FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 2)
Kainth v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2022] FedCFamC2G 588
File number(s): MLG 1924 of 2017 Judgment of: JUDGE KENDALL Date of judgment: 27 July 2022 Catchwords: MIGRATION – Temporary Business Entry visa – decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal – whether the Tribunal failed to afford the applicant procedural fairness by failing to exercise its discretion to adjourn the matter or by failing to invite the applicant to attend a hearing – whether the Tribunal failed to conduct a review of the matter – whether the Tribunal acted unreasonably in refusing to review the delegate’s decision – whether the Tribunal misapplied or misconstrued the case of Huo v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCA 617 – whether the Tribunal misinterpreted or misapplied cl 457.223(4) in Schedule 2 of the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) – whether the Tribunal erred in failing to consider information – whether the Tribunal “acted in haste” – whether the Tribunal failed to comply with its obligations pursuant to s 353 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – whether the Tribunal failed to consider a relevant consideration or placed too much weight on irrelevant considerations – whether the Tribunal erred by failing to grant the applicant a “further seven day extension” – remittal futile in any event – no jurisdictional error – application dismissed. Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 140G, 359, 359B, 359C, 360, 363, 363A & 476
Migration Legislation Amendment (Temporary Skill Shortage Visa and Complementary Reforms) Regulations 2018 (Cth)
Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth), reg 4.18A(4), cl 457.223(4) in Schedule 2
Cases cited: Bala v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2019] FCA 600
Bodige v Minister for Immigration [2019] FCCA 1841
Bodige v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 2026
Craig v State of South Australia (1995) 184 CLR 163
Hasran v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2010] FCAFC 40
Huo v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCA 617
Kaur v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 915
Manna v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2012] FMCA 28
Minister for Immigration & Border Protection v Singh (2014) 231 FCR 437
Minister for Immigration & Citizenship v SZMDS (2010) 240 CLR 611
Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Singh [2014] FCAFC 1
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li [2013] HCA 18
Naeem & Ors v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2019] FCCA 2722
SAAP v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs & Anor (2005) 228 CLR 294
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- Case
- [2022] FedCFamC2G 588
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court addressed the applicant’s claim that the AAT failed to exercise its discretion to adjourn the matter, which is outlined in s 363(1)(b) of the Migration Act. The court noted that while the AAT has the discretion to adjourn, it is not obligated to do so. The court referred to the High Court decision in MIAC v Xijuan Li, which held that a statutory discretion must be exercised reasonably. Despite the applicant’s argument, the court found no unreasonableness in the AAT's decision not to adjourn the matter.
Additionally, the applicant argued that the AAT failed to invite him to appear before it, thereby breaching his right to procedural fairness under s 360 of the Act. The court found that the applicant was adequately notified that failure to provide information by the deadline would result in the AAT making a decision without further action to obtain his views. Since the applicant chose not to provide the required information, the court concluded that no error arose from the AAT's decision-making process.
Lastly, the applicant contended that the AAT misapplied the case of Huo v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, arguing that unlike the applicant in Huo, he had not appeared before the Tribunal. The court, however, found that the AAT appropriately relied on Huo for its general approach to discretionary powers, and the distinction made by the applicant did not affect the applicability of the case law. The court concluded that the AAT's approach was neither arbitrary nor capricious.
Ultimately, the court dismissed the application, finding no jurisdictional error in the AAT’s decision.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The applicant’s concern in this regard (as well as any concerns highlighted in the “grounds of review” as articulated in his amended application for judicial review) will be discussed below.CONSIDERATIONGrounds of reviewGround 1 For ease of reference, ground 1 provides (without alteration):1. The Tribunal failed to Accord to the applicant procedural fairness. Particular:a)The Tribunal’s Purported decision not to exercise discretion under subsection 363(1)(b) of the Migration Act 1958. Was in breach of the applicant most fundamental right to procedural fairness both at common law and under section 360 of the Act being breaches constituting Jurisdictional error.b)In reaching the decision in the way it did, the Tribunal failed to review Mr. Kainth application for review as required under section 430 of the Act, such failure also amounting to Jurisdictional error.c)The Tribunal refusal to review the delegate decision was unreasonable applying the case of MIAC V Xijuan Li and Anor [2013] HCA 18.d)The Tribunal misapplied and misconstrued the case of Huo V Minister of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCA 617 referred at Paragraph 14 of the decision because unlike the present case the applicant (in Huo v Minister) did appear before the Tribunal to present evidence. The first particular of this ground references a failure by the Tribunal to exercise its discretion under s 363(1)(b) of the Act to adjourn the matter, resulting in a failure to afford procedural fairness, as well as a failure to invite the applicant to appear before the Tribunal as required by s 360 of the Act. Section 363(1)(b) relevantly provides as follows:363 Powers of the Tribunal etc.(1) For the purpose of the review of a decision, the Tribunal may:(a) take evidence on oath or affirmation;(b) adjourn the review from time to time; … As outlined in the Act, the Tribunal may choose to adjourn the review “from time to time” but is not required to do so. In this regard, the Court notes the reasoning in Li, wherein the High Court assessed the scope of the exercise of a statutory discretion by a decision-maker as follows (emphasis added):63.Because s 363(1)(b) contains a statutory discretionary power, the standard to be applied to the exercise of that power is not derived only from s 357A(3), but also from a presumption of the law. The legislature is taken to intend that a discretionary power, statutorily conferred, will be exercised reasonably.…76.As to the inferences that may be drawn by an appellate court, it was said in House v The King that an appellate court may infer that in some way there has been a failure properly to exercise the discretion "if upon the facts [the result] is unreasonable or plainly unjust". The same reasoning might apply to the review of the exercise of a statutory discretion, where unreasonableness is an inference drawn from the facts and from the matters falling for consideration in the exercise of the statutory power. Even where some reasons have been provided, as is the case here, it may nevertheless not be possible for a court to comprehend how the decision was arrived at. Unreasonableness is a conclusion which may be applied to a decision which lacks an evident and intelligible justification.