HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
GAGELER CJ,
GORDON, EDELMAN, STEWARD, GLEESON, JAGOT AND BEECH‑JONES JJLENDLEASE CORPORATION LIMITED & ANOR APPELLANTS
AND
DAVID WILLIAM PALLAS AND JULIE ANN
PALLAS AS TRUSTEES FOR THE PALLAS
FAMILY SUPERANNUATION FUND & ANOR RESPONDENTSLendlease Corporation Limited v Pallas
[2025] HCA 19
Date of Hearing: 5 November 2024
Date of Judgment: 7 May 2025S108/2024
ORDER
1.Appeal allowed.
2.Set aside the order made by the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales on 17 April 2024 and, in its place, order that the separate question stated by Ball J on 13 September 2023 be answered in the affirmative.
3.Each party's costs of the appeal be its costs in the proceeding in the Supreme Court of New South Wales.
4.The appellants pay the costs of the contradictor in the appeal.
On appeal from the Supreme Court of New South Wales
Representation
E A Collins SC with C G Winnett and B Lambourne for the appellants (instructed by Herbert Smith Freehills)
W A D Edwards KC with R J May for the respondents (instructed by Maurice Blackburn Lawyers)
K C Morgan SC with Z L M Hillman as contradictor (instructed by MinterEllison)
Notice: This copy of the Court's Reasons for Judgment is subject to formal revision prior to publication in the Commonwealth Law Reports.
In a representative proceeding under Pt 10 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) ("the CPA"), can the Supreme Court of New South Wales make an order under s 175(5) that notice be given to group members of the intention of the defendant (and perhaps the representative plaintiff), if the proceeding is settled, to seek an order that a group member who has neither opted out of the proceeding nor registered to participate in the proceeding shall remain a group member (and whose claims against the defendant will therefore be extinguished by the settlement) but shall not, "without leave of the Court, be permitted to seek any benefit pursuant to any settlement (subject to Court approval) of [the] proceeding that occurs before final judgment"?
The Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales (Bell CJ, Ward P, Gleeson, Leeming and Stern JJA), in answering in the negative a separate question to this effect referred to it for determination, held that the Supreme Court did not have the power to order that such a notice be given.[1] In so holding, their Honours concluded that an earlier decision of the Court of Appeal, Wigmans v AMP Ltd,[2] was not plainly wrong, so its reasoning had to be followed to the effect that the Supreme Court had no power to order the giving of the proposed notice.[3] Their Honours, in consequence, disagreed with the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia (Murphy, Beach and Lee JJ) in Parkin v Boral Ltd[4] that Wigmans v AMP Ltd was plainly wrong.[5] Parkin concerned the materially identical provisions of Pt IVA of the Federal…
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- Case
- [2025] HCA 19
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the High Court involved the interpretation of s 175(5) of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) and its application in the context of representative proceedings. Specifically, the Court had to determine whether this provision empowered the Supreme Court to issue a notice that would inform group members of the defendant's intention to seek an order that could extinguish their claims in a settlement scenario if they had not registered. This required consideration of the Court's power to manage representative proceedings and the potential for conflicts of interest between various parties, including the representative plaintiff, their lawyers, the defendant, and the group members themselves. The Court also had to address the tension between the broad language of s 175(5) and the specific provisions governing representative proceedings, as well as the implications of existing intermediate appellate court authority.
The High Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the order of the Court of Appeal and answering the separate question in the affirmative. The Court reasoned that the potential for inconsistencies of interest between representative parties, their lawyers, and group members is inherent in the statutory scheme for representative proceedings and must be managed by the Court. It distinguished the present case from *BMW Australia Ltd v Brewster*, where a common fund order was deemed outside the scope of s 183 of the CPA because it primarily served the commercial viability of the litigation rather than ensuring a just outcome. In contrast, the proposed notice in this case was considered a measure to manage the proceeding fairly and effectively, consistent with the Court's overarching duty to administer justice. The Court found that s 175(5) provided the necessary power to make the order for the proposed notice, as it was a procedural step aimed at ensuring group members were adequately informed about the potential consequences of their non-participation in the proceeding, thereby facilitating a just resolution.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. Appeal allowed.
2. Set aside the order made by the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales on 17 April 2024 and, in its place, order that the separate question stated by Ball J on 13 September 2023 be answered in the affirmative.
3. Each party's costs of the appeal be its costs in the proceeding in the Supreme Court of New South Wales.
4. The appellants pay the costs of the contradictor in the appeal.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by: GAGELER CJ, GLEESON AND JAGOT JJ, GORDON AND STEWARD JJ, BEECH-JONES J