Kainth v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Kainth v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FCA 1629  

Appeal from: Kainth v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2022] FedCFamC2G 588
File number(s): VID 473 of 2022
Judgment of: ANDERSON J
Date of judgment: 20 December 2023
Catchwords: MIGRATION – Temporary Business Entry (Class UC) visa –whether Administrative Appeals Tribunal failed to afford the appellant procedural fairness by refusing to exercise its discretion to adjourn the matter or by failing to invite the appellant to attend a hearing – no error established – appeal dismissed.
Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth)

Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth)

Cases cited:

Hasran v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2010) 183 FCR 413; [2010] FCAFC 40

Huo v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCA 617

Minister for Immigration v Jia (2001) 205 CLR 507; [2001] HCA 1

SZRUI v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2013] FCAFC 80

Division: General Division
Registry: Victoria
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Number of paragraphs: 51
Date of hearing: 7 December 2023
Counsel for the Appellant: The Appellant appeared in person
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Mr K Sypott of Australian Government Solicitor
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent did not appear

ORDERS

VID 473 of 2022
BETWEEN:

NAVJOT SINGH KAINTH

Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

ANDERSON J

DATE OF ORDER:

20 DECEMBER 2023

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be dismissed.

2.The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs of the appeal, to be fixed by way of an agreed lump sum or, in default of agreement, by way of a lump sum fixed by a Registrar.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

ANDERSON J

INTRODUCTION

  1. This is an appeal from the judgment and orders of the primary judge made on 27 July 2022.  The primary judge dismissed an application for judicial review of a decision made by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (Tribunal) on 16 August 2017.  The Tribunal affirmed the decision made by a delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (Delegate) not to grant the appellant a Temporary Business Entry (Class UC) visa (visa): Kainth v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2022] FedCFamC2G 588 (Judgment).

    BACKGROUND

  2. The appellant is a citizen of India.  On 29 August 2013, the appellant applied for the visa.  In his visa application, the appellant identified “Guru Tegh Bahadur Pty Ltd T/A Royal Productions” as his sponsoring employer (Sponsor).  He sought sponsorship as a Conference and Event Organiser.

  3. On 5 November 2013, the Delegate requested more information including evidence of the appellant’s qualifications, skills and work experience.  On 5 December 2013, the appellant’s representative requested an extension of time of time to provide additional information.  The Delegate granted the appellant an…

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Details
Case
[2023] FCA 1629
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Kainth v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs involved the appellant, who sought judicial review of a decision by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) affirming the Minister's decision to cancel his visa. The appellant raised four grounds for review, focusing on alleged procedural unfairness, jurisdictional error, failure to grant an extension of time, and improper consideration of evidence. The primary judge dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the AAT's decision.

The central legal issues in this case were whether the AAT failed to afford the appellant procedural fairness by not adjourning the matter or inviting him to a hearing, and if it misapplied relevant legislation or regulations. The court examined the AAT's reasons for its decisions and found that the AAT had provided sufficient justification for not adjourning the matter and had not misapplied the law. It was also determined that the appellant had ample opportunity to provide evidence of an approved nomination but failed to do so.

The court held that the AAT's refusal to adjourn the matter was justified and that the appellant had not demonstrated any error in the AAT's analysis. The AAT's decision to not invite the appellant to a hearing was also found to be appropriate, as the appellant was on notice of the consequences of not responding to the invitation to provide information. The primary judge's findings on these points were upheld, and no error was established in the AAT's handling of the case.

The appeal was ultimately dismissed, and the appellant was ordered to pay the Minister's costs of the appeal, to be determined by agreement or by a Registrar if necessary. This outcome affirmed the AAT's decision and the primary judge's dismissal of the appellant's grounds for review.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The appellant pay the first respondent’s costs of the appeal, to be fixed by way of an agreed lump sum or, in default of agreement, by way of a lump sum fixed by a Registrar.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

The Tribunal was not satisfied that the appellant was, at the time of its decision, the subject of an approved business nomination that had not ceased. The Tribunal was also not satisfied that there was an approved nomination of an occupation in relation to the appellant that had not ceased. Therefore, the Tribunal found that the appellant did not satisfy cl 457.223(4)(a) of the Regulations and affirmed the Delegate’s decision: TD [22]-[24].DECISION OF THE PRIMARY JUDGE On 5 September 2017, the appellant applied for judicial review of the Tribunal’s decision. The appellant was unrepresented in those proceedings. The appellant’s application identified four grounds of review:(1)the Tribunal failed to accord to the appellant procedural fairness;(2)the decision of the Tribunal was affected by jurisdictional error on the basis that the Tribunal misconstrued or misapplied cl 45.223(4) of the Regulations;(3)the Tribunal failed to comply with s 353(1) of the Act by refusing to grant the requested extension of time; and(4)the Tribunal erred by not considering certain relevant considerations and giving emphasis to irrelevant considerations. On 27 July 2022, the primary judge made orders dismissing the application, with costs. Ground 1 The primary judge had regard to the Tribunal’s reasons for not further adjourning the review (Judgment [50]-[53]) and found that “in the context of this matter, it cannot be said that the Tribunal’s reasons do not demonstrate an ‘intelligible justification’ for the Tribunal’s refusal to adjourn the review application”: Judgment [54]. The primary judge found that the Tribunal had arguably decided that “enough is enough” and that the appellant had been given a sufficient opportunity to “rectify the relevant issue and obtain an approved nomination”: Judgment [56]-[57]. The primary judge concluded that the Tribunal’s decision contained an evident and intelligible justification for its refusal to adjourn the matter: Judgment [58]. The primary judge found that there was no evidence before the Tribunal to suggest that the appellant was the subject of an approved nomination or that any nomination application was pending, and that while its reasons for decision were different to those given by the Delegate this did not amount to a failure to review: Judgment [60]-[61]. The primary judge found that, once the appellant failed to provide a substantive response to the s 359(2) invitation, s 359C(1) of the Act was enlivened, and the effect of ss 360(2)(c), 360(3) and 363A of the Act were that he lost his entitlement to attend a hearing: Judgment [62]-[67]. The primary judge further found that the appellant was on notice of this (Judgment [68]-[70]), and that no error arose from the Tribunal’s failure to invite the appellant to a hearing: Judgment [71]. Finally, the primary judge found that the Tribunal did not misconstrue or misapply Huo v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCA 617 (Huo). The primary judge held that Huo stood for the proposition that the Tribunal was under no obligation to indefinitely postpone the making of a decision solely on the basis that an applicant wished to attempt to meet a visa criterion not yet met: Judgment [72]-[76].

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The appellant was unrepresented at the hearing of the appeal. At the hearing, the appellant submitted that the “only error” of the primary judge was in failing to address the Tribunal’s refusal to grant the requested extension of time: Transcript page 3, lines 1-13. Notwithstanding this apparent concession, as the appellant is self-represented, I have considered each of the grounds of appeal raised in his notice of appeal. CONSIDERATIONGround 1 In the 5 June 2017 Letter, the Tribunal noted that the appellant’s nomination approval notice dated 4 December 2013, relating to the sponsorship application by The Trustee for Guru Teg Bahadur Unit Trust, ceased after 12 months. As was set out by the primary judge, nothing provided to the Tribunal by the appellant or his representatives following the receipt of this letter suggested that a new sponsorship or nomination application was being arranged: Judgment [89]-[94]. Relevantly to appeal ground 1, at no time after the 5 June 2017 Letter did the appellant intimate, let alone provide information or evidence, to the Tribunal that the appellant was still in touch with his sponsor, or that the sponsor was still willing to sponsor him. The correspondence sent to the Tribunal by the appellant’s representatives made no mention of the sponsor at all. The Tribunal cannot have fallen into error by failing to consider a matter which was not raised with it. Similarly, the material filed by the appellant in the Court below did not assert that the appellant was still in touch with his sponsor or that the sponsor was willing to sponsor him, and the primary judge accordingly cannot have fallen into error by failing to consider these matters. The appellant has not established any error in the analysis and reasons given by the primary judge and ground 1 must be dismissed.Ground 2 As was found by the primary judge, on the evidence before the Tribunal no valid nomination existed: Judgment [85]. The nomination which had been approved had expired, the appellant was put on notice of this, and at no time suggested to the Tribunal that he was in fact the subject of an approved nomination that had not ceased. The appellant also provided no evidence to the Court below to establish that he was the subject of an approved nomination that had not ceased. Accordingly, it was reasonably open to the Tribunal to conclude that the appellant did not have an approved nomination and that he did not satisfy cl 457.223(4), and no error is established in the primary judge’s findings on this point. The allegation that the appellant was not afforded a sufficient opportunity to provide evidence to the Tribunal must be rejected. As noted above, on 5 June 2017 the Tribunal wrote to the appellant pursuant to s 359(2) of the Act inviting him to provide information in writing as to whether he was the subject of an approved nomination and met the requirements of cl 457.223(4)(a) of Schedule 2 to the Regulations. By this letter, the Tribunal drew the appellant’s attention to the criterion prescribed by cl 457.223(4)(a).