Insight SRC IP Holdings Pty Ltd v Australian Council for Educational Research Ltd (No 2)

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Insight SRC IP Holdings Pty Ltd v Australian Council for

Educational Research Ltd (No 2) [2013] FCAFC 73

Citation: Insight SRC IP Holdings Pty Ltd v Australian Council for Educational Research Ltd (No 2) [2013] FCAFC 73
Appeal from: Insight SRC IP Holdings Pty Ltd v The Australian Council for Educational Research Ltd [2012] FCA 779
Parties: INSIGHT SRC IP HOLDINGS PTY LTD (ACN 136 861 884) and INSIGHT SRC PTY LTD (ACN 080 662 380) v THE AUSTRALIAN COUNCIL FOR EDUCATIONAL RESEARCH LIMITED
File numbers: VID 815 of 2012
Judges: NORTH, RARES AND ROBERTSON JJ
Date of judgment: 12 July 2013
Legislation:  Federal Proceedings (Costs) Act 1981 (Cth) ss 6(2), (3)
Cases cited:

Bullock v The Federated Furnishing Trades Society of Australasia (No 2) (1985) 5 FCR 476 applied
Calderbank v Calderbank [1976] Fam 93 applied
CGU Insurance Ltd v Corrections Corporation of Australia Staff Superannuation Ltd (2008) 15 ANZ Insurance Cases 61-785; [2008] FCAFC 173 applied

Gurnett v The Macquarie Stevedoring Co Pty Ltd [No 2] (1956) 95 CLR 106 applied
Insight SRC IP Holdings Pty Ltd v Australian Council for Educational Research Ltd [2013] FCAFC 62 referred to

Sagacious Legal Pty Ltd v Wesfarmers General Insurance Ltd [2011] FCAFC 53 applied
Uniline Australia Ltd v S Briggs Pty Ltd (No 2) (2009) 82 IPR 56 applied

Date of hearing: On written submissions
Date of last submissions: 4 July 2013
Place: Melbourne
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: No catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 17
Counsel for the Appellants: Mr G McGowan SC with Mr J Slonim
Solicitor for the Appellants: Frenkel Partners Lawyers
Counsel for the Respondent: Mr C H Smith
Solicitor for the Respondent: Lander & Rogers

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

VID 815 of 2012

ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:

INSIGHT SRC IP HOLDINGS PTY LTD (ACN 136 861 884)
First Appellant/First Cross-Respondent

INSIGHT SRC PTY LTD (ACN 080 662 380)
Second Appellant/Second Cross-Respondent

AND:

THE AUSTRALIAN COUNCIL FOR EDUCATIONAL RESEARCH LIMITED
Respondent/Cross-Appellant

JUDGES:

NORTH, RARES AND ROBERTSON JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

12 JULY 2013

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY (VIA VIDEOLINK TO MELBOURNE)

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.Order 1 made on 27 September 2012 by the primary judge be set aside and in lieu thereof it be ordered that:

1.The respondent pay the applicants the sum of $162,500 (being $130,000 in general damages and $32,500 in additional damages).

2.The respondent pay the appellants’ costs:

(a)of the appeal:

(1)of considering and answering the respondent’s written submissions in the appeal on an indemnity basis;

(2)otherwise as between party and party;

(b)of the cross appeal until 19 April 2013 as between party and party and thereafter on an indemnity basis.

Note:Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

VID 815 of 2012

ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:

INSIGHT SRC IP HOLDINGS PTY LTD (ACN 136…

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Details
Case
[2013] FCAFC 73
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Insight SRC IP Holdings Pty Ltd v Australian Council for Educational Research Ltd (No 2), the dispute centred around a copyright infringement claim initiated by Insight SRC IP Holdings against the Australian Council for Educational Research. The primary judge had previously ruled in favour of Insight SRC IP Holdings, awarding nominal damages of $130,000. However, the Australian Council for Educational Research appealed this decision, arguing against the award of substantial damages. Insight SRC IP Holdings, in turn, pursued a cross-appeal seeking higher damages.

The court was tasked with determining whether the Australian Council for Educational Research was entitled to a certificate under s 6(2) and whether Insight SRC IP Holdings should be awarded substantial damages based on the previous findings of the primary judge. The court also had to consider whether the Australian Council for Educational Research acted unreasonably by not accepting a compromise offer that could have limited the scope of the appeal.

The court found that there was no presumption in favour of granting a certificate to the Australian Council for Educational Research, as it had chosen to contest the appeal despite the risk of incurring substantial costs. The court also determined that the offer of compromise made by Insight SRC IP Holdings was reasonable and that the Australian Council for Educational Research's decision to oppose the appeal was unreasonable given the likely substantial damages. Consequently, the court ruled that Insight SRC IP Holdings was entitled to damages equivalent to $162,500, including $130,000 in general damages and $32,500 in additional damages. The Australian Council for Educational Research was also ordered to pay the costs of the appeal and cross-appeal, including indemnity costs for considering and answering the submissions on the appeal.

In conclusion, the court set aside the previous order made by the primary judge and ordered the Australian Council for Educational Research to pay Insight SRC IP Holdings the sum of $162,500 and their costs, as specified.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Order 1 made on 27 September 2012 by the primary judge be set aside and in lieu thereof it be ordered that:

1. The respondent pay the applicants the sum of $162,500 (being $130,000 in general damages and $32,500 in additional damages).

2. The respondent pay the appellants’ costs:

(a) of the appeal:

(1) of considering and answering the respondent’s written submissions in the appeal on an indemnity basis;

(2) otherwise as between party and party;

(b) of the cross appeal until 19 April 2013 as between party and party and thereafter on an indemnity basis.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

There is no presumption in favour of the grant of a certificate under s 6(2): Bullock v The Federated Furnishing Trades Society of Australasia (No 2) (1985) 5 FCR 476 at 477 per Smithers, Sweeney and Woodward JJ. Here ACER took the course of resisting the appeal, in conjunction with pursuing its cross-appeal, where there was a more than obvious risk that the $130,000 damages assessment by the primary judge should be used as the yardstick for assessing Insight Holdings’ and Insight’s damages, given the common ground that his Honour had erred in finding that Dr Hart had no claim to assign: cf Bullock 5 FCR at 478-479; cf Gurnett v The Macquarie Stevedoring Co Pty Ltd [No 2] (1956) 95 CLR 106 at 112-114 per Dixon CJ. There is no good reason to visit on the public purse the consequences of ACER’s deliberate choice to contest the appeal. We are not persuaded that it is appropriate to grant ACER a certificate.Conclusion For these reasons we will order ACER to pay the costs of Insight Holdings and Insight:(a) of the appeal:(1)of considering and answering ACER’s submissions in the appeal on an indemnity basis;(2)otherwise, as between party and party;(b)of the cross-appeal until 19 April 2013 as between party and party and thereafter on an indemnity basis.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

ACER contended that it had not acted unreasonably in failing to take up the suggestion in the letter of 18 October 2012 of not opposing the appeal. It argued that Insight Holdings and Insight had not articulated any basis to suggest that ACER had acted unreasonably. It also submitted that no case had been put below that Dr Hart personally had suffered any loss and no evidence had been led on that subject.(b) Consideration In our opinion, ACER was always aware that the result of the appeal would be likely to be substantial, rather than nominal, damages. That was because of its acknowledgment that the primary judge erred in his finding that led to his assessment of nominal damages. His Honour found that Insight would have suffered a loss of $130,000, had it had a licence from Dr Hart at the time of ACER’s infringement of copyright. Thus, it was always likely that, despite the difficulties in calculating what the relevant damages would be if received in Dr Hart’s hands, the result of the appeal would be that Insight Holdings and Insight would be compensated in an amount equivalent to $130,000 in their hands. Indeed, ACER’s offer of compromise recognised that substantial damages were appropriate, albeit in a smaller sum of $30,000. Insight Holdings and Insight led no evidence of an offer based on the costs of their dealing with ACER’s written submissions on the appeal. However, the letter of 18 October 2012 was a genuine attempt to resolve the litigation. Had ACER accepted it, Insight Holdings and Insight would still have had to conduct the appeal on quantum, but unopposed and in circumstances where they did not seek to recover more than $130,000. Since the costs of opposing the appeal were likely to be substantial and the issue was quantification, the offer of 18 October 2012 was a reasonable compromise. ACER’s determination to oppose the quantification of damages cannot be divorced from its decision to cross-appeal. Each of those disincentives put up by ACER to Insight Holdings and Insight pursuing the appeal was unsuccessful. In his reasons in Uniline Australia Ltd v S Briggs Pty Ltd (No 2) (2009) 82 IPR 56 at 65-66 [38], which were approved by Besanko, Perram and Katzmann JJ in Sagacious Legal Pty Ltd v Wesfarmers General Insurance Ltd [2011] FCAFC 53 at [131]-[132], Greenwood J said:“In the modern world of commercial litigation and various subsets of that litigation such as intellectual property litigation, costs are a very real and quantifiable concern. It would be extremely odd to think otherwise. Costs are incurred in a recoverable inter-parties sense from the moment the proceedings issue and they continue to be incurred at every point along the continuum of the litigation. Litigants who are required to pay these costs in order to assert or resist a claim, regard them as a very real and present expense, if not a real and present danger. Very often these costs are a significant business expense. They invariably require a commitment of significant resources and separate budget allocations. An offer to compromise which is framed in terms of a party’s willingness to abandon the recovery of costs so incurred along that continuum through the preparation and analysis of statements, disclosure, analysis of documents and the preparation and review of expert reports, is undoubtedly considered by the litigant as an offer that involves giving up something meaningful, real and measurable. This is particularly so after the completion of case managed preparatory steps at various phases of the litigation which may have the effect of front-end loading significant costs in order to save trial costs. In many cases although not in all cases, the notion that a party is giving up nothing by inviting another party to discontinue a claim on the footing that the offeror will not make any claim for payment of its costs incurred to the date of the offer, is a fundamentally abstracted notion from the practical perspective of the engaged litigant confronting the management of the proceeding and the appropriation of expenditure to conduct it. An offer, on the other hand, that invites discontinuance of a claim on the payment of the offeror’s costs to date offers not very much at all other than the stemming of future costs which in a particular case may nevertheless be very real.” (emphasis in original)