Lachaux (Respondent) v Independent Print Ltd and another (Appellants)

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Trinity Term

[2019] UKSC 27

On appeal from: [2017] EWCA Civ 1334

JUDGMENT

Lachaux (Respondent) v Independent Print Ltd and another (Appellants)

before

Lord Kerr


Lord Wilson
Lord Sumption
Lord Hodge
Lord Briggs

JUDGMENT GIVEN ON

12 June 2019

Heard on 13 and 14 November 2018

Appellants Respondent
David Price QC Adrienne Page QC
Jonathan Price Godwin Busuttil
(Instructed by David (Instructed by Taylor
Price, Solicitor Advocate) Hampton)

Intervener (Media

Lawyers Association)

Guy Vassall-Adams QC

Romana Canneti

Edward Craven

(written submissions only)

Appellants:-

(1) Independent Print Ltd
(2) Evening Standard Ltd

LORD SUMPTION: (with whom Lord Kerr, Lord Wilson, Lord Hodge and

Lord Briggs agree)

Introduction

1. The tort of defamation is an ancient construct of the common law. It has accumulated, over the centuries, a number of formal rules with no analogue in other branches of the law of tort. Most of them originated well before freedom of expression acquired the prominent place in our jurisprudence that it enjoys today. Its coherence has not been improved by attempts at statutory reform. Statutes to amend the law of defamation were enacted in 1888, 1952, 1996 and 2013, each of which sought to modify existing common law rules piecemeal, without always attending to the impact of the changes on the rest of the law. The Defamation Act 2013 is the latest chapter in this history. Broadly speaking, it seeks to modify some of the common law rules which were seen unduly to favour the protection of reputation at the expense of freedom of expression. In particular, there had been criticism of a state of the law in which persons resident outside the United Kingdom with only a very limited reputation in the United Kingdom were able to sue here for defamation and obtain substantial damages. One of the principal provisions of the new Act was section 1, which provided that a statement was not to be regarded as

defamatory unless it had caused or was likely to cause “serious harm” to the

claimant’s reputation.

2. The claimant, Bruno Lachaux, is a French aerospace engineer who at the relevant time lived with his British wife Afsana in the United Arab Emirates. The marriage broke down, and in April 2011 he began divorce proceedings in the UAE courts and sought custody of their son Louis. In March 2012, Afsana went into hiding with Louis in the UAE, claiming that she would not get a fair trial in its courts. In August 2012, the UAE court awarded custody of Louis to his father. In February 2013, Mr Lachaux initiated a criminal prosecution against Afsana for abduction. In October of that year, having found out where Louis was, he took possession of him under the custody order. In January and February 2014, a number

of British newspapers published articles making allegations about Mr Lachaux’s

conduct towards Afsana during the marriage and in the course of the divorce and custody proceedings. These appeals arise out of two libel actions begun by him in the…

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Details
Case
[2019] UKSC 27
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In Lachaux v Independent Print Ltd and another, the Supreme Court was called upon to determine the threshold for what constitutes "serious harm" to a person's reputation under Section 1 of the Defamation Act 2013. The case arose from articles published in the Independent and the Evening Standard which were alleged to be defamatory of Bruno Lachaux. The lower courts had found that the articles had caused serious harm to Lachaux's reputation. The publishers appealed, arguing that the articles did not meet the threshold for being considered defamatory under the new Act. The Supreme Court held, by a majority, that the Act requires actual proof of serious harm to a claimant's reputation, not merely an inherent tendency of the words to cause such harm. The Court found that the lower courts had properly applied this test and concluded that the harm caused to Lachaux's reputation was indeed serious. The appeals were therefore dismissed.

The key issue was the proper construction of Section 1 of the Defamation Act 2013, which states that a statement is not defamatory unless it has caused or is likely to cause serious harm to the claimant's reputation. The Court held that this provision requires evidence of actual serious harm, not just an assessment based on the meaning and inherent tendency of the words. This represented a change from the previous common law position, where damage to reputation was presumed from the words alone. However, the Court found that this did not amount to a revolution in the law of defamation. The Court also rejected arguments that its construction of the Act was inconsistent with other provisions relating to limitation periods and categories of slander actionable per se.

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