MG v PJ

Case [2025] QCA 99

SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

MG v PJ [2025] QCA 99

PARTIES:

MG
(appellant)
v
PJ
(first respondent)
PM
(second respondent)

FILE NO/S:

Appeal No 11509 of 2024
DC No 32 of 2024

DIVISION:

Court of Appeal

PROCEEDING:

Application for Leave s 118 DCA (Civil)

ORIGINATING COURT:

District Court at Maroochydore – [2024] QDC 119 (Cash KC DCJ)

DELIVERED ON:

10 June 2025

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

11 February 2025

JUDGES:

Flanagan and Brown JJA and Davis J

ORDERS:

1.   Application for leave to appeal granted.

2.   Appeal dismissed with costs.

3. Any publication of documents in non-anonymised form which occurred in this appeal be authorised pursuant to s 159(2)(a) of the Domestic and Family Violence Act 2012 (Qld).

CATCHWORDS:

APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – APPEAL - GENERAL PRINCIPLES – INTERFERENCE WITH DISCRETION OF COURT BELOW – IN GENERAL – where the appellant asserted that it was unreasonable for the primary judge to conclude from the facts that the harm suffered by the appellant was not serious – where such contention indicated an error in the exercise of discretion – where, contrary to that submission, serious harm must be proved as a fact – where, in determining the serious harm element, the primary judge was required to undertake an evaluative judgment based on the relevant evidence, including the inferences of fact that could be drawn from a consideration of the whole of the circumstances – where the appeal is to be determined by way of rehearing – where the parties filed further joint submissions addressing the nature of an appeal from a determination under s 10A of the Defamation Act 2005 (Qld) – whether a decision under s 10A is an evaluative decision to which the correctness standard applies

DEFAMATION – ACTIONS FOR DEFAMATION – OTHER PROCEEDINGS BEFORE TRIAL – SEPARATE DECISIONS OF QUESTIONS – where the appellant commenced defamation proceedings against the respondents – where four of the defamatory matters arose from statements made by respondents to police and the alleged republication of those statements in police protection notices – where the serious harm element was determined by the primary judge as a separate question before the trial of the proceedings commenced – where the primary judge found on the evidence and in the particular circumstances of the case that the appellant had failed to establish that the publication of the four defamatory matters had caused or was likely to cause serious harm to the appellant’s reputation – whether the primary judge erred in finding that the serious harm element was not established

APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – APPEAL - GENERAL PRINCIPLES – INTERFERENCE WITH DISCRETION OF COURT BELOW – IN GENERAL – WRONG PRINCIPLE – where the determination of serious harm involves a question of causation – where the determination of causation turns on the seriousness of the harm to reputation rather than of the imputation itself – where the appellant relied on evidence of multiple unpleasant interactions with police following the publications – where the primary…

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AGLC
MG v PJ [2025] QCA 99
Case
[2025] QCA 99
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of MG v PJ involved an appeal against the primary judge’s determination that the appellant had not proven that the publication of certain defamatory matters caused or was likely to cause serious harm to his reputation. The primary judge had determined this as a separate question before the trial of the proceedings commenced. The appeal raised issues concerning the interpretation and application of the serious harm element under s 10A of the Defamation Act 2005 (Qld), as well as the correctness of the primary judge’s evaluative judgment based on the evidence presented.

The court needed to determine whether the primary judge erred in concluding that the serious harm element was not established, particularly in light of the evidence of unpleasant interactions with police that the appellant claimed were a result of the defamatory publications. The appeal also addressed the broader issue of whether a decision under s 10A of the Defamation Act 2005 (Qld) is an evaluative decision subject to the correctness standard of review.

The court found that the primary judge’s determination was correct and that the appeal should be dismissed with costs. The reasoning hinged on the proper interpretation of s 10A, which requires serious harm to be proven as a fact. The court held that the primary judge was required to undertake an evaluative judgment based on the evidence, including the inferences that could be drawn from the whole of the circumstances. The primary judge did not err in concluding that the evidence did not establish that the defamatory publications caused or were likely to cause serious harm to the appellant’s reputation, as there was no clear link between the publications and the subsequent unpleasant interactions with police.

The court further noted that the interpretation of s 10A should be consistent with equivalent provisions in other jurisdictions, promoting a uniform approach to defamation laws in Australia. The appeal was dismissed, and the parties were ordered to pay the costs of the appeal. Additionally, the court authorised the publication of documents in non-anonymised form that occurred during the appeal, in accordance with s 159(2)(a) of the Domestic and Family Violence Act 2012 (Qld).

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Application for leave to appeal granted.

2. Appeal dismissed with costs.

3. Any publication of documents in non-anonymised form which occurred in this appeal be authorised pursuant to s 159(2)(a) of the Domestic and Family Violence Act 2012 (Qld).

Background

Background to the litigation

For the reasons which follow, the primary judge’s finding was correct and the appeal should be dismissed with costs.The separate question – the evidence and relevant factual background In about November 2021, the appellant’s wife was diagnosed with a mild cognitive impairment as a result of mixed dementia being a form of both Alzheimer’s Disease and vascular dementia. At the time of the publications, the appellant and his wife had been together for approximately 53 years. They have two adult daughters. Since his wife’s diagnosis, the appellant has been her primary carer. On 13 January 2023, the appellant and his wife had a disagreement which resulted in the appellant leaving their unit and staying at his eldest daughter’s house who was overseas at the time. On 15 January 2023, the appellant returned to the unit to return his wife’s phone. He observed that the first respondent and the first respondent’s wife were staying with his wife at the unit. On 19 January 2023, the appellant received a text message from his wife seeking the appellant’s assistance to have the first respondent and his wife leave the unit. The appellant returned to the unit that evening. An altercation occurred in the carpark area involving the appellant and the first respondent. The appellant left and returned to his eldest daughter’s house. On 19 January 2023, at a time after 8.45 pm, the respondents participated in an interview with Queensland Police. The words spoken to police on this occasion, which are set out below, constitute the first matter complained of. After the interview, Queensland Police issued a police protection notice dated 19 January 2023 (the First PPN). It named the appellant as the respondent and his wife as the aggrieved. It also identified two police officers, one as the “authorising officer” and the other as the “issuing police officer”. The First PPN was pleaded as a republication of the substance of the first matter complained of and the imputations arising from it.[5] The First PPN constitutes the second matter complained of.[5]RB, Book 1, vol 1, page 39, amended statement of claim, paragraph 13(a). On 20 January 2023, in the early hours of the morning, the appellant decided to drive back to the unit. He admits he drove while very intoxicated. He was stopped by police and found to have a blood alcohol concentration of 0.182 per cent.[6][6]Reasons, [26]. The appellant became aware of the First PPN in the early hours of the morning of 20 January 2023, when he received a copy of the First PPN at the watch-house when being charged in relation to the drink driving offence.[7][7]RB, Book 2, vol 2, page 348. On 20 January 2023, the respondents participated in a further interview with Queensland Police. The words published by the respondents, which are set out below, constitute the fourth matter complained of. On the same day, Queensland Police issued a further police protection notice dated 20 January 2023 (the Second PPN). The Second PPN identified the appellant as the respondent and the first respondent as the aggrieved. The Second PPN was pleaded as a republication of the substance of the fourth matter complained of and the imputations arising from it.[8] The Second PPN constitutes the fifth matter complained of. The Second PPN contained allegations that the appellant had contravened the First PPN by contacting or attempting to contact his wife.[8]RB, Book 1, vol 1, page 42, amended statement of claim, paragraph 20(a).

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

As the provision sits within a national uniform framework it should be interpreted consistently in its operation with equivalent legislative provisions in each State and Territory. This approach to the construction of s 10A “promote[s] uniform laws of defamation in Australia”, consistently with one of the main objects of the Act.[62] As a not dissimilar provision has been considered by the New South Wales Court of Appeal in Rader and s 10A of the Defamation Act 2005 (Vic) by the Full Federal Court in Selkirk v Wyatt,[63] this Court should not depart from an interpretation of such legislation by another Australian intermediate appellate court unless convinced that the relevant interpretation is plainly wrong.[64][62]Defamation Act 2005 (Qld), s 3(a).[63](2024) 302 FCR 541.[64]Australian Securities Commission v Marlborough Gold Mines Ltd (1993) 177 CLR 485 at 492 (Mason CJ, Brennan, Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ); Farah Constructions v Say-Dee Pty Ltd (2007) 230 CLR 89 at 151–152, [135] (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Callinan, Heydon and Crennan JJ).Judicial consideration of the serious harm element The Supreme Court of the United Kingdom in Lachaux and the New South Wales Court of Appeal in Rader considered s 1 of the Defamation Act 2013 (UK) which provides:“Serious harm(1)A statement is not defamatory unless its publication has caused or is likely to cause serious harm to the reputation of the claimant.(2)For the purposes of this section, harm to the reputation of a body that trades for profit is not “serious harm” unless it has caused or is likely to cause the body serious financial loss.” As noted by Besanko J (with whom Anderson and O’Sullivan JJ agreed) in Selkirk v Wyatt:[65]“There is a difference between this section and s 10A in that s 10A provides that serious harm is an element of a cause of action for defamation, whereas s 1 provides that a statement is not defamatory unless its publication has caused, or is likely to cause, serious harm. In both cases, it is serious harm to the reputation of the person…”.[65](2024) 302 FCR 541 at 553, [42]. Nonetheless, given the similarity between s 1 of the UK Act and the uniform Australian provision, the decisions in both Lachaux and Rader offer guidance as to the proper interpretation of s 10A. In Lachaux, Lord Sumption JSC (with whom Lord Kerr of Tonaghmore, Lord Wilson, Lord Hodge and Lord Briggs JJSC agreed) considered the common law background of the law of defamation prior to the introduction of s 1:[66]“6.For present purposes a working definition of what makes a statement defamatory, derived from the speech of Lord Atkin in Sim v Stretch [1936] 2 All ER 1237, 1240, is that “the words tend to lower the plaintiff in the estimation of right-thinking members of society generally”. Like other formulations in the authorities, this turns on the supposed impact of the statement on those to whom it is communicated. But that impact falls to be ascertained in accordance with a number of more or less artificial rules. First, the meaning is not that which other people may actually have attached to it, but that which derived from an objective assessment of the defamatory meaning that the notional ordinary reasonable reader would attach to it. Secondly, in an action for defamation actionable per se, damage to the claimant’s reputation is presumed rather than proved. It depends on the inherently injurious character (or “tendency”, in the time-honoured phrase) of a statement bearing that meaning. Thirdly, the presumption is one of law, and irrebuttable.7.In two important cases decided in the decade before the Defamation Act 2013, the courts added a further requirement, namely that the damage to reputation in a case actionable per se must pass a minimum threshold of seriousness.”[66]Lachaux v Independent Print Limited Ltd [2020] AC 612 at 620–621, [6]–[7].