Kio v Minister for Home Affairs (No 2)

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Kio v Minister for Home Affairs (No 2) [2019] FCA 1293

File number: VID 1114 of 2018
Judge: MURPHY J
Date of judgment: 20 August 2019
Catchwords: MIGRATION - visa cancellation decision pursuant to s 501(3) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – where the Minister stated in his reasons for decision that it was unnecessary to determine whether non-refoulement obligations were owed to the applicant – whether the Minister conflated Australia’s non-refoulement obligations under international law with the protection obligations to which the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) refers – whether the Minister erred by considering fear rather than the potential or risk of harm itself
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth)
Cases cited:

BCH17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 300

Carrascalaov Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCAFC 107; 252 FCR 352

DMH16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCA 448; (2017) 253 FCR 576

Ezegbe v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCA 216

Hossain v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] HCA 34; (2018) 359 ALR 1

Ibrahim v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCAFC 89

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v BBS16 [2017] FCAFC 176; (2017) 158 ALD 198

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZMTA and Another [2019] HCA 3; (2019) 363 ALR 599

SZATV v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2007] HCA 40, (2007) 233 CLR 18

SZSZQ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 403

SZTAL v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection; SZTGM v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] HCA 34; (2017) 262 CLR 362

Date of hearing: 15 July 2019
Registry: Victoria
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 47
Counsel for the Applicant: Ms G Costello
Solicitor for the Applicant: Victoria Legal Aid
Counsel for the Respondent: Ms C Symons
Solicitor for the Respondent: Sparke Helmore

ORDERS

VID 1114 of 2018
BETWEEN:

CHAN BIK KIO

Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS

Respondent

JUDGE:

MURPHY J

DATE OF ORDER:

20 AUGUST 2019

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The Respondent’s decision made on 19 June 2018 to cancel the Applicant’s Class XB Subclass 200 (Refugee) visa be quashed.

2.The Respondent pay the Applicant’s costs.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

MURPHY J:

INTRODUCTION

  1. In this proceeding the applicant, Mr Chan Bik Kio, seeks judicial review of a decision of the respondent, the Minister for Home Affairs (Minister), acting personally, to cancel the applicant’s Class XB Subclass 200 (Refugee) visa ( the visa) under s 501(3)(b) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act). The Minister decided to cancel the applicant’s visa on the basis that he reasonably suspected that the applicant has a ‘substantial criminal record’ and therefore did not pass the ‘character test’ under the Act, and…

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Details
Case
[2019] FCA 1293
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Kio v Minister for Home Affairs (No 2), the Federal Court of Australia was asked to review a decision made by the Minister for Home Affairs to cancel the visa of Mr Kio, a refugee who had been granted a visa based on his status as a refugee from Myanmar. The Minister decided to cancel Mr Kio’s visa under section 501(3)(b) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) due to Mr Kio’s substantial criminal record and concluded that the seriousness of his repeated offending and the risk he posed to the Australian community outweighed the countervailing considerations. The central legal issues in this case were whether the Minister conflated Australia’s non-refoulement obligations under international law with the protection obligations to which the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) refers, and whether the Minister erred by considering Mr Kio's fear of harm rather than the potential or risk of harm itself.

The Court found that the Minister did conflate the two sets of obligations. The Court emphasised that the concept of non-refoulement under international treaties is broader than the protection obligations under the Migration Act. The Court observed that the Minister's reasons used the term "non-refoulement obligations" instead of the term "protection obligations" as it appears in the Act. Furthermore, the Court noted that the Minister's reasons oscillated between referring to Australia's non-refoulement obligations assessed by reference to international treaties and the obligations required to be considered under the Act, without making a clear distinction between them. The Court also highlighted that the Minister stated it was unnecessary to determine whether non-refoulement obligations were owed in respect of Mr Kio because these obligations would be considered in the course of processing any application for a protection visa. This indicated that the Minister believed the protection obligations under the Act were the same as Australia’s non-refoulement obligations under the relevant international treaties.

Based on these findings, the Court concluded that the Minister’s decision was flawed and quashed the decision to cancel Mr Kio’s visa. The Court further ordered that the Minister pay Mr Kio's costs. This decision underscores the importance of correctly distinguishing between international non-refoulement obligations and domestic protection obligations when making visa cancellation decisions under the Migration Act.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The Respondent’s decision made on 19 June 2018 to cancel the Applicant’s Class XB Subclass 200 (Refugee) visa be quashed.

2. The Respondent pay the Applicant’s costs.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

However, the Minister must make any such decision according to law. In my view he did not do so and the Minister’s decision must therefore be quashed.THE FACTS Mr Kio was born in Myanmar. He left that country in 1998 and lived for a period in Thailand and then Malaysia. He claims that he was a village leader in Chin State from 1992 until he left Myanmar, and that as a village leader both the Chin National Army (CNA) and the Myanmar military visited him. He says that on two occasions the CNA asked him to collect donations from village members and he complied. That fundraising came to the attention of the Myanmar military and they imprisoned and beat him. He claims that he had to escape for his life because the military were looking for him to arrest him again and that if he is returned to Myanmar he will be killed or executed by the death penalty. In 2005 he was assessed by the United Nation’s Human Rights Commission to be a refugee. He came to Australia in 2006, at age 53, on a refugee visa. He has resided in Australia ever since and his wife and three children joined him in Australia after also being granted refugee visas in 2010. In the period from April 2009 to February 2017 the applicant was convicted of a range of criminal offences, including sexual assaults. His most serious convictions were as follows:(a)on 3 May 2012 he was convicted of indecent assault and sentenced to 3 months imprisonment, wholly suspended for 12 months. He was placed on the sex offenders register for eight years;(b)on 15 April 2014 he was convicted of indecent assault, false imprisonment, and being a convicted sex offender loitering near a school, for which he was sentenced in aggregate to six months imprisonment. He was also convicted of wilful and obscene exposure, two charges of stalking, and unlawful assault and was given a Community Corrections Order;(c)on 17 December 2015 he was convicted of sexual assault and sentenced to four months imprisonment and placed on the sex offender register for life; and(d)on 8 February 2017 he was convicted of sexual assault and sentenced to 216 days of imprisonment. On 7 October 2016 an officer of the Department of Home Affairs (the Department) undertook an “International Treaties Obligations Assessment” (ITOA) in relation to Mr Kio. The stated purpose of the ITOA was to assess whether Australia has non-refoulement obligations to Mr Kio under the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (1951) as amended by the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (1967) (Refugees Convention); the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (1984) (CAT); and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) (ICCPR) and its Second Optional Protocol aiming at the abolition of the death penalty (collectively, the relevant international treaties). The ITOA did not accept Mr Kio’s claims that he was living in Chin State immediately prior to his departure from Myanmar, that he was a village leader who collected money for the CNA, that he was identified, harmed and detained by the Myanmar military or that he has a political profile as a supporter of the CNA or an imputed political profile as being anti-government. It found that there was no Refugees Convention nexus for the harm he feared, and that he did not have a well-founded fear of being persecuted for a Convention reason. Accordingly it found that he was not a refugee and that Australia accordingly does not have non-refoulement obligations under the Refugees Convention in respect of him.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

On 18 June 2018, the Department prepared a brief to the Minister to again consider cancelling the applicant’s visa under ss 501(2) or (3) of the Act. THE MINISTER’S DECISION On 19 June 2018 the Minister decided to cancel the applicant’s visa under s 501(3)(b) of the Act and he signed the draft reasons for that decision provided by the Department (the Minister’s reasons). The Minister’s reasons state, and it is uncontentious, that by reason of some of the abovementioned convictions the applicant had a “substantial criminal record”. On that basis, the Minister decided that he reasonably suspected that the applicant did not pass the character test. The Minister then turned to consider whether it was in the ‘national interest’ to cancel the applicant’s visa and reached the conclusion that the seriousness of the applicant’s repeated offending, the nature of the harm caused by his criminal conduct and the ongoing risk to the Australian community outweighed the countervailing considerations. The Minister’s reasons said the following in relation to Australia’s non-refoulement obligations (at [83]-[89]):International non-refoulement obligations[83]I have considered Mr KIO’s submissions that he fled Myanmar because of extreme persecution and torture by the military. Mr KIO submits that if he returns to Myanmar he will face persecution and beatings and is at risk of being executed by the military. I also considered the letters of Pastor Lian and Ms McDougall which have expressed concerns for Mr KIO’s welfare in the event he is removed to Myanmar.[84]I have considered the International Treaties Obligation Assessment (ITOA) dated 7 October 2016 which found that Mr KIO may be imprisoned for leaving Myanmar illegally. The assessment, conducted for a previous cancellation consideration, found that prison conditions in Myanmar are such that there are substantial grounds for believing there is a real risk of significant harm if Mr KIO returns to Myanmar. I accept that at the time of the ITOA, Mr KIO was a person in respect of whom Australia had non-refoulement obligations.[85]Notwithstanding the now dated ITOA finding of 2016, I note Mr KIO can make a valid application for a Protection visa. I am aware that my Department's practice in processing Protection visa applications is to consider the application of the protection-specific criteria before proceeding with any consideration of other criteria, including character-related criteria. To reinforce this practice, I have given a direction under s499 of the Act (Direction 75) requiring that decision makers who are considering an application for a Protection visa must first assess whether the refugee and complementary protection criteria are met before considering ineligibility criteria, or referral of the application for consideration under s501.[86]I consider it highly likely that any Protection visa application will be considered by a delegate, and I note that such a delegate will be bound by the terms of Direction 75.[87]In those circumstances, I consider it unnecessary to determine whether non-refoulement obligations are owed in respect of Mr KIO for the purposes of the present decision as he is able to make a valid application for a Protection visa. In the (highly likely) case that such an application is considered by a delegate, non-refoulement obligations would be considered in the course of processing the application.[88]I have also considered and taken into account the possibility that it may be the case that the Minister at that time personally considers Mr KIO’s Protection visa application, rather than a delegate. In such a case, the Minister would not be bound by Direction 75 and would not necessarily determine whether non-refoulement obligations are owed in respect of Mr KIO. However, such a situation would only arise in the unlikely event that the Minister determines to depart from the usual practice regarding the processing of Protection visa applications and determines further to depart from the policy approach set out in Direction 75. I have nevertheless taken into account the fact that that is a possible consequence of my decision, albeit an unlikely one.[89]I have also considered Mr KIO’s claims of harm upon return to Myanmar outside of the concept of non-refoulement and the international obligations framework. I accept that regardless of whether Mr KIO’s claims are such as to engage non-refoulement obligations, Mr KIO would face hardship as Mr KIO has previously faced persecution and torture by the Burmese military and he would face hardship arising from his fear that he would be executed if he was forced to return to Myanmar.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The Minister submits in the alternative that if the Court finds that the Minister conflated Australia’s non-refoulement obligations under the relevant international treaties with the protection obligations under s 36(2) of the Act, there was no material consequence. He contends that neither the relocation principle nor the requirement of intentionality are clearly engaged by the facts of Mr Kio’s case.Consideration I do not accept the Minister’s submissions. As the Full Court held in Ibrahim (at [100]-[104]) the concept of non-refoulement obligations imported by the relevant international treaties is broader than the protection obligations to which s 36(2)(a) of the Act refers, and the same is true in relation to s 36(2)(aa). On a fair reading of the Minister’s reasons he conflated Australia’s non-refoulement obligations under the relevant international treaties with the protection obligations to which the Act refers and which would be applied if Mr Kio made an application for a protection visa. This can be seen in the following parts of the Minister’s reasons, which are relevantly similar to the Assistant Minister’s reasons in Ibrahim:(a)first, the Minister’s reasons used the expression “non-refoulement obligations” which derives from the Refugees Convention and not the term “protection obligations” appearing in s 36(2)(a) of the Act;(b)second, the Minister’s reasons oscillate between referring to Australia’s non-refoulement obligations assessed by reference to international treaties and referring to those obligations required to be considered under the Act, without distinguishing between them;(c)third, and most importantly, the Minister’s reasons state (at [87]) that it was unnecessary to determine whether non-refoulement obligations are owed in respect of Mr Kio, because non-refoulement obligations would be considered (I infer fully) in the course of deciding any application Mr Kio made for a protection visa. That strongly suggests that the Minister believed that the protection obligations under the Act are the same as Australia’s non-refoulement obligations under the relevant international treaties; (d)fourth, the Minister’s reasons state (at [88]) that if the Minister personally considered Mr Kio’s protection visa application the Minister would not be bound by Direction 75 and would not necessarily determine whether non-refoulement obligations are owed in respect of Mr Kio. This tends to confirm that the Minister believed that a determination of the protection obligations under the Act would be the same as a determination of Australia’s non-refoulement obligations under the relevant international treaties;(e)fifth, the Minister’s reasons refer (at [89]) to consideration of Mr Kio’s position “outside of the concept of non-refoulement and the international obligations framework” which indicates that the Minister believed that he had fully addressed the issues relating to non-refoulement within the framework of the relevant international treaties.