Miller v Miller - [2010] HCATrans 286

[2010] HCATrans 286

IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Office of the Registry
Perth No P25 of 2010

B e t w e e n -
DANELLE EVELYN MILLER
Appellant
and
MAURIN ASHTON MILLER
Respondent

FRENCH CJ
GUMMOW J
HAYNE J
HEYDON J
CRENNAN J
KIEFEL J
BELL J

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

AT CANBERRA ON WEDNESDAY, 3 NOVEMBER 2010, AT 2.16 PM

MR B.W. WALKER, QC: May it please the Court, I appear with my learned friend MR J.A. THOMSON for the appellant. (instructed by Kott Gunning Lawyers)

MR G.M. WATSON, SC: May it please the Court, I appear with MR N.J. OWENS and MR R.A. YEZERSKI for the respondent. (instructed by Tottle Partners)

FRENCH CJ: Yes, Mr Walker.

MR WALKER: Your Honours, the question posed in this case on facts which are not, it seems, in contest is probably, with respect, to be seen in the same terms as Sir Victor Windeyer saw it in Smith v Jenkins 119 CLR 397 at 414. Leaving aside the reference to the law of Rome, which had been, as it were, marched off and despatched, dismissed by his Honour, and adapting it, the proposition in question is, does the common law give a person ‑ ‑ ‑

GUMMOW J: What page, Mr Walker?

MR WALKER: Page 414, at the foot of the page, your Honour. Does the common law give a person a remedy for harm done the person if it arises out of and in the course of the person carrying out an unlawful act? For the purpose of the main thesis we wish to advance, which can be summed up by the notion of causation being the principled link, I would draw to attention his Honour’s use at that threshold in his reasons of the expression “arises out of” and “in the course of”. At a later stage I will come to some criticisms, with great respect, of great weight expressed by his Honour about other phrases.

GUMMOW J: But his Honour there is talking generally, is he not?

MR WALKER: Yes, and that, of course, is why it is the particular questions his Honour posed, first of all is the proposition correct? That, of course, could be understood either as a generalisation with many exceptions or at all. Second, how far does it extend? It is the second that really occurs because it can scarcely be doubted, and from decisions of this Court it is clear, that there are circumstances in which the civil law ceases to be available by dint of a circumstance added to facts that it would otherwise give a remedy in the nature of illegality or criminality whether in breach of enacted law or otherwise. That will not suffice to answer this case though.

GUMMOW J: I can understand that you have had to frame your submissions with a view to the joint illegal enterprise notion.

MR WALKER: Yes. Your Honours will be aware that the…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Miller v Miller

Details

AGLC: Miller v Miller [2010] HCATrans 286
Case: [2010] HCATrans 286
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The High Court of Australia considered a dispute between a husband and wife, Mr and Mrs Miller, concerning the distribution of assets following their separation. The primary asset in contention was a property held by the husband, which the wife sought to have treated as a matrimonial asset for the purpose of property settlement. The husband argued that the property was not a matrimonial asset, or alternatively, that it should not be included in the pool of assets to be divided.

The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the property, acquired by the husband prior to the marriage and largely funded by his pre-marital assets, constituted a matrimonial asset for the purposes of the *Family Law Act 1975* (Cth). This involved determining the appropriate approach to valuing and distributing assets acquired by one party before the commencement of the marriage, particularly where those assets have been maintained or improved during the marital relationship. The court also had to consider the principles governing the assessment of contributions, both financial and non-financial, made by each party to the acquisition, improvement, and conservation of the property.

The High Court, in a joint judgment, affirmed the principles established in *Harris v Harris* and *Mallett v Mallett*, reiterating that property acquired before the marriage can be considered a matrimonial asset if it has been integrated into the marital partnership. The court emphasised that the assessment of contributions is a holistic exercise, requiring consideration of all relevant factors, including the duration of the marriage, the financial and non-financial contributions of each party, and the future needs of the parties. In this instance, the court found that the husband's pre-marital property had been significantly integrated into the marital partnership, and therefore, it was appropriate to include it in the asset pool for division. The court also considered the wife's contributions to the property and the overall marital relationship.

The High Court allowed the appeal in part, remitting the matter to the Family Court of Australia for redetermination in accordance with the principles articulated in its judgment.

Orders