Jadwan Pty Ltd v Rae & Partners (A Firm) (No 7)

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Jadwan Pty Ltd v Rae & Partners (A Firm) (No 7) [2022] FCA 1174

File number(s): TAD 28 of 2018
Judgment of: O'CALLAGHAN J
Date of judgment: 4 October 2022
Catchwords: COSTS – where Full Court ordered that appellant pay respondents’ costs of the appeal to be assessed in a lump sum pursuant to r 40.02(b) of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) – where a Registrar of the Court ordered to determine lump sum amount – application for review of Registrar’s order
Legislation:

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 4

Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) ss 55A, 55B, 55C, 86(1)(ga)

Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) rr 40.02, 40.02(b), 40.18, 40.29, Sch 3 items 1, 1.2, 1.3, 3.1, 4.1, 5, 6, 7, 8, 11.1(i)

Cases cited:

Bechara v Bates (2021) 286 FCR 166

Hancock v Rinehart (Lump sum costs) [2015] NSWSC 1640

Harrison v Schipp (2002) 54 NSWLR 738

Innes v AAL Aviation Ltd (No 2) [2018] FCAFC 130

Jadwan Pty Ltd v Rae & Partners (A Firm) (2020) 278 FCR 1

Jadwan Pty Ltd v Rae & Partners (A Firm) (No 2) [2020] FCAFC 95

Oil Basins Ltd v Watson (2017) 252 FCR 420

University of Western Australia v Gray (No 25) (2009) 180 FCR 483

Division: General Division
Registry: Tasmania
National Practice Area: Other Federal Jurisdiction
Number of paragraphs: 41
Date of hearing: 21 September 2022
Counsel for the Appellant: Mr AMJ Meagher
Solicitor for the Appellant: Keypoint Law
Counsel for the First, Second and Third Respondents: Mr AB Walker
Solicitor for the First, Second and Third Respondents: Tremayne Fay and Rheinberger
Counsel for the Fourth and Fifth Respondents: The Fourth and Fifth Respondents did not appear

ORDERS

TAD 28 of 2018
BETWEEN:

JADWAN PTY LTD

Appellant

AND:

RAE & PARTNERS (A FIRM)

First Respondent

WILSON DOWD (A FIRM)

Second Respondent

TOOMEY MANING & CO (A FIRM) (and others named in the Schedule)

Third Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

O'CALLAGHAN J

DATE OF ORDER:

4 OCTOBER 2022

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.Costs be awarded to the first, second and third respondents in a lump sum in the amount of $119,102.63.

2.The appellant pay to the first, second and third respondents costs of $119,102.63.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

O’CALLAGHAN J:

Introduction

  1. By way of interlocutory application dated 2 September 2021, the appellant seeks to review an order made by a registrar of this court dated 12 August 2021 in which she ordered that it pay to the first, second and third respondents (the respondents) the sum of $104,541.57 in respect of their costs of the appeal, assessed on a lump sum basis.  The respondents had originally sought a total amount of $139,703.90, comprised of professional costs of $13,088.90 (inclusive of GST) and disbursements of $126,615 (inclusive of GST).

  2. At the hearing of this application, the respondents accepted (as they accepted before the learned registrar) that they were not…

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Details
Case
[2022] FCA 1174
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Jadwan Pty Ltd v Rae & Partners (A Firm) (No 7) involved a complex appeal concerning legal costs incurred in a previous legal dispute between a nursing home operator and its former lawyers. The respondents sought lump sum costs totaling $126,600, which included $11,899 for solicitors’ fees and $114,700 for barristers’ fees. The initial appeal was a highly intricate case involving professional negligence claims, with the appellant alleging that its former lawyers failed to provide adequate advice regarding the revocation of its approval as a Commonwealth funded nursing home. The appellant claimed that such negligence caused significant economic damage, with a primary claim for damages between $10 to $16 million. The proceedings were extensive, involving over 8000 pages of court documents, a four-week trial, and a lengthy judgment. The appeal itself was heard over four days, with 22 grounds argued. The Full Court ordered that the appellant pay the respondents’ costs of the appeal to be assessed as a lump sum, directing a Registrar to determine the exact amount.

The legal issues before the court involved the interpretation of the relevant federal legislation governing legal practitioners' entitlement to practise in federal courts and the rules of the Federal Court. Specifically, the court had to determine whether the costs claimed by the respondents were allowable under the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) and the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth). The central question was whether the fees claimed could be taxed as costs of the appeal if the practitioner’s name did not appear on the High Court Register of Practitioners. The respondents argued that the fees were allowable under the Federal Court Rules, while the appellant contended that the fees should not be taxed because the practitioner’s name was not on the High Court Register.

The court examined the relevant sections of the Judiciary Act, which require that practitioners entitled to practise in federal courts must have their names on the Register. It was noted that the Federal Court Rules did not explicitly require this, leading to a potential inconsistency. The court concluded that while the Federal Court Rules may permit representation by practitioners whose names are not on the Register, the requirement under the Judiciary Act for the Register should prevail. Therefore, the court held that the fees claimed by the respondents were not allowable as they were paid to a practitioner not on the High Court Register. The court's reasoning was based on the statutory requirement under the Judiciary Act, which takes precedence over the Federal Court Rules in this context.

The court ordered that the respondents’ costs be reduced to reflect only those fees paid to practitioners whose names appear on the High Court Register. The specific amount of the allowable costs was to be determined by the Registrar, and the appellant was directed to pay these costs within 28 days of the order. The court's decision underscored the importance of the statutory requirements for entitlement to practise in federal courts, ensuring that the taxation of legal costs aligns with legislative mandates.

Background

Background to the litigation

Accordingly, the amounts of solicitors’ and barristers’ fees sought as a lump sum were $11,899 and $114,700, respectively. The background Before turning to conduct the review of the decision of the registrar, it is necessary that I should say a little about the background of the proceeding. The (unsuccessful) appeal brought by the appellants in respect of which the lump sum costs are claimed by the respondents was, on any view of the matter, both factually and legally very complex. As the headnote to the authorised report correctly recorded (see Jadwan Pty Ltd v Rae & Partners (A Firm) (2020) 278 FCR 1 (Bromwich, O’Callaghan and Wheelahan JJ)), the case involved the following issues:The appellant was a nursing home operator which sought damages against its former lawyers for alleged professional negligence arising out of the revocation of its approval, under the National Health Act 1953 (Cth) as a Commonwealth funded nursing home, by a delegate of the Minister for Health and Family Services. In particular, the appellant claimed that: (i) reasonable advice from its lawyers required that its attention should have been directed to the operation of new legislation relevant to its operation; (ii) if the appellant had received such advice, it would have instructed the lawyers to seek relevant interlocutory relief; (iii) such application would have been successful, and (iv) it would consequently have become an approved provider under the new legislation. The appellant further claimed that its lawyers’ breaches of duty caused damage to its economic interests, namely a lost opportunity to continue to conduct its nursing home business at a new premises or alternatively to sell its approvals. The reasons for decision alone comprise over 170 pages of the authorised report. In written submissions filed on behalf of the respondents, the complexity of the proceeding was correctly described in these terms:The claim that was made and maintained throughout the trial of the action was for damages of between $10 to $16 million … The claim in respect of the value of the bed licences was one made very late in the day in the alternative to the primary claim for damages.… The original action was commenced in 2004. There were five respondents. The court book and other documents exceeded 8000 pages. The legislation concerning the operation of nursing homes at various times was required to be considered. The trial lasted for 4 weeks and oral closing submissions were heard over 2 days. The transcript ran to 1184 pages. The judgment ran to 742 paragraphs and over 200 pages. The appeal consisted of 22 grounds and was heard over [four] days. Orders were made permitting the appellant and respondents to file submissions up to 50 pages. The appeal was a rehearing requiring the parties [to] traverse numerous and complex facts … In separate reasons, the Full Court ordered as follows (see Jadwan Pty Ltd v Rae & Partners (A Firm) (No 2) [2020] FCAFC 95 (Bromwich, O’Callaghan and Wheelahan JJ)):1.The appellant pay the respondents’ costs of the appeal to be assessed in a lump sum pursuant to r 40.02(b) of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth).2.It is directed that a Registrar of the Court is to determine the amount of the respondents’ costs in such manner as the Registrar deems fit, and shall then make an order fixing the amount of those costs, which are to be payable within 28 days of such orders.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Whether the fees of a legal practitioner of the Supreme Court of Tasmania may be allowed in the taxation or assessment of an order for costs, even if their name does not appear on the High Court Register.
2. Whether there is an inconsistency between the Federal Court Rules and the Judiciary Act regarding the entitlement to practise in federal courts.
3. Whether r 4.01 of the Federal Court Rules should be interpreted as authorizing only representation by a practitioner whose name is on the Register or whether the rule may be partially invalid.

Held
1. The court held that the fees of a legal practitioner of the Supreme Court of Tasmania may be allowed in the taxation or assessment of an order for costs, even if their name does not appear on the High Court Register.
2. The court found no inconsistency between the Federal Court Rules and the Judiciary Act regarding the entitlement to practise in federal courts.
3. The court interpreted r 4.01 of the Federal Court Rules as authorizing only representation by a practitioner whose name is on the Register, finding that the rule may be partially invalid otherwise.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

It was contended in those written submissions that, accordingly, “the costs of a legal practitioner of the Supreme Court of Tasmania may be allowed in the taxation or assessment of an order for costs”, even if his or her name does not appear on the High Court Register.Consideration The High Court Register point The cases are clear about the consequence of ss 55A‑55C of the Judiciary Act. The fees which are the subject of a taxation certificate from a taxing officer must be payable to a practitioner whose name appears on the Register of Practitioners kept by the High Court of Australia pursuant to s 55C of the Judiciary Act. As Dowsett J explained in a judgment in which he was in dissent, but not on this point, in Oil Basins Ltd v Watson (2017) 252 FCR 420 at 432‑433 [61]‑[62]:Entitlement to practise in federal courts is regulated by Pt VIIIA of the Judiciary Act … Section 55A contemplates admission to practise pursuant to rules promulgated by the High Court. No such rules have been promulgated. Sections 55B and 55C effectively provide that a barrister or solicitor who is entitled to practise in the Supreme Court of a State or Territory is entitled to practise in federal courts, provided that his or her name is on the Register of Practitioners, referred to in s 55C(1). Any consideration of [the solicitor’s] entitlement to practise should have started with those sections. Western Australian law may have been relevant to [the solicitor’s] entitlement to have her name entered in the Register, and to the extent of her entitlement to practise. See APLA Ltd v Legal Services Commissioner of New South Wales (2005) 224 CLR 322 at [22].In its written submissions [the appellant] seems to assume that entitlement to practise in this Court is to be derived from r 4.01 of the [Federal Court Rules] … In s 4 of the Federal Court [Act] the term “lawyer” is defined to mean, “a person enrolled as a legal practitioner of a federal court or the Supreme Court of a State or Territory”. There is no requirement that the practitioner’s name be on the Register. However the Federal Court Act does not purport to regulate entitlement to practise. The definition seems to have been included for the purposes of Part VB, concerning case management, including the obligations of practitioners in that area. Hence use of the term, as defined, for the purposes of the Federal Court Act does not raise any inconsistency between that Act and the provisions of the Judiciary Act relating to entitlement to practise. However the definition has been included in the dictionary contained in the Rules and therefore applies to r 4.01, which rule appears to entitle a party to be represented by a lawyer as so defined. That provision seems to be inconsistent with the requirements of the Judiciary Act in that it does not require, as a condition of the entitlement to practise in federal courts, that the practitioner’s name be on the Register. I am inclined to the view that r 4.01 should be read as authorizing only representation by a practitioner whose name is on the Register. Alternatively, the rule may be at least partially invalid.