Skelin v Self Care Corporation Pty Ltd (No 2)

Link copied
Case Copied 36 min read

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Skelin v Self Care Corporation Pty Ltd (No 2) [2022] FCA 50

File numbers: NSD 485 of 2021
NSD 745 of 2021
Judgment of: BURLEY J
Date of judgment: 4 February 2022
Catchwords:

COSTS – application for third party costs order – where party is an undischarged bankrupt – where wife and mother paid part of the legal costs – whether wife and mother played active part in conduct of litigation – whether wife and mother have interest in the litigation – no third party costs orders made

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – whether hearsay evidence is admissible in application for costs made consequent on an application for leave to appeal – whether costs orders sought in relation to stay application are interlocutory

Legislation:

Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s 75

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) ss 24(1)(a), 43

Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) rr 26.12, 26.14, 40.02(c)

Legal Profession Act 2007 (Qld) s 322(4)(c)

Cases cited:

Addenbrooke Pty Ltd v Duncan (No 2) [2017] FCAFC 76; 348 ALR 1

Bienstein v Bienstein [2003] HCA 7; 77 ALJR 908

Caboolture Park v White Industries [1993] FCA 667; 45 FCR 224

Citrus Queensland Pty Ltd v Sunstate Orchards Pty Ltd (No 10) [2009] FCA 498

Cribb (Liquidator) v Jackson [2019] FCA 1632

Dunghutti Elders Council (Aboriginal Corporation) RNTBC v Registrar of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Corporations (No 4) [2012] FCAFC 50; 200 FCR 154

Dymocks Franchise Systems (NSW) Pty Ltd v Todd (No 2) [2004] UKPC 39; [2005] 4 All ER 195

Elevate Brandpartners Ltd v Hammond (No 4) [2020] FCA 421

FPM Constructions v Council of the City of Blue Mountains [2005] NSWCA 340

Hall v Nominal Defendant [1966] HCA 36; 117 CLR 423

Knight v FP Special Assets Ltd [1992] HCA 28; 174 CLR 178

KSMC Holdings Pty Ltd t/as Hubba Bubba Childcare on Haig v Bowden (No 3) [2020] NSWCA 158

Les Laboratoires Servier v Apotex Pty Ltd [2016] FCAFC 27; 247 FCR 61

Licul v Corney [1976] HCA 6; 180 CLR 213

Mbuzi v AGL Sales Pty Limited [2016] FCA 1313

Probiotec Ltd v The University of Melbourne [2008] FCAFC 5; 166 FCR 30

Self Care Corporation Pty Ltd v Green Forest International Pty Ltd (No 2) [2021] FCCA 1000

Self Care Corporation Pty Ltd v Green Forest International Pty Ltd (No 8) [2021] FCCA 1668

Skelin v Self Care Corporation Pty Ltd [2021] FCA 888

Division: General Division
Registry: New South Wales
National Practice Area: Intellectual Property
Sub-area: Trade Marks
Number of paragraphs: 72
Date of hearing: 15 December 2021
Counsel for the Applicant: Mr B Le Plastrier
Solicitor for the Applicant: Taylor David Lawyers
Counsel for the First and Second Respondents: Mr C McMeniman
Solicitor for the First and Second Respondents: Gilbert + Tobin
Counsel for the Third, Fourth, Sixteenth and Eighteenth Respondents in NSD 485 of 2021: The Third, Fourth, Sixteenth and Eighteenth Respondents filed a submitting notice
Counsel…
CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Skelin v Self Care Corporation Pty Ltd (No 2) and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2022] FCA 50
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Skelin v Self Care Corporation Pty Ltd (No 2) involves the issue of third-party costs orders, focusing on whether the wife and mother of the appellant, Pascal Skelin, were active participants in the litigation and whether they have a stake in the litigation's outcome. Skelin, an undischarged bankrupt, sought to discontinue his appeal against Self Care Corporation, an Australian medical services provider. Self Care opposed the discontinuance and sought third-party costs orders against Skelin's wife, Anne, and mother, Ojdana, arguing that they had funded his legal costs. The case hinged on whether these women had an active role in the litigation and if they had an interest in the proceedings' outcome.

The court had to determine whether hearsay evidence was admissible in the application for costs and if the costs orders sought in relation to the stay application were interlocutory. The court held that the legal effect of an order granting leave to file a notice of discontinuance is not a final determination of the parties' rights, making leave to appeal against costs orders necessary. Consequently, hearsay evidence was admissible, and the costs orders sought were considered interlocutory.

The court ruled that Anne and Ojdana Skelin did not have a sufficient connection to the unsuccessful party and the litigation to warrant the court exercising its jurisdiction to make third-party costs orders. The evidence provided by the Skelins' solicitor, which included information and belief, was deemed insufficient to establish their active participation or interest in the litigation. The court emphasised that the discretion under s 43 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 would turn on the particular facts of each case.

The court granted Skelin leave to discontinue his appeal proceedings and ordered him to pay the costs, including those from a previous costs order. The respondents were ordered to pay Skelin's costs of their application for non-party costs orders. If the parties could not agree on the quantum of costs within 28 days, the matter would be referred to a Registrar of the Court for assessment and payment in a lump sum.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Pursuant to rule 26.12(c) of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) (FCR), the applicant be granted leave to file notices of discontinuance in respect of the whole of proceedings NSD 485 of 2021 and NSD 745 of 2021.

2. Subject to order 3, the applicant pay the costs of the proceedings, including the costs ordered on 29 July 2021.

3. The first and second respondents pay the applicant’s costs of their application for non party costs orders.

4. If the parties are unable to agree as to the quantum of the costs in orders 2 and/or 3 above within 28 days, the proceedings be referred to a Registrar of the Court for the assessment and payment of those costs in a lump sum amount.

5. The Registrar be directed pursuant to FCR 1.37 to determine the quantum of the lump sum for costs payable pursuant to orders 2 and/or 3 in such manner as he or she deems fit including, if thought appropriate, on the papers.

6. The Registrar be directed pursuant to FCR 1.37, at the conclusion of the quantification process, to order that whatever sum has been quantified pursuant to orders 2 and/or 3 above be paid within 28 days from the date of the Registrar’s order.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

This case involves the Skelins, including Pascal Skelin, Anne Skelin, and Ojdana Skelin, who are engaged in legal proceedings against Self Care Corporation Pty Ltd. The Skelins are represented by Mr Gear, a solicitor, and Mr Grunert, another solicitor. Self Care Corporation Pty Ltd has raised objections to the Skelins' reliance on hearsay evidence in their affidavits and in their application for costs. The Skelins claim that Anne and Ojdana funded Pascal's legal costs and played an active part in the litigation. They also argue that Anne and Ojdana have an interest in the outcome of the proceedings due to their financial ties to Pascal.

The matter came before the court as an application for costs, specifically a third-party costs order, following a stay application. The Skelins are seeking leave to discontinue the appeal proceedings, and Self Care opposes the application. Self Care also contends that the Skelins' hearsay evidence should not be admissible and that the costs orders sought are interlocutory. The court considered these issues and the procedural steps involved in the matter.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

In the present applications Pascal seeks orders pursuant to r 26.12(2)(c) of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) (FCR) that he be given leave to file notices of discontinuance in respect of the whole of the appeal proceedings. Self Care opposes those orders and proposes that the grant of leave to discontinue be subject to the condition to which I have referred at [1], and that the payment of costs include the costs awarded in the July costs order. Self Care also seeks an order that in the event that the quantum of costs cannot be agreed then the matter be referred to a Registrar of the Court for assessment of the amount due to be paid in a lump sum pursuant to FCR 40.02(c).1.2 The evidence The Skelins rely on an affidavit given by Gregory Grunert, a solicitor in the employ of Taylor David lawyers who works under the supervision of Chad Gear. They also rely on two affidavits given by Mr Gear, who has conduct of the appeal proceedings and the FCCA proceedings. Mr Gear gives evidence that he is instructed to act for Pascal and was instructed also to act for Anne and Ojdana after Self Care identified the orders that it now seeks. In both of his affidavits Mr Gear exhibits documents and gives evidence on information and belief from each of Pascal, Anne and Ojdana. Objection was taken to hearsay evidence being adduced from the Skelins. Self Care contended that s 75 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) does not apply because a decision made consequent on an application for leave to appeal is a judgment under s 24(1)(a) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) (FCA Act), which has been found to be a final decision, citing a tentative view expressed in Probiotec Ltd v The University of Melbourne [2008] FCAFC 5; 166 FCR 30 at [79] (Rares J, Finn and Besanko JJ agreeing). I rejected that objection on the following basis. Whether or not an order is final or interlocutory turns upon its legal, rather than its practical, effect; that is, whether the legal effect of the order is a final determination of the rights of the parties in the principal cause pending between them; Hall v Nominal Defendant [1966] HCA 36; 117 CLR 423 at 433 (Windeyer J); Licul v Corney [1976] HCA 6; 180 CLR 213 at 225 (Gibbs J); Bienstein v Bienstein [2003] HCA 7; 77 ALJR 908 at [25] (McHugh, Kirby and Callinan JJ). Discontinuance of proceedings means that the Court cannot determine an applicant’s claims on its merits; Elevate Brandpartners Ltd v Hammond (No 4) [2020] FCA 421 at [23] (Stewart J). Where proceedings are discontinued, an applicant is not estopped from asserting the claims again in new or other proceedings: FCR 26.14; Addenbrooke Pty Ltd v Duncan (No 2) [2017] FCAFC 76; 348 ALR 1 at [549] (Gilmour and White JJ). The practical effect of an order granting leave to the applicant to file a notice of discontinuance is not to make a final determination of the rights of the parties. As such, leave to appeal against costs orders may be required where the substantive proceeding was discontinued; Les Laboratoires Servier v Apotex Pty Ltd [2016] FCAFC 27; 247 FCR 61 at [290] (Bennett, Besanko and Beach JJ). The Court has recognised that an order of the Federal Circuit Court dismissing an application to set aside a notice of discontinuance is interlocutory and therefore leave to appeal was required; Mbuzi v AGL Sales Pty Limited [2016] FCA 1313 at [28]-[33] (Rangiah J).

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Whether the Skelins' reliance on hearsay evidence is admissible in the application for costs made consequent on an application for leave to appeal.
2. Whether the costs orders sought in relation to the stay application are interlocutory in nature.
3. Whether the Skelins' wife and mother played an active part in the conduct of the litigation and if they have an interest in the outcome of the proceedings.

Held
1. The Skelins' reliance on hearsay evidence is admissible in the application for costs made consequent on an application for leave to appeal. The court rejected Self Care's objection on the basis that the practical effect of the order granting leave to discontinue the proceedings was not a final determination of the rights of the parties.
2. The costs orders sought in relation to the stay application are interlocutory in nature. The court found that discontinuance of proceedings does not result in a final determination of the rights of the parties.
3. The Skelins' wife and mother did not play an active part in the conduct of the litigation and do not have an interest in the outcome of the proceedings. Therefore, no third party costs orders were made.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The parties made submissions as to the weight and relevance of particular factors to be taken from the authorities. However, it must steadily be borne in mind that the only precondition to the exercise of power is that the non-party has a sufficient connection with the unsuccessful party and the litigation to warrant the Court exercising its jurisdiction; Dunghutti at [89]. The exercise of the discretion under s 43 of the FCA Act will in each case turn on its particular facts. 3. CONSIDERATION 3.1 The submissions Self Care submits that, as an undischarged bankrupt with no assets, it cannot be in dispute that Pascal is a “man of straw”. Although the evidence of Mr Gear refers to Pascal having a new income stream, there is no documentary evidence to support that contention. Self Care submits that both Anne and Ojdana have played an active part in the conduct of the appeal proceedings by funding Pascal’s costs. In the case of Anne, it is submitted that she is also a client of Taylor David and as such is jointly and severally liable for her husband’s costs. In addition, she proffered an undertaking to pay Self Care’s costs in the course of making the stay application. In Ojdana’s case, Self Care submits that she appears to have paid the vast majority of Taylor David’s invoices. Self Care submits that caution must be exercised in considering the information and belief evidence of Ojdana and Anne given in the affidavit evidence of Mr Gear, which should be regarded as insufficient to explain their involvement in the litigation and self-serving. In the absence of direct evidence, it is submitted that an inference should be drawn that nothing that they or Pascal might have said regarding the terms upon which funding was provided would have assisted them. It contends that the loan documentation exhibited to Mr Gear’s affidavit reinforces the conclusion that Anne and Ojdana have funded the litigation and that it is not necessary that they give day to day instructions. Self Care further submits that Anne and Ojdana have an interest in the outcome of the appeal proceedings and the FCCA proceedings in circumstances where the personal claims made against Pascal, if successful, will “detrimentally affect their assets”. It contends that they would, “presumably, be the real beneficiaries of a favourable costs order, had one been made in favour of Mr Skelin”. In this regard, it says that a central argument made by Pascal in support of the stay was that the main deficiency in the amended pleading concerned allegations regarding his personal liability. Self Care submits:22 In Anne Skelin’s case, her house is frozen and may be sold to meet any liability of her husband in the FCCA Proceedings. She is also the largest creditor in Mr Skelin’s bankruptcy (through her company Berkeley BC Pty Ltd). Ojdana Skelin is also a major creditor in Mr Skelin’s bankruptcy. Their financial interests were aligned with Mr Skelin’s pursuit of the Appeal Proceedings.