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- Case
- [1920] HCA 7
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The High Court was required to determine whether the respondent had discharged the onus of proving that the use of the "Superoid" trade mark was not likely to deceive, given the existence of the appellant's registered "Ruberoid" trade mark for identical goods. This involved an assessment of the similarity between the two marks, the nature of the goods, and the potential for confusion in the marketplace.
The Court reasoned that the onus was on the applicant for registration to demonstrate that their mark would not cause deception. Applying this principle, the Court found that the respondent had failed to discharge this onus. The Chief Justice observed that the spelling and pronunciation of "Superoid" and "Ruberoid," coupled with the fact that both were invented words, suggested an intention to closely approximate the existing mark. Isaacs J. reiterated the principle that applicants must show their mark is free from danger of deception or confusion, and that if doubt remains, registration should be refused. Gavan Duffy and Rich JJ. concurred, with Rich J. emphasizing that registration should be refused where it is not clear that deception may not result.
The appeal was allowed with costs. The respondent was ordered to pay the costs of the appeal and such costs as would have been allowed had the appellant been successful before both the Registrar and the Law Officer.
Background
Background to the litigation
The Standard Paint Company had been the first to sell and distribute waterproof compositions and fabrics known under the trade name "Ruberoid" in Australia since 1898. They registered the trade mark "Ruberoid" on 26 October 1906 and continued to use it for their products. In March 1912, Hales Limited took over the distribution of these products and became the principal selling and distributing agent for the Standard Paint Company's goods under the "Ruberoid" trade mark. This agency arrangement was terminated by the Standard Paint Company on 10 June 1916, with effect from 10 September 1916. The "Ruberoid" trade mark was printed on the waterproof material and its wrappers. The Standard Paint Company argued that "Superoid" was designed to closely mimic "Ruberoid" to capitalise on the established reputation and goodwill of the latter trade mark.
The matter before the High Court is an appeal from the decision of the Law Officer, who had reversed the Registrar's decision to refuse the registration of the word "Superoid" as a trade mark. Hales Limited applied to the Registrar of Trade Marks on 10 August 1916 for the registration of the word "Superoid" as a trade mark in class 17 in respect of roofing, flooring, damp course, and waterproof cement. The Registrar refused to accept the application, finding that the mark was too similar to the registered trade mark "Ruberoid" owned by Standard Paint Company and was likely to deceive. On appeal, the Law Officer directed that the application should be accepted. Standard Paint Company, the registered proprietor of the trade mark "Ruberoid," opposed the registration of "Superoid," arguing that the use of the word as a trade mark was likely to deceive due to its similarity to their registered trade marks. The appeal to the High Court focused on whether the Law Officer was correct in reversing the Registrar's decision and whether the respondent had discharged the onus of proving that the registration of "Superoid" was not likely to deceive.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Is the respondent's proposed trade mark "Superoid" so similar to the appellant's registered trade mark "Ruberoid" as to be likely to deceive or cause confusion among the public or trade?
2. Has the respondent discharged the onus of proving that the use of "Superoid" as a trade mark is not likely to deceive or cause confusion, as required under sections 25 and 114 of the Trade Marks Act 1905-1912?
3. Should the Registrar have accepted the respondent's application for registration of "Superoid" as a trade mark, or was it proper to refuse registration due to the likelihood of deception or confusion?
4. Does the similarity in the nature of the goods to which the trade marks apply, being exactly the same in each case, increase the likelihood of confusion or deception if "Superoid" is registered?
5. Is it sufficient for the respondent to provide a reasonable explanation for the term "Superoid" (i.e., the prefix "super" indicating superiority over other similar goods), or is further evidence required to demonstrate that registration would not lead to deception or confusion?
Held
1. The respondent's proposed trade mark "Superoid" is so similar to the appellant's registered trade mark "Ruberoid" as to be likely to deceive or cause confusion among the public or trade. Result: Appeal allowed.
2. The respondent has not discharged the onus of proving that the use of "Superoid" as a trade mark is not likely to deceive or cause confusion, as required under sections 25 and 114 of the Trade Marks Act 1905-1912. Result: Appeal allowed.
3. The Registrar should not have accepted the respondent's application for registration of "Superoid" as a trade mark, as it was proper to refuse registration due to the likelihood of deception or confusion. Result: Appeal allowed.
4. The similarity in the nature of the goods to which the trade marks apply, being exactly the same in each case, increases the likelihood of confusion or deception if "Superoid" is registered. Result: Appeal allowed.
5. It is not sufficient for the respondent to provide a reasonable explanation for the term "Superoid" (i.e., the prefix "super" indicating superiority over other similar goods), as further evidence is required to demonstrate that registration would not lead to deception or confusion. Result: Appeal allowed.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The central issue in this case was whether the respondent's proposed trade mark "Superoid" was so similar to the appellant's registered trade mark "Ruberoid" as to be likely to deceive or cause confusion among the public or trade, and whether the respondent had discharged the onus of proving that such deception or confusion was unlikely. The High Court held that the respondent had not discharged the onus of proving that the use of "Superoid" as a trade mark was not likely to deceive or cause confusion, and therefore the registration should have been refused.
The court's reasoning began with the well-established principle that when a person applies for the registration of a new trade mark, it is their responsibility to show that the mark is free from all danger of leading to deception or confusion. This principle was underscored by the words of Lords Watson and Herschell in Eno v. Dunn, which were cited by Isaacs J. in his judgment. According to this principle, if after considering all relevant circumstances a doubt remains, the mark is not to be registered.
In applying this principle to the present case, the court noted that both "Superoid" and "Ruberoid" were invented words, not ordinary English words, and were used in relation to the same class of goods. The court observed that the similarity in spelling and pronunciation of the two words, coupled with the fact that the respondent offered no evidence to counter the appellant's claims, suggested that the respondent intended to get as close to "Ruberoid" as possible without being unable to register "Superoid." This reinforced the court's view that the respondent had failed to discharge the onus of proving that the use of "Superoid" would not likely deceive or cause confusion.
The court also considered the nature of the goods to which the trade marks applied. Since both trade marks were used for the same class of goods, the court held that the registration of "Superoid" would not be free from the danger of confusion or deception. The mutual effect of the two marks when they came into competition in the market could not be overlooked, and this further supported the conclusion that the respondent had failed to discharge the onus cast upon it.
In terms of the Registrar's discretion under sections 25 and 33 of the Trade Marks Act 1905-1912, the court held that it was a proper exercise of this discretion to refuse registration where the matter was left in dubio, meaning the applicant had not made it perfectly clear that there was no danger of deception. The court emphasized that there was no absolute right to registration of a trade mark, but the Registrar had a discretion to refuse or accept registration subject to certain limitations.
The respondent argued that "Superoid" could be reasonably explained as having the prefix "super" indicating superiority over other similar goods, and that this explanation would have no sinister suggestion. However, the court did not find this explanation sufficient to discharge the onus of proving that the use of "Superoid" would not likely deceive or cause confusion. The court's decision to allow the appeal and refuse registration was based on the overall similarity of the marks, the lack of evidence from the respondent to counter the appellant's claims, and the nature of the goods to which the marks applied.
In summary, the ratio decidendi of this case is that when a person applies for the registration of a new trade mark that is similar to an existing registered trade mark, it is their responsibility to prove that the new mark is not likely to deceive or cause confusion. If there is any doubt after considering all relevant circumstances, the mark should not be registered. The court held that the respondent had failed to discharge this onus, and therefore the registration of "Superoid" should have been refused.