.[19] She states that in those countries the parties’ businesses co-exist without there being any confusion to her knowledge.[20]
[19] Hung [16].
[20] Ibid.
Ms Hung describes the business under the Trade Mark as that of “dessert restaurant stores”[21] and Exhibit BH-1, shown below, is a store front of such a store.
[21] Hung [4].
The Applicant concedes that I must take into account the notional use to which the Trade Mark might be put having regard to the scope of the Services but submits that a “real world” view of the businesses conducted under the compared trade marks points against any likelihood of confusion or deception.
In the alternative, the Applicant indicates that it “may seek to amend” the Services to:
“Bar services, cafes, cafeterias, restaurants, self-service restaurants, snack- bars all of the foregoing relating to the provision of desserts.”
(‘the amended services’)
I understand that Mr Horak places store above all else in the proposition that there can be no real danger of confusion or deception where the Opponent has a reputation in energy drinks and the Applicant seeks to use the Trade Mark in respect of the Services or the amended services.
In my assessment, the absence of evidence of actual confusion is in this case not of special value. The Opponent contradicts Ms Hung by stating that there is only one jurisdiction in which the Applicant operates where there are sales of the Opponent’s energy drinks. In any event, I have no knowledge of the market conditions there and can attach no weight to the claim that there has been no confusion. To the extent that anything might turn on it, Exhibit BH-1 to Hung would indicate that the signage used abroad by the Applicant does not correspond with the Trade Mark at issue.
It is the use to which the Applicant could in the future make of the Trade Mark were registration granted that is the critical issue. The notional use of the Trade Mark in respect of the Services or the amended services freely permits the Applicant to sell beverages including energy drinks. The Convention priority claim from Taiwan suggests that is exactly what the Applicant does. I note that it was only during examination of the present application that the following goods were deleted in order to overcome objections from the examiner:
Class 30: Ice, natural or artificial, cream(ice), ice for refreshment, sherbets (ices), frozen yogurt (confectionery ices), edible ices, fruit flavoured water ices in the form of lollipops, fruit ices, ice lollies containing milk, ice lollies being milk, ice lollies being milk flavoured, ice confections, ice cubes, flavored ices.
I observe further that the Applicant was the proprietor of expired (unrenewed) trade mark registration 1050680 for the following goods:
Class 43: For fast-food restaurant, snack bar, restaurant and coffee shop, services for providing hot and cold drinks, all included in international class 43
Registration 1050680 was for the trade mark appearing below, filed in 2005. That trade mark appears to have evolved over time into the Trade Mark. The Applicant’s submission that it made earlier use of, and independently authored the Trade Mark, overlooks the fact that the Trade Mark seems not to have always taken the same form.
I return in the end to the Applicant’s recurrent theme that the gap between the Opponent’s goods and the Applicant’s Services negates any likelihood of confusion. I recognise that in certain cases that might be the determinative factor. What I must balance here is the immensity of the Opponent’s reputation with other factors which do not conclusively weigh in the Applicant’s favour.
The trade marks are linked by a common word. The additional word “ice” is of a kind connected with drinks and does not positively dispel a mental link with the Opponent’s Mark.
In the Cordon Bleu case the Court referred to the complainant’s assertion that “many people would think that pâté or meat spread sold under [the trade mark] was not an ‘incongruous addition’ or ‘unnatural extension’ of a business”[22]
[22] Cordon Bleu, op.cit. at [86]
The fact that the Opponent has concentrated on the sale of energy drinks does not to my mind mean that its potential offering of those goods through premises bearing the Opponent’s Mark is either an incongruous addition or unnatural extension of its business. However, that misses the point to some extent since, as counsel for the Opponent stated, there is “a natural association between beverages, on the one hand, and services involving the provision of beverages.”
In the result, it is my finding that there is a real and tangible danger that a substantial number of people would, taking account of the notional use of the Trade Mark across the Services, be likely to be confused or deceived. The contemplated restriction to the Services does not avoid that danger.
I find that the Opponent has established a ground of opposition under section 60 of the Act.
Decision
Section 55 of the Act relevantly provides:
55Decision
(1)Unless subsection (3) applies to the proceedings, the Registrar must, at the end, decide:
(a)to refuse to register the trade mark; or
(b)to register the trade mark (with or without conditions or limitations) in respect of the goods and/or services then specified in the application;
having regard to the extent (if any) to which any ground on which the application was opposed has been established.
Note:For limitations see section 6.
A ground of opposition has been established. I refuse to register trade mark application no. 1520185.
Costs
As costs ordinarily follow the event, I award costs against the Applicant under section 221 of the Act in accordance with the amounts set out in Schedule 8 of the Regulations.
Debrett Lyons
Hearing Officer
Oppositions and Hearings
21 April 2017
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