Kellogg Company v PB Foods Ltd

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Kellogg Company v PB Foods Ltd [1999] FCA 1610

TRADE MARKS – appeal against Registrar’s dismissal of opposition to registration of word mark “TOUCAN” in respect of class 32 (fruit drinks) – existing registrations of three word and device marks of opponent in respect of class 30 (breakfast cereals) – opponent’s existing marks consisting of fanciful cartoon bird character and his name “SAM TOUCAN” – extensive use by opponent of its trade marks since 1964 in connection with promotion of its children’s breakfast cereal “Froot Loops” – association between opponent’s fruit theme and applicant for registration’s fruit drinks – whether use of word mark “TOUCAN” would be likely to cause confusion – use of survey evidence in trade mark cases.

Trade Marks Act 1955 (Cth) s 28(a)

Nettlefold Advertising Pty Ltd v Nettlefold Signs Pty Ltd  (1997) 38 IPR 495, followed
Radio Corporation Pty Ltd v Disney (1937) 57 CLR 448, applied
Bali Trade Mark [1969] RPC 472, referred to
Smith Hayden & Co Ltd’s Application (1946) 63 RPC 97, followed
Pioneer Hi-Bred Corn Co v Hy-Line Chicks Pty Ltd [1979] RPC 410, cited
In re Remfry’s Trade Mark (1897) 23 VLR 44, cited
Reckitt & Colman (Aust) Ltd v Boden (1945) 70 CLR 84, referred to
Southern Cross Refrigerating Co v Toowoomba Foundry Pty Ltd (1954) 91 CLR 592, applied
Blount v Registrar of Trade Marks (1998) 83 FCR 50, cited
Jafferjee v Scarlett (1937) 57 CLR 115, cited
Nettlefold Advertising Pty Ltd v Nettlefold Signs Pty Ltd (1998) 160 ALR 184, referred to
Musidor BV v Tansing (t/a Apple Music House) (1994) 29 IPR 203, cited
Shoshana Pty Ltd v 10th Cantanae Pty Ltd (1987) 79 ALR 279, cited
TV-am plc v Amalgamated Television Services Pty Ltd (ATN Channel 7) (1988) 12 IPR 85, cited
Arnotts Ltd v Trade Practices Commission (1990) 24 FCR 313, cited
Sterling Pharmaceuticals Pty Ltd v Johnson & Johnson Australia Pty Ltd (1990) 96 ALR 277, cited
Interlego AG v Croner Trading Pty Ltd (1991) 102 ALR 379, cited
State Government Insurance Corporation v GIO (NSW) (1991) 28 FCR 511, cited
Gas Corporation v Phasetwo Nominees Pty Ltd (1998) ATPR 41-644, cited
Centurion Roller Shutters Pty Ltd v Automatic Technology (Australia) Pty Ltd [1999] FCA 1118, cited

KELLOGG COMPANY v PB FOODS LIMITED

NG 270 of 1998

LINDGREN J
19 NOVEMBER 1999

SYDNEY


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

NG 270 OF 1998

On appeal from the Registrar of Trade Marks

BETWEEN:

KELLOGG COMPANY
Applicant

AND:

PB FOODS LIMITED (ACN 008 668 602)
Respondent

JUDGE:

LINDGREN J

DATE OF ORDER:

19 NOVEMBER 1999

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application be dismissed.

2.The applicant pay the respondent’s costs.

Note:   Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT…

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Details
Case
[1999] FCA 1610
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Kellogg Company v PB Foods Ltd involved a dispute over the registration of the word "TOUCAN" as a trade mark for fruit drinks and juices by PB Foods Ltd. Kellogg Company opposed the registration, arguing that it would likely deceive or cause confusion among consumers, as they believed it would associate PB’s products with their own brand, Froot Loops. The opposition was initially dismissed by the Registrar’s delegate, leading Kellogg to appeal to the court. The primary legal issue was whether the use of the mark "TOUCAN" would likely deceive or cause confusion among consumers, as per section 28(a) of the Trade Marks Act 1955.

The court examined the evidence presented by Kellogg, including a survey, and found it to be speculative, particularly in relation to brand extension. The court held that the admissibility of survey evidence is a matter for the trial judge’s discretion under the rules of evidence, but the evidence must meet certain criteria, such as proper methodology and representative sampling. The court decided that Kellogg’s survey evidence did not satisfy these criteria and thus should be given little weight.

In reaching its decision, the court noted that the delegate's decision was a fresh hearing, and it focused on Kellogg's argument that the delegate erred by not associating the word "TOUCAN" with Kellogg and by requiring blameworthy conduct from PB. The court clarified that, following a recent decision, Kellogg was not required to demonstrate blameworthy conduct by PB. Instead, the court found that the use of the word "TOUCAN" as a trade mark was likely to deceive or cause confusion, and thus, the application for registration should be dismissed. The court also ordered that PB Foods Ltd pay Kellogg Company's costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application be dismissed.

2. The applicant pay the respondent’s costs.

Background

Background to the litigation

When it was named “Peters (WA) Limited”, PB applied to register the word “TOUCAN” as a trade mark for fruit drinks, fruit juices and other like products. In substance, Kellogg’s contention has been that PB’s use of that mark in relation to such goods “would be likely to deceive or cause confusion” because a substantial number of consumers or prospective consumers would be caused to wonder whether PB’s products marketed under it came from the same source as Kellogg’s Froot Loops. LEGISLATION AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND PB lodged its application (578456) on 15 May 1992 (“the relevant date”) in class 32 in respect of:“Fruit drinks and fruit juices, including fresh as well as long-life juices, and all other goods in this class.” Class 32 is as follows:“Beers; mineral and aerated waters and other non-alcoholic drinks; fruit drinks and fruit juices; syrups and other preparations for making beverages.” On 29 July 1993, the trade mark application was advertised as accepted in the Australian Official Journal of Trade Marks. Kellogg lodged its notice of opposition on 28 January 1994. On 26 February 1998, the Registrar’s delegate dismissed the opposition in total and directed that PB’s application should proceed to registration. The Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth) (“the 1995 Act”), other than Part 1, commenced on 1 January 1996. Section 232 repealed the 1955 Act. The 1995 Act refers to the 1955 Act as “the repealed Act”. Where an application was pending, or had been accepted under the 1955 Act and the acceptance was in force immediately before 1 January 1996, the 1955 Act continues to apply in relation to the application: ss 241(1) and (2), and the definition of “pending” in s 11(2), of the 1995 Act. Accordingly, registrability in the present case is assessable under the 1955 Act, and Kellogg’s opposition, its determination and Kellogg’s appeal to this Court, were and are pursuant to ss 49 to 51 of that Act. Section 28 of the Act provides, relevantly, as follows:“28 A mark:(a) the use of which would be likely to deceive or cause confusion;(b) the use of which would be contrary to law;(c) ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ ........ .... or;(d)which would otherwise be not entitled to protection in a court of justice;shall not be registered as a trade mark.” (emphasis supplied) The expressions “mark” and “trade mark” are defined in s 6(1) of the Act, relevantly as follows:“‘mark’ includes a device, brand, heading, label, ticket, name, signature, word, letter or numeral, or any combination thereof;”“‘trade mark’ means:(a)... a mark used or proposed to be used in relation to goods ... for the purpose of indicating, or so as to indicate, a connexion in the course of trade between the goods ... and a person who has the right, either as proprietor or as registered user, to use the mark, whether with or without an indication of the identity of that person; ... ”

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

I regard Kellogg’s case based on brand extension as speculative.Kellogg’s survey evidence In conformity with the Court’s Practice Note 11, PB made known to Kellogg its objections to the methodology of Kellogg’s proposed survey. Kellogg modified its methodology in some respects. Counsel for PB submits that survey evidence is hearsay and that it is a matter for the Court’s discretion under O 33 r 3 whether it is allowed to be adduced. Order 33 r 3(b) provides as follows:“3. The Court may at any stage of the proceedings –(a)……………………………………………………………………;(b)dispense with compliance with the rules of evidence where such compliance might occasion or involve unnecessary or unreasonable expense or delay, … .”No doubt PB’s submission is referable to the expense and delay in calling as witnesses all respondents to the survey. Counsel for PB submits as follows:“ … any exercise of discretion is dependent upon compliance with a number of criteria, eg, proof of a correct methodology;proof that the proper universe was examined, and a representative sample drawn from that universe; whether the mode of interviewing was correct;whether the data gathered was accurately reported; andwhether the sample design, the questionnaire and the interviewing were in accordance with generally accepted standards of objective procedure and statistics in the field of such surveys. Where survey evidence does not satisfy these criteria, it should be accorded little weight (Arnotts v TPC (1990) 97 ALR 555 at 608).”Counsel also submits that Kellogg’s survey evidence “should be given no weight at all.” It is not entirely clear whether PB submits that the evidence should be excluded, or should be admitted but given no weight, or whether it makes both submissions in the alternative. I will treat the submission as being of the latter form. Practice Note 11 includes the following:“The admissibility of surveys is always a matter for the trial judge to determine but the risk of the survey being rejected or given little, if any, weight at the trial may be diminished if the following procedure is followed when a party seeks to have a survey conducted.” Clearly, the Practice Note assumes that evidence of the carrying out of a survey and of its results may be admissible. This assumption is consistent with several decisions in the Court: see, for example, Shoshana Pty Ltd v 10th Cantanae Pty Ltd (1987) 79 ALR 279 (FCA/Burchett J); TV-am plc v Amalgamated Television Services Pty Ltd (ATN Channel 7) (1988) 12 IPR 85 (FCA/Einfeld J) at 90-91 Arnotts Ltd v Trade Practices Commission (1990) 24 FCR 313 (FC) at 358-364; Sterling Pharmaceuticals Pty Ltd v Johnson & Johnson Australia Pty Ltd (1990) 96 ALR 277 (FCA/Hill J) at 291-293 (and on appeal at (1991) 21 IPR 1 (FC) at 21 (Burchett J); Interlego AG v Croner Trading Pty Ltd (1991) 102 ALR 379 (FCA/Sheppard J) at 407-416; State Government Insurance Corporation v GIO (NSW) (1991) 28 FCR 511 (French J) at 543; and on Practice Note 11, see Gas Corporation v Phasetwo Nominees Pty Ltd (1998) ATPR 41-644 (FCA/RD Nicholson J); Centurion Roller Shutters Pty Ltd v Automatic Technology (Australia) Pty Ltd [1999] FCA 1118 (French J). The questions of the admissibility of, and the weight to be attributed to, survey evidence have attracted much extra-curial discussion; recent examples are J D Heydon, Cross on Evidence (5th ed) [29155], [37090]; Justice M J Beazley, “Hearsay and Related Evidence – a New Era?” (1995) 18(1) NSWLJ 39 esp at 61-66; Rachel Mulheron, “Survey Evidence in Passing-Off and Trademark Litigation - Admissibility and Weight” (1996) 26(5) Qld L Soc J 449; Skinnon and McDermott, “Market Surveys as Evidence – Courts Still Finding Fault” (1998) 26 ABLR 435; Gary Lea, “Masters of All They Survey? Some Thoughts upon Official Attitudes to Market Survey Evidence in UK Trade Mark Practice” [1999] 2 IPQ 191).

Decision

Reasons for decision

LINDGREN J
Since 4 July 1994, PB has been selling fruit juices and drinks in Western Australia under the trade mark “TOUCAN”. From 1995 to 1997, PB manufactured and sold a mixed fruit and milk drink called “TOUCAN SLING”. PB also manufactures and markets throughout Australia the ice confection, “TOUCAN twin stick icy poles”, the packaging of which bears the Brownes trade mark and the “Brownes Dairy” address. THE DECISION OF THE DELEGATE OF THE REGISTRAR The present “appeal” is in the nature of a fresh hearing: cf Jafferjee v Scarlett (1937) 57 CLR 115 at 119 (per Latham CJ), and any reference to “appeal” in these Reasons is to be understood accordingly. Nonetheless, the Delegate’s decision forms a convenient starting point for discussion. Kellogg submits that that decision is affected by two principal errors. The first is that the Delegate erred by not being prepared to find that the word “TOUCAN”, divorced from any association with the character Sam Toucan, was associated with Kellogg. The second is that he erroneously thought that Kellogg had to demonstrate that PB had been guilty of “blameworthy conduct”. It is common ground on the appeal that in the light of the supervening decision of the Full Court of this Court in Nettlefold Advertising Pty Ltd v Nettlefold Signs Pty Ltd (1998) 160 ALR 184, paras (a) and (d) of s 28 of the Act are to be read disjunctively, at least for the purpose of an opposition to an application for a first registration, with the result that Kellogg is not required to establish blameworthy conduct on the part of PB. Accordingly, as noted earlier, the appeal is to be decided by reference to s 28(a) alone.KELLOGG’S STATEMENT OF POINTS IN SUPPORT OF THE APPEAL In its Statement of Points in Support of the Appeal, Kellogg advances the following arguments:“6.By reason of the extensive use of the Toucan Trade Marks throughout Australia over many years by itself and its authorised user, [Kellogg] has acquired a valuable reputation and goodwill in the sale and promotion of goods, and particularly fruit-based food products, by reference to the Toucan Trade Marks. ……………………………………………………………………………………14.The word TOUCAN is substantially identical with or deceptively similar to each of the Toucan Trade Marks.15.The goods covered by application 578456 are the same as or goods of the same description as the goods covered by the Toucan Trade Marks. 16. [PB] adopted the mark TOUCAN in the knowledge:(a)of [Kellogg’s] reputation and goodwill in the Toucan Trade Marks and the International Toucan Trade Marks; and(b) that [PB] would therefore benefit from the connection that would be made in the minds of purchasers and potential purchasers between the word TOUCAN and [Kellogg] and its products.17. By reason of the facts, matters and circumstances set out in this statement of points in support of the appeal:(a)purchasers and prospective purchasers of [PB’s] products promoted and sold by reference to the word TOUCAN are likely to believe that or to be caused to wonder whether such products are products of [Kellogg], are sold with the licence or authority of [Kellogg], or are manufactured by [Kellogg] or the manufacturer of [Kellogg’s] products; (b) in the alternative ... [PB] cannot establish that purchasers and prospective purchasers of [PB’s] products promoted and sold by reference to the word TOUCAN are not likely to believe that or to be caused to wonder whether such products are products of [Kellogg], are sold with the licence or authority of [Kellogg] or are manufactured by [Kellogg] or the manufacturer of [Kellogg’s] products; (c)the use of the word TOUCAN as a trade mark is likely to deceive or cause confusion…”THE FACTS IN MORE DETAILKellogg’s “Sam Toucan” character

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: LINDGREN J

The court considered the issue of whether the use of the word "TOUCAN" by PB would be likely to deceive or cause confusion among consumers. The court found that PB had been selling fruit juices and drinks under the trade mark "TOUCAN" since 1994, and there was no evidence of confusion among consumers. The court also noted that the products of PB and Kellogg were different and that the use of the word "TOUCAN" would not cause confusion among consumers. The court held that the use of the word "TOUCAN" by PB would not be likely to deceive or cause confusion among consumers.

The court considered the issue of whether Kellogg is required to demonstrate that PB had been guilty of blameworthy conduct. The court noted that the Full Court of this Court had decided that Kellogg is not required to establish blameworthy conduct on the part of PB for the purpose of an opposition to an application for a first registration. The court held that Kellogg is not required to demonstrate that PB had been guilty of blameworthy conduct.

The court considered the issue of whether the word "TOUCAN" is substantially identical with or deceptively similar to Kellogg's Toucan Trade Marks. The court noted that the word "TOUCAN" is not the same as Kellogg's Toucan Trade Marks, and there was no evidence that consumers would associate the word "TOUCAN" with Kellogg's Toucan Trade Marks. The court held that the word "TOUCAN" is not substantially identical with or deceptively similar to Kellogg's Toucan Trade Marks.

The ratio decidendi of this case is that the use of the word "TOUCAN" by PB would not be likely to deceive or cause confusion among consumers, Kellogg is not required to demonstrate that PB had been guilty of blameworthy conduct, and the word "TOUCAN" is not substantially identical with or deceptively similar to Kellogg's Toucan Trade Marks. The court distinguished the decision of the Full Court of this Court in Nettlefold Advertising Pty Ltd v Nettlefold Signs Pty Ltd (1998) 160 ALR 184, which held that Kellogg is not required to establish blameworthy conduct on the part of PB for the purpose of an opposition to an application for a first registration.