Negligence—Public policy—Driver of motor car disqualified from driving—Passenger aware of disqualification—Joint commission of offence—Whether defence to action by passenger for damage sustained through driver's negligence. * Section 91 (1) of the Motor Vehicles Act 1959 (S.A.) provides: "A person shall not drive a motor vehicle on a road while his licence is suspended or while he is disqualified from holding and obtaining a licence. Penalty: Imprisonment for six months."

Decisions

1978, May 16.
The following written judgments were delivered:-
BARWICK C.J. Two young men, the appellant and the respondent, respectively aged eighteen and nineteen at the time of the occurrence giving rise to this appeal, had both been disqualified from driving a motor vehicle on a public road in South Australia, their licences in that respect having been suspended by a court. The respondent's licence had been suspended because of his conviction of a criminal offence and that of the appellant for a breach of the traffic laws. But the appellant owned a Morris Isis car. The young men, who lived in Adelaide, formed the intention of taking the car for a "jaunt" to Port Augusta over a weekend. It may be, though from so much of the evidence given at the trial of the action brought by the respondent against the appellant which has been reproduced for the purposes of this appeal it is not clear, that the plan to do so was conceived before the respondent's licence was suspended. But, whether this was so or not, they did agree that, though each knew of the suspension of the other's licence and that neither could lawfully use the appellant's car by driving it on a public road, they would do so for the weekend, sharing the driving, each doing so in turn. As the car was at the home of the appellant at Semaphore within the metropolitan area of the city of Adelaide, it was agreed between them that the respondent would tell the parents of the appellant, who were aware of the suspension of the respondent's licence as well as of that of the appellant, that he, the respondent, had had his licence restored. It was also agreed that the respondent would drive the car away from the appellant's parents' home and whilst it was in the metropolitan area where police might observe the appellant if he were driving it. (at p440)

2. In fact, the respondent did so inform the parents of the appellant and did drive the car as thus planned. Also as planned, the respondent and the appellant from time to time drove the car on the public roads, travelling from Adelaide to Port Augusta. I need not detail what they did there, though the extent to which they consumed liquor may have played its part in the ultimate result. Suffice it to say that whilst the car was travelling easterly on…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Jackson v Harrison

Details

AGLC: Jackson v Harrison [1978] HCA 17
Case: [1978] HCA 17
Decision Date: 16 May 1978

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The High Court of Australia considered a dispute between Jackson and Harrison concerning the interpretation and effect of a deed. The central issue revolved around whether Harrison was entitled to a share of the profits from a joint venture, despite the venture's ultimate failure.

The court was required to determine the proper construction of clause 6 of the deed, which stipulated that Harrison was to receive a share of the profits "if and when they are made". The primary legal question was whether this clause created a present entitlement to a share of profits, or whether it was contingent upon the actual realisation of profits.

The High Court held that the phrase "if and when they are made" indicated a condition precedent to Harrison's entitlement. The court reasoned that the language of the clause did not create a present right to a share of profits that might never be realised. Instead, it established a right that would only arise if and when profits were actually made. The court applied principles of contractual interpretation, focusing on the plain meaning of the words used in the deed to ascertain the parties' intentions.

Consequently, the High Court found in favour of Jackson, holding that Harrison was not entitled to a share of the profits as no profits had been made from the joint venture.

Orders