Moussa v Minister for Immigration
[2017] FCCA 1678
•21 July 2017
FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| MOUSSA v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION | [2017] FCCA 1678 |
| Catchwords: PRACTICE & PROCEDURE – Application in a Case for adjournment of final hearing – application for an adjournment refused – Application in a Case dismissed. |
| Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss.48, 476 Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth), reg.2.12, sch.1 item 1124B, 1214C, sch.2 cl.801.221 |
| Cases cited: Moussa v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2015] FCCA 1879 Moussa v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 1280 |
| Applicant: | MOHAMAD MOUSSA |
| Respondent: | MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION |
| File Number: | SYG 3537 of 2015 |
| Judgment of: | Judge Nicholls |
| Hearing date: | 7 April 2017 |
| Date of Last Submission: | 7 April 2017 |
| Delivered at: | Sydney |
| Delivered on: | 21 July 2017 |
REPRESENTATION
| Applicant: | In person |
| Counsel for the Respondent: | Ms R Francois |
| Solicitors for the Respondent: | Sparke Helmore Lawyers |
ORDERS
The Application in a Case made on 29 March 2017 is dismissed.
The application made on 30 December 2015 is dismissed.
The applicant pay the respondent’s costs set in the amount of $6,825.
| FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT SYDNEY |
SYG 3537 of 2015
| MOHAMAD MOUSSA |
Applicant
And
| MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION |
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
On 30 December 2015, Mr Mohamad Moussa made an application to this Court pursuant to s.476 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“the Act”) seeking review of the decision made by an officer of the Minister’s department (“the departmental officer”) on 18 December 2015, that a second application for a Partner (Temporary) (Class UK) (subclass 820) visa made by Mr Moussa was not a valid application.
The matter first came before a Registrar of the Court on 3 March 2016. The Registrar made various procedural orders for the progress of the matter before the Court. The applicant was given the opportunity, amongst other matters, to file any evidence by way of affidavit and any amended application.
At the next Court event on 12 May 2016, a Registrar of the Court made orders, amongst other matters, listing the matter for final hearing on 7 April 2017, and orders that directed the applicant to file and serve written submissions on or before 14 days before the date of the final hearing, and the Minister to file and serve written submissions on or before 7 days before the date of the final hearing.
The Minister filed written submissions on 31 March 2017. No written submissions were filed by the applicant within the time provided or after that time. However, on 29 March 2017, the applicant filed an Application in a Case (“AIC”), supported by an affidavit said to have been made by him on 28 March 2017. The AIC, through the affidavit, sought an adjournment of the hearing of his substantive application listed for 7 April 2017. The AIC was set down for hearing before the proposed final hearing on 7 April 2017.
The evidence before the Court is as follows:
a)A bundle of relevant documents filed and tendered by the Minister (“the Court Book” – “CB”, “RE1”).
b)The affidavit of Karwan Ali Eskerie, Solicitor, made on 31 March 2017.
c)The affidavit of the applicant made on 28 March 2017. The applicant was cross-examined (and see further below at [11]).
Background
It is convenient to note the background to this case as set out in the Minister’s written submissions. The applicant did not disagree with the facts and chronological details set out there. I accept that they are an accurate outline of the relevant background as derived from the Court Book. The relevant paragraphs are as follows ([3] – [14] of the Minister’s written submissions):
“[3] The applicant is a 34 year old male from Lebanon (CB 1), who arrived in Australia on 20 December 2011 on a subclass
TU-573 visa which was cancelled on 28 December 2012 (CB 44).
[4] On or about 28 August 2014, the applicant first applied for a Partner (Temporary) (class UK) (subclass 820)/Partner (Residence) (class BS) (subclass 801) visa (CB 36, 1 to 34).
[5] On 24 October 2014, a delegate of the Minister refused the application on the basis the applicant did not meet the requirements of criterion 3001 because his application was not made within 28 days after he last held a substantive visa and there were no compelling reasons not to apply that criterion (CB 40 to 57 at 45 - 47).
[6] On 19 November 2014, the applicant lodged an application for review of that decision with the then Migration Review Tribunal (CB 58 to 60).
[7] On 30 January 2015, the Tribunal determined that it had no jurisdiction to hear the application as it was not lodged within the time required under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (Act) and the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) (Regulations) (CB 66 – 67).
[8] On 7 April 2015, the applicant filed an application in the Federal Circuit Court for judicial review of the Tribunal’s decision which was itself filed 32 days outside the time limit prescribed by section 477 of the Act.
[9] On 16 June 2015, the applicant filed a Notice of Discontinuance.
[10] On 26 June 2015, the applicant filed an Application in a Case seeking to reopen his application for judicial review.
[11] On 9 July 2015, that application was dismissed: Moussa v MIBP [2015] FCCA 1879.
[12] On 30 July 2015, the applicant filed an application in the Federal Court seeking an extension of time and leave to appeal from the dismissal of his application.
[13] On 19 November 2015, that application was also dismissed: Moussa v MIBP [2015] FCA 1280.
[14] On 16 December 2015, the applicant made his second application for the Partner (Temporary) (class UK) (subclass 820)/Partner (Residence) (class BS) (subclass 801) visa. The Minister’s department does not have a copy of that application as it was returned to the applicant once it was determined to be invalid: see Affidavit of Mr Eskerie of 31 March 2017.”
The Applications Before the Court
At the hearing of the AIC, the applicant appeared in person. He was assisted by an interpreter in the Arabic language. He handed up written submissions in support of the AIC. He did not hand up any written submissions in support of the substantive application.
In essence, the applicant’s position before the Court was that he should be granted the adjournment because he and his wife were assisting the Federal Police (see further below at [13]) in a matter of “fraud”, involving his former migration agent. The Minister opposed the AIC. The Minister further sought that the substantive application be dismissed because it did not reveal legal error in the departmental officer’s determination.
The hearing proceeded on the basis that I would hear evidence and argument in relation to the AIC, and then the substantive application. The parties agreed that if an adjournment were to be granted, the Court would call the parties back before the Court to determine the future course of the case. If however, the adjournment was not to be granted, the Court would proceed to final judgment in relation to the substantive application, and deal with both the AIC and the substantive application in the one judgment.
For the reasons that follow, the orders sought in the AIC should not be granted, and the substantive application should be dismissed, as it does not reveal jurisdictional error on the part of the departmental officer.
The applicant’s affidavit of 28 March 2017 was read into evidence (notwithstanding some difficulties, for example there was no interpreter’s jurat). The Minister objected to the fourth sentence of [2] (of the affidavit of the applicant of 28 March 2017), as it did not contain evidence, but it was put by the Minister, and accepted by the Court, that that sentence should be treated as the applicant’s submission.
The applicant was cross-examined on his affidavit. His evidence was that he did not understand all of the contents of the affidavit which is in English, and which was “typed up” by his wife. In light of this, the interpreter translated for him the contents of his affidavit. The applicant confirmed that that was the evidence he wanted to give to the Court.
Before the Court, the applicant’s evidence was that he was working with the Federal Police who were investigating a migration agent whom he and his wife had engaged to assist with his “first” partner visa application. In the circumstances, it was apparent that the applicant meant to refer to the New South Wales (NSW) Police Force (see the affidavit of the applicant of 28 March 2017 and the relevant “attachment”).
The applicant’s evidence was that the migration agent was “currently being charged for several offences including fraud”. The applicant asserted that while his wife had already given a statement to police, he was due to give his “statement” in the “upcoming weeks”. He then asked the Court to allow him to “finalise matters” with the “NSW Police Force”, which would result in “stronger evidence” for his case before the Court (see [2] of the affidavit of the applicant of 28 March 2017).
Attached to the applicant’s affidavit of 28 March 2017 is a “To whom it may concern” letter, from a person who described herself as a “Detective Senior Constable” with the “Sydney City Detectives”. A copy of the letter, produced to the Court, purports to be a document with a “New South Wales Police Force” letterhead and dated 22 March 2017.
The applicant’s evidence was that he obtained the letter from the (NSW) police so that he could show the Court that he was assisting the (NSW) police in this matter. In oral evidence, the applicant made reference to “final papers” that he hoped to obtain from the (NSW) police in the future. This was not explained by the applicant, but in context, it was reasonable to see that the applicant was hoping for some outcome of the charges that would show that he had been affected by the conduct of a migration agent, who had engaged in fraud. That is, a migration agent who had engaged in some fraudulent conduct as a migration agent. In essence, the basis of his complaint to the (NSW) police was that the migration agent had “forged” his signature on some unidentified document, or documents, presumably relevant to his “first” visa application.
In essence, the applicant’s evidence, it must be said, as best as it could be understood, was that he was required to make the application for the visa (on the “first” occasion) within a certain period. His application was late. The migration agent provided an explanation by way of documents that the migration agent had signed “for” the applicant, that asserted that the application was late because the applicant had chickenpox. The applicant’s evidence was that this was not true and that he “did not know anything” about what the migration agent had submitted in those documents.
As set out above (see [6]), the applicant had previously made an application to this Court seeking judicial review in relation to the refusal to grant him a visa. This was on the “first” occasion that he had made such an application. That matter was heard by Judge Street (Moussa v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2015] FCCA 1879 (“Moussa”)).
The applicant gave evidence now, that “at that time”, that is, prior to, and on or about, the time of that application to the Court, he consulted lawyers who told him “[t]he case is not guaranteed”, but that “they didn’t tell … [him] not to continue” the proceedings before Judge Street. Before Judge Street, the applicant gave evidence that he filed a Notice of Discontinuance, and prior to this “had consulted a number of lawyers” (see Moussa at [5]).
There appears to be some discrepancy between what Judge Street recorded in his judgment as to what the applicant said he was told by the “lawyers” (that he was advised not to continue his application before the Court), and the applicant’s evidence now, that he was told that a successful outcome was “not guaranteed”, but that, in essence, he should continue his case before the Court.
What emerges though (on the applicant’s evidence), is that the applicant had sought judicial review in relation to a Tribunal decision concerning his “first” application for a visa. He consulted lawyers and then filed a Notice of Discontinuance. He then sought an order before Judge Street to withdraw the Notice of Discontinuance.
Judge Street’s judgment also records that the applicant told the Court that in relation to his “first” visa application, an email dated 22 December 2014 and sent to the Tribunal in which the Tribunal was told he was late in lodging his application for the visa because of chickenpox, was not true, and the applicant had “no knowledge” of it (Moussa at [4] and [6] and see [5] at CB 67).
Further, he told the Court that an affidavit purportedly sworn on 7 April 2014, contained a signature which purported to be his signature, but was in fact not his signature (Moussa at [7]).
The applicant agreed before the Court now, that the email of 22 December 2014, and the “forged” signature on the affidavit of 7 April 2014, were the two matters identified before Judge Street as being “false” and “fabricated”, in relation to his “first” visa application (and subsequent matters before Judge Street and on appeal from His Honour’s judgment).
The applicant now seeks an adjournment of the hearing of his current matter in relation to his “second” visa application, which was made on 16 December 2015, and in respect of which the applicant was notified on 18 December 2015 by a departmental officer that the application was not a valid application for a visa.
It is clear from the applicant’s evidence that no fraud, or indeed any other misconduct, is being alleged by the applicant in relation to the “second” visa application. The allegations of fraud, and the matter that is now under investigation by the NSW Police Force, all relate to the “first” visa application that was before Judge Street. This is also in the context of the setting aside of a Notice of Discontinuance in relation to that judicial review application, which followed an unfavourable decision of the former Migration Review Tribunal (now the Administrative Appeals Tribunal).
I accept that the applicant sees his various efforts to obtain a visa to be part of one interrelated exercise. However, the only issue properly before this Court now, is whether the departmental officer’s decision of 18 December 2015 that the applicant’s application for the visa made on 16 December 2015 was not valid, is affected by legal error.
No fraud is alleged in relation to the making of the “second” visa application, nor the decision of the departmental officer regarding that application. In this light, even if the Court were to await the results of the NSW Police Force investigation into the alleged fraud in relation to the “first” visa application, it cannot assist the applicant in establishing that fraud vitiated the departmental officer’s determination regarding the “second” visa application, the subject of proceedings before the Court now.
This is so, in circumstances where the matter of fraud as it related to the “first” application for the visa was raised, and considered, by this Court in previous, and concluded, proceedings. This Court’s judgment in that matter was also the subject of an unsuccessful application for leave to appeal to the Federal Court (Moussa v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 1280). For these reasons, the “application” to adjourn the hearing of the current, and separate, proceedings is refused.
This leaves the question of whether there is any legal error in the determination of the departmental officer of 18 December 2015, that the visa application made on 16 December 2015 was not valid.
The grounds of the application to the Court are in the following terms:
“1. The Department of Immigration failed to lift the s.48 bar as in Schedule 1, item 1124B(3)(e).
2. The application be allowed on the basis that on the materials before the Department of Immigration and Border Protection, there was not (clear) evidence to establish, on the balance of probabilities that the applicant did not meet s.48 of the Migration Act and that he is not permitted to apply for a partner visa even though the applicant does not hold a substantive visa.
3. The Department of Immigration and Border Protection erred in law by ignoring the circumstances of the applicant and his wife who for circumstances beyond their control, the first application was refused and that the new application is based on same sponsor and that there are compelling and compassionate circumstances which were ignored by the Department of Immigration.
4. The Department of Immigration erred by asking to depart Australia and apply for a visa outside Australia while the Migration Act allows married people to apply within Australia and pay the prescribed fee because s.48 of the Migration Act does not prevent a couple who have long term relationship to apply for a visa while in Australia.”
Before the Court, the applicant stated that his wife, who had assisted him in drafting the grounds and had a good command of English, could explain the grounds (see further below). The applicant’s wife was granted leave to speak on his behalf for this purpose.
Before addressing the grounds of the substantive application to the Court, it is important to note the relevant statutory and regulatory scheme and how it applies to the applicant’s circumstances.
There is no dispute that s.48(1) of the Act applies to the applicant’s circumstances. At the relevant time, that provision was in the following terms:
“Section 48
Non-citizen refused a visa or whose visa cancelled may only apply for particular visas
(1) A non-citizen in the migration zone who:
(a) does not hold a substantive visa; and
(b) after last entering Australia:
(i) was refused a visa, other than a refusal of a bridging visa or a refusal under section 501, 501A or 501B, for which the non-citizen had applied (whether or not the application has been finally determined); or
(ii) held a visa that was cancelled under section 109 (incorrect information), 116 (general power to cancel), 133A (Minister’s personal powers to cancel visas on section 109 grounds), 133C (Minister’s personal powers to cancel visas on section 116 grounds), 134 (business visas), 137J (student visas) or 137Q (regional sponsored employment visas);
may, subject to the regulations, apply for a visa of a class prescribed for the purposes of this section, or have an application for such a visa made on his or her behalf, but not for a visa of any other class.”
On the background facts presented (about which there was no dispute), the applicant did not, at the time of making his “second” visa application to the Minister’s department, hold a substantive visa (s.48(1)(a) of the Act), and had been refused a visa after last entering Australia which was not a visa referred to at s.48(b)(i) of the Act (s.48(1)(b)(ii) of the Act does not apply).
A person who is caught by what is set out in s.48(1)(a) and (b) of the Act may still validly apply for a visa in certain circumstances. That is, if a class of visa for which the applicant applied provides, for the purposes of s.48 of the Act, that such an application may be made.
For the purposes of s.48 of the Act, reg.2.12 of the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) (“the Regulations”) prescribes the Partner (Temporary) (Class UK) and Partner (Residence) (Class BS) visas. These are the visa subclasses for which the applicant applied on 16 December 2015.
However, it is also clear that under s.48 of the Act, such an application, to be valid, must be made “subject to the regulations” (see s.48(1) and s.48(1A) of the Act).
Relevantly, Schedule 1 to the Regulations provides the criteria for making a valid visa application. Of these criteria, items 1124B and item 1214C are relevant to the current circumstances.
At the relevant time, item 1124B(3)(e)(i)(H) and (K) were in the following terms:
“1124B. Partner (Residence) (Class BS)
…
(3) Other:
(e) Subject to subitem (3A), if the applicant is a person to whom section 48 of the Act applies, the applicant:
(i) must not have been refused any of the following visas since last entering Australia:
(H) a Subclass 801 (Partner) visa;
…
(K) a Subclass 820 (Partner) visa.”
At the relevant time, item 1214C(3)(a) was in the following terms:
“1214C. Partner (Temporary) (Class UK)
…
(3) Other:
(a) Application must be made at the same time and place as an application for a Partner (Residence) (Class BS) visa.”
As can be seen above, item 1124B(3)(e)(i)(H) and (K) of Schedule 1 to the Regulations (as they relate to a Partner (Residence) (Class BS) (subclass 801) visa and Partner (Temporary) (Class UK) (subclass 820) visa respectively), required that if s.48 of the Act applied, the applicant for the Partner (Residence) (Class BS) (subclass 801) visa (as in the current case), must not have been previously refused a Partner (Residence) (Class BS) (subclass 801) visa or a Partner (Temporary) (Class UK) (subclass 820) visa.
In the current case, and on the evidence before the Court, the applicant had previously been refused a Partner (Temporary) (Class UK) (subclass 820) visa and a Partner (Residence) (Class BS) (subclass 801) visa. He was notified of this by letter dated 24 October 2014 (CB 40). In this circumstance, the applicant could not satisfy item 1124B(3)(e)(i)(H) or (K) of Schedule 1 to the Regulations.
As can be seen above, pursuant to item 1214C(3)(a) of Schedule 1 to the Regulations, an applicant for the Partner (Temporary) (Class UK) (subclass 820) visa (as in the current case), must also have made the application for the Partner (Residence) (Class BS) (subclass 801) visa at the same time.
The applicant could not satisfy item 1214C(3)(a) of Schedule 1 to the Regulations, as he could not make a valid application for the Partner (Residence) (Class BS) (subclass 801) visa at the same time as he made the application for the Partner (Temporary) (Class UK) (subclass 820) visa (see further below).
The reason given by the departmental officer for the determination that the application of 18 December 2015 was not a valid application was “because it did not meet section 48 of the Migration Act”. The brief explanation also makes reference to the applicant not holding a substantive visa, and that he had been “refused [a] Partner Combined (Full Fee) (UK 820/BS801) visa” (see CB 68.6).
It must be said that the explanation given by the departmental officer is not clear. The Minister’s counsel, properly in my view, in an understated fashion, described the “decision” record as not being a “model” of decision-making.
However, I ultimately agree with the Minister that however the reasoning is expressed, the issue for the Court now is whether the ultimate determination by the departmental officer that the application was not valid, was correct or not. The answer to that question lays in the application of the undisputed facts as they arise from the applicant’s circumstances, to the proper understanding of the relevant statutory construction as set out above.
On what is set out above, the “bar”, as set out at s.48 of the Act, to the making of a valid application for a visa in December 2015, applied to the applicant’s circumstances. Therefore, for that application to have been valid, it was necessary for it to meet the two relevant matters as set out at item 1124B and item 1214C of Schedule 1 to the Regulations (see [40] and [41] above).
The applicant was a person to whom s.48 of the Act applied. Since his last entry into Australia, the applicant had been refused a Partner (Temporary) (Class UK) (subclass 820) and Partner (Residence) (Class BS) (subclass 801) visa. For the reasons set out above, the applicant does not satisfy item 1124B of Schedule 1 to the Regulations.
Further, in the circumstances, the applicant cannot satisfy (as he must for the application of 16 December 2015 to be valid) item 1214C(3)(a) of Schedule 1 to the Regulations, because he could not make a “valid” application for the Partner (Residence) (Class BS) (subclass 801) visa at the same time as he made the application for the Partner (Temporary) (Class UK) (subclass 820) visa.
It is the case that item 1214C(3)(a) of Schedule 1 to the Regulations does not use the qualification “valid”, to describe the “application” as that word appears in that item (see [41] above). However, in my view, having regard to the entirety of the relevant statutory and regulatory scheme, to read this item as allowing both a valid and invalid application to satisfy the criteria would defeat the very purpose of that scheme, as it relates to partner visas.
The relevant statutory and regulatory scheme creates two related partner visas. The Partner (Temporary) (Class UK) (subclass 820) and Partner (Residence) (Class BS) (subclass 801) visa. Section 48 of the Act relevantly provides for the limited circumstances in which an applicant who does not hold a substantive visa (as in the current case, and see s.48(1)(a) of the Act), and who was refused a visa (as in the current case, and see s.48(1)(b)(i) of the Act), may nevertheless apply for another visa.
Those “limited” circumstances are set out at item 1124B and item 1214C of Schedule 1 to the Regulations. Item 1124B relates to a Partner (Residence) (Class BS) (subclass 801) visa and item 1214C relates to a Partner (Temporary) (Class UK) (subclass 820) visa. To be granted a Partner (Residence) (Class BS) (subclass 801) visa, an applicant must be the holder of a Partner (Temporary) (Class UK) (subclass 820) visa (see cls.801.221(1) and 801.221(2)(a) of Schedule 2 to the Regulations).
In short, an applicant must apply for, and be granted, a Partner (Temporary) (Class UK) (subclass 820) and be the holder of such a visa at the time of the grant of the Partner (Residence) (Class BS) (subclass 801) visa. The relevant scheme envisages this “two-part” process.
Item 1214C requires that an application for a Partner (Temporary) (Class UK) (subclass 820) visa must be made at the same time and place as an application for a Partner (Residence) (Class BS) (subclass 801) visa (see item 1214C(3)(a) of Schedule 1 to the Regulations and [41] above).
In my view, this requirement has the effect of ensuring that in this “two-part” scheme, the Partner (Temporary) (Class UK) (subclass 820) visa, and the application for it, is limited to, and is dependent upon, also applying for the Partner (Residence) (Class BS) (subclass 801) visa, albeit, it may be granted at some time in the future.
An applicant for a Partner (Residence) (Class BS) (subclass 801) visa cannot be granted such a visa unless a valid application for that visa has been made. Given the relevant scheme, a valid application for such a visa cannot be made if the applicant has been previously refused such a visa while in the migration zone.
Given this, it would defeat the purpose of the relevant scheme if at the time of making an application for the Partner (Temporary) (Class UK) (subclass 820) visa, which must be accompanied by an application for a Partner (Residence) (Class BS) (subclass 801) visa, that the application for the Partner (Residence) (Class BS) (subclass 801) visa could be an invalid application. The scheme can only operate if the applications for both visas (to be made at the same time and the same place, see item 1214C(3)(a) of Schedule 1 to the Regulations), are both valid applications. Thus implicit in item 1214C(3)(a) of Schedule 1 to the Regulations is the requirement that the application for the Partner (Residence) (Class BS) (subclass 801) visa must be a valid application.
Without such satisfaction, the application of 16 December 2015 is not valid. That is, an invalid application for the Partner (Residence) (Class BS) (subclass 801) visa, cannot satisfy the requirement in item 1214C(3)(a) of Schedule 1 to the Regulations.
None of the applicant’s grounds seek to challenge the statutory construction, or show legal error in the consideration that the “second” application was not valid.
Rather, and as the applicant’s wife sought to explain, the real basis of their complaint is that there were “compelling” circumstances in their case which the departmental officer ignored.
There were two such circumstances identified by the applicant’s wife, and further explained by the applicant at the hearing.
The first (with specific regard to grounds two and three) was that they had been the “victims of fraud by the migration agent.” While there was “only a little bit of evidence of this” nonetheless, there was sufficient evidence, in the applicant’s submissions, for the departmental officer in December 2015 to “lift the bar”, and allow the applicant to apply for the partner visa while “onshore” in Australia.
For the reasons set out above, this argument does not reveal that the application of 16 December 2015 was valid. The question of the allegation of fraud as it related to the “first” application, had been raised and addressed by this Court previously.
The second was that for the applicant to obtain a “spouse visa” he would need to leave Australia, return to Lebanon and apply “offshore”. He could not do this, as this would require him to leave his sick wife and baby. He needed to remain in Australia so as to assist his wife.
Whatever the applicant’s circumstances in this regard, and that of his family, it does not assist the applicant in light of the statutory and regulatory requirements set out above. In short, as the Minister’s counsel correctly submitted, “regrettably” for the applicant (and his wife), no question of “compelling” or for that matter “compassionate” circumstances arises in light of the statutory and regulatory scheme.
Conclusion
The visa application of 16 December 2015 was not valid. The AIC should be dismissed. The substantive application to the Court should also be dismissed. I will make the appropriate orders.
I certify that the preceding sixty-eight (68) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Judge Nicholls
Associate:
Date: 21 July 2017
0
2
3