George (Respondent) v Cannell and another (Appellants)

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Trinity Term
[2024] UKSC 19
On appeal from: [2022] EWCA Civ 1067

JUDGMENT

George (Respondent) vCannell and another (Appellants)

before

Lord Hodge, Deputy President
Lord Hamblen
Lord Leggatt
Lord Burrows
Lord Richards

JUDGMENT GIVEN ON
12 June 2024

Heard on 17 and 18 October 2023

Appellant
David Price KC
Jonathan Price
(Instructed by Brabners LLP (Liverpool))

Respondent
William Bennett KC

Godwin Busuttil

(Instructed by Thomson Heath & Associates (London))

LORD LEGGATT (with whom Lord Hodge and Lord Richards agree):

Introduction

  1. We are concerned on this appeal with a tort with many names. It embraces actions which have variously been called slander of title, slander of goods, disparagement of goods and trade libel. By the turn of the twentieth century these actions were coming to be seen as examples of a more general wrong, for which Sir John Salmond coined the name “injurious falsehood”: see Salmond, The Law of Torts: A Treatise on the English Law of Liability for Civil Injuries, 1st ed (1907), p 417. That name is still used by many legal writers; but courts in England and Wales have generally preferred the term “malicious falsehood”, which I will use. Whatever name is used, the nature of the wrong is not in doubt. As stated by the Court of Appeal in the leading case of Ratcliffe v Evans [1892] 2 QB 524, 527:

    “an action will lie for written or oral falsehoods … where they are maliciously published, where they are calculated in the ordinary course of things to produce, and where they do produce, actual damage …”

  1. Equally clear is that “actual damage” in this context means pecuniary damage - that is, loss that can be estimated in money (rather than merely being compensated by an award of money). A more modern term which I will use to mean the same thing is “financial loss.” Because financial loss is the basis or “gist” of the tort, malicious falsehood is generally classified as an “economic tort”: see eg Hazel Carty, An Analysis of the Economic Torts, 2nd ed (2010), p 1.

  1. In this case the trial judge found that the first defendant maliciously published falsehoods about the claimant to two individuals; but also that neither publication caused the claimant any financial loss. The claimant asserts that the publications nevertheless caused injury to her feelings for which she is entitled to compensation. Admittedly under the common law such a claim cannot be maintained. But the claimant argues that a statutory modification of the tort made by section 3(1) of the Defamation Act 1952 changed this. She contends that this statutory provision applies here and, where it applies, enables damages to be recovered for injury to feelings even when no financial loss has been sustained.

  1. If section 3(1) of the 1952 Act has this radical effect, it had gone unnoticed for 70 years. The Court of Appeal, however, accepted that it does. They decided, first, that section 3(1) applies here but that, as the claimant suffered no…

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Details
Case
[2024] UKSC 19
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of George v Cannell, the Supreme Court considered the scope of damages available under the tort of malicious falsehood. Fiona George had brought a claim against Linda Cannell and her company LCA Jobs Ltd for both defamation and malicious falsehood after Cannell made false and malicious statements about George to third parties. The trial judge found that Cannell had indeed made false and malicious statements, but that George had suffered no financial loss as a result. The claim for defamation failed because the statements did not cause serious harm to George's reputation. The claim for malicious falsehood also failed because there was no financial loss, even though section 3(1) of the Defamation Act 1952 applied. The Court of Appeal held that the claim did fall within section 3(1) and that George was entitled to damages, including damages for injury to feelings. The Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeal on the interpretation of section 3(1) but disagreed on the availability of damages for injury to feelings. The Court held that financial loss remained the gist of the tort of malicious falsehood, and that damages for injury to feelings could not be awarded under section 3(1). The appeal was therefore dismissed.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established