FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Kiefel v State of Victoria [2014] FCA 411
Citation: Kiefel v State of Victoria [2014] FCA 411 Parties: JAMES KIEFEL (BY HIS NEXT FRIEND, WENDY KIEFEL v STATE OF VICTORIA (DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION AND EARLY CHILDHOOD DEVELOPMENT) File numbers: VID 2 of 2011
VID 250 of 2011Judge: TRACEY J Date of judgment: 30 April 2014 Catchwords: COSTS – party-party costs – indemnity costs – Calderbank offer – respondent’s application for costs where applicant failed to plead viable case – whether costs should follow the event – whether indemnity costs should be ordered against the applicant’s solicitors – whether serious dereliction of duty – whether Calderbank offer unreasonably refused Legislation: Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth)
Disability Discrimination and Other Human Rights Legislation Amendment Act 2009 (Cth)
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) ss 37M, 37N
Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) rr 9.66, 40.03 and O 25Cases cited: Alpine Hardwoods(Aust) Pty Ltd v Hardys Pty Ltd (No 2) (2002) 190 ALR 121 – cited
Black v Lipovac (1998) 217 ALR 386 – cited
Calderbank v Calderbank [1975] 3 All ER 333 – followed
Colgate-Palmolive Company v Cussons Pty Ltd (1993) 46 FCR 225 – considered
Cretazzo v Lombardi (1975) 13 SASR 4 – cited
Cutts v Head [1984] Ch 290 – cited
Denlay v Commissioner of Taxation(No 2) (2013) 302 ALR 237 – cited
Dowling v Fairfax Media Publications Pty Ltd (No 2) [2010] FCAFC 28 – cited
Dr Martens Australia Pty Ltd v Figgins Holdings Pty Ltd (No 2) [2000] FCA 602 – cited
GEC Marconi Systems Pty Ltd v BHP Information Technology Pty Ltd (2003) 201 ALR 55 – considered
Gersten v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 260 – considered
Hamod v New South Wales (2002) 188 ALR 659 – cited
IFTC Broking Services Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (2010) 268 ALR 1 – cited
Kiefel v State of Victoria [2013] FCA 1398 – cited
Medcalf v Mardell [2003] 1 AC 120 – cited
MGICA (1992) Pty Ltd v Kenny and Good Pty Ltd (No 2) (1996) 70 FCR 236 – cited
Modra v State of Victoria (2012) 205 FCR 445 – cited
Perry v Comcare (2006) 150 FCR 319 – cited
Ruddock v Vadarlis(No 2) (2001) 115 FCR 229 – cited
Smallacombe v Lockyer Investment Company Pty Ltd (1993) 42 FCR 97 – cited
Walker v State of Victoria [2012] FCAFC 38 – considered
White Industries (Qld) Pty Ltd v Flower & Hart (a firm) (1998) 156 ALR 169 – citedDate of hearing: Heard on the papers Date of last submissions: 18 February 2014 Place: Melbourne Division: GENERAL DIVISION Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 70 Solicitor for the Applicant: Arnold Thomas & Becker Counsel for the Respondent: Ms R Doyle SC and Mr C Young Solicitor for the Respondent: Allens Arthur Robertson Counsel for Arnold Thomas & Becker (non-party): Mr D A Klempfner Solicitor for Arnold Thomas & Becker (non-party): Colin Biggers & Paisley
IN…
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- Case
- [2014] FCA 411
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court examined several legal issues, including the standard approach to costs in litigation, the exceptional circumstances that might warrant indemnity costs, and the impact of the Calderbank offer on the costs order. The court considered the principles that typically guide the award of costs, recognising that the outcome of litigation is the primary factor. However, the court also acknowledged that other factors, such as the nature and purpose of the proceeding and the conduct of the parties, could influence the exercise of discretion in awarding costs. The court found that the applicant's failure to plead a coherent case and the refusal of a compromise offer by the respondent justified a departure from the usual costs order.
The court concluded that the circumstances of the case warranted an indemnity costs order against the applicant from a certain date, and that the respondent's solicitors should not be penalised for the applicant's costs. The court found that the applicant's solicitors were not in a position to defend against the indemnity costs application due to client legal privilege. However, the court was satisfied that the privileged information could not have assisted the solicitors in absolving themselves from the consequences of the applicant's actions. The court also highlighted the importance of the evolving jurisprudence in the area of disability discrimination, but noted that this did not outweigh the applicant's failure to properly plead and argue the case.
The final orders of the court mandated that the applicant pay the respondent's costs from a specific date on a party-party basis and from another date on an indemnity basis. Additionally, the respondent was ordered to pay the applicant's solicitors' costs for their application regarding indemnity costs, and the applicant was to cover the respondent's costs for their application that the applicant pay the proceeding's costs.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. Subject to previous costs orders, the applicant’s next friend, Wendy Kiefel, pay the respondent’s costs of the proceeding, including reserved costs, from:
(a) 17 June 2010 to 10 August 2012 on a party and party basis; and
(b) 11 August 2012 to judgment on an indemnity basis.
2. The respondent pay the applicant’s solicitors costs of its application that the solicitor be ordered to pay the costs on an indemnity basis.
3. The applicant’s next friend, Wendy Kiefel, pay the respondent’s costs of the respondent’s application that the applicant pay its costs in the proceeding.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
1. Subject to previous costs orders, the applicant’s next friend, Wendy Kiefel, pay the respondent’s costs of the proceeding, including reserved costs, from:
(a) 1 April 2011 to 10 August 2012 on a party and party basis; and
(b) 11 August 2012 to judgment on an indemnity basis.
2. The respondent pay the applicant’s solicitors costs of its application that the solicitor be ordered to pay the costs on an indemnity basis.
3. The applicant’s next friend, Wendy Kiefel, pay the respondent’s costs of the respondent’s application that the applicant pay its costs in the proceeding.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
There will be occasions when a solicitor against whom indemnity costs is sought is not in a position properly to resist the application because he or she is bound to respect client legal privilege. If the client does not waive privilege the solicitor is prevented from revealing instructions given by and advice tendered to the client. In such circumstances indemnity costs will only be awarded if the Court is satisfied that, on no view, could the privileged information assist in absolving the practitioner: see Medcalf v Mardell [2003] 1 AC 120 at 134-5, 145-7. CONSIDERATION In the normal course the costs of the proceeding should follow the event. Such an order is sought by the applicant. The questions which arise for determination are whether the circumstances of this case justify departure from the usual “rule” on the grounds that the applicant failed to plead an arguable case, failed to accept a Calderbank offer and/or because a costs order should be made against the applicant’s solicitor instead of the applicant.Usual Order as to Costs or Indemnity Costs? The applicant emphasised that, in exercising its discretion in relation to costs, a court will normally order that the unsuccessful party pay the successful party’s costs on a party‑party basis. He contended that the respondent had failed to justify any departure from this norm in the present case. He sought to reinforce his case by relying on factors such as the beneficial nature of the DDA, his disabilities and what was described as the “evolving jurisprudence” in this area. In some circumstances considerations such as these may properly be taken into account in determining appropriate costs orders. In Ruddock Black CJ and French J affirmed (at 237) that although “the primary factor in deciding on the award of costs is the outcome of litigation”, the nature and purpose of the proceeding remains a relevant factor in the exercise of the Court’s discretion. A major difficulty which confronts the applicant’s reliance on such factors is that the respondent’s complaint relates not to the nature of the legislation or the case law which has been developed under it. The complaint focuses on the failure of the applicant to plead a viable case under that legislation and the failure by him to accept the respondent’s offer of compromise. It is noteworthy that the deficiencies in the pleadings bear a considerable similarity to some of the deficiencies which were identified in Walker. Despite this being pointed out by the respondent and the Court at various times before trial the pleadings remained substantially unaltered. This led me to make a series of adverse observations in the principal judgment: see, for example, at [44]-[56], [71]-[77], [92], [94], [99], [112], [127], [133], [136], [177], [213]-[214]. There was, for example, a failure to distinguish between claims of direct and indirect discrimination and between causes of action arising before and after amendments to the DDA which came into force in August 2009. These and other shortcomings underpinned the applicant’s failure, through written submissions and oral argument, to advance a coherent case: the deficiencies in the pleadings were neither remedied nor clarified. On the contrary, some submissions added to an already high level of confusion. Despite being on notice of the respondent’s evidence, the applicant pressed on without regard to the strength of the evidentiary case advanced against him. Much of this evidence was unchallenged at trial.