John Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd v Gacic

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HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

GLEESON CJ
GUMMOW, KIRBY, HAYNE, CALLINAN, HEYDON AND CRENNAN JJ

JOHN FAIRFAX PUBLICATIONS PTY LTD
& ANOR   APPELLANTS

AND

ALEKSANDRA GACIC & ORS   RESPONDENTS

John Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd v Gacic
[2007] HCA 28
14 June 2007
S480/2006

ORDER

1.Set aside the orders of the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales made on 30 June 2006 and in their place make the following orders:

"1.      Appeal allowed with costs.

2.        Set aside the orders of Bell J made on 2 June 2005 and in their  place order that:

(a)verdicts be entered that the matter complained of by the appellants carries each of the imputations identified as imputations (a) and (c) and that imputations (a) and (c) are defamatory;

(b)a verdict be entered for the respondents in relation to imputation (b); and

(c)the issues of whether the matter complained of carries the imputation identified as imputation (d) and whether that imputation is defamatory be remitted for determination by a jury in accordance with s 7A of the Defamation Act 1974 (NSW).

3.The appellants to have a certificate under the Suitors Fund Act 1951 (NSW) if so entitled.

4.Order that the appellants pay 25 per cent of the respondents' costs of the trial before Bell J and a jury, the respondents pay 50 per cent of the costs of the appellants of that trial, and that the balance of the costs of that trial abide the outcome of the further trial pursuant to s 7A of the Defamation Act 1974 (NSW)."

2.Otherwise, appeal dismissed with costs.

On appeal from the Supreme Court of New South Wales

Representation

T D Blackburn SC with D R Sibtain for the appellants (instructed by Freehills)

G O'L Reynolds SC with C A Evatt and P Kulevski for the respondents (instructed by Beazley Singleton Lawyers)

Notice:  This copy of the Court's Reasons for Judgment is subject to formal revision prior to publication in the Commonwealth Law Reports.

  1. GLEESON CJ AND CRENNAN J. The issue in this appeal concerns the power given to the New South Wales Court of Appeal by s 108(3) of the Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW) ("the Supreme Court Act"), and the exercise of that power at a certain stage of an action being heard pursuant to the Defamation Act 1974 (NSW) ("the Defamation Act")[1].

    [1]The Defamation Act was repealed by the Defamation Act 2005 (NSW) but continues to apply because of the date when the causes of action accrued.

  2. The facts are set out in the reasons for judgment of Callinan and Heydon JJ.  The case concerns that form of defamation which involves injury to business reputation, that is, the publication of imputations that have a tendency to injure a person in his or her business, trade, or profession.  That the law of defamation affords such protection is not surprising.  Suppose someone says:  "X is a thoroughly decent person, but he is showing signs of age; his eyesight is poor, and his…

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Details
Case
[2007] HCA 28
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The High Court of Australia considered an appeal from the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales concerning a defamation action brought by Aleksandra Gacic, Ljiljana Gacic, and Branislav Ciric (the respondents) against John Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd and Mr Matthew Evans (the appellants). The respondents alleged that a publication by the appellants had caused damage to their business reputation and led to a loss of profits. The core of the dispute involved the interpretation and application of statutory provisions governing appeals from jury findings in defamation cases, specifically sections 7A of the *Defamation Act 1974* (NSW) and 108(3) of the *Supreme Court Act 1970* (NSW).

The legal issues before the High Court included whether section 108(3) of the *Supreme Court Act* conferred a power on the Court of Appeal to direct a verdict for a plaintiff on specific issues where the jury's findings were found to be unreasonable as a matter of law. The Court also had to determine the role of the jury in defamation proceedings, particularly when a jury found that imputations were conveyed but were not defamatory, and whether the Court of Appeal was obliged to order a new trial in such circumstances. The proper interpretation of the word "may" within section 108(3) and its implications for the Court of Appeal's duty to exercise its power when an entitlement to a verdict is established were also central to the determination.

A majority of the High Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the orders of the Court of Appeal. The majority held that the Court of Appeal had erred in its approach to the statutory powers of appeal. They concluded that section 108(3) of the *Supreme Court Act* did confer a power to direct verdicts where issues were established as a matter of law, and that this power should have been exercised in favour of the respondents on certain imputations. The Court ordered that verdicts be entered for the respondents on specific imputations, finding them to be defamatory, while a verdict was entered for the appellants on another imputation. The remaining issues were remitted for a new jury determination.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Set aside the orders of the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales made on 30 June 2006 and in their place make the following orders:

"1. Appeal allowed with costs.

2. Set aside the orders of Bell J made on 2 June 2005 and in their place order that:

(a) verdicts be entered that the matter complained of by the appellants carries each of the imputations identified as imputations (a) and (c) and that imputations (a) and (c) are defamatory;

(b) a verdict be entered for the respondents in relation to imputation (b); and

(c) the issues of whether the matter complained of carries the imputation identified as imputation (d) and whether that imputation is defamatory be remitted for determination by a jury in accordance with s 7A of the Defamation Act 1974 (NSW).

3. The appellants to have a certificate under the Suitors Fund Act 1951 (NSW) if so entitled.

4. Order that the appellants pay 25 per cent of the respondent' costs of the trial before Bell J and a jury, the respondents pay 50 per cent of the costs of the appellants of that trial, and that the balance of the costs of that trial abide the outcome of the further trial pursuant to s 7A of the Defamation Act 1974 (NSW)."

2. Otherwise, appeal dismissed with costs. (Majority decision. Callinan and Heydon JJ dismissing the appeal in its entirity with costs; Kirby J allowing the appeal)

Background

Background to the litigation

In effect, special leave was granted in these proceedings to permit this Court to consider the correctness of the foregoing line of authority[54]; whether it conforms to the applicable legislation; whether it is consistent with longstanding authority of this Court about appellate review of orders following jury verdicts; and whether, in the deployment of any power that is found, the disposition was insufficiently respectful of the parties' right to jury trial which was exceptionally reserved in defamation cases for determinations of this kind.[54]See reasons of Gleeson CJ and Crennan J at [1].The facts and legislation The facts: The facts are described in the reasons of Callinan and Heydon JJ[55]. Those reasons set out the entirety of the matter complained of by Aleksandra Gacic, Ljiljana Gacic and Branislav Ciric (the respondents). Their proceedings in the Supreme Court of New South Wales against John Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd and Mr Matthew Evans (the appellants), claimed damages for defamation and injurious falsehood. By their statement of claim, the respondents alleged the collapse of their restaurant business and a loss of profits in consequence of the subject publication. They pleaded the cause of action in defamation as follows:"[T]he plaintiffs have been greatly injured in their character, credit, reputation, trade and profession and have been brought into public hatred, ridicule and contempt."[55]Reasons of Callinan and Heydon JJ at [153]‑[155], [161]. The legislation: In their reasons, Callinan and Heydon JJ have set out relevant provisions of the Defamation Act[56] and also of the Supreme Court Act[57]. As Callinan and Heydon JJ observe, no separate provision is made in the Defamation Act for appeals to the Supreme Court in defamation matters. Accordingly, the general provisions of the Supreme Court Act, specifically s 108(3), must be adapted, so far as their language and the circumstances permit, to extend to the exercise of that power by the Court of Appeal in cases where a discontented party appeals against a jury determination made pursuant to s 7A(3) of the Defamation Act. [56]ss 7A, 9, 46. Reasons of Callinan and Heydon JJ at [156]‑[159].[57]s 108. Reasons of Callinan and Heydon JJ at [179]. Also set out are the provisions of the Supreme Court Procedure Act 1900 (NSW), s 7. See reasons of Callinan and Heydon JJ at [167] fn 167. In addition to the provisions of s 108 mentioned by Callinan and Heydon JJ, further provisions of the Supreme Court Act should be noted. First, ss 85 and 86 concern the applicable mode of trial within the Supreme Court. Relevantly, they provided:"85Trial without jury unless jury required in interests of justice(1)Proceedings in any Division are to be tried without a jury, unless the Court orders otherwise.…86 Common law claim – defamation(1)Proceedings on a common law claim in which there are issues of fact on a claim in respect of defamation are to be tried with a jury. (2)Despite subsection (1), the Court may order that all or any issue of fact be tried without a jury if:(a)any prolonged examination of documents or scientific or local investigation is required and cannot conveniently be made with a jury, or(b) all parties consent to the order."

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

GLEESON CJ CRENNAN J GUMMOW AND HAYNE JJ KIRBY J

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: GLEESON CJ, CRENNAN J, GUMMOW AND HAYNE JJ, KIRBY J

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