Kainth v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs

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FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA

(DIVISION 2)

Kainth v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2022] FedCFamC2G 588

File number(s): MLG 1924 of 2017
Judgment of: JUDGE KENDALL
Date of judgment: 27 July 2022
Catchwords: MIGRATION – Temporary Business Entry visa – decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal – whether the Tribunal failed to afford the applicant procedural fairness by failing to exercise its discretion to adjourn the matter or by failing to invite the applicant to attend a hearing – whether the Tribunal failed to conduct a review of the matter – whether the Tribunal acted unreasonably in refusing to review the delegate’s decision – whether the Tribunal misapplied or misconstrued the case of Huo v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCA 617 – whether the Tribunal misinterpreted or misapplied cl 457.223(4) in Schedule 2 of the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) – whether the Tribunal erred in failing to consider information – whether the Tribunal “acted in haste” – whether the Tribunal failed to comply with its obligations pursuant to s 353 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – whether the Tribunal failed to consider a relevant consideration or placed too much weight on irrelevant considerations – whether the Tribunal erred by failing to grant the applicant a “further seven day extension” – remittal futile in any event – no jurisdictional error – application dismissed.
Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 140G, 359, 359B, 359C, 360, 363, 363A & 476

Migration Legislation Amendment (Temporary Skill Shortage Visa and Complementary Reforms) Regulations 2018 (Cth)

Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth), reg 4.18A(4), cl 457.223(4) in Schedule 2

Cases cited:

Bala v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2019] FCA 600

Bodige v Minister for Immigration [2019] FCCA 1841

Bodige v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 2026

Craig v State of South Australia (1995) 184 CLR 163

DBX18 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2021] FCA 897

Djokovic v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] FCAFC 3

Hasran v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2010] FCAFC 40

Holkoree v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2021] FCCA 1152

Huo v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCA 617

Kaur v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 915

Manna v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2012] FMCA 28

Minister for Immigration & Border Protection v Singh (2014) 231 FCR 437

Minister for Immigration & Citizenship v SZMDS (2010) 240 CLR 611

Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Singh [2014] FCAFC 1

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li [2013] HCA 18

Naeem & Ors v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2019] FCCA 2722

SAAP v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs & Anor (2005) 228 CLR 294

Sidhu v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2021] FedCFamC2G 207

SZRUI v Minister for…

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Details
Case
[2022] FedCFamC2G 588
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Kainth v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs, the applicant, Mr. Kainth, challenged the decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) to dismiss his application for judicial review of a decision to refuse him a Subclass 457 visa. The dispute involved the application of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) and the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth). The key legal issues before the court were whether the AAT erred in not exercising its discretion to adjourn the matter, whether it failed to afford procedural fairness, and if it misapplied relevant case law in reaching its decision.

The court addressed the applicant’s claim that the AAT failed to exercise its discretion to adjourn the matter, which is outlined in s 363(1)(b) of the Migration Act. The court noted that while the AAT has the discretion to adjourn, it is not obligated to do so. The court referred to the High Court decision in MIAC v Xijuan Li, which held that a statutory discretion must be exercised reasonably. Despite the applicant’s argument, the court found no unreasonableness in the AAT's decision not to adjourn the matter.

Additionally, the applicant argued that the AAT failed to invite him to appear before it, thereby breaching his right to procedural fairness under s 360 of the Act. The court found that the applicant was adequately notified that failure to provide information by the deadline would result in the AAT making a decision without further action to obtain his views. Since the applicant chose not to provide the required information, the court concluded that no error arose from the AAT's decision-making process.

Lastly, the applicant contended that the AAT misapplied the case of Huo v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, arguing that unlike the applicant in Huo, he had not appeared before the Tribunal. The court, however, found that the AAT appropriately relied on Huo for its general approach to discretionary powers, and the distinction made by the applicant did not affect the applicability of the case law. The court concluded that the AAT's approach was neither arbitrary nor capricious.

Ultimately, the court dismissed the application, finding no jurisdictional error in the AAT’s decision.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

This was made clear to the applicant in the invitation to provide information letter which, relevantly, stated (CB 66):If we do not receive the information within the period allowed or as extended, we may make a decision on the review without taking any further action to obtain the information. You will also lose any entitlement you might otherwise have had under the Migration Act 1958 to appear before us to give evidence and present arguments. The Tribunal also reminded the applicant of this in its letter dated 20 June 2017 granting the applicant an extension of time within which to provide that information (CB 74-76). Specifically, the Tribunal noted that (CB 76):If we do not receive your comments or response by 4 July 2017, we may make a decision on the review without taking any further action to obtain your views on the information. You will also lose any entitlement you might otherwise have had under the Migration Act 1958 to appear before us to give evidence and present arguments. The applicant was, accordingly, on notice of what would occur if he did not provide a response to the Tribunal. He chose not to do so. No error arises from the Tribunal’s failure to invite the applicant to attend a hearing before it. The applicant, in the fourth particular, further claims that the Tribunal misapplied and misconstrued the case of Huo because the applicant in Huo (unlike the applicant in the current matter) had appeared before the Tribunal at a hearing. A similar issue was considered in Naeem & Ors v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2019] FCCA 2722 (“Naeem”) wherein Judge Riley of this Court found as follows:17.The Tribunal relied on two cases to conclude that it is not required to indefinitely defer its decision-making processes. The first was Huo v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCA 617. In that case, Conti J stated:31.I am therefore of the opinion that the application for review of Mr Huo made to this Court must fail. The Tribunal was entitled in the exercise of its discretion to withhold from awaiting the Tribunal’s decision on the JNZ application, assuming that the Act allows room for the application of conceivably relevant rules of natural justice additional to what the legislation already stipulates. As Senior Counsel for the Minister rightly contended, there was no error of law apparent or manifest in the conduct of the Tribunal below. It was under no obligation to postpone its decision-making, merely because Mr Huo wished to attempt, either at Departmental level or in the forum of another Tribunal hearing, to meet a statutory criterion found not as yet to have been fulfilled. As Senior Counsel further pointed out, Mr Huo had been in Australia since 1997, and had had more than ample time to satisfy the regulatory criteria.18.The Minister accepted that Huo was distinguishable from the present case. In Huo, the Tribunal found that a sponsorship nomination was not likely to be approved. The Tribunal in the present case did not express any view about the likelihood of the nomination approval application being successful. The Tribunal merely said that there was no evidence suggesting that the nomination will be approved. That observation was neutral, in the context of this case.19.The second case that the Tribunal relied upon was Manna v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2012] FMCA 28. In that case, Nicholls FM, as his Honour then was, said:60.In all therefore, there was no obligation on the Tribunal to advise the applicant as to when it would make its decision. In the context, it was reasonably open to the Tribunal to find that the applicant had been given a reasonable opportunity to meet the legislative requirement for “competent English”. The applicant was put on notice of the opportunity to sit an IELTS test at a time which would have allowed her to submit an IELTS report at a time prior to the time of decision. 61.There is no obligation on the Tribunal to delay making its decision in these circumstances, particularly given the history to which it had regard. In all the circumstances the Tribunal’s exercise of the discretion to proceed was not arbitrary or capricious. While it may be described as a “hard” decision, it cannot be said to be “unfair” given the applicant had ample opportunity and was on notice of the relevant issues.20.The Minister also accepted that Manna is distinguishable. In Manna, it was incumbent upon the applicant to sit an IELTS test and submit the results to the Tribunal. In the present case, the first applicant had done all he could to meet the relevant requirements by lodging his nomination approval application. The matter was then in the hands of the Minister.21.However, the Minister argued that, although Huo and Manna were factually distinguishable, it was open to the Tribunal to rely on them for a general approach. In support of that proposition, the Minister referred to Chen v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCCA 2351 where Judge Smith said:29.The fourth attack is that the authorities referred to by the Tribunal were factually distinguishable. Whether or not those cases are distinguishable is irrelevant. The Tribunal did not purport to follow them in any narrow sense of that word, but only examined the approach taken by the Tribunal to the issues that arose and then took into account the judicial approval of that approach. Thus, at [39], it referred to the fact that the Tribunal’s “approach was endorsed” in a decision of this Court. Further, and in any event, the circumstances in Ghori v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship [2011] FCA 759 were similar to those before the Tribunal to the extent that there had been previous applications for extensions of time. There was nothing illogical about the Tribunal’s approach. It is one taken by the Courts on a daily basis in the consideration of the exercise of discretionary powers.22. I accept the Minister’s proposition in a general sense…

Decision

Reasons for decision

The application is brought pursuant to s 476 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the “Act”). To obtain assistance from this Court, the applicant must show that the Tribunal has fallen into jurisdictional error.THE TRIBUNAL’S DECISION In assessing whether the Tribunal has fallen into jurisdictional error it is useful to first summarise the Tribunal’s decision in some detail: DBX18 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2021] FCA 897. The Tribunal’s decision is six pages long and spans 24 paragraphs. The final two pages of the decision contain extracts of relevant provisions contained in the Regulations. The Tribunal first detailed the type of visa under review (at [1]), noting that the applicant had applied for the visa on 29 August 2013 (at [2]). The Tribunal then outlined the relevant legislative requirements as follows:3.At the time the visa application was lodged, Class UC contained Subclass 457. The criteria for a Subclass 457 visa are set out in Part 457 of Schedule 2 to the Migration Regulations 1994 (the Regulations). One of the criteria to be satisfied at the time of decision is cl.457.223 which requires the visa applicant to satisfy one of the alternative ‘streams’ for the visa. One of these streams is contained in cl.457.223(4) which is set out in the attachment to this decision. In the present case, specific claims have been made against cl.457.223(4) which applies to sponsorship for employment in an occupation by a standard business sponsor. No claims have been made in respect of the other alternative streams in cl.457.223. The Tribunal noted that the delegate had refused to grant the applicant the visa on 23 January 2014 because the applicant had not provided evidence that he had the “skills, qualifications and employment background necessary to successfully perform the tasks of the nominated occupation” (at [4]). The Tribunal explained that on 28 February 2015, a differently constituted Tribunal affirmed the decision under review. The Tribunal noted that the applicant had sought review of that decision and, on 7 December 2016, the matter was remitted to the Tribunal by the FCCA (at [5]). The Tribunal continued:6.On 5 June 2017, the tribunal, differently constituted, wrote to the applicant pursuant to s.359(2) of the Act inviting him to provide information in writing as to whether the applicant is the subject of an approved nomination and meets the requirements of cl.457.223(4)(a) of Schedule 2 to the Migration Regulations.7.The invitation was sent to the applicant’s address provided in connection with the review and advised that, if the information was not provided in writing by 19 June 2017, and no extension of time has been sought or granted, the tribunal may make a decision on the review without taking further steps to obtain the information and the review applicant would lose any entitlement he might otherwise have had under the Act to appear before the tribunal to give evidence and present arguments.8.On 19 June 2017, the applicant’s representative requested an extension of time to provide information. On 20 June 2017, the tribunal granted an extension of time for further statutory period until 4 July 2017.9.On 4 July 2017, the applicant’s representative requested further extension of time to provide information requested in the tribunal letter of 5 June 2017. On the same day, the tribunal officer left the message for the applicant’s representative that, in accordance with the requirements of subsection 359B(4) of the Migration Act 1958, the tribunal may only grant an (one) extension of time and only for the further prescribed period. Accordingly the representative was informed that no further extension of time to provide information requested under s,359(2) of the Act can be granted by the tribunal.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The applicant’s concern in this regard (as well as any concerns highlighted in the “grounds of review” as articulated in his amended application for judicial review) will be discussed below.CONSIDERATIONGrounds of reviewGround 1 For ease of reference, ground 1 provides (without alteration):1. The Tribunal failed to Accord to the applicant procedural fairness. Particular:a)The Tribunal’s Purported decision not to exercise discretion under subsection 363(1)(b) of the Migration Act 1958. Was in breach of the applicant most fundamental right to procedural fairness both at common law and under section 360 of the Act being breaches constituting Jurisdictional error.b)In reaching the decision in the way it did, the Tribunal failed to review Mr. Kainth application for review as required under section 430 of the Act, such failure also amounting to Jurisdictional error.c)The Tribunal refusal to review the delegate decision was unreasonable applying the case of MIAC V Xijuan Li and Anor [2013] HCA 18.d)The Tribunal misapplied and misconstrued the case of Huo V Minister of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCA 617 referred at Paragraph 14 of the decision because unlike the present case the applicant (in Huo v Minister) did appear before the Tribunal to present evidence. The first particular of this ground references a failure by the Tribunal to exercise its discretion under s 363(1)(b) of the Act to adjourn the matter, resulting in a failure to afford procedural fairness, as well as a failure to invite the applicant to appear before the Tribunal as required by s 360 of the Act. Section 363(1)(b) relevantly provides as follows:363 Powers of the Tribunal etc.(1) For the purpose of the review of a decision, the Tribunal may:(a) take evidence on oath or affirmation;(b) adjourn the review from time to time; … As outlined in the Act, the Tribunal may choose to adjourn the review “from time to time” but is not required to do so. In this regard, the Court notes the reasoning in Li, wherein the High Court assessed the scope of the exercise of a statutory discretion by a decision-maker as follows (emphasis added):63.Because s 363(1)(b) contains a statutory discretionary power, the standard to be applied to the exercise of that power is not derived only from s 357A(3), but also from a presumption of the law. The legislature is taken to intend that a discretionary power, statutorily conferred, will be exercised reasonably.…76.As to the inferences that may be drawn by an appellate court, it was said in House v The King that an appellate court may infer that in some way there has been a failure properly to exercise the discretion "if upon the facts [the result] is unreasonable or plainly unjust". The same reasoning might apply to the review of the exercise of a statutory discretion, where unreasonableness is an inference drawn from the facts and from the matters falling for consideration in the exercise of the statutory power. Even where some reasons have been provided, as is the case here, it may nevertheless not be possible for a court to comprehend how the decision was arrived at. Unreasonableness is a conclusion which may be applied to a decision which lacks an evident and intelligible justification.