Lendlease Corporation Limited v Pallas

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HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

GAGELER CJ,
GORDON, EDELMAN, STEWARD, GLEESON, JAGOT AND BEECH‑JONES JJ

LENDLEASE CORPORATION LIMITED & ANOR            APPELLANTS

AND

DAVID WILLIAM PALLAS AND JULIE ANN
PALLAS AS TRUSTEES FOR THE PALLAS
FAMILY SUPERANNUATION FUND & ANOR              RESPONDENTS

Lendlease Corporation Limited v Pallas

[2025] HCA 19

Date of Hearing: 5 November 2024
Date of Judgment: 7 May 2025

S108/2024

ORDER

1.Appeal allowed.

2.Set aside the order made by the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales on 17 April 2024 and, in its place, order that the separate question stated by Ball J on 13 September 2023 be answered in the affirmative.

3.Each party's costs of the appeal be its costs in the proceeding in the Supreme Court of New South Wales.

4.The appellants pay the costs of the contradictor in the appeal.

On appeal from the Supreme Court of New South Wales

Representation

E A Collins SC with C G Winnett and B Lambourne for the appellants (instructed by Herbert Smith Freehills)

W A D Edwards KC with R J May for the respondents (instructed by Maurice Blackburn Lawyers)

K C Morgan SC with Z L M Hillman as contradictor (instructed by MinterEllison)

Notice:  This copy of the Court's Reasons for Judgment is subject to formal revision prior to publication in the Commonwealth Law Reports.

  1. In a representative proceeding under Pt 10 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) ("the CPA"), can the Supreme Court of New South Wales make an order under s 175(5) that notice be given to group members of the intention of the defendant (and perhaps the representative plaintiff), if the proceeding is settled, to seek an order that a group member who has neither opted out of the proceeding nor registered to participate in the proceeding shall remain a group member (and whose claims against the defendant will therefore be extinguished by the settlement) but shall not, "without leave of the Court, be permitted to seek any benefit pursuant to any settlement (subject to Court approval) of [the] proceeding that occurs before final judgment"?

  2. The Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales (Bell CJ, Ward P, Gleeson, Leeming and Stern JJA), in answering in the negative a separate question to this effect referred to it for determination, held that the Supreme Court did not have the power to order that such a notice be given.[1] In so holding, their Honours concluded that an earlier decision of the Court of Appeal, Wigmans v AMP Ltd,[2] was not plainly wrong, so its reasoning had to be followed to the effect that the Supreme Court had no power to order the giving of the proposed notice.[3] Their Honours, in consequence, disagreed with the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia (Murphy, Beach and Lee JJ) in Parkin v Boral Ltd[4] that Wigmans v AMP Ltd was plainly wrong.[5] Parkin concerned the materially identical provisions of Pt IVA of the Federal…

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Details
Case
[2025] HCA 19
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The High Court of Australia considered an appeal from the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales concerning a representative proceeding. The dispute arose from the defendant's proposed notice to group members, indicating an intention to seek an order that any group member who had not opted out or registered would remain a group member but would be barred from seeking benefits from a settlement unless granted leave. This would effectively extinguish the claims of unregistered group members in the event of a settlement prior to final judgment. The central question was whether the Supreme Court of New South Wales had the power under s 175(5) of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) to make an order for such a notice to be given.

The legal issues before the High Court involved the interpretation of s 175(5) of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) and its application in the context of representative proceedings. Specifically, the Court had to determine whether this provision empowered the Supreme Court to issue a notice that would inform group members of the defendant's intention to seek an order that could extinguish their claims in a settlement scenario if they had not registered. This required consideration of the Court's power to manage representative proceedings and the potential for conflicts of interest between various parties, including the representative plaintiff, their lawyers, the defendant, and the group members themselves. The Court also had to address the tension between the broad language of s 175(5) and the specific provisions governing representative proceedings, as well as the implications of existing intermediate appellate court authority.

The High Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the order of the Court of Appeal and answering the separate question in the affirmative. The Court reasoned that the potential for inconsistencies of interest between representative parties, their lawyers, and group members is inherent in the statutory scheme for representative proceedings and must be managed by the Court. It distinguished the present case from *BMW Australia Ltd v Brewster*, where a common fund order was deemed outside the scope of s 183 of the CPA because it primarily served the commercial viability of the litigation rather than ensuring a just outcome. In contrast, the proposed notice in this case was considered a measure to manage the proceeding fairly and effectively, consistent with the Court's overarching duty to administer justice. The Court found that s 175(5) provided the necessary power to make the order for the proposed notice, as it was a procedural step aimed at ensuring group members were adequately informed about the potential consequences of their non-participation in the proceeding, thereby facilitating a just resolution.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Appeal allowed.

2. Set aside the order made by the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales on 17 April 2024 and, in its place, order that the separate question stated by Ball J on 13 September 2023 be answered in the affirmative.

3. Each party's costs of the appeal be its costs in the proceeding in the Supreme Court of New South Wales.

4. The appellants pay the costs of the contradictor in the appeal.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

GAGELER CJ, GLEESON AND JAGOT JJ GORDON AND STEWARD JJ BEECH-JONES J
The salient point is this. It is not to be assumed that the interests of a representative plaintiff and the representative plaintiff's lawyers are continuously consistent and congruent throughout a representative proceeding. It is not to be assumed that the interests of a defendant and the defendant's lawyers are continuously consistent and congruent throughout a representative proceeding. It is also not to be assumed that the interests of a representative plaintiff and the representative plaintiff's lawyers, in respect of each step in a representative proceeding, are opposed to the interests of a defendant and the defendant's lawyers in that proceeding. Equally, it is not to be assumed that the interests of a representative plaintiff and the representative plaintiff's lawyers are inconsistent and incongruent with the interests of group members who have neither opted out nor registered their participation in the proceeding. There are potential and actual inconsistencies of interests between all these persons, but those inconsistencies will wax and wane depending on the circumstances. The potential for inconsistencies of interests is inherent in the statutory scheme and is to be managed by the Court in the interests of the administration of justice as they appear in the circumstances of each case.The earlier decisions The principal decision of this Court on which the Court of Appeal relied in support of its reasoning was BMW Australia Ltd v Brewster.[9] In that case, Kiefel CJ, Bell, Keane, Nettle and Gordon JJ held that s 183 of the CPA did not empower the Supreme Court of New South Wales to make an order, early in the representative proceeding, that provided for a litigation funder's remuneration to be fixed as a proportion of any moneys ultimately recovered in the proceeding, for all group members to be proportionately liable for that remuneration, and for that proportionate liability to have priority over all other payments from the moneys so recovered (a "common fund order").[10] Their Honours' reasoning accepted that s 183 of the CPA was expressed in broad terms but considered that, in context, s 183 contemplated the making of any order "to ensure that the proceeding is brought fairly and effectively to a just outcome", and not any order in favour of a third party (the litigation funder) to ensure the proceeding could be pursued.[11] In reaching this conclusion, Kiefel CJ, Bell and Keane JJ: (a) distinguished the concept of an order ensuring justice is done in the representative proceeding (which would be within the scope of s 183 CPA) from an order ensuring the proceeding could be heard and determined as a matter of commercial practicality (which would be outside the scope of s 183 CPA);[12] (b) did not accept that the statutory provisions supported a legislative intention that "maintaining litigation, whatever its ultimate merit or lack thereof, is itself doing justice to the parties";[13] (c) characterised the order sought as one "centrally concerned to determine whether the proceeding is viable at all as a vehicle for the doing of justice between the parties to the proceeding", which was outside the scope of s 183 of the CPA;[14] (d) characterised s 183, in context, as a "supplementary source of power" or a "gap‑filling" provision,[15] which neither performed the same function as other statutory provisions concerning representative proceedings nor "was intended to meet the exigencies of litigation not adverted to at all by those other provisions";[16] (e) considered that the Court attempting to fix a litigation funder's remuneration at an early stage of the representative proceeding would be a "speculative exercise" absent any criteria to enable evaluation of the appropriateness or necessity (or otherwise) of the remuneration rate so fixed;[17] and (f) concluded that the making of such an order at an early stage of the representative proceeding would be inconsistent with the statutory scheme, which contains a provision (namely, s 173 CPA) that "expressly contemplate[s] the making of an order at the conclusion of the proceedings".[18] On this basis, their Honours concluded that construing s 183 as permitting the making of such an order would be to use s 183 "as a vehicle for rewriting the scheme of the legislation".[19][9](2019) 269 CLR 574.[10](2019) 269 CLR 574 at 588 [1], 589 [3], 624 [125], 628 [135]. [11](2019) 269 CLR 574 at 599 [47]. See also 624-625 [125]-[127], 631-632 [146]‑[148].[12](2019) 269 CLR 574 at 600 [49]-[50]. See also 624-625 [125]-[127], 633 [153]. [13](2019) 269 CLR 574 at 601 [52].[14](2019) 269 CLR 574 at 601 [53]. See also 633-634 [154]-[155]. [15](2019) 269 CLR 574 at 603 [60], 605-606 [69]-[70]. See also 624 [124]-[125], 631 [145], 632 [147]. [16](2019) 269 CLR 574 at 603 [60].[17](2019) 269 CLR 574 at 604-605 [66]-[67].[18](2019) 269 CLR 574 at 605 [68]-[69], 607 [75]. See also 624 [124], 630 [141], 632 [147]. [19](2019) 269 CLR 574 at 606 [70].

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: GAGELER CJ, GLEESON AND JAGOT JJ, GORDON AND STEWARD JJ, BEECH-JONES J