Firexpress Australia Pty Ltd v Imago Exchange Pty Limited

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Firexpress Australia Pty Ltd v Imago Exchange Pty Limited [2022] FCA 129

File number: NSD 650 of 2021
Judgment of: MARKOVIC J
Date of judgment: 22 February 2022
Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – applications for security for costs – where proposed security takes the form of a personal guarantee – where proposed guarantor is a stranger to the litigation – where proposed guarantor gives undertaking not to dispose of or to encumber any of her real property without providing 28 days’ notice to the respondents of her intention to do so – applications granted
Legislation:

Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth)

Corporations Act 2001 (Cth)

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth)

Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth)

Cases cited:

All Class Insurance Brokers Pty td (in liq) v Chubb Insurance Australia Limited [2020] FCA 840

Citrus Queensland Pty Ltd v Sunstate Orchards Pty Ltd (No 10) [2009] FCA 498

Construction Kings Pty ltd v Cashflow Finance Australia Pty Ltd [2020] FCA 1297

DIF III Global Co-Investment Fund, LP v BBLP LLC [2016] VSC 401

Hillbrick Bicycles Pty Ltd v F45 Training Pty Ltd [2017] FCA 1089

Jianshe Southern Pty Ltd v Get Motor Cycles Pty Ltd (formerly Turnbull Cooktown Pty Ltd) (3) [2007] FCA 1078

Success Capital Pty Ltd v Hope Island Resort Holdings Pty Ltd [2007] FCA 1562

Sunstate Orchards Pty Ltd v Citrus Queensland Pty Ltd [2006] FCAFC 93

Yara Australia Pty Ltd v Oswal (2013) 41 VR 245

Division: General Division
Registry: New South Wales
National Practice Area: Commercial and Corporations
Sub-area: Commercial Contracts, Banking, Finance and Insurance
Number of paragraphs: 72
Date of hearing: 2 February 2022
Counsel for the Applicant: Mr B Le Plastrier
Solicitor for the Applicant: B & G Law
Counsel for the Second, Fifth and Sixth Respondents: Ms D Worrell
Solicitor for the Second, Fifth and Sixth Respondents: Donnie Harris Law
Counsel for the Fourth Respondent:  Mr B Ryde
Solicitor for the Fourth Respondent: McLean McKenzie Topfer
Counsel for the Seventh Respondent:  Mr J Adamopoulos
Solicitor for the Seventh Respondent: Weinberg Lawyers

ORDERS

NSD 650 of 2021
BETWEEN:

FIREXPRESS AUSTRALIA PTY LTD ACN 610 194 619

Applicant

AND:

IMAGO EXCHANGE PTY LTD ACN 604 113 813

First Respondent

BSY PTY LTD ACN 609 676 066

Second Respondent

RONALD CAINES (and others named in the Schedule)

Third Respondent

AND BETWEEN:

IMAGO EXCHANGE PTY LTD ACN 604 113 813

Cross-Claimant

AND:

AUSTRALIAN ASSOCIATED TANK FARMS PTY LTD ACN 636 236 505 (and others named in the Schedule)

First Cross-Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

MARKOVIC J

DATE OF ORDER:

22 FEBRUARY 2022

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.Within seven days of the date of publication of these reasons the applicant and the second, fourth, fifth, sixth and seventh respondents are to provide the Associate to Markovic J with a form of proposed orders giving effect to these reasons or, if they cannot agree on a form of proposed orders, with their competing forms of proposed orders. 

2.In the event that the parties referred…

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Details
Case
[2022] FCA 129
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Firexpress Australia Pty Ltd brought proceedings against Imago Exchange Pty Limited and others in the Federal Court of Australia, seeking security for costs in relation to ongoing litigation. The respondents, represented by BSY, Brodie Youd, Emmie Youd, Simon Youd, and Mr. Graham, sought orders for Firexpress to provide security for their costs in the form of a personal guarantee from a guarantor who was a stranger to the litigation. Mrs. Dooley, the proposed guarantor, offered to provide a guarantee and gave an undertaking not to dispose of or encumber her real property without providing 28 days' notice to the respondents. The legal issues before the court were whether the proposed security was adequate and whether it should be accepted despite the guarantor being a stranger to the litigation.

The court considered the principles established in relevant cases, such as DIF III, where it was held that the form of security is at the court's discretion. The court found that the guarantees provided by Mrs. Dooley, together with her undertaking, were an adequate form of security for the respondents' costs. The court also noted that the failure by Firexpress to provide an alternative form of security, such as a bank guarantee or payment into court, was not a strong discretionary factor. The court determined that the guarantees were underpinned by assets sufficient to meet the respondents' estimated costs and any potential costs order. The court concluded that the guarantees should be accepted as adequate security for the respondents' costs.

The court made orders that Firexpress should provide security for the respondents' costs in the amounts sought by each respondent. The security was to be provided by Mrs. Dooley entering into the guarantee with the respondents within 14 days of the making of the orders. The latter order was to be made on the condition that Mrs. Dooley provides the undertaking to the court and the respondents. The proceeding was to be stayed until such time as the guarantees were executed by Mrs. Dooley and provided to the respondents. The court also directed the parties to provide a draft form of orders within seven days of the date of publication of the reasons or, in the absence of agreement, their competing sets of draft orders. If the parties could not agree, the proceeding would be listed for a case management hearing to resolve any differences and, if necessary, to hear from the parties on the question of costs of the security for costs applications. The court made orders accordingly.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Within seven days of the date of publication of these reasons the applicant and the second, fourth, fifth, sixth and seventh respondents are to provide the Associate to Markovic J with a form of proposed orders giving effect to these reasons or, if they cannot agree on a form of proposed orders, with their competing forms of proposed orders.

2. In the event that the parties referred to in Order 1 cannot agree on a form of proposed orders or, on the question of costs of the security for costs applications filed by each of the second, fifth and sixth respondents, the fourth respondent and the seventh respondent, those parties are to approach my Associate to have the proceeding listed for case management hearing.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Firexpress Australia Pty Ltd sought an order for security for costs against several respondents, including BSY, Brodie Youd, Emmie Youd, Simon Youd, and Mr. Graham. The application was supported by a personal guarantee from Mrs. Dooley, who is a stranger to the litigation. Mrs. Dooley also provided an undertaking not to dispose of or encumber her real property without providing 28 days’ notice to the respondents. The respondents contested the adequacy of the proposed security and argued that Firexpress should provide security in the form of payment into court or a bank guarantee instead.

The case came before the court as an application for security for costs. It was not the first instance hearing but a subsequent application in the ongoing litigation. Prior to this application, there were no explicit mentions of previous applications for security for costs. The respondents contested the adequacy of the security proposed by Firexpress, and the court had to determine whether the security offered by Mrs. Dooley was adequate.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Finally, I address the submission that no explanation has been provided by Firexpress as to why Mrs Dooley cannot provide security by way of payment into Court or provision of a bank guarantee. A similar submission was made in DIF III. At [71(6)] Hargrave JA said that in his opinion this was not a strong discretionary factor and that, of itself, it was incapable of providing a good reason for rejecting the security proffered by the plaintiffs in that case, particularly as his Honour had found the security there to be objectively adequate and readily enforceable. That view applies equally here. For the same reasons identified by Hargrave JA, in my opinion the failure by Firexpress to provide that evidence is not a strong discretionary factor. Contrary to the respondents’ submissions that the Guarantee is proffered by an individual as opposed to an insurer, as was the case in DIF III, this does not cause me to give this factor greater or decisive weight. The fact remains that the Guarantee is underpinned by assets which are more than adequate to meet the respondents’ presently combined estimated costs and thus a costs order, should they ultimately be successful. CONCLUSION For those reasons I am of the opinion that Firexpress should provide security for the respondents’ costs in the amounts sought by each of BSY, Brodie Youd and Emmie Youd, Simon Youd and Mr Graham as set out at [1] above but that such security is to be provided by Mrs Dooley entering into the Guarantee with the respondents within 14 days of the making of orders. The latter order is to be made on the condition that Mrs Dooley provides the Undertaking to the Court and to the respondents. Neither the second, fifth and sixth respondents nor the fourth respondent made any submissions in relation to the order sought that I would dismiss the proceeding in the event that Firexpress fails to comply with any order for security. But, given the limited issue before me for resolution and its outcome I would not be minded to make such an order. Rather, the proceeding should be stayed until such time as the Guarantees are executed by Mrs Dooley and provided to the respondents. No submissions were made by Firexpress or the respondents in relation to the costs of the Security Applications. While costs would ordinarily follow the outcome, given the way in which the Security Applications developed and, in the absence of agreement between them, I will hear from the parties on the question of costs on the next occasion that the proceeding is listed before me for case management hearing. I will make an order that within seven days of the date of publication of these reasons the parties are to provide my Associate with a draft form of orders giving effect to them or, in the absence of agreement, they are to provide their competing sets of draft orders. In the event that the parties cannot agree on the form of orders, the proceeding will be listed before me for case management hearing to resolve any differences between the parties and, if necessary, to hear from the parties on the question of costs of the Security Applications. I will make orders accordingly.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Finally, the respondents submitted that Firexpress has not provided an explanation as to why Mrs Dooley is not able to procure a bank guarantee or provide some other form of security such as payment into court or the provision of a charge. They contended that was relevant because, if the Court was minded to make an order requiring the provision by Firexpress of a traditional form of security, namely payment into Court or provision of a bank guarantee, there was no evidence from Mrs Dooley that she would not be in a position to do so and thus no suggestion that such an order would stifle the litigation. In those circumstances, the respondents said that there would be no disadvantage to Firexpress in making such an order. CONSIDERATION In my opinion the Guarantees proffered by Mrs Dooley together with the Undertaking is an adequate form of security for the respondents’ costs. My reasons for reaching this conclusion follow. As set out above s 56 of the FCA Act empowers the Court to make an order that an applicant give security for costs that may be awarded against it. That section also provides that the security shall be given in such form as the Court or Judge directs. That is, the form of security is at the Court’s or Judge’s discretion. In DIF III at [40] Hargrave JA set out the principles which the Court would usually apply in exercising the broad discretion as to the form of security (see [37] above). The respondents submitted that a guarantee will only be accepted as a form of security in exceptional circumstances. But that may be placing the bar too high. Rather the authorities to which I was taken demonstrate that each case will turn on its own facts. In making that submission the respondents relied on the decision in Success Capital Pty Ltd v Hope Island Resort Holdings Pty Ltd [2007] FCA 1562 at [42]. That case concerned an application by the respondents for an order that the applicant pay security for their costs. When the application first came before the Court it was adjourned to allow the respondents an opportunity to consider the applicant’s offer to settle the claim for security by provision of a form of guarantee. That offer was not accepted and the application proceeded to hearing. Justice Collier formed the view that it was appropriate to make an order that the applicant provide security for the respondents’ costs. In coming to that view her Honour considered the deed of guarantee that had been proposed by the applicant. The proposed deed provided for assets of one unit trust to be committed as security for the applicant’s costs as trustee of another unit trust. However, in the absence of supporting evidence, Collier J was not prepared to accept that the relevant clause of the unit trust deed of the Success Development & Property Group Unit Trust empowered the applicant to assume an obligation or give a guarantee of a “substantial sum as security for the costs of the applicant in its capacity as trustee for another Unit Trust in litigation in which, prima facie, the beneficiaries of the Success Development & Property Group Unit Trust have no interest”.