MCLT and Director-General of Security

Link copied
Case Copied 78 min read

MCLT and Director-General of Security [2018] AATA 1359 (25 May 2018)

Division:Security Division

File Number(s):      2016/4015

Re:MCLT

APPLICANT

AndDirector-General of Security

RESPONDENT

DECISION

Tribunal:Deputy President S A Forgie
Senior Member Egon Fice
Senior Member A Nikolic AM CSC

Date:25 May 2018

Place:Melbourne

The Tribunal affirms the Adverse Security Assessment issued by the respondent to the applicant on 15 March 2016.

........[sgd]...........................................

S A FORGIE
Deputy President

CATCHWORDS

NATIONAL SECURITY – adverse security assessment – refusal to grant a Negative Vetting 1 security clearance  – relevance of particular prescribed administrative action - decision affirmed

Legislation

Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 ss 30(1A), 30(1AA), 33(1)(a), 33(1)(c), 35, 35AA, 35AA(1), 37, 37(2), 37(2)(a), 37(2)(b), 39A, 39A(2), 39A(3), 39A(5), 39A(6), 39A(7), 39A(8), 39A(9), 39A(10), 39A(11), 39A(12) to 39A(17), 39B, 39B(11), 43, 43(1), 43(1A), 43AAA, 43AAA(2), 43AAA(3), 43AAA(4), 43AAA(5) and 43AAA(6)

Australian Passports Act 2005 ss 14(1) and 22(2)(d)

Australian Securities Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 ss 4, 17(1), 35(1), 37(1), 37(2)(a), 37(3), 37(4), 38(1), 38(1A), 38(2), 38A, 54, 54(1), 61, 64 and 65(3)

Home Affairs and Integrity Agencies Legislation Amendment Act 2018 s 3, Schedule 2; cll 1-10

Immigration Act R.S.C. 1985 (Canada) ss 7 and 53(1)(b)

Legislation Act 2003 s 8(4)

Migration Act 1958 ss 12, 13, 36(2)(aa), 36(2C), 36(2C)(a), 36(2C)(b)(i), 201 and 202

Telecommunications Act 1997

Migration Regulations 1994 cl 866.225(a) of Schedule 2; Criterion 4002
Public Service Regulations 1999 regs 5.24(1) and 5.29

Cases
Alexandra Private Geriatric Hospital Pty Ltd v Blewett (1984) 2 FCR 368; 56 ALR 265
CIC Insurance Ltd v Bankstown Football Club Ltd (1997) 187 CLR 384; 141 ALR 618

Drake v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1979) 24 ALR 577; 2 ALD 60

Hussain and Minister for Foreign Affairs and Anor [2008] FCAFC 128
Jaffarie v Director-General of Security [2014] FCAFC 102; (2014) 226 FCR 505; 313 ALR 593; 143 ALD 596
Leghaei v Director-General of Security [2007] FCAFC 37; (2007) 241 ALR 141; 97 ALD 516
Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd [1986] HCA 40; (1986) 162 CLR 24; 66 ALR 299
MYVC v Director-General of Security [2014] FCA 1447; (2014) 234 FCR 134; 323 ALR 400; 65 AAR 369; 148 ALD 489
Plaintiff M47/2012 v Director-General of Security [2012] HCA 46; (2012) 251 CLR 1; 292 ALR 245

Queensland Bacon Pty Ltd v Rees (1966) 115 CLR 266

Re BLBS and Director-General of Security and Anor [2013] AATA 820
Re CMHV and Director-General of Security and Anor [2017] AAT 1547
Re Drake and Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (No 2) (1979) 2 ALD 634
Re FLSZ and Director-General of Security (Unreported Administrative Appeals Tribunal, Forgie DP, Fice SM and Nikolic SM, 4 May 2018)
Re RZBZ and Director-General of Security [2015] AATA 296
Re TNFD and Director-General of Security [2015] AATA 752
Re TSJY and Director-General of Security [2015] AATA 243
RJCG v Director-General of Security [2013] FCA 269

Suresh v…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read MCLT and Director-General of Security and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2018] AATA 1359
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) considered an appeal by MCLT against a decision by the Director-General of Security to affirm an adverse security assessment, which resulted in the refusal to grant MCLT a Negative Vetting 1 security clearance. The primary dispute concerned the weight to be given to evidence presented by the Director-General, particularly evidence given in closed sessions and the evidence of a witness named Mr Deklan.

The legal issues before the Tribunal included whether the procedures followed by the Director-General, specifically the refusal to allow MCLT's counsel to be present during closed hearings where the Director-General's evidence was presented, created a forensic disadvantage for MCLT. The Tribunal was also required to determine the weight to be afforded to Mr Deklan's evidence, given submissions that he acted as a commentator rather than providing direct factual evidence and that his evidence contained inconsistencies. Furthermore, the Tribunal had to interpret the meaning of the word "likely" as used in Determination No. 2, a significant legal instrument binding on ASIO officers.

The Tribunal acknowledged that it was bound by the procedures set out in the AAT Act relating to matters heard in the Security Division, even if these procedures were inconsistent with procedural fairness. It noted that it was a practice for the Tribunal to ask questions of witnesses in closed session that the applicant would have the Tribunal ask, to mitigate the disadvantage. The Tribunal stated that it had assessed the evidence directly, including MCLT's own evidence and the Director-General's evidence, without regard to any person's opinion or assessment of what recommendation or advice should be formulated. Regarding the interpretation of "likely" in clause 7.2.5(b) of Determination No. 2, the Tribunal concluded, without the benefit of argument due to redaction of critical language, that the word was used in its ordinary sense and did not require further embellishment, serving as a final check before an adverse or qualified assessment. The Tribunal also discussed the role of policy in discretionary decision-making, noting that the meaning of an enactment is interpreted in light of legislative intention.

Orders

Orders of the court

Full text does not contain this section.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

In some cases, the Director-General asks only that witnesses giving evidence on his behalf be given a pseudonym. In those circumstances, we would fulfil our obligation under s 39A(11) by simply permitting a pseudonym to be used. In a case such as this, the Director-General has gone further and we are of the view that, as he has made the request that Mr Deklan give evidence by telephone and as we consider that a person’s physical attributes and appearance are relevant traits in identifying a person, we must accede to his request.MR DEKLAN’S EVIDENCE On behalf of MCLT, Mr Tracey submitted that the procedure that the Tribunal is required to follow puts an applicant at forensic disadvantage. The Attorney-General had refused MCLT’s request to permit counsel to be present in any closed hearing when the Director‑General’s evidence would be heard. That meant that MCLT was not able to test or challenge any evidence given in Mr Deklan’s closed affidavit or given orally in any closed hearing. The evidence should, therefore, be given limited weight because it had not been tested and challenged and MCLT had not had the opportunity to adduce evidence to contradict or qualify it. Where Mr Deklan gives evidence of his opinion, conclusion, submission or hearsay, that evidence should be given little or no weight. In fact, Mr Deklan should be found to be an unreliable witness and his evidence generally given little or no weight because he rarely gave any direct evidence of material facts but acted rather as a commentator. Mr Deklan was neither the decision-maker who made the ASA or one of the interviewers at the Security Assessment Interview (SAI). Mr Tracey pointed to passages of Mr Deklan’s affidavit that he submitted were inconsistent or contradictory. We are bound to follow the procedures set out in the AAT Act relating to matters heard in the Security Division. They are inconsistent with procedural fairness but they represent the statutory regime within which we are required to review an ASA. It is for that reason, that it is a practice followed by counsel for the Director-General and also by us, that we ask questions of the witnesses in closed session that the applicant would have us ask. It will be apparent from both this and the second parts of our reasons that we have referred directly to the evidence whether it is in the form of the transcript of MCLT’s answers given in the SAI or to forms and questionnaires that have been completed by MCLT. Regard has also been had to MCLT’s own evidence given orally and in two affidavits. We have not had regard to any person’s opinion or assessment of what recommendation, opinion or advice, we should formulate on the basis of the evidence be it Mr Deklan’s, MCLT’s or any other person’s. What we have done is to assess the evidence and we have set it out in the second part of our reasons. That part is available only to MCLT, the Director-General, AGSVA and the ASIO Minister and their legal advisers and the staff of ASIO. We have considered the evidence given in closed session but, having decided that it did not add to what had been given in open evidence in support of either MCLT’s case or that of the Director-General, we have made no further reference to it.

Decision

Reasons for decision

The Tribunal then turned to the meaning of the word “likely” and associated words as used in Determination No. 2. Its discussion includes the following passage:“The Determination may not have been drafted with the precision of an act or regulation but it is a significant legal instrument made by the Director-General. It is binding on officers of ASIO carrying out their statutory functions. The ASIO Act required the Director-General to consult with the Minister before it was promulgated. It is reasonable to assume that the Determination was the subject of extensive and careful scrutiny before it was published and we take notice of the fact, from our own knowledge, that ASIO has extensive legal resources. It is difficult to attribute the different appearance of the word ‘likely’ to carelessness. Instead, the fact that ‘likely’ is not underlined suggests that italics were used in cl 7.2.5(b) simply for emphasis. So understood the words ‘at least likely’ highlight that at the fifth and final stage, before making any adverse or qualified assessment, notwithstanding that to that point an assessment had met all the tests and thresholds which the operative parts of the Determination require, an ASIO officer must yet apply a final check. The finding or conclusion must be judged at least likely.Because Mr Berger’s opponent could not identify or contest the point because the critical language of the Determination was redacted, we express our views without the benefit of argument but, subject to that caveat, the Tribunal concludes that the word likely in cl 7.2.5(b) was used in its ordinary sense and does not require further embellishment in order to apply the policy of the Determination.”[73][73] [2013] AATA 820 at [60]-[62]B. The role of policy in discretionary decision-making Policy has an important role to play in the making of discretionary decisions made under an enactment. In the first instance, the meaning of the enactment under which the discretionary decision is made must be identified. Policy, whether it is described as such or as legislative intent, underpins every enactment made by Parliament. The words of an enactment are interpreted in light of that intention as conveyed by the enactment itself either alone or with the assistance of legitimate aids to assist in its interpretation. “… Instances of general words in a statute being so constrained by their context are numerous. In particular, as McHugh JA pointed out in Isherwood v Butler Pollnow Pty Ltd (1986) 6 NSWLR 363 at 388, if the apparently plain words of a provision are read in the light of the mischief which the statute was designed to overcome and of the objects of the legislation, they may wear a very different appearance. Further, inconvenience or improbability of result may assist the court in preferring to the literal meaning an alternative construction which, by the steps identified above, is reasonably open and more closely conforms to the legislative intention ...”[74][74] CIC Insurance Ltd v Bankstown Football Club Ltd (1997) 187 CLR 384; 141 ALR 618 at 408; 634-5 per Brennan CJ, Dawson, Toohey and Gummow JJ

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Full text does not contain this section.