Citrus Queensland Pty Ltd v Sunstate Orchards Pty Ltd (No 10)

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Citrus Queensland Pty Ltd v Sunstate Orchards Pty Ltd (No 10) [2009] FCA 498

COSTS – s 43 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) – non-party costs sought by successful first and second respondents – wife of second applicant to substantive proceedings provided financial support for litigation – whether jurisdiction to order non-party costs spent after entry of judgment in substantive proceedings – factors relevant to exercise of discretion to award non-party costs – whether non-party played an active part in the conduct of the litigation – non-party to benefit financially if applicants’ claim had been successful – significance of the Knight principles

Held: notice of motion seeking the award of non-party costs against the wife of the second applicant dismissed

Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) s 120, s 121
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 4, s 43
Federal Court Rules O 35 r 7(2)(e) and (f)

Arundel Chiropractic Centre Pty Ltd v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (2001) 179 ALR 406 cited
Bischof v Adams [1992] 2 VR 198 followed
Caboolture Park Shopping Centre Pty Ltd (in liquidation) v White Industries (Qld) Pty Ltd (1993) 45 FCR 224 followed
Carborundum Abrasives Ltd v Bank of New Zealand (No 2) [1992] 3 NZLR 757 cited
Citrus Queensland Pty Ltd v Sunstate Orchards Pty Ltd (No 7) [2008] FCA 1364 cited
Citrus Queensland Pty Ltd v Sunstate Orchards Pty Ltd (No 8) [2008] FCA 1556 cited
Condliffe v Hislop [1996] 1 WLR 753 cited
Cooper v Maxwell [1992] CA Transcript 273 cited
Dymocks Franchise Systems (NSW) v Todd [2004] 1 WLR 2807 cited
Flinn v Flinn [1999] 3 VR 712 cited
Gore v Justice Corp Pty Ltd (2002) 119 FCR 429 followed
Jackson v Thakrar [2008] 1 All ER 601 cited
Kebaro Pty Ltd v Saunders [2003] FCAFC 5 followed
Kennon v Spry (2008) 251 ALR 257 cited
Knight v FP Special Assets Ltd (1992) 174 CLR 178 followed
Life Therapeutics Ltd v Bell IXL Investments Ltd (No 2) (2008) 170 FCR 595 cited
Locabail (UK) Ltd v Bayfield Properties Ltd [1999] 20 LS GazR 39 cited
McFarlane v EE Caledonia Ltd (No 2) [1995] 1 WLR 366 cited
Murphy v Young & Co’s Brewery plc [1997] 1 WLR 1591 cited
Neville v London Express Newspaper Ltd [1919] AC 368 cited
NSW Insurance Ministerial Corporation v Edkins (1998) 45 NSWLR 8 cited
Probiotec Ltd v The University of Melbourne (2008) 166 FCR 30 cited
Queensland Trustees Ltd v Commissioner of Stamp Duties (Qld) (1952) 88 CLR 54 cited
Symphony Group Plc v Hodgson [1993] 3 WLR 830 cited
Thistleton v Hendricks (1992) 32 Con LR 123 cited
UTSA Pty Ltd (In Liquidation) v Ultratune Australia Pty Ltd [1999] 1 VR 204 cited
Vestris v Cashman (1998) 72 SASR 449 cited
Yates v Boland [2000] FCA 1895 cited

CITRUS QUEENSLAND PTY LTD (ACN 110 885 359), PETER MICHAEL TRACY and SUNSTATE CITRUS PTY LTD (ACN 112 847 560) [SUBJECT TO DEED OF COMPANY…

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Details
Case
[2009] FCA 498
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Citrus Queensland Pty Ltd v Sunstate Orchards Pty Ltd (No 10), the first and second respondents sought orders for Adrienne Elizabeth Tracy (Mrs Tracy) to pay their costs of the proceedings on an indemnity basis, jointly and severally with the applicants. The respondents also sought for Mrs Tracy to be held liable for their costs on a party and party basis. The key issues before the court were whether the jurisdiction of the Court to make an order regarding third-party costs was exhausted once orders against the applicants were made and entered, whether Mrs Tracy was liable for the respondents' costs, and if so, whether she should be liable on an indemnity basis.

The court addressed the issue of jurisdiction first, noting that while the orders concerning costs against the applicants had been entered, it did not mean the court's jurisdiction was exhausted. The court concluded that the orders sought by the respondents were not supplemental orders but were fundamentally different, seeking to hold Mrs Tracy liable on an indemnity basis. The court held that its jurisdiction had not been exhausted and could consider the respondents' motion.

The court then turned to the question of whether Mrs Tracy was liable for the respondents' costs. It found that while Mrs Tracy might have benefited financially from the proceedings, the circumstances did not warrant an exercise of the court's discretion to award costs against her. The court highlighted that Mrs Tracy was not a director or shareholder of the applicants, and any financial support she provided was likely motivated by her affection for the second applicant rather than any financial interest in the proceedings.

Ultimately, the court dismissed the notice of motion, finding that the respondents were not entitled to the orders they sought against Mrs Tracy.

Orders

Orders of the court

The notice of motion be dismissed.

Note:

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

COLLIER J
In detail, the first and second respondents by this notice of motion seek the following orders:1.Adrienne Elizabeth Tracy (Mrs Tracy), wife of the Second Applicant, pay the First and Second Respondent’s costs of the proceedings, including all reserved costs on an indemnity basis.2.That Mrs Tracy be jointly and severally liable with the Applicants for such costs.3.The said costs are to be assessed on the basis that:(a)all costs be allowed, except insofar as any costs are of an unreasonable amount or were unreasonably incurred so that, subject to such exceptions, the First and Second Respondents will be completely indemnified for their costs;(b) it was necessary and proper for the attainment of justice and for enforcing the First and Second Respondents’ rights to have retained counsel whose appearance was announced (being Mr J Bell QC and Mr PP McQuade);(c)it was necessary and proper for the attainment of justice and for enforcing the First and Second Respondents’ rights to have engaged expert witnesses:(i)Mr Elias Lytras of Vincents Chartered Accountants;(ii)Mr Ernest Mark Harrison, Registered Valuer.(4)In the alternative to the relief sought in paragraph 1 above, that Mrs Tracy pay the First and Second Respondents’ costs of the proceedings, including all reserved on a party and party basis.(5)That the costs referred to in paragraph 4 above are to be assessed on the basis that:(a)it was necessary and proper for the attainment of justice and for enforcing the First and Second Respondents’ rights to have retained counsel whose appearance was announced (being Mr J Bell QC and Mr PP McQuade);(b)it was necessary and proper for the attainment of justice and for enforcing the First and Second Respondents’ rights to have engaged expert witnesses:(i) Mr Elias Lytras of Vincents Chartered Accountants;(ii) Mr Ernest Mark Harrison, Registered Valuer.(6)That Mrs Tracy pay the costs of this Notice of Motion on a party and party basis.(7) Such further order as this Honourable Court considers appropriate.ISSUES FOR DECISION During the course of argument, both written and oral, three clear issues emerged for decision. Those issues can be summarised as follows:1.Was the jurisdiction of the Court to make an order as to third party costs exhausted once orders as to costs against the applicants were made and entered?2.Assuming that the jurisdiction of the Court was not exhausted, is Mrs Tracy liable for the costs of the first and second respondents?3.In the event that Mrs Tracy is liable for the costs of the first and second respondents, should she be liable on an indemnity basis? I shall address each issue in turn.JURISDICTION OF THE COURT TO ORDER NON-PARTY COSTS It is not in dispute that the orders of the Court of 5 September 2008 and 17 October 2008 have been entered. The applicants have claimed that the issue of jurisdiction arose because, following the entry of those orders, the jurisdiction of the Court has been spent in relation to costs in these proceedings. In summary, the applicants’ argument is:·Judgment was given in favour of the first and second respondents in the primary proceedings on 5 September 2008 (Citrus Queensland Pty Ltd v Sunstate Orchards Pty Ltd (No 7) [2008] FCA 1364).·This notice of motion was filed on 26 September 2008.·On 17 October 2008 in Citrus Queensland Pty Ltd v Sunstate Orchards Pty Ltd (No 8) [2008] FCA 1556 all outstanding costs issues were dealt with, and, subject to a number of reserved interlocutory costs, the first, second and third applicants were ordered to pay the costs of the first and second respondents.·The orders made on those dates have been entered by the applicants. Other than in the circumstances contemplated by O 35 r 7 of the Federal Court Rules – none of which are relevant in this case notwithstanding the submissions of the applicants concerning O 35 r 7(2)(e) and (f) – an order once entered can only be set aside by an appeal court.·The orders sought by the respondents in the notice of motion are in substitution of orders which have already been entered. They are not supplemental orders, because there are already comprehensive orders dealing with the issue of costs.·Further, the orders sought by the notice of motion is fundamentally different from orders already made in relation to costs. The first and second respondents seek an award of costs against Mrs Tracy on an indemnity basis, compared with the standard basis on which costs were awarded against the applicants on 17 October 2008.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: COLLIER J

I consider that it is appropriate to consider any potential liability of Mrs Tracy in terms of principles arising from cases where the courts have considered the exercise of the discretion to award costs against a non-party. The principles articulated in Knight (1992) 174 CLR 178 are relevant as guiding factors only, in appropriate circumstances.Consideration It is common ground that the causes of action determined in the primary proceedings were purportedly assigned by the applicants to Mrs Tracy on 17 June 2005 and then from Mrs Tracy to Janling Pty Ltd on 4 July 2005. (It is not in contention that at all material times the sole shareholder of Janling Pty Ltd was a corporation the sole shareholder of which in turn was Mrs Tracy, and that Mrs Tracy herself was the sole director of Janling Pty Ltd.) I say “purportedly” because the first and second respondent filed a notice of motion on 8 December 2005 seeking orders that the proceedings be dismissed and/or struck out on the basis that, inter alia, the causes of action the subject of the primary proceedings were not assignable (TS 14 December 2005 p 2 ll 35-43). Whether the assignment of the causes of action was valid ceased to be contentious when the parties agreed, and the Court ordered by consent on 15 February 2006, that the strike out motion of the first and second respondents be dismissed, that Janling Pty Ltd be removed as the applicant to the primary proceedings, and that the first, second and third applicants be substituted as applicants. However notwithstanding the orders of 15 February 2006 there is no evidence that the benefit of the relevant causes of action was reassigned by Janling Pty Ltd to the applicants. Accordingly any purported assignment of the causes of action, to the extent that the assignment took effect, remained with Janling Pty Ltd. It followed that presumably financial benefits of any success of the applicants in the proceedings would flow to Janling Pty Ltd, and thence to Mrs Tracy. The fact that the applicants were unsuccessful with respect to their claims against the first and second respondents (other than with respect to a number of reserved costs) is irrelevant in the context of this notice of motion. However in my view, notwithstanding potential financial benefits accruing to Mrs Tracy from the proceedings, the circumstances of this case do not warrant the exercise of the Court’s discretion to award costs against Mrs Tracy pursuant to s 43 of the Federal Court Act. As I have already observed, the mere fact that a person may benefit from litigation will not, without more, suffice to justify an award of costs. I form this view for the following reasons. First, Mrs Tracy was never a director or shareholder of either the first or third applicants. In light of the dominant role played by the second applicant in the affairs of all applicants and the clear professional and financial stake of the second applicant in the businesses of the first and third applicants particularly as director and shareholder, it is clear that the failure of the proceedings would have had a much greater impact on the fortunes of the second applicant than on those of Mrs Tracy. I consider that it is likely that any financial support provided by Mrs Tracy to the applicants’ case was motivated by Mrs Tracy’s natural affection for the second applicant (cf Jackson v Thakrar [2008] 1 All ER 601 at 609) rather than any financial interest she may have had in the outcome of the proceedings. In my view this is an important distinction between the supportive role played by Mrs Tracy of the applicants, and the motivation of such entities as the third party in Gore (2002) 119 FCR 429.