Mbuzi v AGL Sales Pty Limited

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Mbuzi v AGL Sales Pty Limited [2016] FCA 1313

Appeal from: Mbuzi v AGL Retail Energy Limited [2016] FCA 590
File number: QUD 540 of 2016
Judge: RANGIAH J
Date of judgment: 9 November 2016
Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application for leave to appeal – judgment dismissing an application to set aside notice of discontinuance – whether judgment interlocutory or final – whether judgment attended by sufficient doubt – minutes of order treated as an application for summary judgment – alleged errors of fact – alleged prejudice and discriminatory application of the Federal Court Rules – alleged apprehended bias – no reasonably arguable case of error – no substantial injustice – application for leave to appeal dismissed
Legislation:

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) ss 23, 24, 37AO, 37M, and 37P

Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) rr 1.32, 1.34, 1.35, 1.40, 17.01, 26.01, 26.12, 26.14, 36.73

Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth) r 13.01

Cases cited:

Ashby v Slipper [2014] FCA 973

BZAGD v Minister for Border Protection [2016] FCA 905

Carr v Finance Corp of Australia Ltd(No 1) (1981) 147 CLR 246

Chen v Monash University [2016] FCAFC 66

Décor Corporation Pty Ltd v Data Industries Inc (1991) 33 FCR 397

House v R (1936) 55 CLR 499

Johnson Tiles Pty Ltd v Esso Australia Pty Ltd (2000) 104 FCR 564

Khadri v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2014) 140 ALD 136

Moussa v Minister for Border Protection [2015] FCA 1280

MZAOE v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 905

Walsh v Greater Metropolitan Cemeteries Trust (No 2) [2014] FCA 456

Date of hearing: 6 October 2016
Registry: Queensland
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Commercial and Corporations
Sub-area: Regulator and Consumer Protection
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 67
Counsel for the Applicant: The Applicant appeared in person
Counsel for the Respondent: Mr A Barlow
Solicitor for the Respondent: Geoffrey Mendelson and Associates

ORDERS

QUD 540 of 2016
BETWEEN:

JOSIYAS MBUZI

Applicant

AND:

AGL SALES PTY LIMITED ACN 074 839 464

Respondent

JUDGE:

RANGIAH J

DATE OF ORDER:

9 NOVEMBER 2016

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application for leave to appeal is dismissed.

2.The applicant pay the respondent’s costs of the application.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

RANGIAH J:

  1. The applicant, Josiyas Mbuzi, seeks leave to appeal against a judgment given by Edelman J on 5 July 2016.  Mr Mbuzi had discontinued a proceeding against the respondent, AGL Sales Pty Limited, but then applied to set aside the discontinuance and reopen the proceeding.  His Honour dismissed that application with costs (“the judgment”).

  2. Mr Mbuzi’s application for leave to appeal is brought pursuant to s 24(1A) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) (“the FCA Act”) on the basis that the judgment is interlocutory. However, in the course of his oral submissions, Mr Mbuzi argued that the judgment is in fact final,…

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Details
Case
[2016] FCA 1313
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Mbuzi v AGL Sales Pty Limited was an application for leave to appeal a judgment of Justice Edelman, handed down on 5 July 2016, dismissing Mr Mbuzi’s application to set aside a notice of discontinuance of his proceeding against AGL Sales Pty Limited. Mr Mbuzi had commenced proceedings against AGL for overcharging and improperly making demands for payment and issuing disconnection notices to him. The proceeding was settled and discontinued by consent. Mr Mbuzi sought to set aside the notice of discontinuance on the basis that AGL had reneged on the terms of the deed of settlement. His application was dismissed.
The Court was required to decide whether the primary judgment was interlocutory or final, and whether it was attended by sufficient doubt to justify granting leave to appeal. The Court held that the primary judgment was interlocutory and that it was not attended by sufficient doubt to justify granting leave to appeal. The Court held that the primary judgment was interlocutory because it did not finally determine Mr Mbuzi’s rights. The Court held that it was not attended by sufficient doubt to justify granting leave to appeal because Mr Mbuzi had not identified any error in the primary judgment that had a real, substantial and prospects of success. The Court held that the primary judgment was correct because Mr Mbuzi had not identified any basis to set aside the notice of discontinuance. The Court held that the primary judgment was not attended by sufficient doubt to justify granting leave to appeal because Mr Mbuzi had not identified any error in the primary judgment that had a real, substantial and prospects of success.

The application for leave to appeal was dismissed, and Mr Mbuzi was ordered to pay the respondent’s costs of the application.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application for leave to appeal is dismissed.

2. The applicant pay the respondent’s costs of the application.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

For the reasons that follow, I conclude that the judgment is interlocutory, leave to appeal is required and leave should be refused. Background On 24 September 2015, Mr Mbuzi filed an originating application (QUD 881 of 2015) against AGL Retail Energy Limited (“the proceeding”). That company was removed as the respondent and replaced by AGL Sales Pty Limited (“AGL”) by an order made on 3 December 2015. AGL is Mr Mbuzi’s electricity supplier. Mr Mbuzi claimed that AGL had overcharged him and had improperly made demands for payment and issued disconnection notices to him. He sought injunctions and compensatory damages. On 17 February 2016, the parties attended a mediation and resolved the matter. The terms of settlement included that:1.The applicant discontinue his proceedings numbered QUD 881 of 2015 in the Federal Court in Brisbane by filing a notice of discontinuance within seven (7) days.…3. The applicant replace AGL Sales Pty Limited as his electricity supplier on or before 31 March 2016.…5. AGL Sales Pty Limited waives any further fees, including fees for the supply of electricity and for final billing, and any other such charges in respect of the applicant for the period up to 4pm 31 March 2016.6. This Deed may be pleaded as a bar to any further proceedings. Mr Mbuzi filed a notice of discontinuance of the proceeding on 18 February 2016. The notice stated that it was, “As per deed of settlement of 17 February 2016”. On 18 March 2016, AGL rendered an invoice to Mr Mbuzi for $496.35 for electricity supplied between 16 December 2015 and 16 March 2016. That invoice was, on the face of it, inconsistent with the terms of settlement. On 30 March 2016, Mr Mbuzi filed his application to set aside the discontinuance and reopen the proceeding. The application was made on the basis that AGL had “reneged on the terms of the deed of settlement upon which the notice of discontinuance was based”. Mr Mbuzi did not contact AGL or its solicitors before filing his application. In an email to the solicitors for AGL, dated 31 March 2016, Mr Mbuzi said that he would settle the proceeding for $10,000 and payment of certain expenses he claimed to have incurred. AGL’s delivery of the invoice was explained in an email dated 6 April 2016 from Ms Ching-Fei Chiu, the solicitor for AGL, as follows:We have been instructed by our client that they are obligated under the National Energy Retail Rules to send customers periodical invoices so that customers may track their electricity consumption. Our client is aware of its obligations under the settlement agreement. The invoice is not due until 8 April 2016 and our client applied a credit for the amount of the invoice on 1 April 2016. Your account balance with our client remains $0 (account statement attached). Our client, nevertheless, apologises for not sending any explanations with the invoice sent to you in March or advising you as to their intention to credit the invoice at an earlier opportunity. Our client also apologises for any concerns and confusions caused in this regard. However, our client remains of the view that you have still received the benefits under the settlement agreement and, therefore, cannot agree to pay you the amount demanded in your email on 31 March 2016. We take this opportunity to note that the settlement agreement required you to transfer your account to another electricity retailer by 31 March 2016…If you transfer your electricity account to another retailer on or before 27 April 2016, our client will waive all charges incurred prior to 27 April 2016. …We trust the above is sufficient to address your concerns and again resolve the matter. We, therefore, invite you to withdraw your application to re-open the subject proceeding, failing which our client will have no choice but to oppose the application and this correspondence will be produced on the question of costs.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

In his written submissions, Mr Mbuzi objected to the reading of AGL’s affidavits on the basis that they were not permitted to be filed under the orders of 3 May 2016 and on the basis that the claims in them were disputed and there was no opportunity for cross-examination. Mr Mbuzi also contended that both the strike out application and the application for a vexatious proceedings order were not properly made and should not be considered. The primary judgment Justice Edelman’s judgment was given on 5 July 2016. His Honour described the procedural history of the matter as follows:5AGL applied to “strike out” Mr Mbuzi’s application to reopen rather than to allow it to proceed to a hearing. Although AGL’s application was described as a “strike out”, the orders sought by AGL were that Mr Mbuzi’s interlocutory application be dismissed without further hearing. At a directions hearing, I raised the issue of whether AGL’s “strike out” application should be determined on the papers…Neither Mr Mbuzi nor AGL opposed the determination of AGL’s application on the papers. Given the nature and circumstances of Mr Mbuzi’s application, I made that order (Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) rr 1.31, 1.32). Rule 1.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) provides that, “The Court may make any order that the Court considers appropriate in the interests of justice”. His Honour noted that as Mr Mbuzi’s application was based only upon r 1.32, his application may be incompetent, citing Chen v Monash University [2016] FCAFC 66 at [50]. However, his Honour preferred not to decide the application on that basis. His Honour stated that whether leave to reopen proceedings should be granted or refused depends on the interest of justice, citing Ashby v Slipper [2014] FCA 973 at [10] and Walsh v Greater Metropolitan Cemeteries Trust (No 2) [2014] FCA 456 at [48]. His Honour said that it was not in the interests of justice to reopen the proceeding for five reasons. The five reasons were:1.There was no basis identified in Mr Mbuzi’s affidavit evidence or in his submissions upon which Mr Mbuzi could have his notice of discontinuance set aside. He did not dispute that he filed the notice of discontinuance knowingly and voluntarily, and did not allege fraud or duress. Nor did any of the facts alleged by Mr Mbuzi come close to establishing any basis to set aside the notice of discontinuance.2.The parties settled their dispute by deed and discontinued the proceeding by consent. The need for certainty and finality means that the jurisdiction to reopen proceedings is used sparingly. 3.Mr Mbuzi did not seek to reopen the proceeding by reference to matters in that proceeding. Instead, the application was based on an alleged breach of the settlement deed. 4.Relatedly, any proceedings for breach of the settlement deed could be commenced as a fresh proceeding. His Honour noted that a discontinuance is not usually a defence to a proceeding, referring to r 26.14 of the Federal Court Rules. 5.Even if Mr Mbuzi were permitted to reopen the proceeding and amend his claim to allege a breach of the settlement deed, it was extremely doubtful that he could obtain the relief which he sought in his email to AGL of 31 March 2016.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Mr Mbuzi elaborated upon most of these proposed grounds in his written and oral submissions. He also argued that the judgment is, in fact, final, not interlocutory, so that he does not require leave to appeal.ConsiderationWhether the primary judgment is interlocutory or final Section 24(1)(a) of the FCA Act provides that the Court has jurisdiction to hear appeals from judgments of the Court constituted by a single judge exercising the original jurisdiction of the Court. However, s 24(1A) provides that:An appeal shall not be brought from a judgment referred to in subsection (1) that is an interlocutory judgment unless the Court or a Judge gives leave to appeal. Mr Mbuzi submits that the judgment is not interlocutory, but final. He submits that the judgment finally disposes of his rights as he is not able to proceed with his former proceeding. Rule 26.12 of the Federal Court Rules provides, relevantly:(1)A party claiming relief may discontinue a proceeding in whole or in part by filing a notice of discontinuance, in accordance with Form 48. There is no specific provision in the Federal Court Rules for an application to set aside a notice of discontinuance. There are several cases which have assumed that an order of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia dismissing an application to set aside a notice of discontinuance is interlocutory, or held that such an order is interlocutory without providing reasons: Khadri v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2014) 140 ALD 136 at [8]-[10], Moussa v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 1280 at [3], BZAGD v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 670 at [12], [22], MZAOE v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 905 at [21]. Rule 13.01 of the Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth) deals with discontinuance and is indistinguishable from r 26.12 of the Federal Court Rules. In my respectful opinion, the assumption made, or view taken, in those cases is correct for the following reasons. An order refusing to set aside a discontinuance is analogous to an order refusing an application to set aside a default judgment. In each case the applicant seeks an order which would have the effect of allowing the applicant to prosecute a proceeding which has come to an end. In Carr v Finance Corp of Australia Ltd(No 1) (1981) 147 CLR 246, the High Court considered whether a judgment dismissing an application to set aside a default judgment was final or interlocutory. Gibbs CJ and Mason J held that whether a judgment is final depends on whether the judgment finally determines the rights of the parties. Their Honours held that an order refusing to set aside a default judgment does not as a matter of law finally dispose of such rights as it is open to the defendant to apply again to have the judgment set aside. Mason J said that as the setting aside of a default judgment is a matter under the control or generally within the discretion of the Court, there is no justification for imposing a rigid rule that the refusal of an application is a complete bar to a second application. An order refusing an application to set aside a summary judgment is interlocutory even though the practical effect of the order is that a second application must fail.