McLaren v Rallings

Case [2014] QSC 68

SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

McLaren v Rallings & Ors [2014] QSC 68

PARTIES:

CARL ANTHONY McLAREN

(applicant)

v

MARK RALLINGS

(first respondent)

and

CHIEF EXECUTIVE QUEENSLAND CORRECTIVE SERVICES

(second respondent)

and

KERRITH McDERMOTT

(third respondent)

and

SAMANTHA NEWMAN

(fourth respondent)

FILE NO/S:

BS8079/13

DIVISION:

Trial

PROCEEDING:

Originating Application

DELIVERED ON:

17 April 2014

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

2 December 2013

JUDGE:

Jackson J

ORDER:

The order of the court is that:

1.  the decision of the third respondent, made on 18 October 2013 as delegate of the second respondent, making a further maximum security order for the applicant to take effect on 23 October 2013 is set aside;

2.  the second respondent pay the applicant’s costs of the application.

CATCHWORDS:

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – JUDICIAL REVIEW – REVIEWABLE DECISIONS AND CONDUCT – GROUNDS OF REVIEW – PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS – EXISTENCE OF OBLIGATION – GENERALLY – where prisoner currently serving term of imprisonment – where chief executive increased prisoner’s security classification to maximum security and made maximum security order requiring accommodation in a maximum security unit – where two further determinations and orders continuing the prisoner’s maximum security classification – where confidential intelligence information relied upon for determinations which was not provided to the prisoner prior to the determinations – whether procedural fairness applied to each of the second and third determinations – whether sufficient disclosure of the effect of the intelligence information was given to the prisoner

Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld), s 27 B
Corrective Services Act 2006 (Qld), s 3, s 12, s 13, s 14, s 15, s 17, s 60, s 61, s 63
Judicial Review Act 1991 (Qld), s 32, s 33

Leeming, “The riddle of jurisdictional error”, (2014) 38(2) Aust Bar Rev 139
Groves, “Administrative Segregation of Prisoners”, (1996) 20 Melbourne University Law Review 639

Applicant VEAL of 2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2005) 225 CLR 88, cited
Ashley v Southern Queensland Regional Parole Board [2010] QSC 437, cited
Assistant Commissioner Condon v Pompano (2013) 87 ALJR 458, cited
Attorney-General (NSW)l v Quin (1990) 170 CLR 1, cited
Harms v Queensland Parole Board [2008] QSC 163, referred to
Kidd v Chief Executive, Department of Corrective Services [2001] 2 Qd R 393, applied
Kioa v West (19895) 159 CLR 550, cited
Kirk v Industrial Court of New South Wales (2010) 239 CLR 531, cited
Lee v New South Wales Crime Commission (2013) 87 ALJR 1082, cited
M47/2012 v Director-General of Security (2012) 86 ALJR 1372, cited
McEvoy v Lobban [1990] 2 Qd R 235
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 87 ALJR 618, followed
Momcilovic v The Queen (2011) 245 CLR 1, cited
Nicopoulos v Commissioner for Corrective Services (2004) 148 A Crim R 74, cited
Onea v Chief Executive, Department of Corrective Services (2002) 136 A Crim R 488, cited
Plaintiff M61/2010E v The Commonwealth (2010) 243 CLR 319, cited
Plaintiff S10/2011…

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Details
AGLC
McLaren v Rallings [2014] QSC 68
Case
[2014] QSC 68
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The matter before the court was a challenge by McLaren, a prisoner, against decisions made by Rallings and others to maintain his security classification at the maximum level. McLaren argued that he was not given procedural fairness in relation to two of the decisions. The High Court of Australia was asked to review the decisions under administrative law principles.

The legal issues revolved around whether procedural fairness was required in the second and third determinations, and if sufficient disclosure of the effect of intelligence information was given to McLaren. The court had to determine if the decisions were reviewable and whether the requirements of procedural fairness were met, specifically in relation to the confidential intelligence information that was relied upon.

The court found that procedural fairness was indeed required in the second and third determinations. It was held that the decisions did not meet the requirements of procedural fairness because the confidential intelligence information was not disclosed to McLaren prior to the decisions. The court noted that while the first determination did not require disclosure of the intelligence information, the subsequent decisions did because they were based on the same intelligence. The court concluded that McLaren was entitled to know the effect of the intelligence information on the decisions concerning his security classification.

The court set aside the decision made on 18 October 2013, which was the third determination in question, and ordered the second respondent to pay McLaren's costs of the application. The court found that the procedural fairness was not observed in this determination, impacting the validity of the decision.

Orders

Orders of the court

The order of the court is that:

1. the decision of the third respondent, made on 18 October 2013 as delegate of the second respondent, making a further maximum security order for the applicant to take effect on 23 October 2013 is set aside;

2. the second respondent pay the applicant’s costs of the application.

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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