Lamichhane v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs
[2022] FedCFamC2G 251
FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 2)
Lamichhane v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] FedCFamC2G 251
File number: SYG 3462 of 2017 Judgment of: JUDGE KENDALL Date of judgment: 8 April 2022 Catchwords: MIGRATION – Student visa – decision of the Administrative Appeal Tribunal – where the Tribunal found that the applicant was not in the “migration zone” when the application for review was lodged – whether the Tribunal correctly understood and applied s 347 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) when considering whether it had jurisdiction – whether the Tribunal denied the applicant procedural fairness by notifying him of the potential invalidity of his application on the last day that he could lodge a valid application – whether the conduct of the applicant’s representative amounted to a “fraud” on the Tribunal – no jurisdictional error – remittal futile in any event – application dismissed. Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 5, 338, 347, 476 and 494C
Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth), reg 1.10(4) and cl 500.212 in Schedule 2
Cases cited: Ali v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCA 1102
Bala v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCA 600
Beni v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 228
BMY18 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCAFC 189
CAV18 v Minister for Home Affairs [2020] FCA 173
Craig v South Australia (1995) 184 CLR 163
DFQ17 v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2019] FCAFC 64
Minister for Immigration & Border Protection v Singh (2014) 231 FCR 437
Minister for Immigration & Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332
Minister for Immigration & Citizenship v SZLIX [2008] FCAFC
Minister for Immigration & Citizenship v SZMDS (2010) 240 CLR 611
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259
MZAIB v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 1392
SAAP v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs & Anor (2005) 228 CLR 294
Singh v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2020] FCAFC 31
Singh v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2021] FCCA 1426
SZBEL v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2006] HCA 63
SZFDE v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2007] HCA 35
SZRUI v Minister for Immigration, Multicultural Affairs & Citizenship [2013] FCAFC 80
Division: Division 2 General Federal Law Number of paragraphs: 67 Date of hearing: 28 March 2022 Place: Perth Applicant: In person Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr B Wilson Second Respondent: Submitting appearance, save as to costs Solicitor for the Respondents: Sparke Helmore ORDERS
SYG 3462 of 2017 FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)
BETWEEN: BIBEK LAMICHHANE
Applicant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP, MIGRANT SERVICES AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
JUDGE KENDALL
DATE OF ORDER:
8 APRIL 2022
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The application be dismissed.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.05(2)(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.05 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
JUDGE KENDALL:
BACKGROUND
The applicant is a citizen of Nepal (Court Book (“CB”) 2 & 18). He first arrived in Australia in February 2014 as a holder of a student visa (valid until 30 August 2017) (CB 32).
On 4 August 2017, the applicant applied for a Student (Temporary) (Class TU) (Subclass 500) visa (the “visa”) (CB 1-17). In his visa application, the applicant appointed a registered migration agent (the “representative”) as the authorised recipient of any correspondence from the then Department of Immigration and Border Protection (the “Department”) (CB 5).
On 12 September 2017, a delegate of the first respondent (the “Minister”) refused to grant the applicant the visa (CB 30-35). The delegate was not satisfied the applicant had a “genuine intention to stay temporarily in Australia” and thus did not meet the requirements of cl 500.212 in Schedule 2 of the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) (CB 35).
On 12 September 2017, the applicant (through his representative) was notified of the delegate’s decision by email (CB 25-29).
On 13 September 2017, the applicant left Australia to attend his brother’s graduation ceremony in Japan. He did not return to Australia until 3 October 2017 (CB 52, affidavit of Annabelle Victoria Jean Wilford (the “AVJW affidavit”), p 4).
On 15 September 2017, the applicant (who was outside of Australia at the time) applied (through his representative) for a review of the delegate’s decision at the Administrative Appeal Tribunal (the “Tribunal”) (CB 36-46). The applicant nominated his representative to act on his behalf in relation to that review (CB 42).
On 3 October 2017, the Tribunal invited the applicant (via email sent to the applicant’s representative) to comment on adverse information – namely that the applicant was not physically present in the “migration zone” at the time his application for review was lodged with the Tribunal (CB 47-49).
That covering email (also dated 3 October 2017) noted that the last date on which the applicant could lodge another (valid) application for review was 3 October 2017. The email provided as follows (in bold typeface) (CB 47):
Note that today (3 October 2017) is the last day to lodge a valid application for review. If you wish to lodge another application and pay a new application fee, you need to do so today.
The applicant’s representative did not respond to the invitation until 17 October 2017. On that date, the applicant’s representative forwarded a written statement from the applicant (dated 16 October 2017) (CB 50-52) which, relevantly, stated that (CB 52):
(a)the applicant had travelled to Japan to attend a “convocation ceremony”;
(b)he had received the Tribunal's invitation “very late” and on “the very last day to lodge another review application”; and
(c)he had only arrived back in Australia on 3 October 2017 – meaning that he could not make another application even if he had wanted to because he was “outside of country for the entire period” within which he was required to lodge a further application.
On 19 October 2017, the Tribunal found that it had no jurisdiction to determine the application for review because the applicant was not in the “migration zone” at the time his application was lodged at the Tribunal (CB 57-58).
On 13 November 2017, the applicant applied to this Court for judicial review of the Tribunal’s decision. The application is brought pursuant to s 476 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the “Act”). To obtain assistance from this Court, the applicant must show that the Tribunal has fallen into jurisdictional error.
THE TRIBUNAL’S DECISION
The Tribunal’s decision is one page long and spans seven paragraphs. In full, it provides:
APPLICATION FOR REVIEW
1.An application has been lodged for review of a decision of a delegate of the Minister for Immigration, dated 12 September 2017, to refuse to grant a Student (Temporary) (Class TU) visa under s.65 of the Migration Act 1958 (the Act). This decision is reviewable under s.338(2) of the Act.
2.The review application was lodged with the Tribunal on 15 September 2017. For the following reasons, the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to review the decision as the application was not made in accordance with the relevant legislation.
3.Section 347(2) of the Act specifies who has the right to apply for review of a decision that is reviewable under Part 5 of the Act. In the case of a decision described in s.338(2), an application for review may only be made by the non-citizen who is the subject of the decision and is physically present in the migration zone when the application for review is made: s.347(2)(a) and (3). ‘Migration zone’ is defined in s.5(1) of the Act and generally speaking means the Australian States and Territories.
4.The Tribunal wrote to the applicant on 3 October 2017 advising him that at the time he lodged his application for review he was not in the migration zone. He was also advised by the Tribunal, on 3 October 2017, that it was last day for him to lodge a valid application for review. The applicant responded stating that he departed Australia on 13 September 2017 in order to attend his brother's wedding in Japan. He requested the Tribunal provide him with the opportunity to declare his application valid.
5.The Department's movement records show the applicant departed Australia on 13 September 2017. He returned to Australia on 3 October 2017. He was absent from Australia at the time of application for review of the decision, to refuse to grant the applicant a Student (Temporary) (Class TU) visa.
6.The Tribunal finds that the applicant was not in the migration zone at the relevant time. As such, the application for review is not an application properly made under s.347 and it follows that the Tribunal does not have jurisdiction in this matter.
DECISION
7. The Tribunal does not have jurisdiction in this matter.
PROCEEDING IN THIS COURT
The application for judicial review filed by the applicant on 13 November 2017 provides two grounds of review, as follows (without alteration):
1.I applied for Student Visa with Department of Immigration and Border Protection on 4 August 2017. DIBP refused my application on 12 September 2017. DIBP rejected my application stating I do not have genuine intention to study. However, I have been studying and getting qualification on time.
2.I applied for review with AAT on 15 September 2017. AAT refused to take my application as I was in off-shore. I had to go to Japan to attend my own brother’s convocation ceremony. I requested AAT to wait for the decision until I return back but refused. I was not given enough time to lodge another valid application.
The applicant repeats these grounds of review in an affidavit affirmed and filed by him on 13 November 2017, in support of his application for review.
The applicant was given an opportunity to file an amended application, any affidavit evidence and written submissions. No further materials were filed.
The materials before this Court thus include the application for judicial review and supporting affidavit, both filed by the applicant on 13 November 2017, a Court Book numbering 58 pages (marked as Exhibit 1), an affidavit of Lauren Ashworth affirmed and filed on 19 March 2018, an affidavit of Annabelle Victoria Jean Wilford affirmed on 21 December 2021 and filed on 22 December 2021 and written submission filed by the Minister on 24 January 2022.
The applicant appeared before the Court without legal representation. The Court confirmed with him that he had copies of the Court Book, the affidavits of Lauren Ashworth and Annabelle Victoria Jean Wilford and the Minister’s written submissions.
Noting that the applicant was unrepresented, the Court gave him an opportunity to elaborate on, and further particularise, his grounds of review and to explain to the Court if there was anything else he thought that the Tribunal “did wrong” in relation to his matter. This is the standard procedure in this Court following the decision in Bala v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCA 600 at [7].
To assist the applicant, the Court explained to him that this Court can only turn its attention to the issue of jurisdictional error in the Tribunal’s decision. The Court explained that the possible categories of jurisdictional error are not exhaustive and sometimes overlap. For migration decisions of this sort, however, they most commonly include (but are not limited to) the following categories:
(a)where the decision-maker identifies the wrong issue or asks the wrong question: Craig v South Australia (1995) 184 CLR 163 (“Craig”) at 198;
(b)where the decision-maker ignores relevant materials: Craig at 198;
(c)where the decision-maker relies on irrelevant materials: Craig at 198;
(d)where the decision-maker fails to follow mandatory procedures: SAAP v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs & Anor (2005) 228 CLR 294 at [207]-[208];
(e)where the decision-maker shows actual or apprehended bias: SZRUI v Minister for Immigration, Multicultural Affairs & Citizenship [2013] FCAFC 80 at [2]; and
(f)where the decision is illogical, irrational or unreasonable: Minister for Immigration & Citizenship v SZMDS (2010) 240 CLR 611 at [131]; Minister for Immigration & Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332 at [26]-[28]; Minister for Immigration & Border Protection v Singh (2014) 231 FCR 437 at [44].
The Court also explained that it cannot review the merits of the Tribunal’s decision or grant the applicant the visa that he seeks. Rather, the role of the Court is restricted to determining whether the Tribunal made a material error in arriving at the decision that it had no jurisdiction to determine the matter: Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259 at 272.
Against this background, the applicant explained that he had asked his migration agent to ensure that all documentation was filed on time (and while the applicant was in Australia) but that his migration agent had “failed to do so”. This issue will be discussed below.
CONSIDERATION
Grounds of review
In its duty to assist self-represented litigants, the Court has assessed the applicant’s grounds of review as broadly as possible to ensure that, to the extent that any possible legal error is identified, it can be scrutinised: MZAIB v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 1392.
Ground 1
For ease of reference, ground 1 provides:
I applied for Student Visa with Department of Immigration and Border Protection on 4 August 2017. DIBP refused my application on 12 September 2017. DIBP rejected my application stating I do not have genuine intention to study. However, I have been studying and getting qualification on time.
Ground 1 does not relate to judicial review of the Tribunal’s decision. The concerns raised do no more than express disagreement with the delegate’s decision in relation to the genuine temporary entrant criterion outlined in cl 500.212 in Schedule 2 of the Regulations.
This Court has no jurisdiction in relation to the delegate’s decision: ss 476(2) and (4) of the Act. That decision is a primary decision (within the meaning of s 476(2)(a) of the Act). As such, it is not subject to judicial review by this Court: ss 476(2) and (4) of the Act.
No error arises in this regard and ground 1 is, accordingly, dismissed.
Ground 2
For ease of reference, ground 2 provides:
I applied for review with AAT on 15 September 2017. AAT refused to take my application as I was in [sic] off-shore. I had to go to Japan to attend my own brother's convocation ceremony. I requested AAT to wait for the decision until I return back but refused. I was not given enough time to lodge another valid application.
Ground 2 arguably takes issue with the Tribunal’s ultimate decision that it had no jurisdiction to hear the applicant’s case. It also seems to suggest “unfairness” in relation to the fact that the Tribunal did not give the applicant additional time within which to file a “valid” application.
The applicant was in Australia at the time he lodged his visa application (being on 4 August 2017). Section 338(2) of the Act thus applies.
Where s 338(2) of the Act applies, an application for review must satisfy the strict requirements set out in s 347 of the Act.
Section 347 of the Act relevantly provides:
347 Application for review of Part 5-reviewable decisions
(1) An application for review of a Part 5-reviewable decision must:
(a) be made in the approved form; and
(b)be given to the Tribunal within the prescribed period, being a period ending not later than:
(i)if the Part 5-reviewable decision is covered by subsection 338(2), (3), (3A), (4) or (7A)—28 days after the notification of the decision; or
…
(c) be accompanied by the prescribed fee (if any).
(2) An application for review may only be made by:
(a)if the Part 5‑reviewable decision is covered by subsection 338(2), (3), (3A), (4) or (7A)—the non‑citizen who is the subject of that decision; or
…
(3)If the Part 5‑reviewable decision was covered by subsection 338(2), (3), (3A) or (4), an application for review may only be made by a non‑citizen who is physically present in the migration zone when the application for review is made.
If an applicant does not satisfy all of the requirements (outlined above), the Tribunal will not have jurisdiction to hear an application for review.
In his application to the Tribunal (and based on the materials before the Court), the applicant:
(a)used the correct form (CB 36-46): s 347(1)(a) of the Act;
(b)applied within the prescribed 21 day period (CB 39 & 42-45): s 347(1)(b) of the Act; and
(c)had standing to bring the application for review as he was the non-citizen the subject of the review (CB 36): s 347(2)(a) of the Act.
Further, the Court accepts that the applicant had paid the correct application fee in accordance with s 347(1)(1)(c) of the Act (noting that in the letter dated 20 October 2017 notifying the applicant’s representative of its decision, the Tribunal confirmed that the “$1731 review application fee will also be refunded” (CB 55).
Critically, the final requirement found in s 347(3) provides as follows (emphasis added):
If the Part 5-reviewable decision was covered by subsection 338(2), (3), (3A) or (4), an application for review may only be made by a non-citizen who is physically present in the migration zone when the application for review is made.
As the Tribunal noted in its decision (at [3]), the phrase “migration zone” is defined in s 5(1) of the Act and is generally taken to refer to the “Australian States and Territories”.
It is not disputed that the applicant was not in the “migration zone” when he applied to the Tribunal for a review of the delegate’s decision. The evidence before the Court confirms that the applicant left Australia on 13 September 2017 and returned on 3 October 2017 (CB 52, AVJW affidavit, p 4).
The application for review was lodged with the Tribunal on 15 September 2017. The applicant was in Japan on that date. As such, the requirements of s 347(3) of the Act were not satisfied.
In the circumstances, the Tribunal made the only decision open to it.
Here, there was no application before the Tribunal that “engaged” the Tribunal’s jurisdiction. Once it was clear that the application had been filed while the applicant was “off-shore”, the Tribunal lacked a “valid” application about which no further determinations could be made.
In relation to any natural justice or procedural fairness concerns raised by the applicant, the Court notes as follows.
In circumstances such as these (where a valid application has not been filed within the relevant statutory time period), the Tribunal has no power or any discretion to extend the time period – regardless of the reasons for the invalidity. As explained in Singh v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2021] FCCA 1426 at [71] (affirming the decision in Beni v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 228) (emphasis added):
The more recent decision of the Full Court in Beni Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 228 is consistent with the relevant reasoning in the above cases. That decision arose out of a decision by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT), and, in turn, this Court, that the AAT had no jurisdiction to determine an application for review of a decision by a delegate to refuse a visa made out of the time prescribed by s 347(1)(b). Amongst other things, broadly speaking, that decision concerned whether amendments to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) had the consequence that that the AAT had power to extend the relevant time. The relevant amendments were not in force at times relevant to the instant case. In any event, the Full Court held that they were not effective to extend the relevant time.
In terms of “fairness” more broadly, it is noted that the applicant was notified of the delegate’s decision refusing to grant him the visa (by email) on 12 September 2017 (Affidavit of Lauren Ashworth, pp 4-5). The notification letter from the Department (found at CB 26-29) was clear and complied with the relevant legal principles canvassed by the Federal Court in DFQ17 v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2019] FCAFC 64; BMY18 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCAFC 189; Ali v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCA 1102; CAV18 v Minister for Home Affairs [2020] FCA 173 and Singh v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2020] FCAFC 31.
Relevantly, the notification letter provided information about how to lodge a valid application for review at the Tribunal, as follows (emphasis added) (CB 26-27):
Review rights
The decision can be reviewed
We cannot consider your visa application any further. However, you are entitled to apply to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) for a merits review of this decision. An application for merits review of this decision must be given to the AAT within 21 days on which you are taken to have received this letter.
You may only seek merits review of this decision with the AAT if you are physically present in Australia at the time this application for merits review is made.
This review period is prescribed in law and an application for merits review may not be accepted after that date.
Pursuant to s 494C(5) of the Act and reg 1.10(4) of the Regulations, the applicant had 21 days from the date of the Department’s notification within which to lodge a valid application for review with the Tribunal.
This meant the applicant could only lodge a valid application for review on or before 3 October 2017.
The applicant was clearly on notice of this time limitation. He was also on notice that, for his application for review to be “valid”, he needed to be in the “migration zone” (that is, “physically present in Australia”) at the time he filed his application for review with the Tribunal.
On the basis of the above, the applicant (through his representative) should have been aware of the conditions under which a valid application to the Tribunal could be made. The information given to him in the notification letter outlined the prescribed period in which the application for review could be made and, equally important here, where the applicant needed to be (“physically”) in order for any application to be valid.
In the circumstances, the Tribunal was not required to give further notice of the issues relevant to the Tribunal’s ultimate determination: SZBEL v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2006] HCA 63.
The Court notes, and the applicant stresses that, on 3 October 2017, the Tribunal emailed the applicant’s representative and invited him to comment on adverse information – namely, that the applicant was not physically present in the “migration zone” when his application for review was lodged at the Tribunal (CB 47-49). The covering email attaching this correspondence (dated 3 October 2017) stated that the last date upon which the applicant could lodge another (valid) application for review was 3 October 2017. It read as follows (in bold typeface) (CB 47):
Note that today (3 October 2017) is the last day to lodge a valid application for review. If you wish to lodge another application and pay a new application fee, you need to do so today.
The applicant returned to Australia on 3 October 2017.
The applicant’s representative did not respond to the invitation to comment until 17 October 2017. On that day, the applicant’s representative forwarded a written statement from the applicant dated 16 October 2017 (CB 50-52) which seems to contend that the Tribunal did not give the applicant enough time to lodge a valid application.
In his written statement, the applicant highlights the following concerns in this regard (CB 52) (without alteration):
The circumstance was I could not submit review application while I am in Australia as I arrived back to Australia on 3rd October 2017.
I believe I owed generosity from AAT as even I wanted to make second application I could not as I was not in Australia. I also owed fairness from AAT to the given circumstances I was in as I was outside of country for the entire period where I can lodge review application while I am in Australia.
I would like to request AAT to provide the opportunity to declare my application valid so that my concern can be heard for your respected body. This will enable me to prepare myself for the interview.
It is, arguably, “odd” (and, most certainly, less than ideal) that the Tribunal waited until the “last minute” (ie, the last day upon which a valid application could be made to the Tribunal) to advise the applicant that the Tribunal had concerns about the validity of the applicant’s application. Conceivably, had the applicant been sent the same letter on an earlier date, the applicant could have organised his affairs in a way that allowed him to file a further (valid) application.
That, however, is entirely speculative. On the evidence before this Court, the applicant was in Australia on 3 October 2017 and was on notice that there was an issue with the validity of his application. That arose in circumstances where the applicant had been on notice since 12 September 2017 that he needed to file a valid application (and what that entailed). He did not do so before he left the migration zone (on 13 September 2017) or when he returned to the migration zone (on 3 October 2017).
No breach of procedural fairness arises in this context. As highlighted by the Minister (in written submissions filed in this Court on 24 January 2022 at [19]), despite being given clear notice of what was required of him, the applicant chose to leave the migration zone. By doing so, he failed to make a valid application for review within the statutorily mandated timeframe. His failure to do so arose from his own decisions or inaction – not from any “procedural failure” on the part of the Tribunal.
No jurisdictional error arises in relation to ground 2.
Other
Conduct of the applicant’s representative
In oral submissions to this Court, the applicant seemed to suggest that his representative had not done what was asked of him or did not advise the applicant of his statutory obligations.
This Court is, of course, sympathetic to the concerns of all applicants who express frustration with what they perceive to be poor migration advice. Unfortunately, the concerns raised here do not assist the applicant in relation to the issue of jurisdictional error. There is no evidence, for example, that leads the Court to conclude that the representative’s conduct amounts to a fraud on the Tribunal: SZFDE v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2007] HCA 35.
To the extent that the applicant’s representative was, for example, told by the applicant to file the application for review with the Tribunal while the applicant was still in the migration zone or failed to advise the applicant to return to Australia so that a valid application could be filed, the representative’s inaction in this regard is more akin to negligence or incompetence – not fraud: Minister for Immigration & Citizenship v SZLIX [2008] FCAFC 17.
To that end, the Court refers the applicant to the Office of the Migration Agent Registration Authority. Unlike this Court, that entity is legislatively empowered to investigate and address migration services in Australia.
Futility
For completeness, if the Court is incorrect and the Tribunal did fall into error by not notifying the applicant earlier of the invalid application, it would, in any event, be futile to remit the matter to the Tribunal for further review.
There is no dispute that the applicant was outside of the migration zone at the time the Tribunal application was filed. There is no evidence before the Court to suggest that any further (valid) application was filed within the prescribed period.
In those circumstances, no re-assessment of the applicant’s case could assist him. The Tribunal would, in effect, have no choice but to again find that it lacked jurisdiction as there was no valid application filed by the applicant in this matter during the requisite time period. The applicant did not file a valid application whilst he was within the migration zone and within the prescribed 21 day timeframe and, as outlined above, the Tribunal has no discretion or power to extend the time within which an applicant can file an application for review.
On that basis, remittal to the Tribunal would prove futile as the Tribunal would have no choice but to again find that it lacked jurisdiction.
CONCLUSION
The Court is satisfied that the Tribunal did not have jurisdiction to decide the applicant’s matter. The Court is otherwise satisfied that there is no jurisdictional error in the Tribunal’s decision.
The application is, accordingly, dismissed.
I certify that the preceding sixty-seven (67) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Judge Kendall. Associate:
Dated: 8 April 2022
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