FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Hislop v Paltar Petroleum Limited (No 4) [2017] FCA 1632
File number: NSD 1383 of 2017 Judge: GLEESON J Date of judgment: 21 December 2017 Date of publication of reasons: 2 February 2018 Catchwords: COSTS – application for lump sum costs order – quantification of lump sum costs order Legislation: Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 37M
Federal Court Rules 2011 rr 40.01, 40.02, Sch 3 para 1.1
Cases cited: Bayley & Associates Pty Ltd v DBR Australia Pty Ltd [2014] FCA 346
Bitek Pty Ltd v iConnect Pty Ltd [2012] FCA 506; (2012) 290 ALR 288
Fewin Pty Ltd v Burke (No 3) [2017] FCA 693
Hamod v New South Wales [2011] NSWCA 375
Hancock v Rinehart (Lump sum costs) [2015] NSWSC 1640
Harrison v Schipp (2002) 54 NSWLR 738
Idoport Pty Ltd v National Australia Bank Ltd [2007] NSWSC 23
LFDB v SM (No 4) [2017] FCA 753
Re Aquaqueen International Pty Ltd [2015] NSWSC 500
Date of hearing: 21 December 2017 Registry: New South Wales Division: General Division National Practice Area: Commercial and Corporations Sub-area: Commercial Contracts, Banking, Finance and Insurance Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 53 Counsel for the Plaintiff: Ms E Holmes Solicitor for the Plaintiff: Johnson Winter & Slattery Counsel for the Defendants: Mr J Giles SC Solicitor for the Defendants: Herbert Smith Freehills ORDERS
NSD 1383 of 2017 BETWEEN: JOHN HISLOP
Plaintiff
AND: PALTAR PETROLEUM LIMITED (ACN 149 987 459)
First Defendant
ROBERT MADZEJ
Second Defendant
MICHAEL CAETANO (and others named in the Schedule)
Third Defendant
JUDGE:
GLEESON J
DATE OF ORDER:
21 DECEMBER 2017
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The plaintiff be awarded costs in a lump sum in respect of the costs orders made in the plaintiff’s favour on 8 September 2017, 12 September 2017 (noting that two costs orders were made in the plaintiff’s favour on that date) and 26 September 2017, together in the sum of $425,000.
2.The plaintiff pay the costs of the application for a lump sum costs order.
3.The defendants’ application for a stay of order 1 above is refused.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
GLEESON J:
The plaintiff (“Mr Hislop”) sought a lump sum costs order of $549,698.97 in respect of four costs orders made on 8 September 2017, 12 September 2017 (two orders) and 26 October 2017.
The defendants did not dispute that a lump sum order was appropriate but disputed that the amount sought was fair and reasonable. The defendants submitted that the costs should be fixed in an amount in the order of $405,000.
After considering the evidence, written submissions and oral submissions, I ordered the defendants to pay costs in an amount of $425,000 for the following reasons.
LEGAL FRAMEWORK
Section 37M of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) provides:
The overarching purpose of civil practice and procedure provisions
(1)The overarching purpose of the civil practice and procedure…
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read Hislop v Paltar Petroleum Limited (No 4) and more:
- Read every judgment in full
- Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
- See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
- Download judgments as PDF or Word
One click creates your free account or signs you in.
By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.
- Case
- [2017] FCA 1632
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue before the court was to assess the reasonableness of the costs claimed by Mr Hislop, particularly focusing on the fees charged by his solicitors, Johnson & Watson (JWS), and the disbursements made. The defendants argued that the costs claimed were excessive and unreasonable, relying on expert evidence from Ms Valerie Higinbotham, who critiqued the claimed costs based on several factors such as the proportion of senior lawyer involvement, the duplication of work due to multiple solicitors, and the high charge rates. Conversely, Mr Hislop argued that the costs were justified given the complexity and high stakes of the litigation.
The court found that while some elements of the defendants' criticisms were valid, particularly regarding the high proportion of senior lawyer involvement and the duplication of work, these did not justify a significant reduction in the claimed costs. The court considered the Federal Court Scale to be a more appropriate benchmark for determining reasonable costs in this context. It was noted that a substantial portion of the claimed costs related to preparing documents and reading, tasks for which a discount was appropriate. Additionally, the court accepted that some reduction was necessary to account for costs likely not recoverable on a taxation, particularly those related to client correspondence and preparation for the hearing. The court also considered the urgency, complexity, and high value of the subject matter of the litigation as factors supporting the claimed costs.
Ultimately, the court determined that the reasonable costs amounted to $425,000, which was a sum lower than the $630,326.03 claimed by Mr Hislop but higher than the $310,610.79 estimated by the defendants. The court ordered that Mr Hislop be awarded costs in this lump sum and rejected the defendants' application for a stay of this order.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The plaintiff be awarded costs in a lump sum in respect of the costs orders made in the plaintiff’s favour on 8 September 2017, 12 September 2017 (noting that two costs orders were made in the plaintiff’s favour on that date) and 26 September 2017, together in the sum of $425,000.
2. The plaintiff pay the costs of the application for a lump sum costs order.
3. The defendants’ application for a stay of order 1 above is refused.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Full text does not contain this section.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Ms Higinbotham made the following comments:(1)counsels’ fees should be subject to a reduction of $90,000 (in total) to reflect “the involvement of multiple senior solicitors and the excessive charge rates of counsel”;(2)the in-house copying charge is unreasonable and a reduction to this charge by 50% (i.e. $2,500) would not be unreasonable.CONSIDERATIONGenerally I did not give any significant weight to Mr Johnson’s comparison of Mr Hislop’s total costs with the defendants’ estimated costs because I considered that the calculations of Mr Hislop’s total costs were based upon rates significantly in excess of rates derived from the Federal Court Scale, which I regard as a more appropriate benchmark in the determination of lump sum costs on a party/party basis. I was satisfied that it was appropriate to determine the lump sum costs on the basis of the rates used by Mr Johnson to calculate the adjusted JWS fees, having regard to the identified seniority of the various JWS lawyers and the relative urgency, complexity and intensity of the proceeding and the potentially high value of the subject matter. I was not satisfied that I should give significant weight to the fact that Mr Hislop incurred fees to his US lawyers which are not included in the quantum claimed, in the absence of evidence to enable an assessment of any amount foregone. I did not give significant weight to the opinions expressed by Ms Higinbotham, in the absence of persuasive reasoning to support those opinions.Fees The Federal Court Scale makes separate provision for costs allowable for preparing documents and reading at rates different from the maximum rate in para 1.1, as well as providing for the allowance of an additional amount for care, skill and responsibility. Accordingly, it is not reasonable to assume that the full amount of JWS’s adjusted fees would have been allowed on a taxation. I accepted the submission made by senior counsel for the respondents, Mr Giles SC, that there should be a discount to account for the probability that a substantial amount of the costs incurred in corresponding and dealing with clients (15% of total costs, in contrast with 5% of total costs in attending court) would not have been allowed on a taxation of costs. That submission is consistent with Kenny J’s observation in Bitek at [21] to the effect that a relatively low discount was warranted where there were not significant costs incurred in obtaining instructions. I also accepted that there should be a discount to recognise the likelihood that, on a taxation, there would have been a discount having regard to time spent by lawyers on preparing for the hearing (particularly 45% of total costs claimed on preparing pleadings, applications, submissions; reviewing defendants’ pleadings, applications and affidavits; and preparing evidence) having regard to counsel’s charges, which must have included significant time on similar tasks. I note that JWS’s adjusted fees include approximately 324 hours (or 70% of the total hours billed) at the highest scale rate of $580 per hour. Based on my experience in practice as a solicitor, this is a very high proportion of work undertaken by the most skilled legal practitioners. However, my experience is also that significant efficiencies often result from the appropriate deployment of very skilled practitioners. It is not self-evident that JWS’s adjusted fees should be discounted solely on this basis.