FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Mbuzi v AGL Sales Pty Limited [2016] FCA 1313
Appeal from: Mbuzi v AGL Retail Energy Limited [2016] FCA 590 File number: QUD 540 of 2016 Judge: RANGIAH J Date of judgment: 9 November 2016 Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application for leave to appeal – judgment dismissing an application to set aside notice of discontinuance – whether judgment interlocutory or final – whether judgment attended by sufficient doubt – minutes of order treated as an application for summary judgment – alleged errors of fact – alleged prejudice and discriminatory application of the Federal Court Rules – alleged apprehended bias – no reasonably arguable case of error – no substantial injustice – application for leave to appeal dismissed Legislation: Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) ss 23, 24, 37AO, 37M, and 37P
Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) rr 1.32, 1.34, 1.35, 1.40, 17.01, 26.01, 26.12, 26.14, 36.73
Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth) r 13.01
Cases cited: Ashby v Slipper [2014] FCA 973
BZAGD v Minister for Border Protection [2016] FCA 905
Carr v Finance Corp of Australia Ltd(No 1) (1981) 147 CLR 246
Chen v Monash University [2016] FCAFC 66
Décor Corporation Pty Ltd v Data Industries Inc (1991) 33 FCR 397
Johnson Tiles Pty Ltd v Esso Australia Pty Ltd (2000) 104 FCR 564
Khadri v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2014) 140 ALD 136
Moussa v Minister for Border Protection [2015] FCA 1280
MZAOE v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 905
Walsh v Greater Metropolitan Cemeteries Trust (No 2) [2014] FCA 456
Date of hearing: 6 October 2016 Registry: Queensland Division: General Division National Practice Area: Commercial and Corporations Sub-area: Regulator and Consumer Protection Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 67 Counsel for the Applicant: The Applicant appeared in person Counsel for the Respondent: Mr A Barlow Solicitor for the Respondent: Geoffrey Mendelson and Associates ORDERS
QUD 540 of 2016 BETWEEN: JOSIYAS MBUZI
Applicant
AND: AGL SALES PTY LIMITED ACN 074 839 464
Respondent
JUDGE:
RANGIAH J
DATE OF ORDER:
9 NOVEMBER 2016
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The application for leave to appeal is dismissed.
2.The applicant pay the respondent’s costs of the application.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
RANGIAH J:
The applicant, Josiyas Mbuzi, seeks leave to appeal against a judgment given by Edelman J on 5 July 2016. Mr Mbuzi had discontinued a proceeding against the respondent, AGL Sales Pty Limited, but then applied to set aside the discontinuance and reopen the proceeding. His Honour dismissed that application with costs (“the judgment”).
Mr Mbuzi’s application for leave to appeal is brought pursuant to s 24(1A) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) (“the FCA Act”) on the basis that the judgment is interlocutory. However, in the course of his oral submissions, Mr Mbuzi argued that the judgment is in fact final,…
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- Case
- [2016] FCA 1313
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The Court was required to decide whether the primary judgment was interlocutory or final, and whether it was attended by sufficient doubt to justify granting leave to appeal. The Court held that the primary judgment was interlocutory and that it was not attended by sufficient doubt to justify granting leave to appeal. The Court held that the primary judgment was interlocutory because it did not finally determine Mr Mbuzi’s rights. The Court held that it was not attended by sufficient doubt to justify granting leave to appeal because Mr Mbuzi had not identified any error in the primary judgment that had a real, substantial and prospects of success. The Court held that the primary judgment was correct because Mr Mbuzi had not identified any basis to set aside the notice of discontinuance. The Court held that the primary judgment was not attended by sufficient doubt to justify granting leave to appeal because Mr Mbuzi had not identified any error in the primary judgment that had a real, substantial and prospects of success.
The application for leave to appeal was dismissed, and Mr Mbuzi was ordered to pay the respondent’s costs of the application.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The application for leave to appeal is dismissed.
2. The applicant pay the respondent’s costs of the application.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Mr Mbuzi elaborated upon most of these proposed grounds in his written and oral submissions. He also argued that the judgment is, in fact, final, not interlocutory, so that he does not require leave to appeal.ConsiderationWhether the primary judgment is interlocutory or final Section 24(1)(a) of the FCA Act provides that the Court has jurisdiction to hear appeals from judgments of the Court constituted by a single judge exercising the original jurisdiction of the Court. However, s 24(1A) provides that:An appeal shall not be brought from a judgment referred to in subsection (1) that is an interlocutory judgment unless the Court or a Judge gives leave to appeal. Mr Mbuzi submits that the judgment is not interlocutory, but final. He submits that the judgment finally disposes of his rights as he is not able to proceed with his former proceeding. Rule 26.12 of the Federal Court Rules provides, relevantly:(1)A party claiming relief may discontinue a proceeding in whole or in part by filing a notice of discontinuance, in accordance with Form 48. There is no specific provision in the Federal Court Rules for an application to set aside a notice of discontinuance. There are several cases which have assumed that an order of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia dismissing an application to set aside a notice of discontinuance is interlocutory, or held that such an order is interlocutory without providing reasons: Khadri v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2014) 140 ALD 136 at [8]-[10], Moussa v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 1280 at [3], BZAGD v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 670 at [12], [22], MZAOE v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 905 at [21]. Rule 13.01 of the Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth) deals with discontinuance and is indistinguishable from r 26.12 of the Federal Court Rules. In my respectful opinion, the assumption made, or view taken, in those cases is correct for the following reasons. An order refusing to set aside a discontinuance is analogous to an order refusing an application to set aside a default judgment. In each case the applicant seeks an order which would have the effect of allowing the applicant to prosecute a proceeding which has come to an end. In Carr v Finance Corp of Australia Ltd(No 1) (1981) 147 CLR 246, the High Court considered whether a judgment dismissing an application to set aside a default judgment was final or interlocutory. Gibbs CJ and Mason J held that whether a judgment is final depends on whether the judgment finally determines the rights of the parties. Their Honours held that an order refusing to set aside a default judgment does not as a matter of law finally dispose of such rights as it is open to the defendant to apply again to have the judgment set aside. Mason J said that as the setting aside of a default judgment is a matter under the control or generally within the discretion of the Court, there is no justification for imposing a rigid rule that the refusal of an application is a complete bar to a second application. An order refusing an application to set aside a summary judgment is interlocutory even though the practical effect of the order is that a second application must fail.