VETERANS’ ENTITLEMENTS – pension – disease – whether war-caused – standard of proof – standard for determining whether veteran suffers from a disease – post traumatic stress disorder – question whether veteran experienced a traumatic event in course of war service – whether this question determined on balance of probabilities or on reverse beyond reasonable doubt standard – characterisation of symptoms suffered by veteran – whether Tribunal’s approach correct
JOHN WILLIAM MINES v REPATRIATION COMMISSION V 632 of 2003
GRAY J 19 OCTOBER 2004 MELBOURNE
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
V 632 of 2003
ON APPEAL FROM THE ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
BETWEEN:
JOHN WILLIAM MINES APPLICANT
AND:
REPATRIATION COMMISSION RESPONDENT
JUDGE:
GRAY J
DATE OF ORDER:
19 OCTOBER 2004
WHERE MADE:
MELBOURNE
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1. The appeal be allowed.
2. The decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal, made on 14 July 2003, affirming the decision under review, be set aside.
3. The case be remitted to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal, differently constituted, to be heard and decided again.
4. The respondent pay the applicant’s costs of the appeal.
Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
V 632 of 2003
ON APPEAL FROM THE ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
BETWEEN:
JOHN WILLIAM MINES APPLICANT
AND:
REPATRIATION COMMISSION RESPONDENT
JUDGE:
GRAY J
DATE:
19 OCTOBER 2004
PLACE:
MELBOURNE
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
The nature and history of the proceeding
This appeal from a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (‘the Tribunal’) concerns the application of the difficult provisions of the Veterans’ Entitlements Act 1986 (Cth) (‘the VE Act’) concerning the manner in which decision-makers must approach the determination of issues on which entitlements depend.
The applicant served in the Australian Army from 12 April 1967 to 2 August 1998. He rendered operational service in Vietnam between 22 April 1968 and 11 May 1969 and again between 11 February 1971 and 2 February 1972, the second period of service being voluntary. He retired from service on medical grounds, with atrial fibrillation.
On 30 November 1998, the applicant made a claim for a disability pension and medical treatment for hypertension, atrial fibrillation and sleep apnoea. On 16 December 1998, the respondent, the Repatriation Commission (‘the Commission’) refused this…
Grounds of appeal
[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.
[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.
[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.
Consideration
[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.
[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.
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Details
AGLC
Mines v Repatriation Commission [2004] FCA 1331
Case
[2004] FCA 1331
Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The applicant in this case sought to appeal the decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal, which had dismissed his claim for a service pension based on post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). The Tribunal's decision hinged on its assessment of the applicant's claims and evidence regarding the severity of stressors during his operational service, and whether these stressors were linked to his current health conditions. The applicant argued that the Tribunal had applied an incorrect standard of proof, failing to adhere to the higher threshold required to sustain a hypothesis connecting his service to his health conditions. Instead of applying the standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt, the Tribunal seemed to apply a lower standard of satisfaction on the balance of probabilities.
The legal issues before the court were whether the Tribunal had correctly applied the standard of proof required to sustain a hypothesis linking the applicant's service to his health conditions and whether it had appropriately considered the evidence and the relevant statutory provisions and guidelines. The court needed to determine if the Tribunal's errors in applying the standard of proof warranted setting aside its decision and remitting the case for reconsideration. The central question was whether the applicant was entitled to a proper consideration of his claims in accordance with the correct legal principles and evidentiary standards.
In addressing these issues, the court found that the Tribunal had indeed erred by not applying the correct standard of proof. The court held that unless the Tribunal could be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt as to the facts supporting the hypothesis and linking it to the factors in the statutory guidelines, it was bound to find that the hypothesis upheld the necessary connection. The Tribunal's failure to apply this higher standard of proof meant that the applicant had not received a fair and proper assessment of his claims. Consequently, the court allowed the appeal, set aside the Tribunal's decision, and remitted the case back to the Tribunal for reconsideration. The respondent was also ordered to pay the applicant's costs of the appeal.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be allowed.
2. The decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal, made on 14 July 2003,
affirming the decision under review, be set aside.
3. The case be remitted to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal, differently constituted,
to be heard and decided again.
4. The respondent pay the applicant’s costs of the appeal.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
GRAY J
In its fact finding, the Tribunal did not apply the correct standard of proof. It did not recognise that, unless it could be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt as to the facts supporting the hypothesis and linking the hypothesis to the factors in the ‘templates’ of the SoPs, it was bound to find that the hypothesis upheld the necessary connection. Instead, the Tribunal appears to have engaged in a fact-finding exercise of the ordinary kind, determining for itself whether, on the evidence, the facts were as the applicant had suggested at various times. In one respect, when it said ‘the severity of the claimed stressors is in doubt’, the Tribunal appears to have reversed the required standard of proof. Only if it could be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the stressor events had not occurred, or had not had the necessary traumatic effect on the applicant, could the Tribunal have reached the conclusion that the hypothesis as to a connection between any condition suffered by the applicant and his operational service was not sustained. It was not sufficient for the Tribunal just to decide which version of the evidence it preferred. Conclusion When taken together, these errors of the Tribunal are sufficient to warrant allowing the appeal. The applicant has not had a chance to have his case dealt with by the Tribunal by a proper process of reasoning. It might be that he turns out to fail at the first hurdle. When it comes to consider whether it is reasonably satisfied that the applicant suffers from symptoms that, given the right traumatic event, might amount to PTSD, the Tribunal might well find on the material before it that it is not so satisfied. That is not a matter for determination by this Court, which deals only with questions of law in appeals of this kind. In any event, the applicant is entitled to have a proper consideration by the Tribunal, following the four steps referred to in Deledio, in respect of any condition from which the Tribunal is reasonably satisfied that he suffers. The Tribunal must consider whether the applicant suffers from hypertension, sleep apnoea, gastro-oesophageal reflux disease, ‘nervous condition’ and substance abuse. If it is reasonably satisfied that he suffers from any of those conditions, or from a collection of symptoms capable of amounting to any of those conditions, it must consider whether there is a hypothesis connecting that condition with the applicant’s operational service. If so, it must ascertain whether there is a relevant SoP and test the hypothesis against the factors referred to in that SoP, for the purpose of determining whether the hypothesis is reasonable. Only if the hypothesis fits the ‘template’ in a relevant SoP will the Tribunal be called upon to deal with issues of fact. Only if satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the material before it does not establish the facts necessary to sustain the hypothesis will the Tribunal be entitled to dismiss the applicant’s claim.