FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Bodige v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 2026
Appeal from: Application for leave to appeal: Bodige v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection & Anor [2018] FCCA 1841 File number: VID 761 of 2018 Judge: MIDDLETON J Date of judgment: 7 December 2018 Date of publication of reasons: 14 December 2018 Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 359A
Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth)
Cases cited: BLJ16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 525
Gill v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection & Anor [2018] HCATrans 199 (3 October 2018)
House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499
Luck v Chief Executive Officer of Centrelink [2015] FCAFC 75
MZYEZ v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2010] FCA 530
NAKX v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCA 1559
Singh v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection (2007) 253 FCR 267; [2017] FCAFC 105
SZBYR v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2007) 81 ALJR 1190; [2007] HCA 26
SZUAR v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2016] FCA 742
Date of hearing: 7 December 2018 Registry: Victoria Division: General Division National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Category: No Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 37 Counsel for the Applicant: Applicant appeared in person Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr C McDermott Solicitor for the First Respondent: Clayton Utz ORDERS
VID 761 of 2018 BETWEEN: SHIVASHANKAR BODIGE
Applicant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
MIDDLETON J
DATE OF ORDER:
7 DECEMBER 2018
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The application for leave to appeal be dismissed with costs.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
MIDDLETON J:
INTRODUCTION
On 7 December 2018, I made an order that the application for leave to appeal be dismissed with costs. These are the reasons for those orders.
The Applicant seeks leave to appeal from the whole of the judgment of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia (the ‘Circuit Court’) given on 18 June 2018: Bodige v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection & Anor [2018] FCCA 1841.
The Circuit Court dismissed the Applicant’s application filed on 12 June 2018 in which he sought to set aside orders made by a registrar of the Circuit Court on 30 May 2018. On 30 May 2018, the registrar had dismissed the Applicant’s application for judicial review of a decision of the Second Respondent (the ‘Tribunal’), as the Applicant did not attend the directions hearing scheduled that day.
As the Circuit Court judgment was interlocutory, leave to appeal is required.
FACTUAL OVERVIEW
On 17 March 2014, the Applicant applied for a Student (Temporary) (Class TU) Vocational Education and Training Sector (Subclass 572) Visa (the ‘visa’).
Relevantly to this application before me, on 30 November 2016, a delegate of the First Respondent (the ‘Minister’) refused to…
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- Case
- [2018] FCA 2026
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the court were whether the Circuit Court had exercised its discretion to dismiss the application for reinstatement correctly and whether there was sufficient doubt in the Circuit Court's judgment to warrant reconsideration by the Federal Court. The court found that the Circuit Court had applied the correct legal principles in exercising its discretion and that there was no sufficient doubt in the Circuit Court's judgment to warrant reconsideration by the Federal Court. The court noted that the three factors identified in MZYEZ were relevant in assessing whether the Applicant's application for reinstatement should be permitted, and that the Circuit Court had properly considered these factors in dismissing the Applicant's application.
The court further found that the Applicant had not demonstrated any error of law or fact in the Circuit Court's judgment that would warrant reconsideration by the Federal Court. The Applicant's reliance on BLJ16 did not establish any error of any kind, as it was simply an example of the endorsement by the Federal Court of the applicability of the three factors identified in MZYEZ in potentially permitting a party to reinstate their substantive proceeding earlier dismissed in their absence.
In light of the above, the court dismissed the Applicant's application for leave to appeal with costs. The court noted that entry of orders was dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The application for leave to appeal be dismissed with costs.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
The Applicant's visa application was initially refused by the Minister, and the decision was reviewed by the AAT, which affirmed the decision. Mr Bodige then applied for judicial review of the AAT's decision in the Circuit Court. He did not attend a directions hearing on 30 May 2018, leading to the dismissal of his application. The Applicant subsequently applied to the Circuit Court to set aside the orders made by the registrar on 30 May 2018. In support of his application, the Applicant provided a medical certificate dated 28 May 2018, explaining his non-attendance at the hearing. On 18 June 2018, the Applicant appeared at a hearing before the Circuit Court, which dismissed the application with costs. The Applicant then applied for leave to appeal to the Federal Court.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The Applicant then generally submitted that he had an arguable case in this Court. Other grounds relied upon by the Applicant have no bearing to any of the factual circumstances of this case, and do not need to be addressed.CONSIDERATION This Court should not grant leave to appeal unless satisfied, in all the circumstances, that the Circuit Court judgment is attended with sufficient doubt to warrant reconsideration by this Court in its appellate jurisdiction, and whether substantial injustice would result if leave was refused supposing the judgment of the Circuit Court was wrong: see eg SZUAR v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2016] FCA 742 (‘SZUAR’) at [6]. These two questions should be considered cumulatively as the answers bear upon each other, and the degree of doubt sufficient in one case may be different to that required in another: see SZUAR at [7]. However, if there is no realistic prospect of success in any of the grounds of application before this Court, there can be no injustice at all, let alone substantial injustice, in refusing leave to appeal: see SZUAR at [37]. In this application before me, the Applicant must demonstrate an error of the kind identified in House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499 at 504-505 (Dixon, Evatt and McTiernan JJ) that is, it is necessary to show that the Circuit Court’s exercise of discretion was miscarried because the Circuit Court acted upon a wrong principle, was guided by extraneous or irrelevant matters, ignored relevant matters, or made a mistake of fact. Alternatively, a failure to exercise properly a discretion may be inferred where the discretionary judgment is unreasonably or plainly unjust, which can apply when there is no error apparent on the face of the reasons given. In my view, the Circuit Court correctly applied the legal principle governing the exercise of its discretion not to set aside the orders made in the Applicant’s absence on 30 May 2018. In this regard, and contrary to the Applicant’s complaints, it is apparent from the judgment of the Circuit Court (in particular at [2], [6]-[8] and [27]) that the Circuit Court identified, and then applied, relevant considerations as a guide for the lawful exercise of the Circuit Court’s discretion. For instance, in MZYEZ at [7], Ryan J identified that three factors need to be considered and, on balance, assessed as to whether they tended for or against reinstatement of the underlying substantive application. Those factors are:(1)whether there was a reasonable excuse for the party’s absence from the hearing in which the proceeding was struck out;(2)the existence and nature of any prejudice which might flow to the other party from the reinstatement, and the extent, if any, to which that prejudice can be assuaged by an adjournment, an order for costs or other relief which the Court is empowered to grant; and(3)whether the Applicant has a reasonably arguable prospect of success on the substantive application. The Applicant’s identification of BLJ16 does not establish any error of any kind. BLJ16 is an example of the endorsement by this Court of the applicability of the three factors identified as relevant in MZYEZ in potentially permitting a party to reinstate their substantive proceeding earlier dismissed in their absence.