Skelin v Self Care Corporation Pty Ltd

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Skelin v Self Care Corporation Pty Ltd [2021] FCA 888

File numbers: NSD 485 of 2021
NSD 745 of 2021
Judgment of: BURLEY J
Date of judgment: 29 July 2021
Date of publication of reasons: 2 August 2021
Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – applications to stay hearing of Federal Circuit Court proceedings – where applicant seeks leave to appeal from decision of Federal Circuit Court judge granting leave to amend a pleading – where applicant seeks leave to appeal from decision of Federal Circuit Court judge rejecting application to recuse herself on the basis of an apprehension of bias – where Federal Circuit Court proceedings due to commence imminently – principles relevant to grant of a stay – balance of convenience – applications dismissed  
Legislation:

Australian Consumer Law (sch 2 to the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth)), s 18

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), s 29

Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) rr 35.13, 36.08

Cases cited:

Decor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc [1991] FCA 844; 33 FCR 397

Dubow v Fitness First (Australia) Pty Ltd [2010] FCA 660

GetSwift Limited v Webb [2021] FCAFC 26; (2021) 388 ALR 75

GlaxoSmithKline Australia Pty Ltd v Reckitt Benckiser Healthcare (UK) Limited [2013] FCAFC 150

Johnson v Johnson [2000] HCA 48; 201 CLR 488

McBride v Sandland (No 2) (1918) 25 CLR 369

Michael Wilson & Partners Limited v Nicholls [2011] HCA 48; 244 CLR 427

Samsung Electronics Co Ltd v Apple Inc [2011] FCAFC 156; 217 FCR 238

Self Care Corporation Pty Ltd v Green Forest International Pty Ltd (No 2) [2021] FCCA 1000

Self Care Corporation Pty Ltd v Green Forest International Pty Ltd (No 8) [2021] FCCA 1668

Self Care Corporation Pty Ltd v Green Forest International Pty Ltd [2021] FCCA 129

Self Care Corporation Pty Ltd v Green Forest Pty Ltd (No 3) [2021] FCCA 1277

Yorke v Lucas [1985] HCA 65; 158 CLR 661

Division: General Division
Registry: New South Wales
Number of paragraphs: 62
National Practice Area: Intellectual Property
Sub-area: Trade Marks
Date of hearing: 28 July 2021
Counsel for the Applicant: Mr G Sirtes with Mr B Le Plastrier
Solicitor for the Applicant: Taylor David Lawyers
Counsel for the First and Second Respondents: Mr J Hennessy with Mr C McMeniman
Solicitor for the First and Second Respondents: Gilbert + Tobin
Counsel for the Third, Fourth, Sixteenth and Eighteenth Respondents in NSD 485 of 2021: The Third, Fourth, Sixteenth and Eighteenth Respondents filed a submitting notice
Counsel for the Third, Fourth, Sixteenth and Eighteenth Respondents in NSD 745 of 2021: The Third, Fourth, Sixteenth and Eighteenth Respondents did not appear
Counsel for the Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh, Twelfth, Thirteenth, Fourteenth and Fifteenth Respondents: The Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh, Twelfth, Thirteenth, Fourteenth and Fifteenth Respondents did not appear
Counsel for the Seventeenth Respondent: Mr T Di Francesco
Solicitor for the Seventeenth Respondent: HWL Ebsworth Lawyers

ORDERS

NSD…
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Details
Case
[2021] FCA 888
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Skelin v Self Care Corporation Pty Ltd involved an application by the applicant, Mr Skelin, to the High Court for leave to appeal against decisions of the Federal Circuit Court. The applicant sought leave to appeal from a decision granting leave to amend a pleading and from a decision rejecting an application to recuse the judge on the basis of an apprehension of bias. The Federal Circuit Court proceedings were due to commence imminently. The primary issue before the High Court was whether to grant a stay of the Federal Circuit Court proceedings pending the outcome of the appeal. The applicant argued that the judge's conduct during the proceedings reinforced an apprehension of bias. The court considered the exchanges between the judge and counsel in the context of the overall dialogue. The court found that the judge's remarks, while critical, did not indicate a concluded view such that she could not bring an impartial and unprejudiced mind to the final hearing. The court concluded that the balance of convenience favoured the grant of the stay but found that the applicant had not established that the judge's conduct had resulted in a substantial injustice or that the proceedings would be unfair if the stay was not granted. Accordingly, the application for leave to appeal was dismissed. The court ordered that the applicant pay the respondents' costs of the application for a stay and that the proceeding be listed for a case management hearing.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application for a stay of the Federal Circuit Court proceeding SYG 2771 of 2019 in (a) of the application for leave to appeal be dismissed.

2. The applicant pay the first and second respondents’ costs of the application for a stay referred to in order 1.

3. The proceeding be listed for a case management hearing at 9.30am on 8 October 2021.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Full text does not contain this section.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The primary judge noted that ground 2 of Mr Skelin’s application as advanced before her was that her conduct in the management of the proceedings over the course of 18 months since the making of the freezing orders “reinforced” the apprehension of bias which arose from the conduct in ground 1. Having concluded that ground 1 was not made out, the primary judge did not consider it necessary to address ground 2, but nevertheless did so in [137]-[158] of her reasons. She concluded that ground 2 was also not made out. 5.2 Consideration In his submissions on the stay application Mr Skelin identifies 8 short passages taken from the transcript of argument on 17 December 2019. He contends, as he did before the primary judge, that these remarks recorded the primary judge’s actual persuasion that the documentation relied upon by Self Care in support of the application for freezing orders proved that he had been dealing in counterfeit products and the charge of dishonest conduct had been established. He submits that the freezing order made against property owned by Mrs Skelin was an error, and the primary judge never articulated the basis upon which she considered that such order should have been made. It is not appropriate in the present application for a concluded view to be expressed as to the merits of the proposed appeal from the recusal judgment. I have considered each of the passages the subject of the submissions made by Mr Skelin in the context of the passages as they appear in the transcript more generally. It is apparent that the exchanges that took place between the primary judge and counsel were fairly typical of the dialogue that might be expected in an interlocutory application. One example is at transcript page 138 lines 29 to 44. There the primary judge expresses “concern” as to the apparent conduct or intentions of Mr Skelin as reflected in a document that he had produced. There was a debate between the primary judge and counsel for Mr Skelin about how document might be understood. The impugned aspect of the discussion is that the primary judge indicated that the contents of the document “cause, with respect, considerable concern”. Given that the primary judge was required to adjudicate on whether or not to grant interim relief in the nature of a freezing order, it was necessary for her to evaluate the case advanced by Self Care. She debated aspects of that evaluation at some length in exchanges with counsel. However, it is not apparent that in expressing concern, the primary judge was expressing a concluded view such that she might not bring an impartial and unprejudiced mind to the resolution of the question on final hearing. It does not seem likely that the hypothetical observer would have formed that view. Similar observations may be made of the other passages relied upon, once they are placed in the larger context of the dialogue between the primary judge and counsel. Indeed, the primary judge often qualified her remarks, observing:(a)in one passage (which has been singled out for criticism) that an aspect of the evidence before her “suggested” certain content;(b)noting that Self Care had yet to plead its case before there could be any final relief and that the primary judge had “a quia timet concern” – clearly indicating the nature of the application and the primary judge’s consideration of it;(c)noting that there may be other explanations for conduct that are yet to emerge;(d)these observations are consistent with the way that Self Care advanced its submissions, as being based on “serious apprehensions” as to what might take place if a freezing order is not made; and (e)responding to the statement by counsel for Mr Skelin that it was his intention is to defend the matter, by saying that she assumed that this was the case.