FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Moussa v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 1280
Citation: Moussa v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 1280 Appeal from: Application for extension of time and leave to appeal: Moussa v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2015] FCCA 1879 Parties: MOHAMAD MOUSSA v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION and ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL File number: NSD 891 of 2015 Judge: PERRAM J Date of judgment: 19 November 2015 Catchwords: MIGRATION – application for extension of time and leave to appeal from decision of Federal Circuit Court – whether dismissing application to set aside notice of discontinuance attended by error – principles relevant to jurisdiction to set aside notice of discontinuance – whether application lacked utility where application to Tribunal made out of time Legislation: Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 24(1A)
Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 338, 347, 494C
Federal Circuit Court Rules2001 (Cth) r 13.01
Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) r 35.13(a)
Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) reg 4.10(1)(c)Cases cited: Applicant A26 of 2002 v Minister for Immigration &Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCA 1050
Castanho v Brown & Root (UK) Ltd [1981] AC 557
Decor Corporation Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc (1991) 33 FCR 397
Khadri v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2014) 140 ALD 136
SZFOZ v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2007] FCA 1137
Wool International v Sedgwick Ltd (No 2) [1997] FCA 709Date of hearing: 12 November 2015 Place: Sydney Division: GENERAL DIVISION Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 25 Counsel for the Applicant: The applicant appeared in person Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr G Johnson Solicitor for the First Respondent: Sparke Helmore Lawyers Solicitor for the Second Respondent: The second respondent filed a submitting appearance
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
NSD 891 of 2015
BETWEEN: MOHAMAD MOUSSA
ApplicantAND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First RespondentADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
PERRAM J
DATE OF ORDER:
19 NOVEMBER 2015
WHERE MADE:
SYDNEY
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The application be dismissed.
2.The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
NSD 891 of 2015
BETWEEN: MOHAMAD MOUSSA
ApplicantAND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First RespondentADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
PERRAM J
DATE:
19 NOVEMBER 2015
PLACE:
SYDNEY
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Mr Moussa commenced a judicial review proceeding against the Migration Review Tribunal (which is now the Administrative Appeals Tribunal) (‘the Tribunal’) in the Federal Circuit Court by way of an application filed on 7 April 2015. On 16 June 2015 he filed a notice of discontinuance in that Court. The effect of its filing was that that proceeding ceased to exist for most purposes and no longer needed to be dealt with.
On 26 June 2015, that…
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- Case
- [2015] FCA 1280
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issues that the court had to resolve were whether the Federal Circuit Court had erred in dismissing the applicant's application to set aside the notice of discontinuance, and whether the application for leave to appeal lacked utility as it was made out of time and the application to the Tribunal was also out of time. The court examined the principles relevant to the jurisdiction to set aside a notice of discontinuance and the criteria for granting leave to appeal. The court also considered the utility of the application, particularly in light of the applicant's failure to lodge a timely application with the Tribunal.
In its decision, the court held that the Federal Circuit Court had not erred in dismissing the application to set aside the notice of discontinuance. The court found that the principles relevant to setting aside a notice of discontinuance had not been engaged, and the application did not meet the criteria for leave to appeal. The court also concluded that the application lacked utility, given that the applicant had failed to make a timely application to the Tribunal. The court dismissed the application and ordered the applicant to pay the costs of the first respondent.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The application be dismissed.
2. The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
The matter came before the Federal Court on an application for an extension of time and leave to appeal from a decision of the Federal Circuit Court. The Federal Circuit Court had dismissed Mr Moussa's application to set aside a notice of discontinuance, which was related to his removal order. Mr Moussa had sought relief from the Federal Circuit Court but was unsuccessful. He then applied to the Federal Court to appeal the decision, arguing that the Federal Circuit Court's decision was incorrect. This application was made out of time, complicating the proceedings. The Federal Court considered whether it had the jurisdiction to set aside the notice of discontinuance and whether the application lacked utility due to its timeliness.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether the dismissing of the application to set aside the notice of discontinuance was attended by error.
2. What are the principles relevant to the jurisdiction to set aside a notice of discontinuance.
3. Whether the application lacked utility where the application to the Tribunal was made out of time.
Held
1. The court concluded that the dismissing of the application to set aside the notice of discontinuance was not attended by error.
2. The court outlined the principles relevant to the jurisdiction to set aside a notice of discontinuance, finding that the applicant had not demonstrated a sufficient basis for setting aside the notice.
3. The court held that the application lacked utility as the application to the Tribunal was made out of time.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The court began by examining the circumstances under which the application to set aside the notice of discontinuance was dismissed. It noted that the application was made outside the relevant time limits and that the applicant had not provided a satisfactory explanation for the delay. The court held that there was no error in the dismissal of the application as the applicant had not demonstrated a sufficient basis for setting aside the notice of discontinuance.
In relation to the principles relevant to the jurisdiction to set aside a notice of discontinuance, the court referred to prior authority which held that such an application is subject to the court's discretion and that the applicant must demonstrate a sufficient basis for setting aside the notice. The court found that the applicant had not met this threshold and that the application lacked utility.
The court further noted that the application to the Tribunal was also made out of time and that the applicant had not provided a satisfactory explanation for this delay. The court held that the application lacked utility as it was not likely to succeed and that there were no exceptional circumstances that would warrant setting aside the notice of discontinuance. The court also referred to prior authority which held that applications made out of time are generally not considered unless there are exceptional circumstances.
In summary, the court held that the dismissing of the application to set aside the notice of discontinuance was not attended by error, that the principles relevant to the jurisdiction to set aside a notice of discontinuance were correctly applied, and that the application lacked utility as it was made out of time. The binding legal principle established by the decision is that applications to set aside a notice of discontinuance are subject to the court's discretion and that the applicant must demonstrate a sufficient basis for setting aside the notice. The court followed prior authority in applying these principles to the facts of the case.